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The two fundamental questions addressed in this thesis are 1) what are the 
characteristics that are associated with an Australian federal parliamentarian becoming a 
cabinet minister, and 2) how do these characteristics help a parliamentarian become a 
cabinet minister? I examine the standard representational and institutional explanations 
for cabinet appointment decisions such as geography, party/faction, gender and house 
(Senate vs House of Representatives) and find they do not account for more than 25% 
of cabinet appointments. I therefore turn to individual characteristics of cabinet 
ministers. I use education, linguistic/cognitive style, and biographical data to develop a 
classification model. Using data mining, I isolate three characteristics that explain a 
high proportion of the appointments to cabinet over the period under examination. 
These variables are: i) having a legal qualification: ii) entering parliament at an early 
age: and iii) using abstract language. These three variables explain approximately 78% 
of cabinet appointments over the period under investigation. I argue that these variables 
are associated with cabinet appointment because they tap into a particular set of 
cognitive and behavioural characteristics that are beneficial in demonstrating cabinet 
potential. An important insight from the analysis is that, in selecting parliamentarians to 
serve in cabinet, personal factors are more important than representational factors.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Section 1.1: Context and Overview 
Barry Jones did not become a cabinet minister whereas Gareth Evans did. Was 
this due to differences in ability, social skill or political judgment? Alternatively, was it 
because Evans represented the appropriate faction, state or house? The same questions 
could be asked as to why Peter McGauran, Martin Ferguson and David Kemp became 
cabinet ministers while their brothers and fellow parliamentarians Julian, Laurie and 
Rod, respectively, did not. Despite the extensive commentary on cabinet appointments 
by commentators, leaders and ministers themselves, the reasons for cabinet 
appointments have not been systematically studied in the Australian setting. It is the 
intention of this thesis to address the issue in an analytical way.  
Standard explanations of cabinet appointments are based on various criteria. One 
common explanation is the “representational” explanation. The idea here is that leaders 
attempt to make their cabinets representative of the various competing geographical, 
gender, factional and other groups vying for representation, and that this explains a 
large proportion of cabinet appointments. Weller, for example refers to ministerial 
selection in the Liberal National Party coalition as a “…jigsaw: balancing the powerful 
states, the Senate and the coalition” (Weller 2007, p199).  
Related to the representational variables are those that could be described as 
“institutional” variables. These are variables that, due to the nature of the institution of 
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parliament, have an influence on cabinet appointment decisions. For example, the 
institutional arrangements of the Liberal National Party Coalition (LNPC) are such that 
the National Party must be given cabinet appointments as close as possible to their 
representation in the parliamentary LNPC: if National Party members make up 20% of 
the parliamentary LNPC then the national party must be given 20% of cabinet positions. 
Another such representational factor is the relative representation of the two Houses: 
there is some expectation that a party’s parliamentary representation in terms of the 
relative number of Senators and House of Representatives members should be mirrored 
in cabinet. 
Age and experience are also referred to as being important factors in the 
allocation of cabinet positions. However, there is a difference between these and the 
representational and institutional factors (RIFs) in that a leader is often justified in 
selecting a cabinet that does not represent the age or experience profiles of parliament as 
a whole. In general, a cabinet is expected to be more experienced than the parliament as 
a whole. Similarly, a leader may decide to increase the number of older cabinet 
ministers (CMs) if she wants to create an image of seniority, experience and gravitas but 
has the option of selecting younger members if she needs to infuse cabinet with “new 
blood”. This same trade-off is a feature of appointments and dismissals in the UK 
parliament (Alderman and Cross 1985: 397-399). Thus, a leader is not expected to 
simply mirror the age and experience profiles of the parliament in her cabinet.  
As well as the above variables, the literature also refers to more ephemeral 
qualities such as “talent”. Interestingly, however, such qualities are often acknowledged 
but seldom analysed in any way. A good example of this is Weller who holds that junior 
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ministerial roles are essentially “soft positions for the loyal, but not massively talented, 
ministers who would never reach cabinet rank” (Weller 2007: 197). The implication 
here is that cabinet ministers have levels of “talent” that exceed those of junior 
ministers. However, no analysis of such ephemeral qualities is given.  
The purpose of this thesis is to address the issue of the characteristics of 
parliamentarians that lead to appointment to cabinet and to explain why these 
characteristics lead to cabinet appointment. Are there representational and institutional 
factors that are important and, if so, why are they important? Conversely, is there a set 
of more ephemeral qualities that are important and why do these lead to cabinet 
appointment? 
Thus, the basic questions I wish to address in this thesis can be stated quite 
simply: what are the characteristics of the Australian federal parliamentarians who 
become cabinet ministers and why are these characteristics associated with success at 
becoming a cabinet minister?  
To some extent this thesis seems to be associated with classic leadership studies 
on legislative pathways which examine the factors that lead to recruitment to the 
legislature (Ranney 1965; Matthews 1984; Norris 1997). The legislative recruitment or 
“pathways to power” literature examines the characteristics of individuals who enter the 
legislature. These studies tend to use methods such as surveys of legislators to come up 
with broad descriptions of the kinds of individuals who become legislators. Because the 
procedure is based on surveys of individuals there is no definitive study or control 
group. In this respect such studies tend to be descriptive. However this thesis is quite 
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different in that it uses a method akin to a case-control approach. In this thesis I am 
interested in the differences between those members of the legislature who rise to 
cabinet positions and those who do not. As such, the group that does not rise is a quasi-
control group.  The thesis involves determining the differences between those who 
become senior ministers and those who do not. As we shall see, individual differences 
in cognitive style are an important part of the analysis. 
As cognitive style is an essential component of the method I use it is important 
to preface the issue of how I get a measure of cognitive style for the parliamentarians 
under examination. Ideally I would administer a battery of tests and the results would be 
used as the independent variables in the analysis. However, this is impractical. Instead I 
use two other broad markers of cognitive style: education and linguistic behaviour. I 
also use a set of biographical variables which I interpret as being potential markers of 
differences in cognitive style. 
Education is an important marker of cognitive style. As I will show, there is 
research that demonstrates that not only are people with particular cognitive styles 
attracted to particular subject areas but particular subject areas can have an influence on 
an individual’s way of thinking. Thus, the specific educational subject studied by a 
parliamentarian is a good marker of their cognitive style. Six different subject areas 
were included in the initial modelling. I will demonstrate, however, that only 
backgrounds in Law and Arts are associated with accession to cabinet and that, of these 
two subject areas, only the former has discriminative power. The finding that there is an 
association between a legal background and accession to high political office is 
consistent with findings in the international literature. Kerby (2009) for example found 
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that legal education was associated with cabinet appointments in Canada. However, the 
current thesis is the first time the association has been found using Australian Federal 
data. 
The second set of markers of cognitive style I use is derived from speech.  The 
speech uttered by an individual is a highly individual marker of the way they reason and 
see the world. However, the parliamentary setting is not ideal for finding examples of 
the idiosyncratic aspects of the speech of individuals given the penchant for 
parliamentarians to rely on speeches prepared by others. Furthermore, a large number of 
individuals, such as backbenchers, speak little. One way around to get representative 
speech samples is to use the first or “maiden” speech delivered in parliament. This is 
usually delivered by neophyte parliamentarians who do not have the staff or resources 
to have their speech prepared. Thus the first speech is a very good source for highly 
individual linguistic behaviour. For each parliamentarian in the sample I break down the 
first speech into linguistic variables using the program Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (LIWC) which reduces text to 68 linguistic variables. These variables have been 
found to be associated with a vast array of psychological and cognitive phenomena 
(Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010). As well as the LIWC variables I use a number of 
psycholinguistic variables derived from the Paivio, Yuille and Madigan (1968) and 
Clarke and Paivio (2004) word norms. I will show that there is good evidence that 
parliamentarians who use relatively abstract language are more likely to become cabinet 
ministers. This is the first time this has been found in any parliamentary setting, 
Australian or international. 
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  Another set of variables I use is derived from the biographical 
background of individuals. I examine such variables as gender, and age at the time of 
entry to parliament. It is possible that these variables influence the way parliamentarians 
conceive of the world and therefore affect their cognitive style and, as a consequence, 
their chances of becoming a CM. The main finding here is that the age at the time of 
entry to parliament (Parlage) is the only significant biographical variable associated 
with becoming a CM. The earlier an individual enters parliament the more likely they 
are to become a CM. This observation has been made in other contexts. Buck (1963) 
and King (1981) made the same observation in relation to the UK parliament and 
Schlesinger (1966) in relation to accession to high political office in the US. Kerby 
(2009) found a negative quadratic effect of age on the probability of appointment to 
cabinet in the Canadian parliament with the maximum probability at age 42 after which 
the probability declines. In this thesis I find that there is a negative association between 
the age at which an individual enters parliament and the likelihood of becoming a CM. 
This is the first time such a finding has been made in the context of the Australian 
Federal system. Following Buck (1963), King (1981) and Schlesinger (1966) I explain 
this phenomenon in terms of ambition: those who enter parliament at a younger age 
have a higher base rate of ambition and this is manifested in a higher propensity to seize 
opportunities as they arise. 
Cognitive style and related phenomena such as psychological traits have been 
used as a basis for much research on the behaviour of leaders in office. It is important to 
distinguish between this tradition and the approach I intend to take in this thesis. The 
leader trait branch of the leadership literature takes as its sample those who have risen to 
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high levels of leadership such as prime ministers and presidents. Differences between 
leaders in terms of behaviour in office, charismatic appeal and policy choice are 
explained terms of differences in individual leadership “traits”. Herman’s (2005) 
Leadership Trait Analysis, Winter’s (1987) motive profile analysis and Tetlock’s (1983) 
integrative complexity fall into this category. While I have derived number of insights 
from these approaches it should be stressed that this literature is quite separate from the 
major questions being addressed in this thesis. One way to conceptualise the basic 
difference is to point out that I am trying to work out who gets to the top of the pyramid 
while Leadership Trait Analysis is concerned with the behaviour of individuals already 
at the top of the pyramid. In other words, my analysis concerns the differences between 
leaders and non-leaders while the leader trait analysis concerns differences between 
leaders. 
The context of this thesis is the Australian federal parliamentary system. No 
other study on the Australian federal system has dealt with the selection of ministers by 
specifically looking for characteristics that explain cabinet appointments. There have 
been studies on recruitment to the legislature such as Studlar and McAllister (1991) and 
McAllister (1997). There have also been descriptive studies of individual ministers 
(e.g.: Weller 1989; 1999; Aubin 1999; Scott 1999), cabinet government (Weller 2007), 
and ministers in general (Tiernan and Weller 2010). But there has been no systematic 
analysis of the differences between those who rise to senior ministerial positions and 
those that do not. Thus, the current thesis is an extension of the Australian literature. 
This thesis is unusual in the cabinet appointment literature in that it is analytical 
rather than descriptive. There is a plethora of descriptive and qualitative work on senior 
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ministers and leaders. In chapter 2 I will survey a small selection of this work. Despite 
the interest in the field, however, there has been little systematic analysis of the 
characteristics of those who get to cabinet using a case-control design. Two exceptions 
are those of O’Malley (2006) and Kam et al (2010) which deal with the Irish and UK 
parliaments respectively. It should be noted, however, that there is a significant 
literature on the tangentially related area of de-selection which I will also consider in 
Chapter 2.  
Because I Use a case-control design I can make claims about the appointment of 
Australian cabinet ministers that cannot otherwise be made. For example, one of the 
most interesting outcomes of the analysis is that the single most powerful predictor of 
an individual’s likelihood of becoming a CM is the possession of a legal education. That 
is, notwithstanding that the legislature in general has a substantial number of legally 
trained individuals, possessing a legal education significantly increases the odds of an 
individual becoming a CM. This observation cannot be made definitively by 
undertaking a descriptive study. What is required is a case-control study which includes 
a sample of legislators who became CMs, a sample of legislators who did not become 
CMs, and a method of systematically comparing them. It is this that the current thesis 
provides and, because of this, it is possible to derive positive statements that go beyond 
impressionistic descriptions.  
Another aspect of the thesis that is of interest is that it demonstrates that in the 
Australian Federal system, the commonly accepted explanation for CM appointments is 
only partially correct. As mentioned above, the conventional explanation for cabinet 
appointments includes the idea that individuals are selected for CM positions because 
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they satisfy certain representational and institutional demands. That is, they represent 
the interests or aspects of the institution of parliament such that they are regarded as 
being necessarily included in cabinet to balance the competing demands. This thesis 
finds that such representational and institutional factors explain only a very small 
proportion of the cabinet appointments. 
The idea that identifiable and measurable variables associated with cognitive 
style can be used to determine who has cabinet potential has implications for the wider 
leadership literature. There is a plethora of research on ephemeral qualities such as 
charismatic leadership, transformational leadership, transactional leadership and a 
variety of similar concepts. While there is some statistical support for these ideas in a 
broad sense they tend to use as a starting point the idea that “leadership” is an actual 
quality. By finding that there are highly predictive markers of cognitive style that 
differentiate between those who are likely to get to cabinet and those that are not, I am 
claiming that selection for high political office may be akin to personnel selection. I 
make the claim that the idea of “leadership” is at worst a reification of concrete qualities 
and at best a useful shorthand to refer to these. The idea that the identification of senior 
political figures may be reducible to a mechanistic procedure, while interesting, may be 
disconcerting to some.   
My statement of the basic research questions contains two questions in that I 
wish to first identify the characteristics that lead to cabinet appointment and secondly to 
explain why these characteristics lead to cabinet appointment. This second part of the 
exercise is essential if we wish to engage in a scientific as opposed to a merely technical 
exercise. The explanatory phase of the exercise is of interest because it shows that 
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phenomena identified in the broader psychology and political science literature can be 
seen to be at play in cabinet appointments in the Australian federal parliament. 
Consider, for example, the observation alluded to above that a text-derived measure of 
concreteness of language is associated with decreased odds of a legislator becoming a 
CM in the Australian federal parliament. The identification of this variable as an 
important predictor is part of the first research question in which the identification of the 
important predictive variables is the focus. However, the second part of the research 
question, the explanation as to why the identified variables are predictive of cabinet 
appointments, is a separate exercise. Having identified that concreteness of language is 
a predictive variable it is important to explain why this is so. To do this it is necessary to 
look at the wider research on the relationship between concrete language and 
persuasion, leadership effectiveness, popularity and even such ephemeral characteristics 
as the ability to make generalisations. In this way this thesis is able to incorporate the 
wider literature on political and leader selection and thus situates itself in the broader 
research that has preceded it. 
The final issue that needs to be addressed in this section is the modelling 
method. In the first part of the thesis I will use traditional hypothesis testing to examine 
a number of RIFs that are associated with cabinet appointment in the literature. I will 
demonstrate that this results in a model that is able to explain no more than 25% of 
cabinet appointments. I therefore turn to personal characteristics to explain cabinet 
appointments. In order to look for other explanatory variables based on personal 
characteristics I survey a vast number of linguistic variables derived from maiden 
speeches. This means that I need to use a method unlike hypothesis testing. Searching 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
11 
 
through vast amounts of data calls for using data-mining methods. A major advantage of 
using data mining is that a number of variables that may not have been considered in a 
standard hypothesis testing approach can be discovered. The data mining algorithm 
trawls through a large number of candidate independent variables in order to identify 
those that are most strongly associated with the dependent variable. This in itself makes 
the discovery process innovative. We might not, for example, have been likely to 
hypothesise that there would be an association between a high level of abstract language 
use in a first speech and the probability of becoming a CM by engaging in ex ante 
hypothesising about the nature of CMs. The data-mining approach enables us to come 
up with such unforseen associations and as such enables a more extensive understanding 
of what makes a CM. 
Data mining models are assessed by their ability to classify a “holdout sample”. 
The procedure is to build a model using one portion of the data and test the model on a 
portion of the data that has not been used to create the model. The latter portion is the 
holdout sample. The idea is that a model is more likely to have captured an important 
association if it can be shown that the independent variables are robustly associated with 
the dependent variable. A high holdout sample classification accuracy is a very good 
indication that the model is not merely finding associations that are statistically 
significant but which have weak overall predictive power. This test is important because 
searching through a large number of potential independent variables can result in 
finding variables that are related to the dependent variable by chance alone. Testing 
using a holdout sample reduces the probability of this. We will see that, using holdout 
samples, the models created are able to correctly classify neophyte parliamentarians as 
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future CMs or non-CMs with an accuracy of above 70%. This is a good indication that 
the variables associated with cabinet appointment have been identified. 
 
Summary of Section 1.1 
In this section I have attempted to give a broad overview of the issues I wish to 
address in this thesis. I have noted that there is a great deal discussion of those who rise 
to high levels in the Australian federal parliament. I have also noted that there is little 
analytical discussion of what the underlying characteristics of those who do so might be. 
I have stated that I wish to address the issue by determining the characteristics of those 
who become CMs in the Australian federal parliament and by explaining why these 
characteristics are associated with appointment to cabinet. I have pointed out that the 
standard explanation is that representational and institutional factors are the most 
prominent reason for cabinet appointments and have also pointed out that this is not my 
finding. Instead, I find that cognitive factors provide a better explanation. I have pointed 
out that the legislative recruitment literature tends to be descriptive in that, unlike my 
approach, it does not use a case-control design. I have outlined my approach to the issue 
of deriving independent variables for my study and have pointed out that the basic 
analysis will focus on educational variables, biographical variables and linguistic 
variables derived from the first speeches of parliamentarians. Given the prominence of 
cognitive style in my study I mentioned another stream of literature that uses cognitive 
elements – the leader trait school of thought. I differentiated this school from my 
approach because, although this literature uses a cognitive approach as I do, it focuses 
on leaders to the exclusion of non-leaders. As such it is only peripherally related to the 
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kinds of issues I wish to address. I have shown that, while the questions I am addressing 
are related to a number of issues that are prominent in the descriptive Australian 
leadership literature, this thesis departs from such studies in that it uses a case-control 
design. This enables me to make statements about the differences between those that get 
to the top and those that do not. I have pointed out that after identifying the predictive 
variables, the second part of the research question involves explaining why these 
variables are important and that this involves looking at the wider literature on cognitive 
style. Finally, I addressed the issue of the modelling method to be used in identifying 
the predictive variables. The data mining approach has the advantages that more 
explanatory variables can be considered than would be feasible in traditional hypothesis 
testing and that, because the classification accuracy is the criterion of judging a model, 
the variables must be strongly associated with the dependent variable. This means that 
the variables isolated are very likely to be the important factors at play in cabinet 
appointments. 
 
Section 1.2: Outline of the Thesis 
So far in this chapter I have presented an overview of the methods and overall 
approach I will be using in this thesis. I would now like to present a summary of the 
steps to be taken in the remaining chapters. 
In Chapter 2 I present an overview of the research that has been done on 
ministerial selection in order to see how others have approached the question as to the 
characteristics associated with selection for cabinet positions.  Much of the material I 
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review is based on research from the UK because of the parallels between the Australian 
and UK parliamentary systems. I also review some of the work done on ministerial 
selection in continental Europe and Ireland. Because there is little parallel between the 
Australian and US ministerial roles I do not cover the literature on cabinet selection in 
the US. However the Canadian literature is relevant due to the Canadian parliament’s 
Westminster origin and I therefore briefly cover some Canadian work. The overall 
impression from the review is that there are three major strands in the literature: the 
qualitative, the quantitative and the historical/biographical. I attempt to extract from 
these approaches a set of characteristics that may be helpful in solving the first research 
question. The extracted characteristics fall into two main categories: representational 
and institutional factors such as gender and geographical area of origin, and personal 
factors such as age, experience and “talent”. 
In Chapter 3 I concentrate on the representative and institutional factors (RIFs) 
that I have identified as being applicable in the Australian context. These are 
State/Territory represented, gender, party (in the LNPC), faction (in the ALP), House 
(HOR or Senate), age and experience. I use a cross sectional approach to test the 
hypothesis that these factors differ between those who become CMs and those who do 
not. I find a weak but statistically significant effect of age and experience. The analysis 
reveals that approximately 25%–26% of cabinet appointments can be explained using 
these variables leaving approximately 74%–75% unexplained. I conclude that RIFs are 
not important in determining who becomes a CM. I then briefly address the apparent 
paradox that prime ministers apparently put a great deal of effort into ensuring that 
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cabinets are representative and yet the RIFs do not explain the vast majority of cabinet 
appointments.  
Having failed to find convincing evidence that RIFs are able to explain more 
than a small proportion of the appointments to cabinet I devote Chapter 4 to the 
development of ideas as to how personal factors can be measured and used to determine 
whether there are significant differences between those who are appointed to cabinet 
and those that are not. The first method I examine for capturing individual cognitive 
style is education. I survey the literature on the relationship between 
personality/cognitive style and education and conclude that there is good evidence that 
education can be used as a marker of the way an individual perceives the world and 
interacts with it. As such, those with different types of education will be likely to 
perceive the world differently and interact with it differently, and it is these differences 
that may account for differences in their success in becoming CMs. I then go on to 
examine another way of capturing highly personal markers of psychological and 
cognitive style: speech. In particular I use the first speech in federal parliament. This is 
because the first speech is delivered in similar circumstances by all parliamentarians. I 
briefly review a number of methods of using text to derive characteristics of individuals. 
I then give an overview of the two methods I use to analyse the speech samples in this 
thesis. The first is set of linguistic measures is derived from LIWC (Pennebaker and 
King 1999); the second is a set of linguistic variables based on 32 psycholinguistic 
measures derived from Paivio et al (1968) and Clarke and Paivio (2004). These two 
methods are used to convert the texts of parliamentarians into numeric variables. 
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Finally, I discuss the issue of biographical variables. I include in the analysis 
only 2 specific biographical variables and one further variable representing the 
circumstances in which the first speech was delivered. I explain that these biographical 
variables may provide some way of tapping into the psychological profiles of 
parliamentarians and are therefore possible variables that could explain why some 
individuals become CMs while others do not.  
In Chapter 5 I continue with methodological issues, this time focusing on the 
modelling method to be used. The first problem to deal with is how to select the 
variables to be used in the analysis. LIWC produces 68 variables from each text and 
psycholinguistic variables provide 32. As well as these I use six educational variables 
and three biographical variables. Thus, there are 109 variables. This situation clearly 
calls for a method to analyse the data that goes beyond traditional statistical methods. 
Therefore, in order to select the variables to produce a model that is able to classify 
parliamentarians into CMs and non-CMs, I use data-mining. In Chapter 5 I discuss the 
aims and methods of data mining and, from this discussion, determine how best to solve 
the problem at hand. In particular, I emphasise that the method of assessing the models 
produced will be based on classification accuracy using separate training and hold-out 
groups. This method increases the probability that the relationships found in the data are 
robust. Furthermore I use the concept of a “committee” classifier. This is a method used 
in data mining that maximises the classification accuracy of a set of models by allowing 
each model to “vote” on the outcome.  
 Having discussed the variables in Chapter 4 and the modelling method in 
Chapter 5 I turn to the actual modelling process in Chapter 6. An important part of the 
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modelling process is the sample design and I detail the cohort used as a basis for the 
study and then explain how the final sample was derived. The next stage in the process 
is to describe in detail how the variables were derived. In chapter 4 I present an 
overview of this and it is in Chapter 6 that I provide the details of how the independent 
variables are derived. I then explain the use of the “committee” method of classification 
(Dietterich 2000). This method involves the creation of five different testing and 
training divisions of the data and the creation of five models, all of which are judged to 
have classification accuracies beyond chance. The final “classifier” consists of the 
averaged results of all five models in the “committee”. Having given an overview of the 
committee method I describe how each individual model in the committee is created. 
The first stage is the division of the data into training and test sets. This is an important 
part of the process because it ensures that the analysis is done only on the training set 
and the test set is “held out” and used only for the testing of the model. I then describe 
how the independent variables are screened using t-tests so that only those likely to 
provide a good “signal” in the data are retained. I find that 7 variables are significant at 
the p<.01 level.  These are then used to create a “naïve” model which has a test set 
classification accuracy at borderline (p<.1) level. This is the baseline model and 
attempts are made to improve its accuracy by eliminating redundant variables. 
Redundant variables are defined as variables in the training set that are more correlated 
with each other than the dependent variable. Removing redundant variables results in a 
model with 2 variables. The holdout sample classification accuracy of this model is 
74%. Having completed Model 1 of the committee I then go on and repeat the model 
building process four more times with independently generated random holdout 
samples. Three of the committee models have three variables while two have two 
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variables. Using committee classification averaging (Dietterich 2000) I then combine 
the five models to create a committee classifier which, on the basis of the out-of-sample 
classifications, has an accuracy of approximately 78%. Across the “committee” of five 
models it becomes apparent that there are three basic variables that are associated with 
being appointed to cabinet: possessing a legal qualification, entering parliament at a 
relatively early age and using abstract language.  
By isolating three characteristics that are associated with accession to cabinet I 
have essentially answered the first research question. The next three chapters are 
devoted to explaining why the three variables I have identified as being associated with 
becoming a CM should be so associated. In Chapter 7 I discuss the effect of having a 
legal qualification. I discuss a number of reasons as to why having a legal qualification 
should be associated with becoming a CM. I begin by discussing the popular press’ 
impression of the over-representation of lawyers in parliament. I follow this with a 
consideration of the possibility that similarity bias is the explanation. That is, I examine 
the possibility that legally trained individuals (LTIs) are selected for cabinet because it 
is the legally trained who are doing the selection. I find there is no statistical support for 
this idea. I then look at the international discussion on the relationship between legal 
education and high political office. This association has been noted in the US setting 
such that those with legal backgrounds have significantly higher levels of representation 
on influential Congressional committees than the non-legally trained. I examine the 
given reasons for this and conclude that technical expertise in the process of legislation 
as well as early ambition are the possible reasons for this. The remainder of the chapter 
is devoted to examining the specific skills that legal training bestows upon individuals. 
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Using empirical research on the association between legal training and cognitive style I 
identify a number of cognitive ways of thinking that are emphasised in legal training. I 
provide an analysis of how these could be of value to an aspiring CM. 
In Chapter 8 I discuss the negative effect of Parlage, the age of arrival in 
parliament, on the probability of becoming a CM. I find that there is support in the 
literature for the idea that the age at entry to parliament is a proxy for ambition. I also 
examine a number of alternative possibilities for the association between age of entry to 
parliament and the likelihood of subsequent accession to cabinet and conclude that 
ambition is the most appropriate explanation. I find support for my conclusion from the 
data as well as two biographical accounts.  
In Chapter 9 I turn to the question of why using concrete language should be 
negatively associated with CM. I first define concreteness as a measure of the extent to 
which a word can be represented by an image presented to one or more of the senses. I 
then demonstrate that the variables I use to measure concreteness tap into this same 
concept or something very similar. I go on to point out a number of psychological 
correlates of concreteness and abstraction. A tendency to use concrete language is likely 
to have a number of behavioural and cognitive correlates. I bring these ideas under the 
rubric of the psychological level of construal (Trope and Liberman 2010). The idea here 
is that some individuals have a more global way of looking at the world while others 
have a more local and detailed orientation. The former tend to use abstract language 
while the latter concentrate on the concrete. My contention is that the linguistic 
measures of concreteness are highly correlated with the psychological level of construal. 
That is, those whose language is relatively abstract have a higher psychological level of 
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construal while those parliamentarians with relatively concrete language have a 
relatively low level of construal. The characteristics associated with a high level of 
construal, such as long term planning, an ability to see the bigger picture and the ability 
to generalise, are more likely to be associated with the qualities associated with 
leadership. I can therefore explain the negative association between concrete language 
and CM by saying that those with more concrete speech are likely to have a lower level 
of construal. They are therefore less likely to conceive of the world in a way that a those 
charged with executive responsibilities need to be able to do. I test the idea that 
concreteness as measured in the speech sample is a measure of the level of construal by 
examining a dyad consisting of the highest scorer on concreteness in the sample with 
the lowest scorer in order to determine if there is evidence they have differing 
psychological levels of construal. I find there is support for this. I conclude that 
concreteness is negatively linked to becoming a CM because those with high levels of 
concreteness in their speeches have a lower level of psychological construal and 
therefore have fewer of the cognitive habits of mind associated with leadership. 
In Chapter 10 I review the findings of the thesis and offer a number of further 
observations. The most prominent is that there is little need for anything akin to a 
discussion of a separate category of “leadership” in relation to CMs. In fact, CM 
selection can simply be seen as a species of personnel selection. This is not to suggest 
that there is no significant difference between those who become CMs and those who do 
not. On the contrary CMs have a very different set of characteristics compared with 
non-CMs. However, to posit a characteristic over and above the base level 
characteristics that lead to their success is a reification akin to what traditional baseball 
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scouts engage in when looking for “talent” as opposed to specific measurable 
characteristics (Lewis 2004: 9).  In this chapter I also suggest a number of shortcomings 
of the approach used in this thesis and make some suggestions as to how these 
shortcomings could be addressed. Finally I refer to two practical applications of the 
findings of the thesis. 
 
Summary of Chapter 1: 
In this chapter I have presented an overview of the thesis. Importantly, this 
includes a statement of the basic research questions. I have also situated the thesis 
within the literature and have explained why the thesis is an extension of the existing 
literature. I have also presented an outline of the thesis including a broad description of 
the steps I intend to take. 
In the next chapter I will embark on a literature review in order to determine the 
kinds of approaches that have been made to the question of cabinet appointments in 
systems similar to those of Australia as well as in the Australian system. 
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Chapter 2: An Overview of the Research 
 
Section 2.1: Introduction 
In Chapter 1 I outlined two basic research questions. These were as follow: 
1) What are the characteristics of the Australian federal parliamentarians who 
become cabinet ministers? 
2) Why are these characteristics associated with success at becoming a cabinet 
minister? 
In this Chapter, I will begin the search for the answer to research question 1 by 
reviewing the literature on ministerial appointment. The purpose of this chapter is to 
attempt to glean from the literature a set of characteristics which have been found by 
others to be associated with appointments to ministerial positions. It should be stressed 
that some of this literature deals with promotion to various levels of the ministry. That 
is, it does not deal exclusively with appointments to cabinet. While some of this 
literature on appointments to junior executive positions is not directly relevant to the 
appointment of CMs, insights can be gained from it because some of the factors that are 
associated with promotions to junior positions are also associated with promotions to 
more senior positions. Furthermore, much of the literature on ministerial appointments 
does not distinguish between junior and senior appointments and to exclude these 
studies because they were not specific enough would significantly reduce the available 
sources. 
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Another point that should be noted is that most of the literature cited is from 
non-Australian sources. The reason for this is that much of the research on ministerial 
selection has come from research on the European parliaments. While this research may 
be only tangentially applicable to the Australian context, insights gained from the 
research on the UK parliament will be more directly applicable due to the close parallels 
between the Australian and UK systems. 
The literature falls into three broad categories: quantitative research; qualitative 
research; and biographical/historical accounts. Each one of these can provide some 
insights into the question. However, it should be pointed out that the specific questions I 
wish to answer have only been systematically studied in a very small proportion of the 
literature. There are many studies that are peripheral to the issue but there are very few 
that specifically attempt to determine what characteristics lead to a new entrant to 
parliament becoming a cabinet minister at some time in the future. This is partly 
because there is a tradition in leadership studies of focusing on those who rise to the top. 
While studies of such individuals are grist to the mill of any serious researcher of 
leadership, concentrating on these alone leads to a problem of selection on the 
dependent variable (Geddes 1990). As Kerby says: 
We cannot begin to address the causes of ministerial 
appointment unless we extend our analysis beyond those MPs 
who are appointed to cabinet by including those MPs who have 
the possibility of being appointed but were not. Failure to do so 
invites selection bias on the dependent variable (Kerby 2009: 
595, italics in original). 
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Thus, in much of what follows I will try to distil from the literature factors that 
distinguish those who rise to senior positions from those who do not.  
 
Section 2.2: The Quantitative Literature 
In this section I review a selection of the kinds of studies that have been done on 
issues relating to the selection and de-selection of ministers. It is not suggested that 
these are representative of the entire field. However, they do give a good idea of the 
approaches that have been taken and the variables that have been used. The variables 
identified in these studies give a good overview of the kinds of variables that are likely 
to be useful in developing a cabinet selection model. It should be noted however, that 
most of these studies do not directly compare those who have been selected for senior 
positions with those that have not. 
The first issue to deal with is the distinction between selection studies and de-
selection studies. This thesis is concerned with the selection of CMs. However, there is 
a stream of the literature which deals with de-selection. That is, it looks at the factors 
that lead to the characteristics of CMs that lead to their removal from cabinet. Although 
these are not directly relevant to the issue of selection it is worthwhile noting some of 
the findings.  
A good recent example of the de-selection literature is Berlinski, Dewan and 
Dowding (2007) which examines the influences on a minister’s “risk” of losing their 
position in cabinet. In this study a Cox proportional hazards framework is used to model 
the time to the resignation of a minister. The finding is that Oxbridge education and 
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female gender have a significant effect on reducing hazard. Also significant are 
ministerial rank, which reduces hazard, and ministerial experience, which increases 
hazard. 
An extension of the above study is Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2010) which  
examines the effect of ministerial performance as well as that of the government as a 
whole on the likelihood that a minister will resign. The measure of ministerial 
performance is the number of calls for the resignation of the minister reported in The 
Times while the measure of performance for the government is the number of call for 
the resignation of the other ministers reported in The Times (Berlinski et al 2010: 562). 
Observable traits of ministers controlled for are gender, educational background, rank 
and nobility. There are also controls for whether the individual had experience in a 
previous government and whether she received a resignation call in that government. 
Various controls are included for the government in which the minister served such as 
size of the majority as well as a dummy for different leaders which enables different 
baseline hazard rates to be compared as between different leaders. 
The study shows that, where a minister faces a first resignation call, her hazard 
rate rises relative to that of a colleague who has not had any call for her resignation. For 
a second and subsequent resignation call the hazard rate rises again. For a minister who 
has no calls for his/her resignation, a unit increase in the cumulative calls for 
resignations of other ministers decreases her hazard rate. Thus, there is evidence for 
both relative assessment and collective responsibility. 
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In a further specification of the model, two interaction terms are included which 
consist of i) a dummy for first resignation call x the cumulative government calls and ii) 
a dummy for second resignation call x the cumulative government calls. The idea here 
is to test for the possibility that the hazard rate of an individual minister is affected by 
the interplay between the performance of the minister and the performance of the 
government. Only the first interaction term is statistically significant. Specifically, it 
shows that, upon receiving a first resignation call, a minister’s hazard rate increases by 
6% for every call for a resignation that has been made for a colleague. This clearly 
shows the link between collective and individual responsibility. In other words, an 
individual minister will suffer the consequences of the failings of her colleagues 
(Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding  2010: 568). 
While this study gives a good indication of the reasons why a minister might be 
de-selected, it does not give us an insight into reasons why a parliamentarian who is not 
a minister might be selected to be a minister. Having said this, it is clear that 
performance is likely to be an important issue but the reasons why parliamentarians are 
selected to be ministers are likely to be quite different from the reasons why ministers 
are de-selected, largely because parliamentarians who have not been ministers have no 
public performance upon which the public might judge their suitability for office.   
Before leaving the issue of de-selection it is worthwhile noting that there is a 
stream of the literature that deals with cabinet durability (Alt 1975; King, Alt, Burns and 
Laver 1990; Grofman and van Roosendaal 1997). This stream of the literature deals 
with the extent to which cabinets as a whole are likely to change. The standard variables 
used to explain cabinet durability are based on the political and institutional factors that 
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influence cabinet formation. These include party strength, ideological composition of 
parties that form the government coalition, fractionalisation and constraints on the 
leader to call early elections and a number of similar variables. There is evidence that 
these standard factors that are associated with cabinet duration are unrelated to 
ministerial de-selection (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008).  
I now move on to the section of the literature that is more likely to cast light on 
ministerial selection than the de-selection and cabinet durability literature — the 
analytical quantitative literature that has directly addressed the minister selection issue.  
One of the earliest studies of ministerial selection is Buck (1963) which 
compares MPs who did not rise to CM positions with those who did. The major finding 
is that the MPs who entered parliament at an earlier age and those who received an early 
promotion to junior roles such as parliamentary private secretary are more likely to 
become senior ministers.  The conclusion drawn by Buck is that it is those who have 
deliberately chosen a career in politics that become senior ministers. Those who later go 
on to become CMs enter the House of Commons at an earlier age and “…seize the 
opportunity…” for promotion once there (Buck 1963: 631). 
One of the few recent studies that addresses the issue of cabinet appointment is 
Kerby (2009). Using data for the period 1935-2008 and a Cox proportional hazards 
approach, this study uses the time from becoming a member of the government party to 
the time of appointment to cabinet to model the probability that a given MP will 
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experience an appointment event at time T given that she has “survived”1 up to that 
point without the event occurring. Those MPs who cease to be a member of the 
government party before they are appointed to cabinet are treated as censored. The 
implicit idea here is that those who are appointed earlier are considered more suitable 
than those who are not. The two extremes of suitability are represented by the member 
who is appointed to cabinet but does not yet have a seat in the HOC and the permanent 
backbencher (Kerby 2009: 596).  
The independent variables are divided by Kerby into the personal and the 
political. The personal variables include those that members bring to parliament as new 
members. These are gender, university education, legal training and age at appointment. 
Also included are personal factors that vary after becoming members: previous 
ministerial experience, margin of victory in the MP’s electorate, and whether the MP 
has challenged the PM for leadership. Political factors are the share of seats held by the 
government party in the MP’s region (Western Canada, Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic 
Canada), the size in percentage of the government party’s majority, a dummy variable 
for Liberal party status, and prime minister’s term (1-5). The study does not include 
Senators because senators are not elected in the Canadian system, nor are they generally 
appointed to cabinet positions (Kerby 2009: 609).  
Kerby’s first model includes variables for gender, legal qualification, university 
education and age. All these variables are significant at the p<.01 level. Female gender, 
                                                 
1
 The term “survived” here is used in the Hazard modelling sense in that it denotes a 
characteristic of having not “suffered” a condition to which she was under some “risk” of “suffering”. 
These terms have a negative connotation but clearly an increased “risk” of becoming a member of cabinet 
is a positive event and “survival” in this context actually means languishing on the backbench or in some 
junior ministerial role. As such I will use the term “chance rather than “risk” in the remainder of the 
discussion.  
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legal education, university education and age up to 42 increase chance of being 
appointed to cabinet with legal education being the most influential. Legal education 
increases the chance of appointment to cabinet by 1.31 percentage points.  
A second model includes years of previous ministerial experience, margin of 
victory in the MP’s electorate, leadership challenger status, regional seat share and 
government majority in the HOC. The results show that previous ministerial experience 
is highly significant, increasing the risk of appointment by 373 percentage points over 
those without previous ministerial experience.  Being a leadership challenger increases 
the chance of appointment by 123 percentage points. For each unit increase in the MP’s 
electoral majority there is a 1% increase in chance of appointment, indicating that there 
is an advantage for MPs who do well electorally. However, the government’s vote share 
in the MP’s region is slightly negatively associated with chance of appointment, 
indicating that an MP who wishes to become a CM is at an advantage if her party does 
not do well in her region. Similarly, as the government’s vote share in the HOC 
increases, chances of appointment fall slightly but significantly (p<.01). In contrast to 
the results in the first model, the university education variable is not significant (p<.1) 
in the second model. However, the legal education variable is still significant (p<.01) 
but, in comparison with the first model, has a lower influence on chances of 
appointment, increasing the chance by only 70 percentage points in comparison with 
131 for the first model. 
The third model includes dummy variables for the Prime Minister’s second, 
third, fourth and fifth terms. Only the second and third of these are significant (p<.01 
and p<.05 respectively). These variables indicate that an MP who is not appointed in the 
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PM’s first term suffers a significant decrease in chances of appointment to cabinet in the 
PM’s subsequent terms. An MP who had not been appointed to cabinet in the first term 
has a 70% lower chance of appointment in the PM’s second term, and a 61% lower 
chance of appointment in the PM’s third term. This indicates that the PM very early in 
her tenure as PM selects a cabinet that is the most durable from the individuals 
available. Those who are not selected are highly unlikely to be selected subsequently.  
The major advantage of the Kerby study in terms of informing the current thesis 
is that it considers personal as well as representational and institutional factors. The 
most interesting aspect of the study is that it highlights the role of education and, 
specifically indicates that a legal education is likely to be a useful indicator of future 
success as a CM.  This supports the idea that education is likely to be an important 
factor. However, it is worth noting that, in this particular instance, it is not the education 
per se that is being selected for. Kerby (personal communication, August 1 2011) has 
pointed out that in an interview with a particular Canadian Prime Minister it emerged 
that there was a tendency to select lawyers for cabinet positions in the Canadian 
parliament because individuals who had been screened by the Bar association were less 
likely to have “skeletons in the closet”. 
 A disadvantage of the study for the current purposes is that it uses survival 
analysis rather than a method that can enable classification of individuals. Survival 
analysis enables the identification of variables that influence the “risk” of an event 
happening to an individual. However, it does not enable us to classify individuals into 
CMs and non–CMs.  
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O’Malley (2006) uses logistic regression which means that the ministerial 
selection procedure is seen as a classification problem. The study’s main emphasis is on 
the institutional, legal and political influences on the selection of ministers in the Irish 
Taoisigh. 
A significant element of the study is that it explores ministerial selection in a 
context of a very small pool of potential ministers. Due to the size and nature of the 
institution, 30 members must be chosen for junior and cabinet roles out of the 
approximately 80 members who are legally and politically eligible. Furthermore, the 
pool is such that interpersonal rivalries as well as loyalties to play a significant part in 
ministerial appointment. Another important factor that differentiates the Taoisigh from 
other comparable systems is that the turnover of members of the legislature is quite low. 
This situation, coupled with the relatively small numbers to draw from, makes it 
difficult to dismiss CMs because a dismissal is likely to have a significant negative 
effect on personal relations in the party. All these factors lead to a situation in which 
reshuffles are less common than in other Westminster systems such as the UK and 
Canada (O’Malley 2006: 320). 
O’Malley cites a number of other issues that must be taken into account in CM 
appointments such as geographical representation and internal party politics as well as 
the need to create a stable majority in the context of factions and coalitions. He also 
discusses the common issue of trading off loyalty for talent and other issues associated 
with selection on the basis of character. These ideas are discussed quite frequently in the 
literature. However, where the O’Malley study differs from the majority of discussions 
is that it addresses ministerial selection essentially using a case-control design.  
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Variables included in the modelling are age, years since first elected, a dummy 
taking the value of 1 if the member has tertiary (“third level”) education, personal vote 
as a proportion of the electoral quota,
2
 a dummy taking the value of 1 if the member had 
previously been a junior minister, the percentage party vote in the member’s 
constituency, a dummy taking the value of 1 if the member is in the junior government 
party of a coalition, and a dummy taking the value of 1 if the member is from Dublin 
and environs. There are three models: a combined parties model and models for the two 
main parties Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. The results of the analysis are as follow: 
Table 2.1: Logistic Regression Results from O’Malley (2006) 
 
Source: O’Malley 2006: 332. Note: Coefficients are odds ratios; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
 
                                                 
2
 The Taoisigh uses a version of the Single Transferrable vote to select members. 
Full model Fianna Fáil Fine Gael 
Age 0.99 1.01 1.02
Years since first elected 1.05*** 1.02 1.03
Third level educated 2.68*** 2.21** 3.88** 
Personal vote as % of quota 13.9*** 37.33*** 108.49*** 
Previously a junior minister 1.64* 3.26*** 0.37
Party vote in constituency % 1.71 308.61** 0.04
TD in junior govt’ party 1.28 – – 
Dublin and environs – 1.31 2.05
Pseudo R-squared 0.18 0.275 0.198
n 1077 710 225
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Age is not significant in any of the models. According to O’Malley this is 
because ministers are appointed on the basis of how well known they are (O’Malley 
2006: 331). The close knit personal nature of the small pool means that a member will 
not be appointed to cabinet unless she is known and the only way to get known is to 
have experience in parliament.
3
 There evidence for this in the full model in which the 
experience variable “Years since first elected” is significant. Tertiary education is 
significantly (p<.001) associated with increased odds of being a CM; in Fine Gael the 
odds ratio is 3.88 indicating that having a tertiary education increases the odds of being 
a CM by a factor of almost 4. The lowest odds ratio for tertiary education out of the 
three models is that for Fianna Fáil at 2.21. Thus, across the board, tertiary education is 
a highly positive influence on cabinet appointment. The effect of having a high 
proportion of personal votes as a proportion of the electoral quota is a powerful 
influence on cabinet membership with odds ratios of 13.9, 37.33 and 108.49 for the full 
model, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael models respectively. However, the effect of the party 
vote in the member’s constituency is only significant in the Fianna Fáil model (odds 
ratio = 308.61, p<.001). Having held a junior ministerial post is a positive influence on 
future cabinet membership for the full model (odds ratio 1.64, p<.05) and the Fianna 
Fáil model (odds ratio 3.26, p<.001).  
The O’Malley study includes variables that capture to some extent the 
characteristics of individuals likely to enter cabinet. It could be said that personal vote 
count, junior ministerial experience and tertiary education tap into underlying character 
traits. As with the Kerby (2009) study, the role of education is important. However, age 
                                                 
3
 The personalistic nature of Irish politics with its emphasis on local networks of support has 
been noted by others such as Gallagher (1985) and Marsh (1981). 
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is not important and the reasons for this are related to the particular circumstances of the 
Irish parliamentary system.  
A second study which uses a case-control approach is Kam, Bianco, Sened and 
Smyth (2010). This study uses a cross-sectional approach to examine the appointment 
of CMs and shadow CMs in the UK parliament over the period 1987-2005 on the basis 
of the extent to which they represent the ideological position of the other MPs in the 
broader party. The dependent variable is a dummy taking a score of 1 if, in a given 
parliamentary term, an MP was appointed to cabinet or shadow cabinet immediately 
after a general election or a change in the party leadership. All other MPs are scored 0 in 
that term including those who were appointed to cabinet in a mid-term shuffle. The 
ministerial selection variables included in the initial specification of the models are:  
first term promotion, which takes are value of 1 if the MP had a promotion to a non-
cabinet ministerial role in their first term and 0 if they did not; age at the start of the 
term; Experience at the start of the term; experience squared at the beginning of the 
term (to account for possible non-linear effects of experience); Oxbridge education, 
which takes a value of 1 for Oxbridge education and 0 otherwise; government, which 
takes a value of 1 if the MP’s party was in government and a value of 0 if not and; 
dissenting votes, which is the number of dissenting roll call votes the MP cast in the 
previous term. All of these were found to be significant without including the variables 
for ideology. Positive coefficients were found for first term promotion, experience and 
Oxbridge education. The remaining variables had negative coefficients.  
The next stage of the analysis involved introducing ideological variables. 
Ideology of individual MPs was based on a survey of MPs, data from which was 
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analysed using principal components to yield two basic policy dimensions: 1) a left-
right dimension, and 2) a dimension measuring support for the devolution of power 
from Westminster. Using these dimensions the Euclidian distances between individual 
MPs’ ideal points and those of their parties and leaders were calculated. The findings 
indicate that an MP who is ideologically closer to their party’s general ideological 
position is significantly more likely to be appointed to cabinet even after controlling for 
the standard ministerial selection variables cited above. The distance between an MP’s 
ideological position and that of their leader was not significant.  
The studies cited above are characteristic of the approach taken in the 
quantitative literature in general. In the Berlinski Dewan and Dowding (2007; 2010) 
studies it is existing ministers who are the subjects of the research and it is de-selection 
which is examined. There are several insights that are available from this stream of the 
literature in that there are clearly institutional and political, as well as personal 
characteristics, that influence leaders’ decisions. However, these studies are not as 
relevant to the topic of selection as the Kerby (2009), O’Malley (2006) and Kam et al 
(2010) studies. These latter three studies deal with selection rather than de-selection. 
The next stage in the attempt to find useful variables is to survey the qualitative 
literature. The purpose of this is to identify the most important variables for ministerial 
selection according to the descriptive and historical accounts. As with the quantitative 
literature, much of the literature is peripheral to my aim but there are observations 
which can inform the process of model building. 
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Section 2.3: The International Qualitative Research 
This section will concentrate on two major figures in the European qualitative 
research: Blondel (1991) and Rose (1975). These works represent approaches to 
ministerial selection which are often cited. The two approaches are contrasting in that 
they emphasise quite different characteristics, with Blondel emphasising the 
institutional settings in which ministerial skills can be attained, and Rose emphasising 
the more ephemeral characteristics of talent and ability. 
  
Blondel 
Blondel (1991) accounts for ministerial selection almost entirely in terms of 
institutional processes. In his conception of the process “…the only way to understand 
fully the nature of the ministerial career in cabinet government is to view it not just as 
emerging ‘normally’ from but as being truly part of a parliamentary career...” (Blondel 
1991:8).  Blondel cites Bagehot as the originator of this idea in that Bagehot considered 
cabinet to be a committee of parliament (Bagehot 1963: 66-7, cited in Blondel 1991:8). 
However, Blondel says that the committee conception of the ministry does not 
completely reflect the current reality because the technical and managerial complexities 
of the function of ministers are such that there is a greater gap in knowledge and 
experience between ministers and parliamentarians than existed in the past.  
Blondel points out that in cabinet government systems in general, parliamentary 
origin is not a legal requirement. All that is required is that ministers be members of the 
legislature during their period as minister. From this he draws the conclusion that 
parliamentary origin is only relevant to ministerial selection if the individual has spent a 
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significant portion of their working life in parliament. Blondel’s idea is that in systems 
where there is a long pre-ministerial career, the system’s emphasis will be on electoral 
representative practice, the reason being that an individual’s long term expertise will be 
centred around representing their constituents in the hope of being re-elected. Where, on 
the other hand, ministers come from a system in which there is generally no substantial 
pre-ministerial career, managerial and technical skills will be emphasized (Blondel 
1991: 11).   
As well as political representation skills mentioned above, Blondel points out 
that a potential minister can develop specializations in particular fields through the 
Parliamentary committee system. In this way a parliamentarian can develop and apply 
specific technical skill in the scrutiny of legislation and administration, if not real 
decision making (Blondel 1991: 11).  
Actual training in management, Blondel says, must be acquired by ministers 
before or during their parliamentary careers. Jobs that foster such skills are those in 
business, the civil service, interest groups or local and regional government. An 
alternative source of skill development is to become a junior minister in government. 
The role of junior minister, according to Blondel, was created to relieve the 
administrative burdens on more senior ministers as well as to provide a way of shaping 
party political representation in government, particularly in coalition governments 
(Blondel 1991: 12).  Junior ministers in these roles can develop their own skills relevant 
to more senior positions while having access to the skills of managers in such positions. 
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Blondel holds that, to be fully trained, a parliamentarian should have had a pre-
ministerial managerial or professional career. As most parliamentarians are not elected 
to the legislature until the age of 30, some such pre-ministerial training is likely to have 
occurred in the pre-parliamentary stage. The parliamentary career is seldom the first, 
although choice of career may be on the basis of a desire for a future parliamentary 
career. Similarly, there is a cluster of professions from which parliamentarians tend to 
be drawn. Lawyers, teachers, party officials, and interest group organisers are most 
likely candidates. Businessmen and senior civil servants are less likely to be drawn to 
parliament but, if they do enter parliament, are more likely to accede to ministerial 
office because they are more likely to have the skills that general parliamentarian do not 
have (Blondel 1991: 13).  
Overall, Blondel’s position is that the background of ministers results in a 
perpetuation of the particular skills that are sought after in ministries. Pre-ministerial 
careers may supply specialist skills that cannot be developed by merely being an 
electoral representative in parliament. Furthermore, pre-ministerial time in parliament 
offers the possibility of developing the skills acquired in the previous career 
specialization via the committee system. As well of these sources of ministerial training, 
there is another factor influencing the supply of experienced ministers: training and 
recruitment are self-reinforcing. The effect of parliamentarians being drawn from a 
select cluster of occupations is that a particular set of skills is given prominence in most 
systems (Blondel 1991: 13). Thus, the skills that are selected for will be those that those 
who are attracted to parliament will already possess to some extent.  
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It can be seen that Blondel emphasizes the development of skill sets and 
technical expertise in the training of potential ministers. However, he does not explain 
the process by which skill and expertise are assessed and ministers are sifted. His 
analysis seems incomplete without an account of factors other than skill and expertise 
required in the selection of ministers.  
 
Rose 
Rose (1975) takes an “inductive” approach to the problem and holds that 
ministerial selection is a process that is conditioned by the conventions and rules that 
have evolved in selecting ministers in the past. Thus the important issue is the kind of 
person the system elevates to ministerial positions rather than the characteristics of a 
potential minister (Rose 1975: 4). 
According to Rose, there are three general considerations: factional and social 
representativeness, loyalty to the prime minister, and competence. Rose holds that these 
three characteristics must be either balanced within the individual, with a deficit in one 
or the other(s) being made up for by a surplus in the remainder(s), or there must be a 
similar trade-off within the cabinet as a whole.   
Rose holds, as do other theorists, that the inclusion of factional representatives in 
the cabinet is a necessity however he also sees it as a potential benefit for the Prime 
Minister because it effectively silences potential critics via the convention of cabinet 
solidarity (Rose 1975: 6). This is quite a departure from the point of view that the need 
to incorporate representational or institutional interests is purely a cost or constraint. It 
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implies that the PM has the opportunity to trade the costs of factional inclusion against 
the benefits.   
Berlinski et al (2007), point out that the interests of the PM and her ministers 
may diverge. Similarly, Rose states that ministers are more likely to be interested in the 
performance of the government than the PM. The reason for this is that the PM is more 
likely to consider loyalty and representativeness as important ministerial characteristics 
than competence because his/her survival is dependent on a party vote. The competence 
of ministers is an instrumental aspect of government which has a less direct effect on 
the survival of the PM than loyalty and representativeness. Furthermore, he opines that 
the promotion of competence threatens the PM in that a large pool of competent 
ministers provides a large pool for his/her replacement (Rose 1975: p9).  
Rose holds that the pool of potential ministers is substantially less than the 
number of MPs due to practical considerations such as age (between 30 and 70 being 
optimum), experience, and personal grounds such as ideological extremity, poor 
physical or mental health, and improper business or sexual association. The PM is left 
with a pool of approximately 2/3 – 3/5 of the MPs. Of these, half will need to be given 
ministerial appointments or some kind in order to fill the required posts. Thus, there is a 
sense that in the lower levels of the ministry the leader has to choose ministers such that 
the talent level of the marginal ministers is lower than might be desired. At cabinet 
level, the competition is greater but the candidate calibre is higher so the issue is not so 
much who is appointed as what particular job they get (Rose 1975: 14).  
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In terms of personal characteristics that mark an MP as having qualities that 
signal potential minister, the key skill is verbal ability: “Verbal skill goes beyond mere 
verbal fluency or rhetorical tricks. It also includes the ability to show conviction and in 
some cases, knowledge of complex matters” (Rose 1975: 15). According to Rose, 
verbal skill seems to underlie almost every aspect of a minister’s performance. The 
following is a list of the roles distilled from Rose’s account of a minister’s duty:  
i. Being responsible for all that is done in his/her department including potentially 
politically “explosive” issues; 
Speaking in the HOC on behalf of his/her department to advance the department as 
well as to defend the government against criticism; 
ii. Representing the department in inter-departmental negotiations and in Cabinet. 
This involves negotiating over administrative details, and competing with other 
departments for funds and parliamentary time for the passage of department 
related bills; 
iii. Acting as spokesman to and negotiator with interest groups affected by the 
department; 
iv. Presenting and publicizing the department through the media; 
v. Presenting ideas in Cabinet on broad issues not related to his/her department 
(Rose 1975: 17). 
All but i) are highly verbally intensive activities. Thus, verbal skill is an implicit 
requirement in most of the activities undertaken by a minister. 
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The social interaction required in the HOC is such that successful ministers learn 
skills that reduce the effect of different social backgrounds among ministers. Personal 
relations skills include dealing with people in Westminster and being able to work with 
other politicians both co-operatively and competitively. This is, according to Rose, quite 
different from the “gladhandling” required in election campaigning (Rose 1975: 15).  
As we have seen, Blondel (1991) considers that much of the training required for 
a minister can come from expertise derived from work in a committee. Similarly, Rose 
holds that the committee system gives an MP the opportunity to learn something of the 
subject matter needed in Parliament. But according to Rose, a minister cannot learn in 
the HOC all the skills required to be a minister.  Skills that must be developed outside 
the HOC, according to Rose, include dealing with high volumes of paperwork and the 
ability to delegate tasks to civil servants without losing control over them. These, 
moreover, are not skills that are acquired by someone in the role of junior minister 
(Rose 1975: 16). In keeping with his inductive account, which considers the institution 
as the force which elevates certain types of people, Rose does not attempt to explain 
what kind of person develops these skills. Instead, he describes the institutional 
circumstances in which a minister has to function and infers that those who are able to 
function in such an environment have the required skills. 
In order to further illustrate the kind of institutional background that results in 
people with certain skills being “selected”, Rose draws from a then unpublished study 
of British cabinet ministers by Heady (1974). Heady breaks the work of a cabinet 
minister into three basic roles: 1) departmental representative; 2) departmental chief 
executive and; 3) key issues minister. These roles are described as follows: 
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i. A departmental representative presents the work of the department to all external 
parties including other departments. HOC training here is invaluable in that 
ideas must be presented orally and the minister must relate well to others. To a 
large extent the basic skill is that of image management; 
ii. A departmental chief executive requires a forensic commitment to departmental 
administrative detail. An acute sense of judgment is required in choosing 
between alternatives when the administrative process throws up alternative ways 
of doing things. Maintaining the flow of work through the department is 
essential because it is necessary to keep abreast of all that is happening in the 
department; 
iii. A key issues minister must decide which issues the department is going to 
emphasize given the multitude of tasks and the scarcity of time. This is not a 
problem where a disaster forces the issue on a minister because the minister’s 
discretion is not required. However, in circumstances where there is no such 
disaster a minister must make a decision and, in doing so, implicitly decides 
what issues to ignore. To some extent tasks can be delegated to junior minister 
and civil servants. However, the choice of what to delegate itself requires the 
exercise of judgment. 
Rose holds that, of the three roles, that of the key issues minister most correctly 
characterizes the cabinet minister. This is because it is the initiation of programs 
reflecting the minister and her party’s values that make a minister’s influence felt. 
Conversely, the chief executive has no such influence on the on-going activities of the 
department and a chief executive’s Permanent Under-Secretary could equally choose 
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methods of prosecuting the administrative process.  Similarly, the departmental 
representative does not necessarily promote policies or programs that are his own or 
those of his party (Rose 1975: 19). 
This account, based on Heady’s characterization of a minister’s role, ties 
together Rose’s previous general observations and in particular emphasizes the verbal 
communication skills required of a minister. But there is another skill which is 
important: the skill of judgment. Rose makes reference to the need for ministers to 
allocate their time, select the most appropriate of a number of alternatives of various 
kinds, and prioritize tasks and issues. This goes beyond the technical and bureaucratic 
skills mentioned by Blondel (1991).  
  
Summary of Section 2.3: 
The studies by Blondel (1991) and Rose (1975) only discuss ministers without 
in-depth comparisons with non-ministers. Therefore, they potentially suffer from the 
problems associated with selection on the dependent variable (Geddes 1990).  However, 
they do offer insights into what might be helpful in a model of ministerial selection. 
Clearly, Rose holds that verbal ability is important. Thus, a model that intends to 
capture the qualities required of CMs should have some way of capturing verbal skills 
or proclivities. Furthermore, Rose emphasises that a minister needs to have good 
judgment. In contrast to Rose, Blondel holds that the institutional setting is important. 
However, Blondel’s conception of the institutional setting is quite different from the 
institutional setting that is featured in the quantitative literature. One way to 
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conceptualise his approach is to say that MPs enter parliament with a range of skills and 
ministers “emerge” from this system according to the extent to which they have 
developed the required skills. It is hard to see how Blondel’s conception can be used to 
inform the current enterprise. 
  
Section 2.4: The Australian Qualitative Literature 
In the Australian literature there are no analytical accounts of how a Federal 
Australian parliamentarian rises to the ministry. However, there are biographical and 
descriptive accounts, and, from what can be learnt from such accounts, it seems that the 
process is very similar to the process that occurs in the UK with similar influences of 
representational and institutional factors setting constraints on the Prime Minister. The 
qualitative accounts of the role of personality and personal characteristics also provide a 
good source of ideas as to what makes a minister, with verbal ability again surfacing as 
an important characteristic. Finally, the biographical accounts provide some idea of the 
kinds of general qualities that lead to an individual rising to cabinet. 
 
Representational and Institutional Factors 
There is little systematic discussion of representational or institutional influences 
on ministerial selection in the academic literature. Where reference to these types of 
variables is made the reference tends to be descriptive. I mentioned above that Weller 
(2007) makes the observation that the selection process for LNPC ministers is like a 
“…jigsaw: balancing the powerful states, the Senate and the coalition” (Weller 2007: 
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199). Tiernan and Weller (2010) make a similar claim pointing out that there are 
pressures on a leader to take account of the various demands to include geographical, 
factional, parliamentary (HOR vs Senate) and gender interests. Age is also an issue, 
although there are conflicting demands. The age structure of cabinet is said to require 
not simply a mirror image of the age structure of parliament but instead an allowance 
for the arrival of “new blood” (Henderson 2000). Similarly, experience is valued highly 
so we would expect an astute leader to make her cabinet on average more experienced 
than the average parliamentarian. Factions are perceived to be important variables in the 
discussion of ministerial selection, particularly in the ALP. There are also factions in the 
LNPC but, being a coalition the two LNPC parties are effectively the most significant 
two factions.  
The descriptive observations from the Australian literature mirror the 
observations made in the quantitative literature. It will be recalled that Kerby (2009) and 
O’Malley (2006) included variables for MP’s geographical regions. Buck (1963), Kerby 
(2009) and O’Malley (2006) and Kam (2010) included variables for age. Kam (2010) 
and O’Malley (2006) included a variable representing the length of experience of an MP 
in parliament. In the tangential de-selection literature, Berlinski et al (2007; 2010) 
include a variable for gender and find that female gender increases the risk of de-
selection. In the qualitative literature Rose (1975) mentioned the importance of 
geographical, factional and social representativeness. The point here is that the general 
findings in the international literature that factors unrelated to personal ability and 
personality are taken into account by leaders in their selection of ministers is mirrored in 
the Australian qualitative literature. 




Personality and Behavioural Factors 
Barry Cohen, a junior minister in the Whitlam and Hawke governments, gives a 
slightly frivolous account of parliamentary life in Australia in How to Become Prime 
Minister. He observes that to be marked as possible minister material you need to have 
“…applied yourself assiduously to your parliamentary responsibilities, made some 
impressive speeches, produced excellent papers on aspects of party policy and received 
good media coverage on a couple of subjects in which you have specialized” (Cohen 
1990: 227). Cohen points out that these activities must be directed to different 
individuals depending on which party or coalition a parliamentarian is from. For LNPC 
parliamentarians it is necessary that the leader notice these activities as it is the leader 
who both selects ministers and allocates portfolios. In the case of the ALP it is the 
Caucus which must notice an aspiring minister as, traditionally, the ALP traditionally 
Caucus elects the ministry/shadow ministry while the leader merely allocates portfolios. 
It should be noted that there is some evidence that Rudd departed from this tradition and 
made his selection unilaterally although his selection of ministers took place after 
“consulting widely with the leadership group and the transition-to-government team” 
(Tiernan and Weller 2010: 27).  
Cohen’s account is interesting because the specific qualities he mentions – skills 
in parliament, media liaison, policy development and speechmaking – are often 
mentioned by others in their accounts of why certain individuals rose to the ministry. In 
the following account of how Fraser selected ministers we will see that some of these 
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qualities are mentioned. However, the most interesting aspect of the account of Fraser’s 
ministerial appointment process is that it seems to have been opaque to Fraser himself. 
Weller’s (1989) account of how Fraser selected ministers casts light on the 
ministerial selection process because, paradoxically, it demonstrates that perhaps 
leaders themselves do not know how they select CMs.  Fraser basically gives different 
and conflicting accounts of how he selected ministers. In one account, Fraser says that 
he selected ministers not on the basis of personality but on the basis of their ability to 
cope with the pressures of the job. Thus, Fraser claims he eschewed personality in the 
selection of then backbencher Senator Fred Chaney for a ministerial role. Fraser says he 
chose Fred Chaney even though Chaney had not voted for Fraser as Liberal party 
leader. Chaney was surprised to get such support from a man he had not himself 
supported. According to the account given by Fraser, Chaney’s lack of support was 
irrelevant as Fraser felt that, with the leadership contest over, the party needed to 
function as a unit and Chaney had the talent needed in the ministry (Weller 1989: 62). 
This seems to be an objective, or at least non-personality based appointment process. 
However, Fraser is subsequently quoted as saying, in reference to the Chaney 
appointment “…[y]ou think that the guy can do the job without having enumerated the 
particular things about him that led you to the conclusion. You are just convinced in 
your own mind and that’s your judgment of people” (Weller 1989: 63). This subjective 
assessment seems to be based on some aspect of “personality” which, according to the 
earlier account, Fraser eschewed for the purposes of ministerial selection. Thus, we 
have an objective account of Chaney’s selection and a subjective account, both from the 
same source. 
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To complicate the picture, Fraser gives an entirely different account of the 
reasons for appointing the then junior minister John Howard to cabinet. In relation to 
the Howard appointment, Fraser claims he assessed parliamentarians’ abilities by their 
records. John Howard was chosen to succeed Philip Lynch as Treasurer in 1977 because 
“…[Howard] had performed well as minister for Special Trade Representations and 
could debate well” (Weller 1989, p63). The latter quality was seen as particularly 
valuable in election campaigning. This objective approach seems to be similar to the 
objective account of Chaney’s appointment. However, it should be noted that in the 
objective account of Chaney’s appointment, no actual qualities were mentioned: Fraser 
simply states that Chaney “had the talent” but what objective qualities this talent was 
assessed on is not stated. This contrasts with the case of Howard in which two qualities 
were specifically enumerated. In short, it is difficult to find any systematic thought in 
Fraser’s appointment process. This is not to say that he did not have a systematic 
method, merely that he may have been more subjective than he imagined. This is not 
unusual in the identification of talent. Lewis (2004) points out that the selection of 
professional baseball players is, traditionally, a subjective assessment of objective 
qualities. Thus, a traditional baseball scout will subjectively assess the ability of a junior 
baseball player on the objective ability to score home runs. Whether or not an individual 
has a high rate of scoring home runs is an objective phenomenon. However, when asked 
how they make their decisions, that is, how they determine an individual’s objective 
ability to score home runs, talent scouts tend to be as subjective as Fraser was in his 
account of his appointment of ministers while appearing to be using objective criteria. 
 




The main problem with biographical accounts is that they tend to deal almost 
exclusively with the most prominent parliamentarians – the CMs and, to a lesser extent, 
JMs. Since federation there have been only 8 auto/biographical accounts of 
backbenchers (Selth 2007: 102). Thus, using biographical accounts involves the danger 
that the analysis could be skewed due to selection on the dependent variable (Geddes 
1990). With this caveat in mind I would like to survey the biographical accounts of two 
of the best political performers in recent years: John Howard and Kevin Rudd. These 
two individuals provide good sources for the kinds of qualities that should be 
considered as differentiating between those that are CM material and those that are not. 
As we will see there are some characteristics revealed by both these individuals that 
have been noted in the literature on ministerial selection in general. 
 
John Howard   
The above discussion about Fraser’s selection method was intended to highlight 
the fact that even when asked to explain their choices directly, a leader might not be 
fully aware of his reasons for making a decision. However, the discussion also brings 
into the foreground the early career of a superb political performer – John Howard. It is 
worthwhile to cover his early career in some detail as it demonstrates some of the skill 
required of an MP determined to rise up the political ladder. Furthermore, it shows how 
three of the qualities highlighted by Cohen – assiduous attention to parliamentary 
duties, giving well received speeches, and getting good media coverage – were the 
qualities that enabled Howard to rise through the ranks.  
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The first stage in Howard’s elevation from the backbench occurred when his 
party, the Liberal Party, was in opposition and he was selected by Fraser to be Chief 
Opposition Whip. This occurred less than 12 months after Howard entered parliament. 
Howard was considered a good choice as Chief Opposition Whip because he had 
developed good organizational skills through his work in the NSW branch. However, 
two days later shadow junior minister Bob Ellicott resigned and Howard was elevated to 
the junior shadow ministry in the roles of shadow spokesman on Consumer Affairs and 
Commerce as well as the shadow Attorney-General’s representative in the Lower 
House. Less than 12 months later the LNPC won the 1975 Federal Election and Howard 
became Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs. His portfolio ranked third in the 
outer ministry (Errington and van Onselen 2007: 61). By December 1977 at the age of 
38 he was Federal Treasurer. 
Why was Howard promoted so quickly? Was it because he impressed people 
around him or was it because Fraser saw talent and rewarded it. Some evidence is 
provided by Errington and van Onselon (2007) who state that soon after arriving in 
parliament Howard had won respect of other politicians for the effort he put into the 
party, and had earned praise for his talent even from those whom he had crossed such as 
then Liberal Party leader Billy Sneddon (Errington and Onselon 2007: 59). This 
supports the objective interpretation of Fraser’s procedure. Fraser seems to have been 
particularly impressed with Howard’s parliamentary performance. While still in 
opposition, Fraser expressed to journalists how impressed he was that Howard was 
willing to “...mix it with Labor on the floor of Parliament” (Errington and Onselon 
2007: 59). The motif of promotion for parliamentary performance we saw in Rose 
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(1975) and Cohen (1990) is repeated here. It should be noted that praise for Howard’s 
parliamentary performance may not have been confined to his own party. Errington and 
van Onselen report that in April 1975, while an opposition front bencher, Howard spoke 
on the Racial Discrimination Bill criticizing the inclusion of a provision for harsh civil 
penalties for proven cases of discrimination. His argument was that government 
coercion would be less effective than conciliation and education (Errington and Onselen 
2007: 60). The bill was eventually passed without the coercive provision. Thus, either 
Howard had been able to convince the ALP government with his argument or he had 
successfully exploited a weakness in the government’s ideological makeup such that 
those in the ALP who supported the coercive approach could no longer justify their 
position. Either explanation provides an example of an impressive parliamentary 
instinct and it is possible that this is the kind of performance that Fraser responded to. 
It should be stressed that during this period, Howard was assiduously cultivating 
journalists and was being open and friendly to all he met, even when the openness was 
forced (Errington and Onselen 2007: 60).  This is an important factor to consider in the 
overall explanation of Fraser’s decision to appoint Howard to the Government ministry 
in November 1975. One of the considerations facing Fraser may have been how he 
could justify to the public not including in the government a member who was known 
and ostensibly liked and admired by the public. 
One other factor possibly contributing to Howard’s rise was the presence of two 
of his political mentors on the senior frontbench (Errington and Onselen 2007: 60). 
There are accounts of successful members mentioning the importance of mentors in 
their rise through the ranks: Keating mentions Lang (Kelly 2011: 10); Latham mentions 
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Whitlam (Donovan 2004: 280). This is in keeping with Camp’s study of the Mexican 
elite of the late 20
th
 century which emphasizes the importance of a mentor giving 
general advice in the process of building up a career (Camp 2002: 24). One of the 
observations in Camp’s study is that a high proportion of Mexican elite members had 
mentors who were in the same power circle (Camp 2002: 24). Such mentors could give 
advice and moral support at times of crisis as well as providing overall strategic input. 
Thus, it is possible that Howard was able to benefit from the presence of his mentors on 
the frontbench, a position which gave them a particularly good insight into the 
interstices of the party which they could pass on to their protégé. 
The account of Howard’s accession to the ministry brings into focus more than 
just Fraser’s procedure: it highlights the role of Howard himself. That is, although the 
leader and other institutional factors may be important considerations in explaining the 
rise of a minister, the individual’s skills clearly play an important role. Howard had 
personal networking skills, speechmaking skills, parliamentary skills, media skills and a 
keen sense of judgment on political matters. In the following account of Rudd’s rise 
from backbencher to senior opposition minister we will see a similar collection of 
personal qualities at play. 
 
Kevin Rudd 
When Rudd was a new backbencher in the ALP opposition in 1998 he was 
ambitious to be more than “just a good local member” and intended to be the person 
next in line to be the shadow Foreign Minister. An equal concern was to ensure that he 
held on to his own electorate (Stuart 2007: 105). The electoral situation was precarious: 
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Rudd was concerned that the 1998 swing to Labor which gave him his seat was a 
reversal of the anti-Labor swing of 1996 and he was concerned that it might swing back 
at the next election. For this reason he took on the task of getting to speak to as many of 
his constituents as possible. His rationale was that they would get to like him if they 
knew him (Stuart 2007: 105). In order to raise his profile he made himself available to 
reporters and engaged in the usual activities of a backbencher such as weekly visits to 
shopping centres.  
However, his commitment went beyond mere contact. He seemed to be 
genuinely interested in his constituents’ concerns. One example of the extent to which 
he would involve himself in local affairs was his support of his electorate’s opposition 
to the expansion of Brisbane Airport. The local concern was that the expansion would 
increase air traffic over the area and have adverse impacts on the quality of life and 
property values. Rudd’s method was to gather as much information as he could and then 
take the issue to court. Stuart reports that Rudd spoke to “every pilot he could get hold 
of” and that he would contact international airports to find out details of the possible 
effects of different wind patterns on the noise level (Stuart 2007: 128). Legal 
proceedings to prevent the expansion were not successful and there was some 
suggestion that Rudd was using the issue to gain political credibility in his electorate 
(Stuart 2007: 129). However, the campaign had the intended effect of significantly 
raising his profile in the electorate.  
As well demonstrating his ability to raise his profile, this episode gives another 
insight into Rudd’s potential. We saw that Rose’s (1975) account of a minister includes 
the ability to discuss issues outside their department’s ambit. This suggests that it is 
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adaptable generalists who do well as cabinet ministers. With the airport issue, Rudd 
demonstrates this kind of highly adaptable behaviour. There is no suggestion that Rudd 
was a specialist in Blondel’s (1991) sense in relation to airport planning. But his 
willingness to tackle technical issues in which he had no previous background seems to 
be a paradigm example of the kind of generalist adaptability that marks successful 
ministers in the Anglo-Australian model. 
Three years after he had arrived in parliament, Rudd was appointed to a senior 
role in the opposition executive as spokesman on foreign affairs. In order to do this he 
had to displace the incumbent Foreign Affairs spokesman, long running ALP party 
identity Laurie Brereton who had been a CM in Keating’s cabinet. Thus, a relative 
neophyte had replaced a stalwart. The qualities that propelled Rudd seem to have been 
ambition, attention to detail, a willingness to engage with his constituents, and an ability 
to successfully network within his party. These are characteristics that are easily 
subsumed within the typologies presented by Rose (1975). But there is another aspect of 
Rudd’s character which seems to have been instrumental in his success. As the 
following episode demonstrates, Rudd seems to have been highly open to ways of 
addressing any impediments that he, or others, saw in his attempt to rise within the 
party.  
In late 2003, when Crean’s leadership of the Labor party was being contested, 
Rudd had considered running as a candidate. Rudd felt that he had credibility within the 
party because he had, by this stage, played a significant role in the development of the 
Labor party’s policy on the invasion of Iraq. This experience included successfully 
staving off criticism that he had not been sufficiently decisive in his initial stance on 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
56 
 
Iraq. Despite this success he was advised by Tasmanian backbencher Harry Quick that 
he lacked sufficient humility to be supported by the party. Part of the problem, 
according to Quick was Rudd’s ‘diplomatic’ language which was intended to project an 
aura of ‘invincibility’ (Stuart 2007: 152). According to Stuart, Rudd was taken aback by 
Quick’s criticism as he had considered Quick, being a factional independent and a 
fellow Christian, as a likely supporter. Quick’s comments led to his realization that he 
had to do something differently in order to become leader. At about the same time a 
group of backbenchers approached him and said that the leaders of the party were not 
taking account of what the backbenchers were saying. 
Soon after these discussions Rudd began a religious discussion group which 
involved getting to know backbenchers better. He also began making frequent casual 
visits to other parliamentarians and generally making himself more accessible (Stuart 
2007: 155).  The important point about this episode is that it shows that Rudd had not 
lost sight of his own weakness in his rise through the party structure. He was willing to 
take on board what others were saying. Importantly, these comments were not coming 
from the upper reaches of the hierarchy – they were coming from those who were below 
him in the hierarchy.  
If we were to compare the accounts of both Rudd and Howard there are several 
similarities that emerge. The most prominent is that both courted the attention of the 
wider community. In Howard’s case it was the media that he used to gain attention, and 
in doing so he also got the attention of his party. In Rudd’s case it was a high profile 
issue that affected his electorate. In both cases the effect was the same in that their 
profile was lifted. This seems to bear out Cohen’s (1990) observations that it is 
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necessary to get the attention of the leader. Another similarity between Howard and 
Rudd that emerges is that they were both highly skilled in the kind of parliamentary 
behaviour that Rose claims is essential for an aspiring minister. In Howard’s case it was 
his networking ability that led to him getting a reputation throughout the party and, 
eventually, with the leader. In Rudd’s case it was the behind the scenes negotiation with 
parliamentary colleagues that may have accounted for his rapid rise. Thus, in both cases, 
there is evidence of skill in the ways of working within the institution of parliament. 
 
Summary of Section 2.4: 
I began this section with some representative examples of the way the Australian 
qualitative literature discusses the importance of representational and institutional 
variables. I followed with a qualitative interpretation by an ex-minister, Barry Cohen, of 
the qualities that lead to appointment to the ministry. These were essentially skills 
associated with parliamentary performance, the media, policymaking and 
speechmaking. All these skills have one basic aim – to get the attention of those who do 
the ministerial selections. I then gave an account of how an ex-Prime Minister, Malcolm 
Fraser, accounted for his cabinet appointments. There was some overlap of the accounts 
of Cohen and Fraser with Fraser mentioning how Howard’s parliamentary and 
speechmaking skill had prompted him to elevate Howard. However, an interesting 
outcome of the account of CM selection given by Fraser is that it was contradictory and 
applied inconsistently. I then went on to cover the early careers of two prominent CMs, 
Rudd and Howard. Both seem to have had one of the qualities enumerated by Cohen – 
the ability to get the attention of the media. They also both seem to have had excellent 
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skills in terms of working within the institution of parliament. Rudd seems to have 
exemplified the generalist minister typology that Rose (1975) says is the archetypal 
Westminster minister. Howard had the speechmaking qualities referred to by Cohen as 
being essential for an aspiring minister. Thus, the two cases seem to exemplify the skills 
enumerated by Cohen and also several enumerated by Rose in the previous section.   
A final point should be made about the sources discussed in this section: verbal 
facility is at a premium in the majority of the activities enumerated by Cohen (1990) 
that ministers must excel in and which I have mentioned in relation to the reasons for 
Howard and Rudd’s swift rise to ministerial status. In particular, Cohen mentions three 
skills which are verbally based: parliamentary speaking; negotiation with party 
colleagues; and liaising with the media. These three skills were associated with 
Howard’s rise and the second two with Rudd’s. As I mentioned in the previous section, 
Rose also makes a similar point about the prominence of verbal skills (Rose 1975: 15). 
Thus, there is consistent evidence that the role of verbal ability must be considered in 
any definitive analysis of what makes a CM. 
 
Summary and Conclusion - Chapter 2 
The quantitative and qualitative studies discussed above can be seen as a starting 
point for my investigation. There is a sense in which they all contribute to an 
understanding of how a parliamentarian rises from the backbenches to cabinet. 
However, only three of the studies discussed above deal directly with the problem of 
differentiating between cabinet ministers and non-cabinet ministers: Buck (1963), 
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O’Malley (2006), and Kam et al (2010).  To some extent Kerby (2009) deals with the 
problem but his study is only indirectly related to the problem in that the aim of his 
study is to determine the factors underlying the time to appointment of ministers.  
What can be gleaned from the quantitative studies is that age and experience and 
some measure of education are likely to be useful in explaining cabinet appointments. 
Geography may be less useful: the geographical variables in Kerby (2009) and 
O’Malley were not significant while Kam et al (2010) do not include any geographical 
variables in their models.  Finally, Kam et al (2010) indicates that gender is also likely 
to be useful. Thus, we have some starting point for how to approach the problem using 
insights gained from the four quantitative studies that most closely address the problem 
we are trying to solve.  
It is difficult to see how Blondel’s (1991) approach can be used to determine a 
set of characteristics that we could use to differentiate between those that were likely, 
and those that were not likely, to become CMs. Blondel (1991) gives no account of how 
ministers are assessed. His emphasis is on the institution of parliament and how it might 
be used to give potential ministers the skills they require. Rose (1975) on the other 
hand, gives a descriptive account of what he sees as necessary in a minister. One of the 
key issues that emerges from Rose’s account is that verbal facility underlies almost all 
of the skills that a minister must have.  
The descriptive Australian literature also gives us some ideas as to how to 
proceed. The observations from Weller (2004) and Tiernan and Weller (2010) about the 
importance of representational and institutional factors suggest that these are likely to be 
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useful in explaining cabinet appointments. Included in such representational issues are 
the factional (in the ALP) and party (in the LNPC) demands on the leader to 
accommodate conflicting interests. As such, some account will need to be taken of these 
in the cabinet appointment models. 
Cohen’s (1990) observations are of most use in reinforcing the point made by 
Rose that ministers need to be verbally adept. Cohen does not state the importance of 
verbal skills directly but he does enumerate several skills, all of which require a high 
degree of verbal facility, thus complementing Rose’s (1975) observation that verbal 
facility is important in a minister. Taken with what we observed in the accounts of 
Howard and Rudd – that the skills that led to their rise were essentially verbally based – 
Rose’s and Cohen’s observations seem apposite. We will therefore need some 
indication of verbal ability at some point in our analysis. 
Given the above observations, it is clear that both representational and 
institutional factors as well as “individual” factors such as verbal ability and education 
are likely to be important. I will begin the process of examining these factors in the next 
chapter by focusing on the representational and institutional factors. I will use a 
traditional hypothesis testing approach to determine whether a set of standard 
representational and institutional factors are significantly associated with cabinet 
appointments to the Howard ministry over the period 1996-2007. I will also look at 
appointments to the ALP shadow cabinet over a smaller time frame. I will then be in a 
position to determine whether representational and institutional factors are important in 
determining appointments to the frontbench.  
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Chapter 3: Representational and Institutional Factors 
 
Section 3.1: Introduction 
In the previous chapter I examined a selective representation of the literature on 
ministerial appointment in order to determine what characteristics have been found to be 
associated with appointment to cabinet. I found that there were two broad sets of 
variables. On the one hand there are the representational and institutional factors (RIFs). 
These are the factors which a leader must take into account in order to make her cabinet 
“representative” of the various competing interests and institutional demands within the 
party. On the other hand there are individual factors which pertain to the individual 
independent of the RIFs such as verbal ability. In this Chapter I will examine the role of 
RIFs in the allocation of cabinet positions. I will first define what a RIF is using 
examples from the Australian federal parliamentary context. I will then develop a list of 
RIFs that are likely to be useful in explaining cabinet appointments in the Australian 
federal parliamentary context.  The bulk of this analysis will come from the public 
discussion of cabinet appointments in the Howard government over the period 1996-
2007. The interesting aspect of this part of the analysis is that it seems to be pressure to 
allocate cabinet posts on the basis of RIFs from the media as well as the party and the 
public at large that affects decisions of the leader. The importance of this aspect of the 
appointment procedure is that it casts light on how much pressure the leader is under to 
change the representational structure of cabinet to mirror the representational makeup of 
parliament. I will follow the public debate on the various RIFs with a descriptive 
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account of whether the leader actually did respond to changes in the parliamentary 
proportions of the various RIFs by making changes to cabinet.  
After the descriptive exercise I turn to the analytical question of whether the 
RIFs influence the probability of an individual becoming a CM. I do this because the 
literature points to an important role of RIFs in determining CM appointments. 
Furthermore, it makes intuitive sense that, if leaders work hard to ensure that cabinet 
reflects the makeup of parliament, there should be an advantage in coming from a large 
state or faction because your chances of being selected as a CM are increased. However, 
as I will demonstrate in the analytical part of the exercise, this is not the case.  An 
analysis of cabinet appointments using logistic regression will demonstrate that, of the 
RIFs, only age and experience and dummy variables for three states are statistically 
significantly associated with cabinet appointments and the practical influence of each 
these factors is weak. I conclude the chapter with an explanation for this highly 
counterintuitive finding. 
Before I begin the investigation it is worthwhile pointing out that the emphasis 
in this chapter will be on the LNPC over the period 1996-2007. I will attempt to provide 
some account of the Labor opposition over the same period to see whether the forces at 
work in both groups are similar. However, there is a problem with looking at the 
opposition over that period in that, during this period, there was a return to a long-
standing ALP policy of recording all shadow ministers as being members of a general 
ministry rather than dividing them into a cabinet and a junior ministry. This is partly a 
historical tradition; Whitlam initially included all ministers in his first ministry in 1972 
in a “super ministry” in which there was no distinction between junior and cabinet 
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ministers (Freudenberg 2009: 257). Labor leaders have since had a propensity to do the 
same at various times, including much of the period under discussion. The effect of this 
is that over the study period of 1996-2007 we have only two years in which there is a 
breakdown of the ALP ministry into an inner and outer shadow ministry. These are the 
years 2005 and 2006. For the remaining years it is possible to come to an approximation 
of the cabinet by considering the importance of the portfolio. However, given variations 
in the importance of portfolios over time, using this as a criterion this could result in 
systematic errors that could significantly affect the generality of any findings. As such I 
will focus on these two years for the analysis of the ALP shadow cabinet appointment 
dynamics. This means that I will not have a 12 year time series for each of the RIFs as I 
do for the LNPC. Nevertheless, in the section in which I use panel data to attempt to 
predict shadow cabinet appointments I will demonstrate that the ALP data for the years 
2005-6 enable me to say that there is some evidence that experience is important in the 
allocation of shadow cabinet positions.  
A second issue with the ALP data is that, because the ALP was in opposition 
over the period in question, the nature of the media coverage was quite different 
compared with the coverage of the government. This is not to say that there was not 
concern expressed by regional and sectional interest groups when there was a perception 
that the ALP shadow ministry was not an adequate reflection of the parliamentary 
representation of those groups. However, the salience of the issues was lower and 
therefore the coverage significantly lower in terms of volume and vehemence.  
For the above reasons I will focus my main attention on the LNPC. In Section 
3.3 I will discuss a 12 year time series of cabinet appointments and include observations 
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from the public debate that occurred in parallel with the appointments. In section 3.4 I 
will test, using multivariate analysis, the proposition that cabinet appointments were 
connected to the parliamentary representation of states and territories, gender, house and 
party. I will also examine the influence of age and experience.  
Section 3.2: RIFs: Australian Federal Context 
I discussed in Chapter 2 the view in the literature that a Prime Minister is under 
pressure to allocate cabinet positions to reflect the representation of the party in 
parliament as a whole. Thus, a parliamentary party made up of 20% Queenslanders, for 
example, should have a cabinet of 20% Queenslanders. If an election were to lead to a 
decrease in the proportion of the party’s parliamentary representation of Queenslanders 
there would be pressure on the leader to decrease the representation in cabinet of 
Queenslanders and increase the representation in cabinet of the states whose 
representation in parliament has increased. Similar arguments apply for factions (in the 
ALP), gender, house (House of Representatives versus the Senate) and, in the LNPC, 
the representation of the Liberal Party vis-à-vis the National Party.  
There are three other factors which, while strictly speaking not RIFs, should be 
considered for inclusion in this part of the analysis because they are related to the 
pressures the leader is under to appease various interest groups. These are age, 
experience and, possibly, electoral performance.  
Age and experience are slightly different from the other RIFs in that it is 
accepted that the experience and age of cabinet is not necessarily meant to mirror the 
average age and experience of parliament. The logical reciprocity in the relationship 
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between these means that a leader who opts for a cabinet that is too young will end up 
with a cabinet that is not sufficiently experienced and vice versa. Thus, the leader is 
more likely to be concerned with getting the right balance of age and experience in her 
cabinet than in strictly mirroring the age and experience structure of parliament in the 
cabinet. Furthermore, a leader is justified in creating a cabinet that is experienced. 
However, a leader may also be under pressure to ensure that there are periodic infusions 
of “new blood” (Henderson 2000). This will be the case if there is a very significant 
difference between the average age of the cabinet and the average age of parliament. 
Thus, it is clear that simple representational issues may not be directly applicable to 
these variables but there is a representational element to them. As such it seems that age 
and experience should be included in the overall analysis of RIFs.    
Electoral performance is not a representational factor in the sense of state, 
gender, party or house. However, there is some anecdotal evidence that Howard used 
electoral performance as a basis for awarding ministerial positions, albeit to the outer 
ministry (Errington and van Onselon 2007: 252; Milne 1998; 2003). Furthermore, 
Tiernan and Weller claim that ministers in the Howard and Rudd governments tended to 
hold seats that were “safe” and “fairly safe” (Tiernan and Weller 2010: 34). On this 
basis it could be said that electoral performance may be a representational factor in that 
there is pressure on the leader to give “representation” in the ministry to those who 
perform well electorally. It should be re-iterated that Kerby (2009) and O’Malley (2006) 
found a positive association between electoral performance and ministerial appointment. 
For these reasons I need to consider how to deal with electoral performance.  
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The first issue is whether there is any evidence in the Australian context of 
cabinet positions being awarded on the basis of electoral performance. The answer is 
that there is not. The only indication that Howard considered electoral performance in 
allocating ministerial positions is in the context of junior ministerial positions, not 
cabinet positions: Jackie Kelly and Dana Vale were said to have been given positions in 
the junior ministry due to their electoral success (Milne 1998; 2003).  
One closer examination the situation is far from clear. It seems that Howard 
needed a justification for the appointment of Jackie Kelly to the junior ministry and he 
used electoral performance as the justification. His justification for appointing her was 
that she had managed to win a traditionally Labor seat in a by-election with a significant 
margin (Errington and van Onselon 2007: 252).  But there were concerns that this was 
not a valid justification because others had done similarly well electorally but not been 
similarly rewarded. Glen Milne put the case in the following words in The Australian 
Howard's standard line has been to praise Kelly's performance 
as a marginal seats campaigner. Yet her critics have compiled 
statistics showing that on October 3 [1998, the date of the 
election] six other Liberal MPs also held the swings against 
them to under one per cent: in Hughes, La Trobe, Deakin, Gray, 
Makin and Leichhardt. What differentiates these results from 
Kelly, they ask (Milne 1998). 
The real reason for Kelly’s appointment, according to Milne (1998) was that it 
was a case of “teacher’s pet” and Howard needed a justification for promoting her.  
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In the case of the appointment of Dana Vale to the junior ministry there was no 
such evidence of favouritism. Thus it is possible that Howard rewarded her electoral 
success with a junior ministry. Nevertheless, even if Vale’s appointment to the junior 
ministry was based on her electoral success, the fact remains that there is no evidence 
Howard allocated cabinet positions on the basis of electoral performance.  
How do we account for Tiernan and Weller’s (2010: 34) observation that 
ministers in the Rudd and Howard governments held safe and fairly safe seats? The first 
point that should be made about this observation is that there is no comparison with 
non-ministers so it is possible that, on average, non-ministers also held safe and fairly 
safe seats. The second point that can be made is that if there were a relationship between 
ministerial appointment and electoral performance, there is no way of telling, from the 
information provided, what the direction of causation was. An individual who has a 
marginal seat and subsequently becomes a minister will have higher name recognition 
and this could be manifested in a higher vote at subsequent elections. This is quite a 
different phenomenon from the leader awarding seats on the basis of performance but 
the result is the same – there is a positive association between having a relatively safe 
seat and being a minister. Which of these phenomena is at play is not made clear by 
Tiernan and Weller (2010).  
The possible confounding effects of name recognition spills over into a third 
point that needs to be addressed. Kerby (2009) and O’Malley (2006) found a positive 
relationship between electoral success and ministerial appointment and I therefore need 
to consider carefully whether electoral performance may indeed be a factor I need to 
take into account, notwithstanding the concerns raised above. My answer to this is that 
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the Kerby (2009) and O’Malley (2006) studies may have found the positive relationship 
between cabinet appointment and electoral performance due to the confounding effect 
of name recognition discussed above. As mentioned above, a person who is appointed 
as a minister in one period will tend to have higher visibility, and consequent name 
recognition, than someone who has always been a backbencher and this may have a 
direct effect on her vote share in a subsequent period. Thus it may be that, in the Kerby 
(2009) and O’Malley (2006) studies, CMs get a higher proportion of votes because they 
are CMs or were CMs in a previous period rather than because individuals who get 
higher votes are given CM positions. Both the O’Malley (2006) and Kerby (2009) 
studies use cross sectional studies involving “repeated measures” of individuals over 
time and it is therefore possible that name recognition is the causative factor. It is 
important to note that Kam et al (2010), who also used a cross sectional design, did not 
include electoral performance in their “standard” set of ministerial appointment 
variables. This is possibly because it is difficult to control for this confounding effect, 
although it should be noted that no such comment was made in that study. As the 
methodology in this chapter is effectively cross-sectional it is important to avoid the 
possible confounding effect of name recognition.  
A final reason for not including electoral margin as a factor associated with 
cabinet appointments is that it is not possible to derive a common marginality measure 
for all Australian federal parliamentarians. This is because the HOR and the Senate use 
very different voting systems. The HOR uses the alternative vote while the Senate uses 
the single transferable vote. Thus, the “margin” means quite different things in the case 
of the Senate and the HOR. A second complication is that some Senators are appointed 
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by the State governments when a state has a casual vacancy in the Senate. This means 
that in a given year it is possible that some individuals may have no electoral margin at 
all. The problem of having different voting systems in the two houses of parliament is 
not an important issue in a system such as Canada’s where ministers are only rarely 
drawn from the upper house. Kerby excluded senators from his analysis because they 
are not elected members of parliament but as the number of CMs drawn from the Senate 
are relatively low this was not a major problem. In Ireland all but two of the maximum 
15 members of cabinet must come from the Dáil Éireann (Lower House). If non-Dáil 
members are chosen they must be members of the Seanad Éireann (Upper House) but 
this occurs rarely (O’Malley 2006: 324). Therefore, O’Malley was able to disregard the 
Seanad in his study. Thus, Kerby (2009) and O’Mally (2006) were able to include 
measures of electoral success in their analysis because they focused on one house with 
one voting system.  However in the Australian system ministers are typically drawn 
from both houses so the difference in voting systems presents an obstacle to including a 
common measure for marginality in any account of ministerial selection. 
 To summarise the above discussion, there is no evidence from the 
Australian literature that cabinet appointments have been made on the basis of electoral 
performance. Furthermore, there is no statistical evidence of an association between 
marginality and ministerial status: even if there were such a relationship it is possible 
that the relationship was due to name recognition rather than direct awarding of a 
ministerial position on the basis of electoral performance. Finally, there is no way, in 
the Australian system, to derive a common measure of marginality for all 
parliamentarians. 
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Given the above considerations I will exclude electoral data from the 





Party (Liberal Party, National Party) 
House (HOR/Senate) 
 
I will begin the next section of this chapter with a consideration of what 
“expected” representation entails and how to conceptualise it. Next, I will examine the 
various representation factors to see whether they significantly deviate from the 
“expected” level of representation. The idea here is that, the literature notwithstanding, I 
must examine whether the reality and the theory converge. That is, I must consider 
whether the leaders do actually allocate cabinet positions on the basis of RIFs. To do 
this I will need to calculate the “expected” number of ministers for each RIF. The 
expected number of ministers for a given representational factor is the number of 
ministers we would expect to be appointed on the basis of that representational factor if 
the leader appointed cabinet positions in proportion to the parliamentary representation 
of that factor. I will then need to compare the expected number with the actual number 
of ministers appointed. I will demonstrate that, during the Howard government, there 
were situations in which the expected and actual were quite closely connected. Thus 
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there is evidence to support the literature. However, I will also demonstrate that there 
were situations in which there were substantial deviations.  
I will include a consideration of the public discussion of the individual RIFs. 
This is because it is worthwhile to try to determine how the process is understood from 
the point of view of the actors themselves. In order to do this I will undertake a brief 
and selective survey of the changes to the frontbench as they were initially reported in 
the media. This provides a good overview of the public discussion because it involves 
direct quotations from the ministers, parties and leader as well as input from 
commentators. By doing this it is possible to see the kinds of issues that the actors 
consider as important in influencing the shape of the ministry. It should be noted that 
this overview must be incomplete given the large amount of coverage these issues get.  
 
Section 3.3: What Would Perfectly Mirrored Representation Look Like? 
In this section I wish to explore how the cabinet would appear if the leader 
attempted to select individuals for inclusion in cabinet in order that the RIFs were 
represented in cabinet according to their proportions in parliament. The following 
analysis uses data taken from the Hansard of the first session in parliament for each year 
over the period 1996-2007. From this data it is possible to determine the individuals 
present and to record their state/territory, party (Liberal or National), house 
(HOR/Senate). If an individual changed their state/territory, party or house during a 
given year this is reflected in the data for the following year. Gender is derived from the 
names of the individuals. Data for age and experience were derived from time of entry 
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to parliament and date of birth from the various editions of the Parliamentary Handbook 
of the Commonwealth of Australia (1996-2008). Also used was the online edition of the 
Parliamentary Handbook available on the website of the Australian Parliament House 
(www.aph.gov.au) as at May 2008. Where there was any conflict between the book 
version of the Parliamentary Handbook and the online version, the latter was taken as 
the definitive source given that it was more likely to have been corrected.  
Table 2.1 shows the relative proportions of the RIFs excluding age and 
experience
1
 for the LNPC in Parliament over the period of the Howard government 
1996-2007. Senators, for example, represented 27% of the LNPC in Parliament in 1996. 
On average over the 12 year period, Senators made up 30% of the LNPC parliamentary 
cohort with a standard deviation of 1.5%. 
Table 3.1: Percentage RIFs – LNPC 1996-2007 
 
The theory states that a prime minister will need to take these RIFs into account 
when selecting his cabinet. In 1996, for example, perfectly mirrored representation 
would mean that cabinet would consist of 27% senators, 18% females, 21% Victorians 
etc. Thus, in a cabinet of 15 persons, we would expect to see, in 1996, approximately 4 
                                                 
1
 Age and experience will be dealt with separately below. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean Stdev
Senate 27 28 28 32 30 31 30 30 28 29 31 31 30 1.5
Female 18 19 21 23 23 23 22 22 22 20 21 21 21 1.6
Vic 21 21 21 21 21 21 20 20 19 20 19 19 20 0.8
NSW 26 27 27 28 28 28 28 28 28 26 26 26 27 0.9
Qld 22 22 22 21 21 20 21 21 21 21 22 22 21 0.8
Tas 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 5 0.8
SA 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 11 11 11 12 0.7
WA 10 10 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 13 13 13 12 1.0
ACT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.0
NT 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0.3
NP 18 18 18 18 17 17 14 14 14 12 13 13 15 2.3
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senators (.27 * 15 = 4.05), 3 females (.18 * 15 = 2.7), 3 Victorians (.21 * 15 = 3.15), and 
so on for the other RIFs other than age and experience. As stated above, age and 
experience are slightly different and I will demonstrate below that these have their own 
distinctive patterns.  
In the sections that follow I will descriptively examine the RIFs by selectively 
surveying the public debate in order to determine the extent to which Howard was under 
pressure to alter the representation of his cabinet. I will then examine, in relation to each 
of the RIFs, the extent to which the actual number of CMs deviated from the expected 
number. 
 
Section 3.1.1: National Party Representation 
The representation of the National Party (NP) in the LNPC gives us a good 
starting point for analysing RIFs in general because it is the only LNPC representational 
factor that approximates perfectly mirrored representation.  
The public discussion of National Party representation is less controversial than 
the discussion of other RIFs. This is because there is an explicit Coalition Agreement 
which states that the number of ministers selected from the National Party will mirror 
the parliamentary representation of the National Party. Thus, there is little room for 
variation. However, there are times when controversial issues arise. An issue emerged 
in January 2006 when, as a result of a reduction in the number of NP junior ministers 
from 5 to 4, National Party members felt aggrieved and threatened to vote against 
government legislation in future (Schubert et al. 2006). Rather than address the 
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concerns which emerged in relation to the outer ministry, Howard defended his move by 
saying that the National Party was over-represented in Cabinet. In fact, the NP was only 
marginally over-represented in cabinet and any reduction in cabinet representation 
would have resulted in under-representation. I will re-visit this controversy below when 
I consider the specific figures. At this stage it is important to note that what this 
controversy illustrates is that Howard was acutely aware of the fine-grained analysis 
that had to be applied to NP representation in order to fulfil the Coalition Agreement. 
I demonstrated above that in order to measure the extent to which parliamentary 
representation of RIFs is reflected in cabinet we must start with the the expected number 
of members in relation to a particular RIF. This is the number of ministers we would 
expect given the proportional representation of the RIF in parliament (the Parliamentary 
Proportion) multiplied by the numerical size of the cabinet.  
The RIF under discussion here is National Party representation. The 
Parliamentary Proportion of National Party parliamentarians is the number of National 
Party Parliamentarians divided by the total number of LNPC Members. Thus, the 
Parliamentary Proportion for the NP at any time t1 is given by 
No. of members of NP in Parliamentt1 / No. of members of the LNPC in 
Parliamentt1 
Table 3.2 gives the figures for the calculation of the Parliamentary Proportion of 
NP parliamentarians for the period 1996-2007.  
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Table 3.2: LNPC and NP Members and NP Proportion – 1996-2007 
 
In Table 3.2 we can see that the number of members of the National Party in 
parliament in 1996 was 23 and the number of members of the LNPC was 129. Thus, the 
Parliamentary Proportion of NP members was 23/129 = .18 or 18%. To use this to 
determine the expected number of NP CMs we need to take into account the size of the 
cabinet. Table 3.3 shows that in 1996 the number of LNPC cabinet ministers was 15.  
Table 3.3: Actual and Expected LNPC and NP Representation 1996-2007 
 
The expected number of NP CMs in 1996 is the parliamentary proportion of NP 
members from Table 3.2 (.181996) multiplied by the total number of CMs from Table 3.3 
(151996) = .18 * 15 = 2.7. This is the number of NP CMs we would expect if the leader 
were attempting to mirror the NP parliamentary representation in the cabinet. In fact, as 
we can see from Table 3.3, the actual number of CMs from the NP was 3. This is 
effectively as close as possible to get to perfectly mirrored representation in that year. 
To call the difference between the actual and expected of .3 (3-2.7) an “over-
representation” would be incorrect. The fractional result of 2.7 for the expected number 
of CMs is not interpretable as it is not possible to make a fractional appointment of an 
individual in order to achieve perfect representation. To put this into context consider a 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
No. LNPC in Parlt' 129 130 131 117 115 114 117 117 116 122 126 126 122 6.39
No. NP in Parlt' 23 23 23 21 19 19 16 16 16 15 16 16 19 3.18
Parl' % NP 18% 18% 18% 18% 17% 17% 14% 14% 14% 12% 13% 13% 15% 2%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
No. LNCP CMs 15 15 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 16.67 0.89
No. NP CMs 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00 0.00
Exp' No. NP CMs 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.53 0.31
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situation in which the leader tried to reduce the “over-representation” by reducing the 
number of NP CMs to 2 in 1996. This would have resulted in under representation. 
Thus, fractional differences in actual and expected representation should realistically be 
ignored. The important issue is whether actual and expected CMs differ by 1 or more.  
So far I have examined one year only: 1996 but Table 3.3 shows the 12 year 
trend. The figure for the mean number of actual NP CMs (3) is simply the average of 
the actual number of CMs over the 12 year period. Similarly, the mean number of 
expected NP CMs (2.53) is the average number of expected NP CMs over the period. 
There is a significant
2
 difference between these but, as I demonstrated above, the 
difference is fractional (less than one) and therefore not important. The final figure of 
interest is the correlation between the expected and actual number of ministers. The 
correlation between the expected and actual number of CMs shows the extent to which 
changes in the expected number of CMs gave rise to changes in the actual number of 
ministers. If the leader attempted to change cabinet representation of NP CMs as 
parliamentary representation of NP CMs changed over time, we would expect that this 
figure would be positive. It should be noted that it is not possible to calculate this figure 
in the case of the NP because as Table 3.3 shows, the actual number of ministers did not 
vary. 
With an objective measure of the expected number of CMs it is now possible to 
revisit the re-shuffle in 2006 discussed above. The number of NP members in Cabinet 
was 3 in 2005 and 2006 and Table 3.3 shows that the expected numbers were 2.1 and 
                                                 
2
 A p-value of below .05 can be interpreted as evidence for a difference between two means 
despite the low sample size (n = 12) . However, due to the low sample size, a p-value above .05 cannot be 
interpreted as evidence of no difference between the two means. 
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2.2 in 2005 and 2006 respectively. However, the difference is fractional and therefore 
difficult to eliminate without creating subsequent slight under-representation. 
Realistically, therefore, despite Howard’s statement, the Nationals were not over-
represented in Cabinet. Furthermore, any reduction would have resulted in under-
representation.  
Over the long term, the representation of the NP comes as close as possible to 
perfect representation. For the 12 year period, the mean actual number of NP CMs was 
3 while the mean expected number of NP CMs was 2.53. This fractional difference is 
significant (p<.01) but the difference between these figures is less than one indicating 
that there was no realistic over-or under-representation.  
The NP scenario demonstrates the “gold standard” in cabinet ministerial 
representation in that there was a very close mirroring between the actual and expected 
number of NP CMs with insignificant differences between the expected and actual 
figures. This supports the view in the literature which holds that a leader is under 
pressure to apportion ministerial positions according to the parliamentary 
representation. It will become apparent that several of the RIFs are not represented in 
cabinet in proportion to their parliamentary proportions. The reason that National Party 
representation is paradigmatic is the Coalition Agreement which states as a requirement 
of the on-going coalition that the NP be represented in the Cabinet as closely as possible 
to its parliamentary representation. 
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Section 3.3.2: Female Representation 
Female representation provides a good contrast with NP representation because 
it is the most unrepresentative of all the remaining RIFs. This is possibly why the debate 
over the period 1996 – 2007 was spirited. 
In the public discussion in general, the Howard government seemed to be 
concerned with issues of performance rather than gender representation. These issues 
became salient in October 1997 when Howard replaced CM Senator Amanda Vanstone 
with Senator David Kemp because of concern that concern Vanstone “…could not sell 
the array of policies being developed to tackle unemployment…” and because Howard 
had “…been impressed by Dr Kemp's aggressive selling of the Government's hard-
edged policies on schools and training, particularly literacy” (Short 1997a). Vanstone 
was demoted to the junior ministerial role of Justice Minister. Thus, there was a 
seemingly genuine concern that Vanstone’s demotion was due to unsatisfactory 
performance. However the public debate focused on the fact that the female 
representation in cabinet had fallen. 
Soon after Vanstone’s demotion another controversial issue emerged when the 
Status of Women portfolio, which up until then was a portfolio with cabinet rank, was 
taken from a cabinet minister, Senator Jocelyn Newman and re-assigned to a junior 
minister, Judith Moylan. These individuals remained cabinet and junior ministers 
respectively but it was the portfolio that was re-assigned. The relative representation of 
women in cabinet did not change. However, in conjunction with the demotion of 
Senator Vanstone, it signalled a reduction, in the eyes of some, of the importance 
Howard placed on women’s issues. According to Short, Howard had initially wanted to 
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remove Moylan from her junior minister role as Minister for Family Services due to 
Moylan’s inability to deal with the ALP’s criticism of matters relating to the 
administration of nursing homes: Howard did not sack her due to pressure from 
Moylan’s fellow WA Liberals (Short 1997a). It is interesting to note that at the same 
time as the above changes took place, Howard elevated two female backbenchers to 
parliamentary secretary positions. This was described by Short as being motivated by a 
desire to reduce the negative backlash that resulted from the changes that were seen as 
detrimental to female representation (Short 1997a).  
In June 2000 there was speculation from “senior coalition figures” that the then 
sole woman in cabinet, Senator Jocelyn Newman, was intending to quit politics (Harvey 
2000). The article stated that because Senator Newman was the only woman in the 
Cabinet, if she were to quit then Howard would have an obligation to promote another 
woman. Towards the end of the year Newman did in fact quit thus initiating a reshuffle. 
The reshuffle, on 19 December 2000, resulted in a fall in the number of women 
parliamentary secretaries by 1 and a fall in the number of junior ministers by 1 while the 
number of ministers at Cabinet Level remained at 1 with Newman being replaced by 
Senator Amanda Vanstone. Michelle Grattan echoed the rest of the popular press in her 
coverage of the reshuffle stating that, in contrast to Howard’s insistence about quotas 
not being important to Liberal women, Vanstone’s gender was crucial for her re-
elevation to cabinet (Grattan 2000).  
In January 2007 Vanstone was sacked and the issue of quotas for women in the 
LNPC ministry arose again. Howard was quoted as saying "I don't think talented 
women in the Liberal Party do these [gender representation] sums every time there's an 
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adjustment made - I think that is a rather patronising, old-fashioned view to take…Most 
of the talented women in the Liberal Party take the view that you've got to make 
decisions - sometimes they fall in favour of more women, sometimes they don't" 
(Schubert 2007). Thus, Howard seems to have been aware that the issue had high 
salience in the electorate and the media. 
The above sample from the public discussion represents only a fraction of the 
discussion that took place in relation to the issue of female representation in cabinet. 
Much of the rancour with which the public debate about female representation in 
cabinet, as well as Howard’s defensiveness, can be put down to the chronic under-
representation of women in cabinet. Female representation in parliament averaged 21% 
over the period. This gave rise to an average expected number of female CMs of 3.54 
over the 12 year period but actual cabinet representation averaged only 1.83. 
Table 3.4: Female CM Representation 1996-2007 
 
At the Cabinet Level there is a significant (p<0.01) difference between the long 
term expected (3.54) and actual (1.83) number of ministers. Thus, the representation of 
females in the LNPC over the period 1996-2007 shows a significant level of long term 
under-representation of 1 individual (3.54 – 1.83 = 1.7). In the individual years 1998-
2001 the under-representation was at two, reaching almost three in 1999 when the actual 
number was 1 and the expected number was 3.9.   
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
No. Fem' CMs 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 1.83 0.72
Exp' No. Fem' CMs 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.52 0.40
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The next question is whether Howard changed the proportion of women in 
cabinet as the proportion of women in parliament changed. To ascertain this we need to 
look at the correlation between the expected and actual number of CMs over the 12 year 
period. Unfortunately, due to the small sample size of n=12, we cannot say that there is 
evidence that the number of actual ministers changed relative to the expected number of 
ministers. The reason for this is that the correlation of -.34 is not high enough with to 
establish an effect beyond mere chance.
3
 
The standard arguments in the literature about representation do not apply to 
female representation in the LNPC cabinet over the period under discussion. The case of 
female representation provides a stark contrast to NP representation in that there is a 
significant departure from expected representation. The public’s realization of this had 
an effect on the public debate and Howard responded to the concerns defensively in the 
media. It is possible that the reduce under-representation in the later part of the period 
were in response to the criticisms Howard received for the significant under-
representation in the early part of the period (Table 3.4).  However, I will demonstrate 
below that the situation is not as simple as the descriptive analysis above suggests. I 
have considered only the univariate situation. After controlling for other factors, I will 
demonstrate that there is no significant effect of being female on selection for cabinet. 
The actual reason for the lower level of female representation in cabinet is that women 
tend to be less experienced than men in parliament and it is the lack of experience of 
                                                 
3
 With a sample size of 12, correlation coefficients with absolute values of .575 and .701 are 
significant at the p<.05 level and p<.01 (two tailed) respectively. Absolute values of correlation 
coefficients below these are not significant.   
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women that leads to their lower level of representation. I will return to this issue in 
Section 3.4 below. 
 
Section 3.3.3: New South Wales Representation 
At several times over the period 1996-2007 NSW was significantly over-
represented. The public debate reflects this and Howard received a significant amount 
of criticism for giving cabinet a bias in favour of his own state (NSW). 
On 25 June 2005 a report appeared in The Age which announced the end of a 
long-running feud between two Victorian branches of the Liberal Party, the Costello-
Kroger branch and the Kennett branch. One of the putative reasons for the ceasefire was 
the concern that Sydney was becoming the de facto capital of Australia (Age, June 25 
2005: 10). The article states that the tension between the Prime Minister John Howard 
(NSW) and the Treasurer Peter Costello (Vic) was possibly based on a geographical 
difference rather than the usually stated conflict over leadership succession. A reshuffle 
that followed the resolution of the putative rift resulted in a decrease in the number of 
NSW CMs suggesting that Howard was responding to the newly unified Victorians who 
could now speak with one voice in opposing NSW over-representation.  
The data show that there was support for the idea that NSW was over-
represented. Parliamentary representation of NSW over the 1996-2007 period averaged 
27% with a high of 29% in 2004 and a low of 26% in the years 1996-97 and 2005-07. 
As shown in Table 3.5 this yielded an average expected number of NSW CMs of 4.55 
over the period compared with the actual of 5.92.  
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Table 3.5: NSW CM Representation 1996-2007 
 
This difference is significant at the p<.05 level indicating a consistent over-
representation of one individual at least (5.92 – 4.55 = 1.37). Given the consistency and 
level of over-representation of NSW in Cabinet it is surprising that the public debate 
was not more vehement, particularly in 2007 when the over-representation of NSW in 
cabinet had risen to 4 individuals with the actual at 8 and the expected at 4.7. 
More so than any other state, NSW was over-represented. Clearly, this means 
that other states/ territories had to be under-represented to counterbalance the numbers. 
 
Section 3.3.4: Victorian Representation 
At cabinet level there is a significant (p=0.01) difference between the mean 
expected (3.34) and actual (4.08) number of Victorian cabinet ministers (Table 3.6) but 
the difference is less than 1 indicating that the long term number of expected and actual 
number of ministers was effectively equal.  
Table 3.6: Victorian CM Representation 1996-2007 
 
Furthermore, the expected and actual numbers are positively correlated (r=.56, 
p<.1). Thus, there is some evidence that Howard adjusted the number of actual 
ministers in response to changes in the number of Victorian LNPC parliamentarians.  
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
No. NSW CMs 5 5 5 6 5 6 6 6 6 7 6 8 5.92 0.90
Exp' No. NSW CMs 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.55 0.31
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
No. Vic CMs 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 4.08 0.79
Exp' No. Vic CMs 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.34 0.15




Section 3.3.5: Representation of South Australia 
Like NSW, South Australia experienced a long term trend of over-
representation. However this fact rarely spilled into the public debate.  
As we have seen, the two occasions on which South Australian Senator Amanda 
Vanstone’s was sacked from Cabinet, in 1997 and 2007, were seen as losses to gender 
representation. There was almost no discussion in the mainstream press of that fact that 
removing South Australian Vanstone redressed the over-representation of SA. This may 
have been because the extent of gender under-representation was greater than the extent 
of South Australian over-representation. 
There was no reason given for the long term over-representation of South 
Australia by Howard other than his standard explanation of ministerial appointments 
being based on talent. Thus, in 2007 when SA’s over-representation was addressed, the 
debate took place in terms of the talent issue. Vanstone was replaced by Malcolm 
Turnbull (NSW) who had been a parliamentary secretary. In a feature on the reshuffle in 
The Australian in January 2007 (Australian January 24: 13) there was particular 
emphasis on the fact that Turnbull’s role was to be as Environment and Water resources 
minister and that the promotion was, as Howard was at pains to emphasise, designed to 
capitalize on Turnbull’s talents which had been admirably demonstrated in his role as 
parliamentary secretary. This is possibly why no mention is made of the fact that 
Turnbull’s appointment meant that NSW was over-represented by three individuals at 
Cabinet level. Thus, it seems that the public had accepted Howard’s idea that significant 
variations from perfectly mirrored representation were acceptable when promotion to 
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CM was talent based. However, the South Australian Adelaide Advertiser, as might be 
expected given its regional bias, pointed out that the loss of Vanstone signalled a 
reduction of SA representation in Cabinet (Advertiser January 25 2007, p18). The report 
failed to mention that the actual number of SA Cabinet Members equalled the expected 
number of 2 (Table 3.7).  
Table 3.7: South Australian CM Representation 1996-2007 
 
The long term trend of over-representation at the Cabinet level for South 
Australia is evident from Table 3.7 which shows that the mean expected number of 
Cabinet ministers was 2.06 while the means actual was 3.5. This difference is 
significant (p<.01). The actual and expected numbers are correlated but not significantly 
(r = .12, ns) so we cannot say that there is evidence that the number of actual ministers 
changed in response to changes in the expected number of ministers.  
  I have shown that NSW and SA had long periods of over representation 
while Victoria had a sporadic period in which it was over-represented. The important 
point here is that these instances of over-representation add up and this means that other 
states must carry the burden by being under-represented. I will show below that there 
are two states in particular that carried the burden. 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
No. SA CMs 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 3.50 0.67
Exp' No. SA CMs 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.06 0.15
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Section 3.3.6: Queensland Representation 
Queensland was significantly under-represented in cabinet over the 1996-2007 
term. There was a great deal of discussion of why this was the case in the popular press. 
It seems that much of the pressure on Howard to increase Queensland’s representation 
was ameliorated by his insistence, and that of others, that there was a lack of talent in 
Queensland.  
In 2000 a reshuffle occurred in which the actual number of QLD ministers in 
cabinet was reduced to 1 while the corresponding expected number of CMs was 3.4. 
Franklin (2000) writing in the Queensland based Courier Mail opined that the lack of 
Queensland representation after the reshuffle was due to the absence of renewal of 
potential candidates. This had led to a situation in which sincere, but untalented, 
“timeservers” were all that remained in the Queensland branches. The Queensland party 
leaders were reluctant to remove mediocre performers and then blamed “southern bias” 
when the ministerial positions were not allocated to Queenslanders. Franklin felt that 
the entrenched systems of rewards for time servers dissuaded talented and ambitious 
people from entering politics in Queensland. The upshot was that “…the Queensland 
Liberals did not provide potential Cabinet members for grooming back in 1996”.  
Whatever the actual reasons Howard had for not promoting Queenslanders to 
Cabinet, the fact is that there was significant long term under-representation of 
Queensland in cabinet. There is a significant (p<.01) difference between the mean 
expected number (3.56) and mean actual  number (1.75) of Ministers equivalent to 
almost two individuals (Table 3.8).  
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Table 3.8: Queensland CM Representation 1996-2007 
 
The expected and actual figures are positively correlated (r = .76, p <.05) which 
shows that there was an attempt to react to changes in the parliamentary representation 
over time but, given the entrenched under-representation, the effect was that the 
expected and actual figures moved in parallel so that the actual number of QLD CMs 
never reached the expected.  The situation is depicted in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: Expected and Actual Queensland CMs 1996-2007 
 
There is an obvious attempt to vary the number of actual CMs to match the 
changes in the expected number. However, the gap between expected and actual 
numbers never closes.  
Queensland is one of the states that suffered significant under-representation to 
counterbalance over representation of other states at various times.  
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
No. Qld CMs 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 1.75 0.75
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Section 3.3.7: Representation of Western Australia 
In 1996-1997 there were no CMs from WA despite the figures for the expected 
number of CMs being 1.6 and 1.5 respectively. A report in The Australian in October 
1997 suggests that problems with the WA branch may have led Howard to disregard 
state balance:  
Liberal sources said Mr Howard was not impressed with the 
[West Australian branch of the party] after years of damaging 
internal battles involving expelled former WA Senator Noel 
Crichton-Brown. Furthermore, West Australian Allan Rocher 
won Perth’s safest Liberal seat of Curtin as an independent in 
1996 after being “dumped by the party in a bitter pre-selection 
battle” (Price and Short 1997).  
But there was pressure on Howard to appoint a CM from WA. WA State 
Premier Richard Court said that WA liberals should be included in Federal Cabinet 
given that “the state [was] producing 26% of Australia’s export wealth (Price and Short 
1997). 
On 6 October a re-shuffle was announced and the Attorney General portfolio, 
previously a junior ministerial portfolio, was elevated to a cabinet portfolio and, along 
with it, the serving Attorney General, Daryl Williams. There was some suggestion that 
Williams’ promotion was not entirely related to his ability. It was reported in The 
Australian that Howard was concerned that Williams was unable to control the statutory 
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authorities he had responsibility for and that he lacked overall political ability (Short 
and McKenzie, 1997). The implication is that the elevation of Williams may have been 
due to a desire to redress the lack of WA representation in Cabinet.  
After the election of October 9 2004, The West Australian reported Liberal 
sources as saying that, given WA liberals had won two seats from Labor at the October 
election, “…there was a case to elevate one more West Australian to Cabinet” 
(Middleton 2004). In fact, the expected number of ministers had barely changed. Prior 
to the election it was 2.1 (see Table 3.9) and after the election it was 2.2, with the actual 
number of CMs remaining the same at 1 both before and after the election. In other 
words, WA Liberals winning two seats from Labour did not substantially affect the 
level of under-representation. It is interesting to note that the WA liberals needed the 
election wins of 2004 to justify a claim to extra representation even though they were 
already entitled to an extra seat before the election. The actual number of CMs was 1 in 
both years so there was under-representation of 1 individual both before and after the 
election. This under-representation had existed since 2002 and was not actually 
addressed until 2006. This highlights the fact that the public debate quite often ignored 
the reality of the data.  
The long term expected number of WA CMs was 1.94 which is almost 1 
individual more than the long term actual number of CMs.  
Table 3.9: West Australian CM Representation 1996-2007 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
No. WA CMs 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1.00 0.60
Exp' No. WA CMs 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 1.94 0.25
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
91 
 
The difference in these long term means is significant at the p<.01 level. The 
actual and expected numbers were positively correlated (r=.85, p<.01) which indicates 
that there was an attempt to change the number of actual number of CMs as the number 
of expected CMs changed over time. However, as with the case of Queensland, there 
was a gap between the two parallel sets of figures for much of the time but, unlike the 
case of QLD, the gap eventually closed in 2006-7 when the expected number of 
ministers was 2.2 and 2.3 respectively while the actual was 2 for both years. 
The most salient aspect of WA representation is that there were large portions of 
the period in which there was an under-representation of 1 individual. In the years 1996-
1997 and 2002 to 2005 there was a good representational argument for increasing the 
number of WA CMs. However, as we saw from a sample of the media debate, there was 
little impetus to address the issue at these times. 
 
Section 3.3.8: Representation of the NT, the ACT and Tasmania 
The remaining two Territories and the state of Tasmania are quite different from 
the other states due to the low numbers involved. I will deal with each briefly before 
going on to other RIFs. 
To illustrate the problem the effect of small numbers it is worthwhile looking at 
the calculation of the parliamentary proportion for Tasmania which, as explained above, 
is the basis for the calculation of the expected number of CMs. Table 3.10 shows that, 
over the period 1996-2007 the average number of LNPC parliamentarians from all 
states and territories was 122 while the average number of LNPC parliamentarians from 
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Tasmania was 6. Thus, on average, Tasmanians represented 5% of the total number of 
LNPC parliamentarians.  
Table 3.10: Tasmanian Representation in  Parliament 1996-2007 
 
With such a low parliamentary proportion of Tasmanian parliamentarians, the 
expected number of CMs averages .84 over the period 1996- 2007. 
Table 3.11: Tasmanian CM Representation 1996-2007 
 
In the years 1996 to 2000 there was effective equality of expected and actual 
number of Tasmanian CMs with actual CMs = 1 and expected number of Tasmanian 
CMs varying between .7 and .9. However, had there been no Tasmanian CM over this 
period we could also argue that this would have been justified until the expected number 
was equal to or greater than 1. Similarly, in the period 2001 – 2004 when the actual fell 
to 0 and the expected was at .7, it is difficult to argue that Tasmania was under-
represented given the fractional number of expected CMs.  Thus, over the period 1996 – 
2004, there is an argument both for and against appointing a CM. As it turned out, for 
five of these years 1996-2000 there was 1 actual CM while thereafter there was no 
actual CM. In 2005 the expected number of CMs rose to 1 and in 2006 and 2007 to 1.1 
so there was no longer any representational case for not appointing a CM. However, no 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
LNCP (Aust) 129 130 131 117 115 114 117 117 116 122 126 126 122 6.39
LNCP (Tas) 7 7 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 8 8 6 1.27
Parl' % of TAS 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 6% 6% 6% 5% 1%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
No. Tas CMs 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.42 0.51
Exp' No. Tas CMs 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.84 0.15
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
93 
 
Tasmanian CM was appointed. We can therefore say that there was under-
representation in these years.  
However, if we look at the situation over the long term a different interpretation 
is possible in that the periods of deviation from actual and expected representation 
cancel each other out. The mean actual number of CMs was .42 and the mean expected 
.84. There was, therefore, over the period as a whole, effective equality of expected and 
actual number of CMs.  
As Table 3.12 shows, the NT makes up only 1% of LNPC parliamentary 
representation. As such there is some justification for the proposition that it is not 
entitled to ministerial representation at all on the strictly representational argument. This 
is possibly why no CM was appointed from the NT over the period 1996-2007.  
Table 3.12: NT Representation: Parliament 1996-2007 
 
Table 3.13: NT CM Representation 1996-2007 
 
The case of the ACT is similar to that of the NT except that the representation of 
the ACT in terms of the LNPC’s parliamentary representation is even lower than that of 
the NT, with an average of less than 1% leading to a mean number of expected CMs of 
.14 over the 12 year period (Table 3.15). 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
LNCP (Aust) 129 130 131 117 115 114 117 117 116 122 126 126 122 6.39
LNCP (NT) 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.45
Parl' % of NT 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 0%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean
No. NT CMs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
Exp' No. NT CMs 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.24
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Table 3.14: ACT Representation: Parliament 1996-2007 
 
Table 3.15: ACT CM Representation 1996-07 
 
It is therefore not unexpected that the ACT, like the NT, did not have a CM over the 
period 1996-2007.  
To summarise this section on the geographical areas with small populations, we 
can see that the small state of Tasmania instantiated an intermediate situation in which 
there was an argument both ways as to whether an individual should have been 
appointed to cabinet in the early years while in the latter years there was under-
representation. Taking mean figures for the period as a whole there was virtual equality 
of expected and actual representation. In the case of the NT and ACT, the numbers were 
so small that it would have been more difficult to argue that an individual should be 
appointed from these areas. This was borne out in that there were no CM appointments 
from these areas over the period. Finally, it should be noted that the public debate seems 
to accept that the smaller geographical regions should be given lower rates of 
representation. The debate is largely acquiescent on issues associated with small region 
representation with the majority of attention being devoted to the more populous 
geographical regions. 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
LNCP (Aust) 129 130 131 117 115 114 117 117 116 122 126 126 122 6.39
LNCP (ACT) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.00
Parl' % of ACT 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
No. ACT CMs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00
Exp' No. ACT CMs 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.14 0.01
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Section 3.3.9: Senate Representation 
In the public discussion, proportionality in the senate is generally not a 
contentious issue. It is accepted that there should be some attempt at representing the 
Senate in cabinet in terms of its parliamentary representation but the issue is not pursued 
vehemently. For example, when Senator Jim Short resigned his junior ministerial role in 
1996 due to breach of the ministerial guidelines involving a conflict of interest, there 
was talk in the media of a possible “reassignment of ministerial duties in the Senate” 
(Daley 1996). Little more was said on the issue. Similarly, a reshuffle in the following 
year elicited the following statement: “Howard […] must keep a proper balance 
between ministers drawn from the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Senate 
is already seen as over-represented. This would virtually put a stop to [Senator] Ian 
Macdonald being promoted, even though he is from Queensland” (Short 1997b).  
Another point of view is that talent is more important than adhering to strict 
representation. Commenting on the likely replacements for three Senators who left the 
ministry in late 2005, another commentator made the following remark: “All three 
ministers who [have left] the ministry are Senators. At least one of the three 
replacements will surely have to be a senator. But given the balance of talent, it is likely 
that two of the newcomers will come from the House of Representatives” (Canberra 
Times, January 26 2006:12). 
A re-shuffle in 2007 after Senator Rod Kemp vacated his junior ministerial 
position in early 2007 raised the issue of workload: “Liberal senators believe Senator 
Kemp's free position must be filled by another member of the Upper House and are 
lobbying hard for Senate representation…[…]…Without a Senate replacement, the 
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seven remaining ministers would face a heavy workload representing Lower House 
ministers” (Anderson 2007). In relation to the same reshuffle it was stated that 
“…[w]hile the likely winners [of a ministerial appointment] include Parliamentary 
Secretary for water [HOR member] Malcolm Turnbull and Parliamentary Secretary for 
Citizenship [HOR member] Andrew Robb, speculation is growing that Liberal Senator 
Michael Ronaldson and Nationals Senator Fiona Nash may secure a promotion to boost 
the dwindling representation of senators in the Ministerial ranks” (Maiden 2007).  
The general tenor of the public discussion is far less ardent than that in relation 
to the other RIFs. This may explain why the Howard government was able to allow high 
and variable divergences from expected Senate representation over his period of 
government. Table 3.16 shows that the long term average expected number of 
Senatorial CMs was 4.94 and the average figure for the actual number of senatorial 
CMs was 4.17.  
Table 3.16: Senate CM Representation 1996-2007 
 
There is a significant (p<.01) difference between these figures but the difference 
is 4.94 – 4.17 = .77 which is a fractional value indicating an inconsequential difference. 
Thus, on the face of it, actual and expected numbers of CMs were equivalent in the long 
term. However, throughout the period there were significant deviations from perfectly 
mirrored representation. For example, over 1998-2001 there was under-representation 
of 1 and this persisted until 2002 when expected and actual numbers converged. In 2005 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean StDev
No. Sen' CMs 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 5 4 6 4 3 4.17 0.83
Exp' No. Sen' CMs 4.1 4.2 4.5 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1 4.8 4.9 5.3 5.6 4.94 0.47
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there was an instance of over representation of 1. In 2006 the over-representation 
reversed to under-representation of 1 and this increased to under-representation of 2 in 
2007. The situation is best explained by referring to Figure 3.2 which graphically shows 
expected and actual number of senatorial CMs over the 12 year period. 
Figure 3.2: Expected and Actual LNPC Senate CMs 1996-2007. 
 
Senate representation is unusual in that it is the only representational factor 
which experiences reversals from significant under-representation to significant over-
representation. The jump in the actual number of senators in 2005 coincides with the 
coalition gaining majority control of the Senate after the election in 2004. Thus it is 
possible that the greater number of CM positions reflected the greater number of seats 
held by LNPC parliamentarians. However, as the graph demonstrates, this situation was 





































































The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
98 
 
Section 3.3.10: Age and Experience Representation 
Age and experience representation are different from the other representation 
factors because, unlike the other RIFs, it is quite justified for the leader to make a 
conscious attempt to differentiate the representational structure of the cabinet from that 
of parliament. It would be considered legitimate, for example, for a leader to appoint 
CMs who were more experienced than the average LNPC parliamentarian. Similarly, it 
would be considered appropriate for a leader to specifically choose a cabinet that, for 
example, exemplified the infusion of “new blood” (Henderson 2000). In short, age and 
experience are not the same as the RIFs we have considered so far which, theoretically, 
should take the representational structure of parliament as the blueprint for the 
representational structure of the cabinet.  
The public discussion of age and experience reflects the fact that both qualities 
can be seen as positive or negative depending on how extreme they are. An overly 
young cabinet is likely to be criticized for being inexperienced while an experienced 
cabinet is likely to be criticized for being too old.  
In a reshuffle in December 2000 which was brought on by the resignation of 
three experienced ministers, the new ministry was described in The Australian as “…a 
new-look team with an emphasis on youth and social policy to lead into next year's 
election campaign” (Henderson 2000). The report mentioned that Senator Newman had 
told Howard that she was “…willing to make way for fresh blood by voluntarily leaving 
the ministry”. The reshuffle had replaced two cabinet ministers and one junior minister 
in their 60s with ministers in their 40s. However a quote from Howard emphasised the 
talent aspect of the reshuffle rather than the youth/new blood aspect: "It display[ed] the 
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depth of talent, the reservoir of very able people within the Government, that three very 
long-serving, senior and highly respected colleagues can be departing the ministry, and 
[there was] immediately available […] talented people in different areas of the 
Government to take their places." However the Adelaide Advertiser included a quote 
from Howard in which he emphasised the youth aspect of the changes. Howard is 
quoted as saying "[t]he point in relation to all of them is that no matter how well you're 
going in something, you do reach a point where some kind of generational change is 
desirable…I've had those sorts of discussions with Jocelyn [Newman] and with John 
Moore and I think all of them see the merit of what has happened" (Coorey 2000). 
The age and experience themes emerged again in relation to a reshuffle in 
November 2001. The Canberra Times described the reshuffle in the following terms: 
“Howard's desire to push his own type of coalition politician, the need for new talent, 
and the need to retain experience at the highest levels were the forces behind his 
reshuffle” (Canberra Times November 25 2001, p20).  
The above quotations from the public debate are a small sample of the 
discussion on the issues of age and experience but they convey the theme that exists in 
the debate in general – that there is a trade-off between age and experience. Howard is 
on record as saying that age is a factor in ministerial appointments. There is a similar 
argument with experience. As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, it is seen as 
legitimate for a leader to make appointments in order to skew the ministry towards 
greater experience while ensuring there is sufficient “new blood” on occasion.  
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How did the various reshuffles affect the age structure of Cabinet? Figure 3.3 
shows the average age of all LNPC parliamentarians (including CMs) for each year of 
the period 1996-2007 as well as the average age of CMs over the same period.
4
 The 
average age of both LNPC parliamentarians and LNPC CMs rose of the period 1996-
2007. In only two years, 2001 and 2007 was the average age of CMs lower than that of 
LNPC parliamentarians as a whole.  
Figure 3.3: Average Age – LNPC Parliament and Cabinet 1996-2007 
 
The long term average age of LNPC parliamentarians was 51.03 while that of 
LNPC CMs was 51.80. These figures are not significantly different (p=.17), although it 
should be noted that with a sample size of n=12 this conclusion cannot be definitive. 
The long term growth in the average age of LNPC parliamentarians is the logical 
outcome of there being a large number of long term parliamentarians. Falls in the 
                                                 
4
 Data for Figure 3.3 are calculated from dates of birth given in the Parliamentary Handbook of 
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average age are associated with elections in which older parliamentarians retire and are 
replaced by younger parliamentarians. The same can be said of CMs to some extent 
except that there was a major fall in the average age of CMs in 2001 which reflects the 
departure of Jocelyn Newman and John Moore, both in their 60s. A declining trend is 
evident in the period 2004-2006 which reflects the departure of CMs such as David 
Kemp and Daryl Williams and replacements with younger ministers. 
The interesting observation that can be made about the age structure of cabinet is 
that, although there was no obvious statement of it explicitly, Howard effectively 
mirrored the age structure of the parliament in the cabinet. The trends, although not 
identical, are very similar (r = .83, p<.01) and the average ages of CMs and LNPC 
parliamentarians are very close.  
In the case of experience in parliament there is a definite difference between 
LNPC parliamentarians as a whole and CMs. Figure 3.4 shows that there is a rising 
trend in both groups over the period 1996-2007.
5
 There is, however, a persistent gap. 
The gap gives rise to a significant (p<.01) difference between the average number of 
years of experience of LNPC parliamentarians (8.77 years) and that of CMs (13.74 
years). On average, CMs had approximately five years more experience than 
parliamentarians as a whole. The number of years of experience both for parliament as a 
whole and for CMs grows as time passes due to the fact that a substantial number of 
parliamentarians are in office for the duration of the period due to electoral success. The 
                                                 
5
 Data for Figure 3.3 are calculated from dates of parliamentary service given in the 
Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, online edition, www.aph.gov.au, accessed 
July 2008.  
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falls in 2002 and 2005 are due to incoming new parliamentarians and outgoing 
experienced parliamentarians in the elections immediately preceding these years.  
 
Figure 3.4: Average Experience - LNPC Parliament and Cabinet: 1996-2007 
 
There is evidence of a possible trade-off between age and experience. The 
average difference in experience between parliament as a whole and cabinet is 4.97 
years. If we look at the year 2005, the difference in experience grows to 6.53 years 
(Parliament = 9.70, Cabinet  = 16.23). The gap closes to 5.92 and 4.67 in the following 
two years respectively. This could be taken as evidence that Howard was trying to 
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Summary of Section 3 
In this section I have considered various RIFs at cabinet level. For the non-age 
and experience variables there are four basic scenarios: 
1) Predominant over-representation, where the factor is over-represented for most 
years over the study period. This is the situation with NSW cabinet 
representation. 
2) Chronic under-representation, there the factor is under-represented for the entire 
study period. An example of this is female cabinet representation. 
3) Equality of actual and expected representation, where the representation is as 
would be expected. The best example of this is the NP which has a high equality 
of expected and actual representation for all three levels of the ministry.  
4) A period of under-representation followed by a compensating period of over-
representation. This is the situation with only one factor – Senate representation.  
The age and experience variables constitute a different set of factors. There 
seems to be some relationship between them such that one is traded off for another so 
that a balance is created. 
The question I must now address is whether the instances in which there is not 
equality of actual and expected representation are evidence that in general the 
parliamentary representational structure is not mirrored in the representational structure 
of the cabinet. That is, are the deviations from expected representation of such 
magnitude and duration that there is doubt cast upon the theory that the parliament’s 
representational structure is mirrored in the ministry? Alternatively, are the aberrations 
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we have seen small in the scheme of things such that they do not have a significant 
effect on the overall representativeness of cabinet?  
The importance of this question is that it has a direct bearing on the chances of a 
member of the LNPC becoming a CM. The literature has maintained that the constraints 
on a leader to conform to the representational structure of parliament are significant 
influences on the probability of being appointed to the cabinet. The public debate has 
shown that the politicians, the leader and the commentators are aware of these 
constraints and there is, in most cases, pressure on the leader to conform to them. It is 
also clear from the public debate that the leader is often at pains to justify deviations 
from strictly representational appointments to cabinet. The question is how systematic 
the deviations are and whether or not deviations affect the chances of the individual 
member to be appointed to cabinet. This is the subject of the next section. 
 
Section 3.4: Multivariate Analysis 
In the previous section I descriptively examined the RIFs and found that there 
were significant deviations from proportional representation for several factors while for 
most factors there was close to correct proportional representation with minor 
deviations. The purpose of this section is to test whether, taken as a whole, the RIFs can 
significantly affect cabinet appointments. This is an important question because if there 
is a significant distortion in a representational factor then, if that representational factor 
applies to a parliamentarian, her chances of being selected as a CM will be affected. In 
this section I will analytically determine whether the RIFs I have discussed above are 
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able to explain CM appointments. It will be seen that the RIFs only explain a small 
proportion of CM appointments. I will conclude the section with a discussion of why 
this counterintuitive finding should be the case when there is a great deal of effort made 
by leaders to select their cabinets to mirror, to a large extent, the parliamentary 
representation of RIFs.  
 
Section 3.4.1: The Data and Models 
The idea of the models discussed in this section is to determine whether the RIFs 
influence the probability of the individual parliamentarian becoming a CM. One way of 
doing this is to take a cross section of the parliamentary party at a given time and see if 
a relationship can be discerned between the parliamentary proportions and cabinet 
proportions with respect to each representational factor. Table 3.17 shows the RIFs for 
the LNPC in April 1996 just after the LNPC won the Federal election and John Howard 
needed to select his first cabinet. There were 129 members of the LNPC in parliament 
and of these 15 were CMs.  
 
Table 3.17: RIFs for the LNPC – April 1996 
 
 
Of the 129 LNPC members, 35 were senators, 23 were female, 27 were from 
Victoria, and so on. The representational literature suggests that, with 34 members, 
more CMs should come from NSW while significantly fewer should come from 
Tasmania with only 7 representatives in parliament. However, it is important to note 
n Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Av' Age Av' Exp'
129 35 23 27 34 29 7 16 13 1 2 23 48.6 6.6
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that this data does not reveal how the each of the RIFs influences the probability of any 
given individual being a CM. The general probability of a member of the LNPC being a 
CM is 15/129 = .12. The important point, however, is whether the RIFs affect this 
probability. For example, does coming from Victoria increase or decrease an LNPC 
parliamentarian’s probability of being a CM? Similarly, does being 52 and having 10 
years’ experience influence chances of selection as a CM? To answer these questions I 
will consider the characteristics of the entire cohort of 129 LNPC members and take 
into account the RIFs listed in Table 3.17 simultaneously. However, even this is not 
sufficient because it would only provide a snapshot for the period depicted, April 1996. 
The question is whether there is a general trend towards rewarding or punishing 
particular states, parties etc. Thus, several cross sections over several time periods are 
required. 
To address these issues I will take five cross sections at times that represent the 
composition of the parliament and cabinet after the elections in 1996, 1998, 2001 and 
2004. I will also include the data for the period after the last LNPC reshuffle in 2007.  
Before I continue I need to explain several aspects of the data. The data are 
taken from the yearly Hansard for the first parliamentary session of the year. Thus, the 
data represent the makeup of the LNPC in parliament and cabinet at that time for each 
year. For example, the 1996 data show the situation at the first parliamentary session in 
April 1996 which followed the election of March 1996.  The problem is that several 
elections took place in the middle of the year and therefore the changes in the makeup 
of parliament are not manifested in the data until the following year. This means that the 
changes that took place in the October 1998 election, for example, are not reflected in 
the data until the first session for 1999. The same situation exists for the elections in 
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November 2001 and October 2004. This means that, in order to get cross sections that 
represent the situation as it existed after the elections over the period, it is necessary to 
use the data from 1996, 1999, 2002 and 2005. Along with the 2007 cross section, which 
represents the final reshuffle before the 2007 election, these data represent the five cross 
sections. Analysis of these should capture any patterns in the way cabinet posts were 
awarded, if any. 
In order to demonstrate the structure of the data, it is worthwhile considering the 
data for two particular individuals in the cohort. Table 3.18 shows the data for Tony 
Abbott and Judy Troeth. These two individuals were selected from the cohort of 192 
LNPC parliamentarians who were in parliament over the period 1996-2007 in order to 
provide an insight into the nature of the dataset. 
Table 3.18: Data for Logistic Regression –Abbott and Troeth 1996 – 2007 
 
 
All variables other than age and experience are binary variables which take the 
value of 1 if the RIF applies to the individual and 0 if it does not. For example, Table 
3.18 shows that for the Senate variable, Abbott receives a 0 and Troeth a 1. Similarly 
Troeth receives a value of 1 for the variables Fem (Female) and Vic (Victoria) because 
she is a female representing the State of Victoria. By the same logic, Abbott receives a 1 
Year Name Sen Fem Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp CM
1996 Abbott, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.5 2.1 0
1999 Abbott, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.3 4.9 0
2002 Abbott, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44.3 7.9 1
2005 Abbott, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.3 10.9 1
2007 Abbott, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.3 12.9 1
1996 Troeth, J 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55.8 2.8 0
1999 Troeth, J 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.5 5.6 0
2002 Troeth, J 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61.5 8.6 0
2005 Troeth, J 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64.5 11.6 0
2007 Troeth, J 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66.5 13.6 0
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for NSW because he representing an electorate in NSW. Both Abbott and Troeth 
receive a 0 for NP (National Party) as they both belong to the Liberal Party. The age and 
parliamentary experience columns depict their age and years of parliamentary 
experience respectively for the given years. Finally, the CM column shows the CM 
status for both parliamentarians at the time the cross section was taken. Abbott was 
promoted to CM in 2000 and remained a CM for the duration of the period so the value 
for CM is coded as 0 for 1996 and 1999 and thereafter he receives a coding of 1. Troeth 
did not become a CM in the years concerned so receives a coding of 0 for all years. 
All 192 individuals who were members of the LNPC for the period 1996 to 2007 
were coded using these same principles. Individuals who were members of the LNPC at 
any stage but subsequently became independents were included in the analysis only for 
as long as they were in the LNPC. Similarly, individuals who changed party, state or 
house had their coding changed in the appropriate years. 
 The data from all five cross sections illustrates the long-term structure of the 
parliament as well as that of the cabinet for the period 1996-2007.  Table 3.19 
summarises the data.  
Table 3.19: LNPC Representational Data - Pooled Cross-sections 
 
 
The pooled data involving 192 individuals provides 611 observations of 
“events” over the five cross sections. There were 527 non-CM “events” while there 
n Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Av' Age Av' Exp'
Parliament 611 181 126 122 165 132 32 74 72 5 9 91 50.9 8.7
Non-CMs 527 159 116 103 133 123 30 57 67 5 9 76 50.8 7.9
CMs 84 22 10 19 32 9 2 17 5 0 0 15 51.7 14.0
Parl' Prop' 30% 21% 20% 27% 22% 5% 12% 12% 1% 1% 15% n/a n/a
Cab' Prop' 26% 12% 23% 38% 11% 2% 20% 6% 0% 0% 18% n/a n/a
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were 84 CM “events”. This shows that the overall probability of a cabinet appointment 
event was 14% (84/611). The next step is to consider how the probability of 
appointment for each different RIF can also be calculated. Consider, for example, the 
Parliamentary Proportion figure for the Senate which  shows that over the five cross 
sections, the Senate made up 181/611 = 30% of parliament. In comparison, the Senate 
cabinet proportion was only 22/84 = 26%, demonstrating that a senator was marginally 
less likely to be appointed to cabinet than the parliamentary proportion of senators 
suggests should have been the case. Females were systematically under-represented in 
cabinet with female representation in parliament overall at 21% (126/611) but only 12% 
(10/84) were selected for cabinet. Using this method of cross sectional analysis it is 
possible to see whether each RIF was over of under-represented in cabinet. 
On the face of it, deviations from perfectly mirrored representation can affect the 
probability of an individual becoming a CM. For example, it is possible that, given the 
under-representation of WA and the over-representation of SA, a parliamentarian from 
SA should have a higher probability of being selected than an individual from WA. In 
fact, what is required is a systematic analysis of how all the RIFs affect the probability 
of appointment to cabinet simultaneously. This needs to be done because descriptive 
data are not enough to determine the underlying associations.  
Consider, for example, two phenomena that are clear from the cross sectional 
data: the under-representation of females and a positive effect on the probability of 
cabinet appointment of a member having more experience. It might be supposed that 
these phenomena are independent. However, it is also possible that they are linked. The 
average experience of females in the five cross section sample is 7.7 years. This is less 
than the non-CM average of 7.9 and very significantly less than the CM average 
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experience of 14. Thus, independently of any possible gender bias against women it is 
important to take into account fact that there was only a small pool of experienced 
women to draw from. This means that, to some extent, the under-representation of 
women in cabinet may be due to women being relatively inexperienced in comparison 
to men. This kind of observation can only be made if a method of analysing all the RIFS 
simultaneously is used. Similarly, the under-representation of one state may take place 
due to some other factor such as underrepresentation of members from the Senate or 
National Party. It will not be possible to tease out these possibilities unless we look at 
the influence of each individual factor on CM appointment while holding all other 
factors constant. In other words it is necessary to simultaneously take into account all 
the variables as presented in Table 3.19. The way to do this is to use logistic regression.  
In order to examine the influence of the RIFS on selection for CM positions I 
used logistic regression with a repeated measures design. The repeated measures design 
was required because many of the individuals in the cohort are measured repeatedly in 
the 5 cross sections. As such there is variation both between and among individuals and 
both these variations need to be accounted for. 
Two models were created. The only difference between the two is the reference 
category for the states. Model 1 uses Victoria as the excluded category while Model 2 
uses NSW. The variables included were all the variables that have been discussed in 
relation to RIFs including age and experience. Age squared and experience squared 
were also included to capture any non-linear effects of these variables. It should be 
noted that in both models the ACT and the NT were excluded because there were no 
CMs from these regions in the years under consideration. The parameter estimates of 
the models are presented in Table 3.20.  




Table 3.20: Parameter Estimates for Multivariate Analysis of LNPC RIFs  
 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 
 










Age .800 *** .798 ***
AgeSq -.008 *** -.008 ***
Exp .322 *** .314 ***
ExpSq -.005 * -.005 *
n 611 611
True Positives 21 22
False Positives 17 16
True Negatives 510 511
False Negatives 63 62
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In Model 1 only age and experience are significant. Age is significantly (p<.01) 
positively associated with CM while age squared is significantly (p<.01) negatively 
associated with CM. In essence this means that there is a negative quadratic relationship 
between age and CM such that the odds of appointment to cabinet rise up to age 47 and 
thereafter decline. The significant (p<.01) positive coefficient for experience along with 
the borderline significant (p<.1) coefficient for experience squared indicates that there is 
a borderline significant negative quadratic relationship between experience and CM 
such that the odds of appointment rise for the first 31 years of experience and then 
decline. There is a borderline (p<.1) positive association between NSW and cabinet 
appointment. In this model Victoria is the excluded state so the positive coefficient for 
NSW indicates that there was some evidence that, in comparison to Victoria, there was 
a greater probability of becoming a CM if a member was from NSW.  
In Model 2 NSW is the (excluded) reference category for the states. The age and 
experience variables and their squares are as for Model 1. The only other variable with a 
significant coefficient is Queensland: Queensland is significantly (p<.05) negatively 
associated with CM appointment. A possible reason for the negative association 
between QLD and CM in the second model is that, as we saw in section 2 there was 
under-representation of Queensland and significant over-representation of NSW.  
The conclusion overall is that there are some statistically significant influences 
of the LNPC RIFs on appointment to cabinet. However, I wish to turn now to the 
question of how many actual cabinet appointments the models explain. The literature 
emphasises the role of RIFs in the explanation of cabinet appointments. In Models 1 and 
2 I have used the variables that are commonly cited as being important so we would 
expect that, as well as some statistical significance, a reasonable proportion of the actual 
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appointments would be correctly classified by the model. Despite the finding of a 
statistically significant influence of age and experience in both models, and of QLD 




The ability of the model to classify individuals into the CMs and non-CMs can 
be determined by considering the overall accuracy.
7
 This is calculated by taking the 
proportion of true classifications (True Positives and True Negatives ) over all 
classifications: 
 
Accuracy =  (TP + TN) / (TP + TN + FP +FN) 
 
A second set of measures is the Sensitivity and the Specificity of the model. The 
Sensitivity is the ability of the model to classify those who are actually positive cases 
(CMs) as positive cases. It is calculated by taking the Number of True Positives and 
dividing by the number of True Positives and False Negatives: 
 
Sensitivity =  TP / (TP +FN) 
 
The Specificity is the ability of the model to classify those who are actually 
negative cases (non-CMs) as negative cases. It is calculated by taking the Number of 
True Negatives and dividing by the number of True Negatives and False Positives: 
                                                 
6
 In reporting the performance of regression models it is customary to report r
2
 values in some 
form. It should be noted that this is a repeated measures design and therefore includes variance both 
between and within subjects. As such a meaningful r
2
 value cannot be calculated. 
7
 Cutpoints for all classification models in this thesis = 0.5. 




Specificity =  TN / (TN +FP) 
    
Sensitivity and specificity measure two different aspects of the classification 
accuracy of the model. To take account of the overall classification accuracy we need to 
consider a global measure of the extent to which the predicted classification is similar to 
the actual classification. One measure which provides this information is Cohen’s 
Kappa which measures the “agreement” of the predicted classification with the actual 
classification. The Kappa takes a value of -1 if there is complete disagreement, 0 if there 
is no agreement (that is, if the two sets of classifications are randomly associated) and 1 
if there is perfect agreement. 
 With measures of the accuracy, sensitivity, specificity and kappa, it is 
possible to assess the classification accuracy of the models. These can be compared with 
the baseline accuracy which is the “accuracy” which would occur if we assumed that no 
parliamentarian would become a CM. Figures for the two models are as follow: 
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The overall accuracy of each model is 87% which seems to indicate that the 
models are efficient. However, this is due to the fact that the vast majority of the cases 
(86%) are classified correctly simply due to the balance of the CM and non-CM 
categories. That is, 86% of the events are non-CM events and we would get all of these 
“correct” if we did not have a model but just assumed that there would be no CM 
events. In other words, we would get 86% accuracy simply by saying that no given 
individual would become a CM. The idea of using the model is that it should add to this 
baseline level of accuracy. However, the models add only a marginal increase in 
accuracy from 86% to 87%. In other words, despite including a vast amount of 
information which, according to the literature, is useful in explaining cabinet 
appointments, the models only provide a very marginal increase in the ability to explain 
cabinet appointments. It should be noted that an accuracy of 87% would be a good 
result if the sensitivity were significantly higher. However, this is not the case. The 
Model 1 Model 2
Accuracy 0.87 0.87
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sensitivity is only 25% indicating that the accuracy of the model comes from the 
baseline accuracy. 
However, there is evidence that the models classify well beyond what we would 
expect by chance alone. The Kappa of .28 (p<.01) for Model 1 and .30 (p<.01) for 
Model 2 show that there is a positive correlation between the predicted and actual 
classification for both models. Thus the variables in the model are able to add some 
information beyond mere chance. 
The next question is how well the model explains individual CM events. The 
sensitivity of .25 for Model 1 indicates that Model 1 can correctly classify 25% of the 
CM “events”. That is, of the 84 CM events, the model can identify 21. This leaves 63 
unexplained. Similarly, Model 2 can classify 26% of the 84 CM events which is 
effectively 21, the same as model 2.  
To summarise the discussion of the accuracy of the models in classifying CMs it 
is possible to say that the models definitely add to the classification accuracy over and 
above what would be achieved by chance alone. However, the model leaves a large 
number of CM events unexplained. Furthermore, the high level of correct classifications 
of the non-CM events (97%) is largely due to the default baseline accuracy which is an 
artefact of the high proportion of non-CM events in the dataset. 
A second study was undertaken, this time with data from the ALP in opposition. 
I pointed out above that the problem with the ALP data is that for most of the study 
period the shadow ministry was not divided into a shadow cabinet and a shadow outer 
ministry. However, in 2005 and 2006 the ministry was so divided so it was possible to 
run a similar analysis to that undertaken for the LNPC. However, it should be stated that 
the sample size is very much smaller for the ALP study so the results need to be 
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interpreted cautiously. In fact, the sample size falls below the threshold requirement of 
10 positive events per independent variable. Nevertheless the analysis yields some 
observations that partially overlap with the findings from the LNPC model.  
As with the LNPC models, two models were created each with one of the two 
main regional areas, NSW and Victoria, as the excluded regional category. There were 
no ministerial appointments from the ACT or the NT so these regions were eliminated 
from the analysis. As with the LNPC models, a repeated measures design was used. 
One main point of difference between the LNPC and the ALP scenario is that, 
unlike the LNPC, the ALP does not consist of two parties. However, it does contain 
several factions. In order to represent these, three basic categories were created: the Left 
faction; the Right faction; and a faction representing those that remained including those 
who identified with the centre-left and the independents.
8
 In the models the Right 
faction was the excluded category. 
 
Parameter estimates for both models are provided in Table 3.22. 
 
                                                 
8
 It should be noted that the information as to the factional memberships of ALP 
parliamentarians is not available from public sources. The data for this section of the analysis was 
assembled with the assistance of several individuals with a knowledge of ALP factional memberships, 
particularly John Nethercote and Jane O’Dwyer. 
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Table 3.22: Parameter Estimates - ALP  Multivariate Analysis 
 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 
 
The broad conclusions for the ALP models are as for the LNPC models except 
that neither of the age variables is significant in the ALP models, although age squared 







SA 1.875 2.613 *




AgeSq -.013 * -.012
Exp .740 *** .768 ***
ExpSq -.021 ** -.022 **
n 175 175
True Positives 7 9
False Positives 9 10
True Negatives 130 129
False Negatives 29 27
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is borderline significant (p<.1) in Model 1. In both ALP models, experience is 
positively and significantly (p<.01) associated with cabinet appointment while 
experience squared is negatively significantly (p<.05) associated with cabinet 
appointment. Thus, the same quadratic relationship between experience and executive 
appointment that occurs in the LNPC Model 1 is evident in the ALP models. However, 
years of parliamentary experience beyond which the probability of appointment falls in 
the ALP models is 19 which is much lower than the inflection point for experience in 
the LNPC models of 31. This difference may be due to there being very big differences 
in the appointment dynamics in government as opposed to opposition. Furthermore, the 
ALP data includes the entire shadow ministry rather than just the senior members of the 
ministry and this may have an effect on the results.  
In ALP Model 2 the parameter WA has a significant (p<.05) positive coefficient 
and indicating that coming from WA increases the odds of a shadow cabinet 
appointment. Similarly there is a borderline significant (p<.1) positive effect of coming 
from SA. In this Model the excluded regional variable is NSW. This means that the 
states of origin parameters in Model 2 are effectively compared with NSW. Thus, the 
positive coefficients for WA and SA indicate that, relative to NSW, there is an increase 
in the odds of being appointed to cabinet of coming from WA and SA. 
The classification accuracy of the ALP models is comparable to the 
classification accuracy of the LNPC models in that only a small proportion of the 
cabinet appointments are explained by the models.  
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The overall accuracy of Model 1 and Model 2 are .78 and .79 respectively. 
Given that the baseline accuracy is .79 there does not seem to be an improvement on 
what we would get by merely saying no individual will become a shadow CM in the 
ALP. However, there is some evidence that the models are able to classify beyond mere 
chance. The Kappas for Model 1 and 2 are .16 (p<.05) and .21 (p<.01). However, their 
magnitudes indicate that the classification accuracy is not greatly above the value of 0 
(no agreement) and does not come close to 1 (complete agreement). 
The sensitivity of .19 for Model 1 indicates that 19% of shadow ALP ministers 
are classified correctly while the sensitivity of .25 for Model 2 indicates that 25% of 
CMs are correctly classified. The high specificity values, as explained above, are due to 
the high proportion of shadow non-CMs in the sample. The conclusions from the 
classification performance of the ALP models are similar to those of the LNPC models: 
the models do not enable us to explain the majority of shadow cabinet appointments.  
Model 1 Model 2
Accuracy 0.78 0.79    
Baseline Accuracy 0.79 0.79    
Sensitivity 0.19 0.25    
Specificity 0.93 0.93    
Kappa 0.16* 0.21**
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 In short, the ALP RIF models, like the LNPC RIF models, have a 
classification accuracy beyond mere chance but overall leave the vast majority of CM 
appointment events unexplained. Unlike the LNPC models, in the ALP models neither 
age nor age squared have significant influence however experience and experience 
squared do. There is some indication that coming from SA and WA in comparison to 
NSW is beneficial for an appointment to the ALP shadow ministry. It should be noted 
that a direct comparison between the ALP and LNPC models may not be warranted 
because the study group is different in each case. Furthermore, the dynamics of 
appointment to the front bench in opposition may be unlike the dynamics of 
appointment to the frontbench in government. Finally, the ALP RIF model is 
constructed with a small sample size relative to the number of independent variables 
and this could affect the results. 
 
Summary of Section 3.4.1 
In this section I have used logistic regression to test the hypothesis that RIFs 
explain cabinet appointments. The analyses were run for the LNPC in government using 
cross-section data for five post-reshuffle period 1996-2007. For the ALP the analyses 
were run for the years 2005-2006. The findings were that age and cabinet appointment 
are related in a significant negative quadratic relationship in the LNPC, with a 
maximum at age 47. In the ALP models there is no such relationship between age and 
CM. However, the relationship between age squared and shadow cabinet appointment 
age is significant at the borderline level in ALP Model 1. In both the LNPC and the 
ALP there is a negative quadratic relationship between experience and cabinet 
appointment. However, the number of years of experience at which the maximum 
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probability of appointment occurs in the LNPC is 31 which is higher than the age at 
which the maximum probability occurs in the ALP of 19. This difference may reflect 
different dynamics of appointment in government as opposed to opposition. Of the other 
representational variables there is some evidence from the LNPC Model 2 that coming 
from Qld in comparison to NSW reduces a parliamentarian’s chances of cabinet 
appointment. There is borderline evidence from LNPC Model 1 that coming from NSW 
is positively associated with CM appointment.  There is evidence from the ALP model 2 
that an ALP parliamentarian coming from WA and SA in comparison to NSW has 
increased chance of shadow cabinet appointment. Beyond these no other variables are 
significant. 
 Of considerable moment is the finding that no model explains actual 
cabinet appointments to any great degree. The model with the highest sensitivity is 
LNPC model 2 which has a sensitivity of .26. Thus, the best model leaves 74% of the 
cabinet appointments unexplained. In short, there is very little evidence that the 
representational variables can be used to explain cabinet appointments in the LNPC 
over the period 1996-2007 or shadow cabinet appointments in the ALP over 2005-2006. 
Thus, despite the fact that leaders in general attempt to mirror the structure of 
parliament in their cabinets, the RIFs have little influence on the probability of an 
individual being appointed to cabinet. In the next section I will attempt to explain why 
this might be. 
 
Section 3.4.2: Explanation of the Results 
How can the coefficients for most of the RIFs in both parties be non-significant 
when much of the literature states that RIFs affect cabinet appointments? Furthermore, 
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how can it be that the RIFs explain very few actual cabinet appointments? As we saw in 
Section 2 there is a plethora of discussion as to who should be demoted and who should 
be promoted on the basis of the representation of states, parties, gender etc. However, 
the regression analysis tells a different story. The analysis shows that the influence of 
most RIFs is not statistically significant and that the effect on actual appointments is 
weak. How can we reconcile these two opposing viewpoints? 
  The answer is that the leaders are good enough at mirroring the 
representational structure of the parliament in their cabinets that the statistical effect of 
most RIFs on cabinet appointment is eliminated. A good way to conceptualise the 
situation is to consider the probability of selection in a virtual parliament. Consider a 
parliamentary party with 120 members from which the leader has to select a cabinet of 
12. The probability of being a CM for any individual is 1/10. Let us now divide the 
party into three factions (we could use states, gender or any other representational factor 
other than age or experience as the concept is exactly the same). Faction A has 30 
members, Faction B has 20 members and Faction C has 70 members. The leader needs 
to maintain factional balance in each of the factions so she must ensure that the 12 
members of cabinet are drawn from each faction in proportion to the faction’s numbers. 
Thus three members are drawn from Faction A, 2 from faction B and 7 from faction C. 
What is an individual’s probability of being CM for each faction? For faction A the 
probability is 3/30 = 1/10; for faction B the probability is 2/20 = 1/10, and for faction C 
the probability is 7/70 = 1/10. For all factions, the probability of being selected to 
become a member of Cabinet is 1/10, the same as the probability of being a CM for a 
member of the parliamentary party without taking into account factions. In other words, 
if the leader draws CMs from the factions in the same proportion as their numerical 
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representation in parliament, being a member of any faction does not alter the 
probability of being a CM no matter how numerous its members or “powerful” it is 
relative to the other factions.  
This explains why the coefficients for the RIFs except age and experience and 
some smaller states are not significant; Leaders tend to draw CMs from the various 
RIFs, reasonably closely to their numerical representation in parliament. They don’t do 
this in relation to age, experience, Queensland vis-à-vis NSW and possibly NSW vis-à-
vis Victoria in the LNPC; nor do they do this in relation to experience, SA or WA vis-à-
vis NSW in the ALP. For the other RIFs, they do mirror in cabinet the representation in 
parliament so there is no statistical effect of these other RIFs on cabinet appointments.  
 
Summary of Section 3.4 
I have examined the factors that are usually cited as being important for 
explaining cabinet appointments. I looked at the RIFs that are usually cited and found 
that in both the ALP and the LNPC there was a positive quadratic relationship between 
experience and cabinet appointment and between age and cabinet appointment in the 
LNPC. There was a significant negative effect of coming from QLD in comparison to 
NSW in the LNPC and a significant positive effect of coming from WA and SA in the 
ALP. No other variables were significant. Furthermore, in both the LNPC and the ALP I 
demonstrated that the explanatory power of both models was small. The two LNPC 
models explained only 25% (Model 1) and 26% (Model 2) of the cabinet appointments 
while the ALP model explained 19% (Model 1) and 25% (Model 2). I explained the 
lack of statistical effect of RIFs by pointing out that the RIFs do not affect the 
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probability of an individual being selected if the leader draws CMs from the various 
RIFs according to the parliamentary makeup of the RIFs.  
I can therefore conclude that there is little evidence for the RIFs explaining 
cabinet appointments.  
 
Summary of Chapter 3 
The focus of this chapter has been the RIFs that are commonly cited in the 
Australian literature as being important for determining CM appointments. They are 
important for the current thesis because if cabinet appointments are made on the basis of 
these factors then, according to the standard argument, they should have an effect on the 
probability of an individual becoming a CM. With this in mind I examined the RIFs and 
their relation to cabinet appointments in the case of the Howard LNPC government 
1996-2007. 
The first stage of the process was to descriptively examine the RIFs. This 
involved looking at the media debate over 1996-2007 and the relationship between the 
actual and expected number of CMs for the RIFs under investigation. The general 
finding here is that the media debate provides some indication of the pressures the 
leader was under to represent the various RIFs. There are generally four different 
scenarios for the various RIFs: chronic under-representation (as with females); chronic 
over-representation (as with NSW); variation between over and under–representation 
(as with the Senate) and; close to perfect representation (as with the National Party). In 
the case of age and experience there is more leeway, and there is some evidence of a 
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tradeoff between experience and age such that the leader seems to have attempted to get 
a relatively experienced cabinet but to occasionally infuse it with “new blood”.  
The next stage in the process was to examine the RIFs in a multivariate setting. 
This was done using a repeated measures design logistic regression analysis. In the case 
of the LNPC there is evidence of a negative quadratic effect of age, experience, and 
borderline evidence that coming from NSW in comparison to Victoria is a positive 
influence on CM. There is also evidence of a negative influence of coming from 
Queensland in comparison to Victoria. In the case of the ALP in opposition there is 
good evidence of a negative quadratic relationship between experience and shadow CM 
appointment. There is also borderline evidence of a non-linear relationship between age 
and appointments as the squared term for age was negative and significant at the p<.1 
level in Model 1. However, in neither of the models was the age variable significant. 
There was also evidence that coming from WA and SA as opposed to Victoria has a 
positive influence. There is no evidence of the other RIFS having an influence on CM. 
I went on to assess the classification accuracy of the models. The conclusion was 
that the classification accuracy did not explain the vast bulk of CM appointments. My 
overall conclusion was that the RIFS are not as important in determining cabinet 
appointments as the literature suggests.  
My next task was to try to explain why the RIFs, apart from a few exceptions, 
are not statistically linked to cabinet appointments despite the obvious efforts the leader 
made to appoint CMs from cabinet in proportion to the various RIF proportions in 
parliament. I explained this by pointing out that if the cabinet directly mirrors 
parliament as a whole then the statistical effect of the RIFs will be eliminated.  
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Having failed to explain the vast bulk of cabinet appointments using RIFs I will 
now turn to methods based more on individual factors. 
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Chapter 4: Towards a Method of Measuring Ministerial Ability 
 
Section 4.1: Introduction 
The findings from the previous chapter enable us to say that the RIFs commonly 
referred to in the literature and the public debate are not able to explain the vast majority 
of cabinet appointments. This leaves us with three possibilities.  
The first is that there are other representational variables that we have not 
discovered which explain cabinet appointments. This is unlikely because given that the 
leader is under intense scrutiny, particularly from the popular press, it would seem 
unlikely that there could be another set of variables which the leader was taking into 
account.  
A second possibility is that individuals are selected for cabinet roles on the basis 
of random assignment. That is, the leader randomly selects individuals and, subject to 
the need to make her cabinet representative of all the competing RIFs, there is no other 
identifiable selection criterion. In other words, it is possible that there is no selection on 
the basis of either RIFs or individual talents and abilities and that the references to these 
in the literature are merely post hoc anecdotal accounts. This would mean that those 
who engage in discussions of ministerial ability are falling foul of the “narrative 
fallacy” (Taleb 2008: p62). This phenomenon is based on the human need for some kind 
of explanatory narrative to account for complex events, the actual causes of which we 
were not able to discern prior to the event but which, after the event, become “obvious”.  
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It is a third possibility that I wish to explore: that there are individual differences 
in the abilities of ministers. If this account is true then it may still not be possible to 
identify what these differences are. Perhaps if we were to administer a battery of 
personality tests to cabinet ministers and a control group of non-ministers we might be 
in a good position to identify what the differences are. As it is, even if we operate under 
the assumption that there is a difference between cabinet ministers and non-cabinet 
ministers we still have to find variables that tap into these difference. This is the 
essential subject matter of this chapter – how do we identify a set of independent 
variables that can be used to determine the differences between CMs and non-CMs? 
Primarily this will involve looking at the rather ephemeral concept of ministerial ability. 
The literature often refers to ministerial talent but stops short at trying to assess or 
measure it. In this chapter I will take steps to try to come up with a way of identifying 
individuals who have ministerial ability.  
One of the most obvious places to look for differences in individual abilities is 
education. The education one receives is a very good indication of the abilities one has. 
It is highly unlikely that an expert in classical languages will lack verbal ability. 
Similarly it is unlikely that a scholar doing pioneering work in topology will lack spatial 
skills. Thus, education is a primary source of information as to the specific skills an 
individual has.  
Another source of information about individual abilities is the way an individual 
uses language. We saw in Chapter 2 that Rose (1975) points out that most of the skills 
required of a minister are based on verbal ability. Cohen (1990) makes a claim about 
what an aspiring minister must do and, on inspection, most of these activities are 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
130 
 
verbally oriented. We also saw that the skills that were salient in enabling Howard and 
Rudd to rise to senior ministerial roles were verbally based. It therefore seems that a 
good place to start looking for a method of identifying ministerial ability is to look at 
the speech behaviour of parliamentarians. As I will show in this chapter, differences in 
the ways individuals use language can be used to determine cognitive and psychological 
differences. 
Another set of characteristics that will be examined are biographical variables. 
These are not specifically markers of cognitive style but may be important in 
distinguishing between CMs and non-CMs for other reasons. Age at the time of entering 
parliament will be used because the idea of there being a relationship between age and 
appointment to high political office is a recurring motif in the literature. We also have 
direct evidence from the modelling in the last chapter that age is likely to be important. I 
will also include gender in the selection of independent variables. Finally, the 
circumstances in which the first speech was delivered needs to be taken into 
consideration. While this is not a biographical variable, there is some evidence that 
those whose party is in opposition tend to use language that is different from those 
whose party is in government (Hirst, Riabinin and Graham 2010). Therefore I include a 
dummy variable for this purpose in case this phenomenon is important. 
The next question that needs to be addressed is where to draw this data from. In 
the case of educational and biographical data this is not difficult as there is detailed 
information on the qualifications, dates of service and dates of birth of parliamentarians 
in the Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia (1968-2008). 
However, there is a major issue in terms of finding speech samples. One might think 
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that because there is a record of parliamentarians speech in the form of Hansard this 
would not be a problem. In fact, there are problems with gaining representative speech 
samples that can be meaningfully compared. The highly prepared speech of a minister 
may not be as representative as a more spontaneous speech. Another problem is getting 
a sample of speeches from the range of individuals under study. Certainly it is possible 
to get speech samples of the CMs. However, many backbenchers say little during their 
entire parliamentary careers. My solution to these problems rests on recognising that 
there is one type of parliamentary speech that is very similar for all parliamentarians and 
is delivered by all parliamentarians in essentially the same circumstances – the maiden 
speech. My source for speeches will therefore be the first official parliamentary speech 
of each parliamentarian. As I will explain in detail below, this source has various 
advantages for extracting information about the speaker’s cognitive style over other 
speeches delivered in a parliamentarian’s career. I will use this source to examine what 
neophyte parliamentarians think is important and, more importantly, I will get an 
indication of how they think. The idea here is that a snapshot at this time is an indication 
of overall cognitive style. It is a contention of this thesis that cognitive style is the 
fundamental factor that determines whether or not a parliamentarian becomes a CM.  
Having identified the maiden speech as the text source, the next issue is how 
precisely to analyse the text. In order to determine the most appropriate method I will 
review a number of different text analysis methods. I will show that there are a number 
of text analysis methods that have been applied in a number of domains including 
political speeches, all of which have some merit. I divide the text analysis methods 
reviewed in this chapter into two basic categories: those that are based on some a priori 
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idea about what kinds of linguistic phenomena are of interest – the “content analysis” 
methods, and those that are based purely on the distribution of words in the text – the 
“text” analysis methods. Both have merit and I will explain why I have decided to use 
content analysis rather than text analysis. 
Thus, this chapter is intended to address the following issues: 
1) We need to recognise that the RIFs do not explain the vast majority of cabinet 
appointments and therefore it is possible that it is individual qualities that play 
an important role in determining cabinet appointments. 
2) Methods of determining some measure of individual qualities needs to be 
derived. One method is to use the educational backgrounds of parliamentarians 
to determine cognitive orientations. Another method is to use speech samples to 
isolate the way individuals reveal cognitive style in their speech. Finally, a 
number of biographical variables will be included on the assumption that these 
can reveal cognitive characteristics.  
3) Determining the educational background is a straightforward procedure which 
simply requires collecting data about what qualifications parliamentarians have. 
This is also the means by which biographical data will be sourced. 
4) Determining the verbal characteristics of parliamentarians is significantly more 
involved and requires two steps. The first is the identification of a representative 
speech sample for each parliamentarian. It is contended that the maiden speech 
is ideal for this purposes.  The second is to determine a method of analysing 
speech. It is contended that content analysis is the most appropriate way of doing 
this. 
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 By following these steps I should be able to develop a set of independent 
variables based on the educational background and verbal behaviour of 
parliamentarians. These independent variables can subsequently be used to see if 
there is a significant difference in the verbal style of cabinet ministers and non-
cabinet ministers. 
 
Section 4.2: Education as a Marker of Cognitive Style 
We have seen in chapter 2 that Kerby (2009) found, in the Canadian context, a 
positive relationship between having a university education and the “risk” of becoming 
a CM. Having a legal background was also positively associated with increased 
probability of becoming a CM. O’Malley (2006) demonstrated that a tertiary education 
was significantly associated with the odds of appointment to cabinet in Ireland. Kam et 
al (2010) found that Oxbridge education was positively associated with appointment to 
the UK cabinet and Dewan et al (2007) found that Oxbridge education reduced the risk 
of de-selection. Thus there are good precedents for the idea that education may be 
linked with decisions about the kinds of individuals who will function well in cabinet.  
Education can be used as a means of coding for a number of inherent 
characteristics of parliamentarians. Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding, for example, 
consider that public school or Oxbridge education could be a means of capturing 
characteristics such as acquired skills, latent ability or access to social networks. 
(Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding 2012: 79). In this thesis I wish to emphasise the 
importance of education as a marker of cognitive thinking styles. Thus, the specific 
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subject area pursued by a parliamentarian is what I need to code for. The idea here is 
that a particular type of education is likely to be linked to a particular way of looking at 
the world. This is not to posit a causal relationship between the two. I am not asserting 
that a particular type of personality or cognitive style is likely to be attracted to a 
particular type of education. Nor am I asserting the reverse – that a particular type of 
education is likely to have an effect on the cognitive orientation of an individual, 
although both these scenarios are compatible with the idea that the kind of education 
one has is a good maker of cognitive style.  
The idea that there is a link between the type of education pursued by an 
individual and their personality style is by no means a new idea. Lievens, Coetsier, De 
Fruyt and De Maeseneer (2002) found that medical students were more likely than other 
students to score highly on extroversion and agreeableness; Boone, van Olffen and 
Roijakkers (2004) found that individuals with a high internal locus of control were more 
likely to select subject areas for study that were more challenging and uncertain and led 
to more unstructured future careers in comparison to individuals with a low internal 
locus of control; Frey and Meier (2003) used data on contributions to social funds and 
found that students of political economy are more generous than students of business 
economics; McLain and Christiansen (1970) found that students training to be English 
teachers tended to be more extroverted, independent and emotional than other students; 
Trautwein and Lüdtke (2007) found that final year high school students who score 
highly on certainty beliefs (that is, they see scientific theories and findings as correct, 
true and stable and believe there is a “right” answer to all questions) were more likely to 
enrol in applied areas such as engineering and business while those low on the certainty 
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of knowledge scale were more likely to enrol in pure and “soft science” areas such as 
the social sciences and humanities. Interestingly, the study found that when the cohort 
was followed up two years later and had enrolled in their chosen fields of study, the 
differences in certainty beliefs were more pronounced indicating that there was a 
socialisation process at work on top of the self-selection process.  
Thus, there is good reason to believe that the education a parliamentarian 
pursues is a good marker of other cognitive characteristics. The specific psychological 
characteristics that each type of education might represent may be difficult to determine. 
Furthermore, it is possible that despite education being a good marker of psychological 
characteristics, the characteristics that they pick out may not be those that distinguish 
between CMs and non-CMs. Nevertheless, education is a good place to start.  
From the literature, it would seem that an appropriate starting point for coding 
for education would be to flag particular types of education. It is therefore proposed that 
binary variables be provided for 1) Legal education, 2) Arts/Humanities education, 3) 
Economics/Business 4) Teacher Education, 5) Science/Technical Education, 6) Medical 
Education.  Coding for these variables accounts for 96 of the 97 individuals with a 
tertiary education in the sample of 134 used for modelling in Chapter 6.  
 
Summary of Section 4.2 
In this section I have given an overview of the reasons for including some 
measure of education. Education is likely to be a very good marker of cognitive style 
and therefore it is likely to provide the kind of marker that may be useful in 
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distinguishing between CMs and non-CMs. To this end six dummy variables will be 
investigated to determine whether they are associated with the likelihood of being 
appointed to cabinet.   
In the next section I will continue the attempt to isolate parliamentarians’ 
individual cognitive differences by focusing on variables associated with linguistic 
behaviour. 
 
Section 4.3: Verbal Behaviour as a Marker of Cognitive Style 
In this section I wish to examine how language use might be used to tap into 
cognitive style. Again, the underlying assumption here is that there are cognitive 
differences between CMs and non-CMs. If there are no such cognitive differences then 
it is unlikely that cognitive differences as revealed by language use will be useful in 
distinguishing between CMs and non-CMs. However, an examination of the reasons 
why some parliamentarians are appointed to cabinet while most are not requires that we 
look for differences between them and a plausible place to look for cognitive 
differences is in the way language is used.  
In the remainder of this section I would like to take two steps towards analysing 
the language of parliamentarians. The first is to determine the source for the samples of 
speech. I will argue that the maiden speech is an ideal such source. The second is to 
determine how the sample maiden speeches should be analysed in such a way as to 
generate independent variables. I will argue that the ideal way to do this is to use 
content analysis. 




Section 4.3.1: Maiden Speeches as a Source for Speech Behaviour 
Maiden speeches were used to analyse Australian parliamentarians by Pickering 
(1996) who used them to compare the incoming LNPC MPs in 1996 with those of 1975. 
Pickering held that the maiden speech “…provides an important window into the minds 
of those who have sought and achieved office on behalf of the coalition” (Pickering 
1996: 96). The basis of comparison was the difference in content between the incoming 
36 LNPC MPs after the Federal election of 1996 on the one hand and that of the 33 
incoming LNPC parliamentarians in December 1975 on the other. One of the significant 
differences Pickering found was the differing emphasis placed on small business and the 
family by the different cohorts. Small business received 100 mentions in 36 speeches 
from the 1996 cohort compared with 8 mentions in the 33 speeches from the 1975 
cohort, indicating that small business became significantly more important in 1996 
compared with 1975 (Pickering 1996: 106). Another difference was the rate of mentions 
of the family. The family was mentioned on average four times per speech by the 1996 
cohort but not at all by the 1975 cohort.  
Power and Beradone (1998) compared the first speeches of a random sample of 
5 men and 5 women in the House of Representatives of the 38th parliament. The idea 
behind the study was that both the style and content of women’s speeches differ from 
men’s and therefore this should be detectable in maiden speeches. The assumption is 
based on Power and Beradone’s observation that previous research into women’s 
speech “...indicate[s] that women seek confirmation more from the other speaker, are 
more precise in their speech and speak less than men do, but they speak of attitudes, 
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beliefs and concerns more than men do”(Power and Beradone 1998: 4). The main 
findings of the study of parliamentary speeches were that women acknowledge support 
from others more than men do, women disclose more personal information than men, 
and women focus more than men on topics and issues relating to the three broad 
categories of family/spouse/children, crime/police/violence, and gender equity (Power 
and Beradone 1998: 9). 
Maiden speeches will be used in the current thesis because, it is contended, they 
are able to provide linguistic clues to the cognitive makeup of parliamentarians. The 
idea is that there may be a cognitive style that is associated with cabinet membership 
and this can be extracted from the speech acts of parliamentarians. The maiden speeches 
of parliamentarians are a good source for these speech acts because the speech acts all 
occur in a similar manner, format and context.  
In House of Representatives Practice the first speech is defined as being the first 
speech delivered in the House, notwithstanding that the member may have previously 
served in the Senate or a State parliament. The convention is that the first speech, which 
is not to exceed 20 minutes, is heard without interruption and that the speech not be 
unduly provocative. The speech of a new member is usually made in the Address in 
Reply debate of a new parliament following a general election. Members elected at a 
by-election usually give their speech in debate on Appropriation bills. The rules of 
relevance are suspended in relation to a first speech such that the member need not 
confine the content of their speech to the subject matter of the debate at hand 
(Department of the House of Representatives 2005: 141-142). As such, a speech is the 
opportunity for the new member to introduce themselves to the parliament and make a 
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general statement of their aims and intentions.  Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice 
defines the first speech in the Senate in essentially similar terms (Department of the 
Senate 2008: 210). 
From the guidelines set out above it is clear that the topics of maiden speeches 
are intended to be general. This is certainly what inspection of the speeches reveals.  
Most speeches include a biographical sketch of the parliamentarian and reference to the 
characteristics of her electorate. Most speeches also cover general economic issues as 
well as specific economic issues that affect the parliamentarian’s electorate. Most 
speeches also cover in detail issues that interest the parliamentarian. Finally, many 
speeches include sections on thanking people who have helped the parliamentarian get 
into parliament. This kind of broad spectrum of topics that have been chosen by the 
parliamentarian is what is needed to compare parliamentarians. To see why this is 
important consider a speech by a parliamentarian representing her party’s position on a 
specific concrete area such as taxation policy and a speech by another parliamentarian 
representing her party’s position on a more abstract specific area such as human rights. 
If we were to compare these we might conclude that the first parliamentarian was more 
concrete in outlook while the latter was more abstract. In fact, it is the subject matter 
that is leading to the distinction not the cognitive style of the parliamentarian. In order 
to avoid this problem we need general speeches and the maiden speech is likely to be 
significantly more general than any other speech a parliamentarian will make in her 
parliamentary career. Thus, the maiden speech is ideal for getting a speech sample that 
shows how the parliamentarian addresses a relatively broad spectrum of subjects.  
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It should be stated at this point that there is no suggestion that there might be a 
causal connection between the speech and the subsequent career trajectory. Rather, the 
maiden speech is being taken as a marker of cognitive characteristics. Because it is 
essentially on topics of the parliamentarian’s own choosing, the maiden speech is likely 
to be highly indicative of what the parliamentarian considers important. As such it is 
likely to be indicative of what the parliamentarian thinks about and, more importantly, 
how the parliamentarian thinks. The maiden speech therefore instantiates a general set 
of psychological/cognitive characteristics of the individual and it is contended that these 
characteristics are related to a parliamentarian’s chances of being appointed to cabinet. 
Thus, it makes no sense to say that a minister might change the content of her maiden 
speech in an attempt to change her career trajectory. A good analogy here is that of a 
blood test is used to assess the risk of a heart attack. There is not a causal relationship 
between having high blood pressure and having a heart attack. However, such a marker 
is indicative of a syndrome, the presence of which increases the risk of having a heart 
attack. Similarly, it is contended that the presence of certain verbal characteristics as 
revealed in maiden speeches does not cause selection to cabinet.  However, they may be 
related to a cognitive “syndrome”, the presence of which significantly increases the 
“risk” of being selected for a CM role. 
One other issue of importance is whether the maiden speech consists of the 
parliamentarian’s own thoughts. The issue here is that many high profile political 
leaders have speeches written for them and therefore the texts may not reflect the 
cognitive characteristics of the “speaker”. The “ghost writer” problem has been given 
careful consideration in the literature. Winter (1987) explained why presidential 
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inaugural addresses, usually written by a speechwriter, could be reliably used as a basis 
for content analytical assessments of individual presidents even though the presidents 
are unlikely to have written them. There are two reasons why, according to Winter, the 
prepared speech can be relied on as a marker of what the speaker think. Firstly, a good 
speech writer will produce words and images that the “client” will feel comfortable 
with. Secondly, the client will spend considerable time reviewing and vetting the text 
(Winter 1987: 198). 
Support for this contention of Winter’s comes from Ballard (1983) who found 
that the spontaneous speech utterances of a selection of Canadian prime Ministers had 
the same level of linguistic complexity as prepared speeches. This supports the idea that 
speech writers and adapt to their client’s style and that the client will adapt the 
speechwriter’s words to his own style. However in contrast to the findings of Ballard, 
Dille and Young (2000) found in an analysis of the speeches of presidents Carter and 
Clinton that there was a difference in the complexity of spontaneous and prepared 
speech, with spontaneous speech being more complex. Their explanation was that 
speech writers tend to reduce the complexity of speech for mass consumption. Thus, 
there is evidence for both sides of the ghost writer argument. 
Fortunately, this problem is not as great in the current situation is it is with 
speeches from high profile politicians. The ghost writer issue emerged because the texts 
being used were known to have been written by others because the individuals under 
study were high profile leaders such as presidents. Such individuals have the resources 
available to have speeches written for them. But maiden speeches in the Australian 
federal parliament are typically given by low profile newly elected members of 
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parliament. Such individuals tend to have very limited resources and are therefore very 
unlikely to have personal speechwriters. What this means is that, although there will 
certainly be parliamentarians who have had their speeches written for them, the vast 
majority will not and therefore, in general, the speeches are likely to represent the ideas 
and cognitive style of the parliamentarians delivering them.  
 
Section 4.3.2: Deriving Independent Variables from Texts 
The decision to use maiden speeches as a source of independent variables raises 
the question as to the manner in which the speeches are to be analysed. Clearly, the text 
of the speech needs to be analysed in some systematic way. In this section I will briefly 
review several methods of reducing texts to variables that can be used in statistical 
modelling. The basic requirement here is that the texts need to be broken down into 
some kind of numerical data. The question is what kind of variables will be most 
useful? Various text and content analysis methods could be used so the important issue 
to address is which methods are most likely to tap into individual markers of cognitive 
style. I will argue in this section that two specific forms of content analysis will be the 
appropriate way to proceed.  
 
Content Analysis versus Text Analysis 
There are two broad approaches to analysing text. The traditional approach is 
content analysis which focuses on analysing texts by looking for some kind of pre-
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determined content. The other approach is text analysis which treats the words in text 
inductively as data independent of the semantic content of the text.  
A good example of a method of content analysis is the study by Power and 
Beradone (1998). This study involves a content analysis of five maiden speeches of men 
and five of women of the 38
th
 parliament. As stated above, they found that women 
acknowledge support from others more than men do, disclose more personal 
information than men, focus more than men on topics and issues relating to the family, 
crime and gender equity (Power and Beradone 1998, p. 9). This is essentially a content 
analysis because their starting point is that there is a particular content that distinguishes 
women’s from men’s texts. Consider their finding that women acknowledge support 
more than men do. In order to ascertain this it is necessary to find statements in which 
the speaker expresses gratitude. Thus, the number of words devoted to “thanking” in 
women’s speeches is compared with that of men. Similarly, the finding that women 
mention issues about crime, the family and gender equity requires that a particular 
selection of words is sought in each of these categories. In short, there is a search for 
particular content. 
Power and Beradone’s (1998) study is in stark contrast to the approach used in 
an archetypal text analytical technique, that of Laver, Benoit and Gary (2003) who 
“…present a new way of extracting policy positions from political texts that treats texts 
not as discourses to be understood and interpreted but rather, as data in the form of 
words” (Laver et al 2003: 312). The approach they use is to focus on word frequencies 
in texts. The starting point is to examine a sample of texts, the authors of which are 
known to have a particular ideological orientation. The particular words and their 
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relative frequencies that distinguish between these political orientations are then derived 
from the texts. By comparing scoring “virgin” texts on the basis of the word frequencies 
derived from the training sample it is possible to derive the ideological position of the 
virgin texts. The idea here is that the relative frequencies of the words in the reference 
sample is a signature of ideological orientation. It should be noted that there is no 
reference to meaning, semantics or content. The process requires no interpretation. 
However, it should be noted that the selection of reference texts and their scoring on 
ideological position can be considered to an extent an interpretative exercise (Laver et 
al 2003: 314). 
Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov and Laver (2011) describe a content analytical 
approach to the same problem of determining the political orientation of texts. The 
method used in this study is described as “traditional manual content analysis” (Lowe et 
al 2011: 124). The political orientation of texts is based the count of 13 “left” and 13 
“right” categories of content. That is, there are 13 categories of typically “right” policy 
content and 13 categories of typically “left” policy content. The coder looks for this 
content and the tallied scores for each of these categories provide the basis for 
positioning a given text on a left-right scale. The important difference between this 
approach and that of Laver et al (2003) is that the construction of the scale in the former 
case is dependent on coding specifically identified content whereas the latter involves 
no such search for content but relies on the distributions of words in the archetypically 
“left” and “right” texts. 
One way of looking at the difference between content analysis and text analysis 
is to say that content analysis tends to be deductive while text analysis is inductive. 
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Content analysis starts with an assumption about what should be in particular kinds of 
document and then goes about looking for it. Text analysis makes no assumptions about 
what should be present or absent in different kinds of documents but instead takes what 
it finds and uses these findings as a basis for making distinctions between kinds of 
documents (Laver et al 2003: 314). 
Between the two extremes of the Power and Beradone (1998) approach and that 
of Laver et al (2003) there are methods that adopt elements of each. In the following 
review of the literature it is not intended to try to classify the various approaches into 
content analysis and text analysis. Rather, the attempt is made to give an overview of 
the kinds of analysis that have been undertaken. At the end of the section I will explain 
why, for the purposes of tapping into cognitive differences, a method that is more 
content analytic (deductive) should be preferred over the more text analytic (inductive) 
one.  
House, Spangler and Woycke (1991) analysed the inaugural speeches of 31 
presidents in order to derive a number of psychological constructs. Their hypothesis was 
that presidents’ scores on these psychological constructs should be related to subsequent 
assessments of the presidents’ charisma and achievements. Their approach was heavily 
deductive. For example they assumed that the number of times the word “not” was 
mentioned in the text divided by the number of words in the text gave a measure of the 
construct “Activity Inhibition”, which is a measure of the extent to which an individual 
is willing to use “…power to achieve institutional or social goals rather than personal 
goals” (House, Spangler and Woycke 1991, p365). Using the texts to generate measures 
for Activity Inhibition, and three other psychological constructs, they found some 
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support for their hypothesis that each of the constructs were related to various measures 
of charisma and greatness. The interesting point of this from the perspective of the 
current thesis is that they were able to extract from the inaugural speeches personality 
elements that were shown to be related to the subsequent career performance of 
presidents. This supports the idea that speeches in a politician’s career contain elements 
that mark their psychological and cognitive style. 
 In a similar vein to House Spengler and Woycke’s study, Emrich, Brower, 
Feldman and Garland (2001) analysed US presidents’ inaugural speeches to determine 
whether those that used more imagery were perceived as having higher levels of 
charisma and greatness. According to Emrich et al (2001), certain categories of words 
are more evocative than others. Thus, using a phrase such as “I have a dream” is 
somehow more evocative than a phrase such as “I have an idea”, and this should mean 
that listeners perceive those who use more evocative phases as being more charismatic 
and “great”. In order to score each speech for evocativeness they used Martindale’s 
(1975, cited in Emrich et al 2001: 530) 2900 word Regressive Imagery Dictionary. This 
dictionary lists words in different categories which fall into two broad categories of 
words: those that are evocative of physical sensations on the one hand and those that are 
conceptual on the other. The general hypothesis was supported. Those presidents who 
used more image-based speech were considered by historians to be “greater” and scored 
higher on various measures of charisma. 
The Emrich et al (2001) study like the House et al (1991) study shows how 
information about the underlying characteristics of individuals can be derived “at a 
distance” by using speeches. The main difference between the two studies is that the 
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data extracted from the speeches in the House et al (1991) study were psychological 
constructs whereas the data extracted in the Emrich et al (2001) study were of a 
propensity to use a particular kind of language. The important point is whether 
extracting linguistic proxies for psychological constructs or general linguistic markers 
of cognitive style, speeches can be used as a source of useful information about 
individuals.  
There is tradition in the content analysis literature of attempting to identify traits 
that can be used to explain the behaviour of leaders in office. A good example of this is 
Herman’s (2005) Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA). This framework uses insights from 
cognitive psychology to derive seven constructs that measure the “traits” of   need for 
power, ethnocentrism, locus of control, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, distrust 
of others, and task/interpersonal emphasis. The idea is that these traits can be used to 
explain why particular leaders took particular courses of action while in office. The 
interesting aspect of the approach for the current thesis is that the scores on these traits 
are all derived using “at a distance” methods: the scores are entirely derived from the 
public speech acts of leaders. For example, conceptual complexity is measured by 
creating an index based on the frequency with which they use words associated with 
high or low levels of complex thinking. According to the theory, the conceptually 
complex person sees the world in a nuanced rather than black and white way. The 
speech acts of leaders are used to identify their level of conceptual complexity, the 
assumption being that the way a leader speaks reflects the way she processes 
information about the external world. This profile can then be used to explain their 
behaviour in office. The measure is calculated by dividing the number of words 
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denoting certainty by the number of words denoting tentativeness. The use of tentative 
words to qualify statements, such as “probably” and “likely”, indicate a higher level of 
cognitive complexity than words such as “certainly” and “definitely”.   
Dyson (2009) applied this technique to responses to foreign policy questions in 
the House of Commons by post-1945 British prime ministers and found that Margaret 
Thatcher had the lowest conceptual complexity of the post 1945 prime ministers. Dyson 
claims that Thatcher’s low level of conceptual complexity was evident in her propensity 
to see the world in binary “us and them” terms.  Dyson points out that Thatcher’s 
colleagues and biographers found a tendency toward black-and-white thinking to be one 
of the foremost characteristics of her leadership. Anthony King (1985: 132, cited in 
Dyson 2009: 38) notes “a disposition to see the political world as divided into friends 
and enemies, goodies and baddies”.  
A concept similar to conceptual complexity is integrative complexity (Suedfeld 
and Rank, 1976; Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock, Hannum and 
Micheletti, 1984). As with Herman’s (2005) approach, the basic idea behind these 
concepts is that individuals differ in the way they process information, come to 
conclusions, and make decisions.  
LTA and integrative complexity can be considered to be within the content 
analysis tradition because the approach is to look for particular content. In the case of 
conceptual complexity the content under investigation is complexity of information 
processing.   
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Purpura and Hillard (2006) use a system akin to that of Laver et al (2003) in that 
they use individual words to classify texts. Their aim was to automate the classification 
of legislative bills according to the 20 major topics and 226 sub-topics of the Policy 
Agendas Program. A given bill can be classified into one major topic and one sub-topic. 
The idea of using word frequencies is that certain types of bill will contain certain types 
of words: a document containing the high frequencies of the words “international” and 
“trade”, for example, is likely to belong to the major topic category of Foreign Trade. 
Similarly, a document containing high frequencies of the words “export” and “subsidy” 
is likely to fit into the sub-topic Tariff and Export Restrictions.  In the procedure each 
word in a document was weighted according to the number of occurrences divided by 
the number of all other words. A “training sample” of bills that had already been 
classified provided the word frequency signatures for each of the topic and sub-topics. 
The algorithm compares the word frequency scores of un-classified bills against the 
word frequency scores of the classified bills. Clearly, this method is inductive in that the 
schema for classifying bills is taken as given by the word frequencies. There is no 
specific content that the classification scheme relies on other than the distribution of 
words in the texts. 
The above review covers only a small fraction of the growing number of articles 
on content analysis, and text analysis. Due to the availability of texts in the form of 
‘blogs’ and “tweets” methods of extracting data in the form of opinion mining and 
sentiment analysis are developing at a great rate. The common element to all of these is 
the reduction of text to some form that can be used for further analysis.  
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The question we are left with is which method should be used in the current 
application? The answer, I submit, is that I need to select a method that is appropriate to 
the task. Strictly speaking, I am not trying to classify texts, I am trying to classify 
individuals. The basis on which I am trying to classify individuals is their cognitive 
profile. As such, the ideal method of breaking down the speeches should be one that 
enables me to track the cognitive style of individuals. This means that I will need to use 
some form of content analysis. I am looking for some kind of cognitive difference 
between CMs and non-CMs so I will need to break each speech down into some proxy 
for cognitive style. In other words I need to look for content related to cognitive style.  
There are two content analysis methods I wish to use. One is based on research 
into psycholinguistics, the other has become the industry standard for text analysis in 
psychology and related disciplines – Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). 
 
Psycholinguistic Content Analysis 
This method of content analysis is based on Paivio Yuille and Madison’s (1968) 
and Clarke and Paivio’s (2004) word norms. The idea is to score each speech on the 32 
psycholinguistic variables under consideration in these studies. 
 The Paivio Yuille and Madison (1968) and Clarke and Paivio (2004) 
(PYMCP) word norms are based on a sample of 925 nouns. For each of these words, 32 
linguistic and psycholinguistic variables were derived. Many of these are structural and 
include such measures as the number of letters and number of syllables. The more 
interesting from a cognitive style point of view are those variables that were derived 
from subjects’ responses to the words. For each word, subjects were asked to answer 
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questions on a number of psycholinguistic dimensions. For example, meaningfulness 
was derived by asking subjects, for each word, how many associated words they could 
think of in 30 seconds. Similarly, the age of acquisition was derived by asking subjects 
at what age they estimate they learnt each of the 925 words.  The result is that there are 
32 variables for each of the 925 words that measure structural and psycholinguistic 
properties. This means that for each word there is a comprehensive set of variables that 
tap into the nature of the word and how it is processed by subjects. 
 The idea of scoring each speech on these 32 variables was that the 
psycholinguistic characteristics measured by the variables may enable us to tap into 
differences in the cognitive style of parliamentarians. For example, one of the 32 
psycholinguistic variables is the age of acquisition which measures the average age of 
acquisition of the 925 words across the cohort of subjects used in the study. The idea is 
that simpler more concrete words are acquired at an earlier age and the AOA measure 
should provide insight into various aspects of the way language is used by individuals 
with different cognitive styles. My use of this variable is based on the idea that a 
parliamentarian whose speech includes a lot of words with a high age of acquisition 
could be considered to be using language that differs on some cognitive dimension from 
that of a parliamentarian who uses a lot of words with a lower age of acquisition. Given 
that there is a strong verbal emphasis in the selection of parliamentarians it is 
conceivable that such variables may have the key to distinguishing between those who 
become CMs and those who do not.  
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To explain how the scoring of the speeches was done I will use the “ease of 
definitions” (Def) variable. All 32 variables were used by me to score the speeches in 
the same way. 
Before I begin my explanation it is worthwhile explaining precisely what Def is 
a measure of. The PYMCP Def scores for each of the words in the 925 word sample 
were derived by asking subjects to score how easy it would be to explain the meaning of 
the word on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being the easiest. Out of the sample of 925 words 
the word that was easiest to define was “baby” (score = 6.79) while the word that was 
the hardest to define was “gadfly” (score = 1.92). Over the 925 words, the average score 
was 5.14. No individual words scored precisely the average of 5.14 however words with 
in this range were “vessel” (5.13), “warmth” (5.13), “alimony” (5.17) and “caravan” 
(5.17).  
To use the raw Def scores to score speeches, the first stage was to determine, for 
each speech, which of the 925 words in the PYMCP sample were present. The average 
Def score for each speech could then be calculated. Consider for example the sentence  
 “The baby ridiculed the gadfly’s caravan”, 
In this sentence the words “the” and “ridiculed” are not in the 925 word sample 
so they are ignored. The words “baby”, “gadfly”, and “caravan” are in the sample with 
scores of 6.79, 1.92, and 5.17 respectively. As the sentence contains three words from 
the sample, the “Def” score for the sentence is calculated as follows:  
(6.79 + 1.92 + 5.17)/ 3 = 4.6.  
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If the word “baby” had appeared twice, as in the sentence  
“The baby ridiculed the baby gadfly’s caravan” 
the score for the word “baby” is included twice so the calculation is 
(6.79 + 6.79 + 1.92 + 5.17)/ 4 = 5.17.  
In this way we get a proxy for the average ease of definitions of words used in 
each speech. It is only a proxy because it is based on a 925 word sample. The speeches 
were scored on all 32 psycholinguistic variables in the same way as described above of 
ease of definition.  
 As we will see, the psycholinguistic variables are prominent in the 
modelling process. We will see that speeches that score high on the presence of concrete 
words are those that tend to be from non-CMs.  
 
Content Analysis with LIWC 
LIWC uses 68 predefined dictionaries to create 68 linguistic categories. As such 
it is in the content analysis tradition in that the method only searches for what the 
researcher is looking for. That is, it is not inductive like the Laver et al (2003) and 
Purpura and Hilliard (2006) methods.  
The word categories used are based common behavioural and cognitive 
processes. They include Negative Emotion, Affect, Leisure, Work, Family, Social 
Activities and Psychological Processes.  The idea here is that the list of 68 categories is 
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common to all individuals. That is, the categories are not designed to isolate 
characteristics associated with specific psychological constructs of proclivities. The 
categories were derived from a list of words associated with each category. For 
example, the Psychological Processes category was populated with words developed 
from the Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clarke and Tellegen, 1988, 
cited in Pennebaker et al 2007), Roget’s Thesaurus, as well as standard English 
dictionaries. From these sources the list of words associated with “Psychological 
Processes” was developed.  
The utility of LIWC in text analysis has been demonstrated across a substantial 
number of domains. Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010) list 121 studies using LIWC  for 
text analysis since 2001 when the first version of the software became commercially 
available. These include applications to political discourse. LIWC was used to analyse 
television interviews with Democrat presidential candidates in the 2000 and 2004 
election (Slatcher et al 2006). It was found that Kerry and Edward used similar rates of 
positive emotion words whereas Kerry used higher rates of Negative emotion words. A 
comparison between Kerry and Gore found that they had very similar linguistic styles. 
In particular they had very similar levels of pronoun usage and Insight and Cognitive 
words. Edwards’ interviews were statistically significantly different from both Kerry 
and Gore on these measures. Hirst Riabinin and Graham (2010) analysed the Hansard of 
the Canadian Parliament in two periods over which the government had changed. They 
found that the party in government uses more positive emotion words while the party in 
opposition uses more negative emotion words. Yu, Kaufman and Diermeier (2008) used 
LIWC to determine whether it was possible to use text analysis to classify opinions on 
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topics in congressional debates as “for” or “against” the motion under discussion. The 
idea here was that it should be possible to determine whether a speaker supports or 
opposes a topic under discussion on the basis of markers such as positive and negative 
emotion. They found that most Congressional debate involves very low levels of 
sentiment. Thus, they concluded that using sentiment-laden adjectives was not sufficient 
for opinion classification in political speech. Niederhoffer and Pennebaker (2002) used 
LIWC to analyze the official transcripts of the Watergate tapes. They were looking for 
evidence that in dyadic conversation the words of one speaker will co-vary with the 
words of the other. The idea behind this is that the words used by the first speaker prime 
the second speaker to use particular words. This “synchrony” is the verbal equivalent of 
physical synchrony in which interlocutors will mirror each other’s body language. They 
found support for the language synchrony hypothesis at both the turn-by-turn level and 
the overall conversational level.  
It seems that LIWC may be a good way of analysing text for the purposes of 
extracting cognitive “signatures” of the author. I will therefore use LIWC to break down 
the maiden speeches of parliamentarians in the hope that within the 68 linguistic 
variables there are some variables that tap into the cognitive style of parliamentarians.  
 
Summary of Section 4.3 
I began this section by giving an overview of the reasons for using maiden 
speeches as a means of determining the cognitive characteristics of parliamentarians. 
The maiden speech is ideal for this because it is delivered under controlled conditions 
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and because it covers general topics of interest to the individual. As such it should 
provide a highly individual snapshot of how parliamentarians use language and this 
should give an insight into the cognitive characteristics of the speakers. There is 
unlikely to be a problem with ghost writing given that the neophyte parliamentarian is 
likely to write her own speech. 
The next issue I dealt with was how the maiden speeches of parliamentarians 
should be broken down in order to derive a set of independent variables that are most 
likely to tap into the cognitive style of parliamentarians. I surveyed a number of content 
analysis and text analysis methods. I decided that, because I am trying to categorise 
individuals rather than texts it was more appropriate to use content analysis rather than 
text analysis. The idea here being that I am looking for some kind of marker of 
cognitive style rather than classifying speeches. I explained that one way of doing this 
would be to use the psycholinguistic variables derived from the PYMCP word norms to 
score speeches. I then discussed LIWC which has been used in a variety of settings. It 
has been shown to be useful for extracting useful psychological information from texts 
in a number of settings. 
In the next section I will consider how Garrad (2003) used the LIWC categories 
to analyse the application essays of Airforce trainees to determine which applicants 
would be more likely to complete their courses. The point of this is to demonstrate that 
the LIWC categories are efficient at analysing texts in a situation where the task is to 
distinguish between the cognitive characteristics of individuals. As this application is 
very similar to what I am engaged in with this thesis this should provide a good 
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example of how useful LIWC should be for classifying parliamentarians into CMs and 
non-CMs 
 
Section 4.5: Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count and Personnel Selection 
Garrad used the application essay written by trainees in the Royal Australian Air 
Force to assess the likelihood of the applicant successfully completing training courses 
leading to the positions of Pilot, Air Defence Officer and Air Traffic Controller. 
Applicants for these courses completed a 20 minute writing task which required the 
applicants to “…discuss their motivation for joining the RAAF in the occupational 
capacity for which they had applied, their expectations of adjustments that they will be 
required to make, and the nature of the officer role and any relevant experiences they 
may have” (Garrad 2003: 70). Using an earlier (2001) version of LIWC than the version 
used in this thesis (2007), Garrad converted the essays to 72 text categories using the 
LIWC dictionaries. As there were far more categories (variables) than could be of 
practical use in standard linear modelling, a procedure for exclusion of categories was 
adopted from Pennebaker and King (1999).  Text categories that had mean usage levels 
below 0.5 % of the total text were excluded. Secondly, text categories that substantially 
overlapped with other categories were excluded. Thus, Affect was removed because it 
overlapped Positive Emotions and Negative Emotions. Thirdly, variables that did not 
meet at least 0.5 on Kaiser’s Measure of Sample Adequacy were removed. Additionally, 
the categories of Pronoun and Present were removed as variance proportions suggested 
that there was considerable overlap between these variables and others. Finally, 
variables that did not relate to the specific content of words, such as variables relating to 
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punctuation and word length, were removed. After the exclusions, 23 variables 
remained. These were used as dependent variables in logistic regression models. The 
dependent variable in the models consisted of a binary coding of 1 for successful 
completion of the training course and 0 for unsuccessful completion.  
Models for each of the three categories of applicants, Pilot, Air Defence Officer 
and Air Traffic Controller, were created separately. As a first stage in the modelling 
process the various psychometric scores used by the Air Force to select trainees for the 
three training courses were introduced as a block of independent variables. The second 
block of independent variables consisted of the LIWC variables. These were entered in 
a backward stepwise procedure.  
In the case of the Pilot model, of the 23 candidate variables introduced in the 
stepwise procedure, four were selected: Pronouns (e.g.; “he”, “she”, “they”), Present 
(present tense verbs), Insight (e.g.; “think”, “know”, “consider”) and Negations (e.g.; 
“not”, “not”, “never”) were found to significantly add to classification accuracy. In the 
case of the Air Defence Officer model, of the 23 variables introduced in the stepwise 
procedure, four were selected. Positive Emotions, (e.g.; “happy”, “good”, “like”), 
Discrepancies (e.g.; “should”, “would”, “could”), Tentative (e.g.; “maybe”, “perhaps”, 
“guess”) and Achievement (e.g.; “try”, “goal”, “win”) were found to significantly add to 
classification accuracy. In the case of the Air Traffic Controller model, of the 23 
variables introduced in the stepwise procedure, six were selected: Negations, Inhibition 
(e.g.; “block”, “constrain”, “stop”), Tentative, School (e.g.; “class”, “student”, 
“teacher”), Job (e.g.; “employ”, “boss”, “work”), and Leisure (e.g.; “house”, “TV”, 
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“music”). In this model, however, the inclusion of the linguistic variables did not 
increase classification accuracy. 
In the case of the Air Defence officer model, the inclusion of the LIWC 
variables improved the Nagelkerke Pseudo R
2
 by 0.19 and improved model fit with χ2 
moving from 7.09, df=2, p<.003 to 22.52, df=6, p<00. The classification accuracy 
improved from 71.29% to 77.23%.
1
 Similar results were found for the Pilot model with 
overall classification accuracy rising from 61.75% to 63.38%. The result for Air traffic 
Controllers was mixed. The non-LIWC variables consisted of an interview rating and 
various psychometric variables. Neither the psychometric nor interview variables were 
significant. The addition of the LIWC text variables added to the ability of the model to 
detect failures (increased the specificity) but, simultaneously, decreased the ability of 
the model to detect passes (decreased the sensitivity). Thus, the overall accuracy of the 
model was not improved. 
The conclusion was that, in the case of Air Defence Officers and Pilots, there is 
a clear influence of text variables on the ability to detect potential successful candidates. 
In the case of Air Traffic Controllers, there is not a good overall improvement in the 
classification accuracy when the text variables are added. It should be noted that, in the 
Air Traffic Controllers model even the psychometric and interview data failed to be able 
to distinguish between completers and non-completers. Garrad (2003) attributes this to 
the range problem. That is, the range of dependent variables is already highly restricted 
because the selection processes prior to selection for the Air Traffic Control course has 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that classification accuracies referred to in this section are the in-sample 
classification accuracies. Out-of-sample accuracy cannot be assessed as a holdout sample was not used. 
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already highly selected the cohort of candidates (Garrad 2003, p158). Thus, according 
to Garrad the failure of the text data to improve the accuracy of the model is due to 
sample problems rather than any problems inherent in the methodology. It should be 
noted that this does not seem to be explain the lack of performance of the model. The 
Air Defence Officers and Pilots had also been “pre-selected” yet there does not seem to 
have been a range problem with these models. 
It is important to note that the text variables that improved the accuracy of the 
models in the above scenario were not selected on the basis of theory. There were 23 
candidates for inclusion in the model and backward stepwise regression was used to 
“select” the LIWC variables. This is more akin to data mining than traditional 
theoretically based research. The only “theory” used here was the assumption that 
somehow, the way people use language is indicative of underlying characteristics which 
need not be explicitly enumerated in order to be of use in making classifications. 
One shortfall of the method described here is that independent holdout samples 
were not used to test the models. This means that the models may have overfitted the 
data and that the patterns detected in the training data may not be generalizable to 
“unseen” data.  
 
Summary of Section 4.5 
In this section I have given a brief overview of a method of personnel selection 
which uses, among other variables, a selection of LIWC variables generated from a 
common verbal task. This is essentially what I aim to do with parliamentarians. 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
161 
 
Garrad’s (2003) study can be seen as very similar to the task I intend to undertake with 
parliamentarians and the fact that he was able to increase the accuracy of two of the 
three classification models by including LIWC variables suggests that LIWC variables 
may tap into some kind of cognitive variables useful for distinguishing between people 
of differing abilities. Whether these variables will be useful in distinguishing between 
CMs and non-CMs remains to be seen.  
 
Chapter 4 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter I have considered three sets of variables that are likely to be 
useful in distinguishing between CMs and non-CMs. The variables are educational, 
biographical and linguistic. The biographical variables are relatively straightforward and 
are likely to be useful in the classification task because they have been found to be 
useful in previous research. The other two sets of variables, education and linguistic 
behaviour, have also been found to be useful in previous research. This may be because 
they directly tap into the cognitive style of individuals. In relation to education I 
discussed a number of studies which have shown that students in particular disciplines 
have cognitive styles that differ from students in other disciplines. I came to no 
conclusion as to the direction of cause because the important element of education as a 
marker is the cognitive style that accompanies it, not its aetiology.  I decided on 6 
different educational variables that cover a range of cognitive styles. These will be 
included as potential independent variables in classification models designed to classify 
parliamentarians into CMs and non-CMs. Having decided on the educational variables 
to examine I turned to question of how to use the language of parliamentarians to tap 
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into their cognitive style. This procedure involved two steps 1) deciding on an 
appropriate speech sample and 2) deciding how to analyse the speech sample. I decided 
that the maiden speech would be a good choice of speech sample because it is delivered 
in controlled conditions and covers general subjects that reflect parliamentarians’ 
personal interests rather than specific party or policy related issues. It is also highly 
likely to be written by the parliamentarian himself. In deciding on the method of 
analysing the speech sample I reviewed a number of content analysis and text analysis 
methods. As I am looking for cognitive content I decided on two content analysis 
methods rather than the more inductive text analysis methods. I decided to use a 
psycholinguistic method as well as LIWC to analyse the speeches. The psycholinguistic 
method scores speeches using 32 variables derived from sample of 925 nouns. LIWC is 
a content analysis method derived from common cognitive and language categories.  
Having decided on the method of deriving the educational, biographical and 
linguistic variables I then provided an example of an actual classification task using 
psychometric and linguistic variables. Garrad’s (2003) study has several parallels with 
the project I am undertaking and it was therefore instructive to find that the LIWC 
variables used in Garrad’s study increased the classification accuracy of two of the three 
models used for personnel classification tasks. 
In the next chapter I will discuss how to approach the issue of how to use the 
independent variables I have decided on in an actual modelling situation. There are 68 
LIWC variables and 32 psycholinguistic variables, 6 educational variables and 3 
biographical variables to investigate. To include all 109 of these in a standard regression 
model would require a sample size larger than that provided by all the parliamentarians 
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who have sat in the Australian federal parliament since federation. However, each 
variable is potentially able to add to the ability of the model to classify parliamentarians 
into CMs and non-CMs; thus it would be unwise to discard any particular variable 
without a good reason. Therefore, I need to consider a method for selecting the 
variables. I will argue that the most appropriate approach is to use methods derived 
from data mining to select the “features” (independent variables). I will also argue that 
the correct approach to use is to create a model using a “committee” classifier. An 
important aspect of the procedure will be the creation of models using “training” data 
and testing them on holdout samples. 




Chapter 5: An Approach to Modelling using Data Mining 
 
Section 5.1: Introduction 
The first research question of this thesis asks what the characteristics are of 
those parliamentarians who become CMs. We have seen that the representational 
approach accounts for only a small proportion of cabinet appointments. Thus, I have 
turned to looking at individual characteristics to see if there is a better way to explain 
cabinet appointments. In particular, I wish to see whether there are cognitive 
characteristics that differentiate between parliamentarians who become CMs and those 
that do not. In the last chapter I considered the kinds of variables that can be used to tap 
into the individual cognitive characteristics of parliamentarians. It was determined that 
there are three types of variables that could be used to do so: educational, linguistic and 
biographical variables. The upshot of this is that there are 109 variables that can be used 
in the analysis. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain my decision to use data mining to 
analyse the data. This is an important issue because, as I will explain, data mining 
maximises the probability of finding variables that might be useful in distinguishing 
between CMs and non-CMs. Furthermore, data mining methods reduce the probability 
that the final model is overfitted which can result in a model that seems to perform well 
but in fact merely “learns” the noise in the data and is unable to generalise. This is a 
possible flaw in the approach used by Garrad (2003).  
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The first part of the chapter will consider the nature of data mining by 
contrasting it with traditional hypothesis testing. I will then go on to consider a number 
of issues that must be considered in approaching an analytical exercise using data 
mining. These include the selection of “features” (independent variables),1 validating 
the model, validation metrics, interpreting the model and the advantage of using a 
“committee” of models rather than a single model.  
 
Section 5.2: Traditional Statistics and Data Mining 
One of the best ways to highlight the difference between data mining (DM) and 
traditional hypothesis testing (THT) is to consider their different approaches to variable 
selection. There are 109 independent variables to choose from in constructing the 
model. How do we select the variables that are to be used to differentiate between CMs 
and non-CMs? I need to make a choice between the “dust bowl empiricism” (Miner 
2007: 8) of DM and the rational theorising of THT to determine which variables should 
be included. Let us consider the case for each. 
  
Theory Driven Hypothesis Testing 
Traditional hypothesis testing involves making a hypothesis about the 
relationship between two variables, and testing for this relationship. If the relationship is 
statistically significant the hypothesis is not rejected. If the relationship is not 
statistically significant the hypothesis is rejected. This method of developing theory is 
                                                 
1
 In data mining the terms “features” and “dimensions” are used to describe independent 
variables.  
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the cornerstone of scientific method. However, in the current thesis we have a problem 
which hypothesis testing is not suited to deal with – the selection of a small number of 
variables out of a possible field of 109 to enable us to solve a classification problem. Let 
us consider why it is difficult to use THT is such a situation.  
The first reason is not so much a methodological problem as a lack of coherent 
theory in leadership theory upon which to derive hypotheses. With hypothesis testing 
we need a theoretical basis for choosing variables. It is contended that this condition 
does not hold for the field of leadership studies. The area of leadership study has been 
highly infused with theoretical debates and yet has not delivered any consistent or 
empirically supported means of determining what the characteristics are that lead to 
some people rising to the top of the pyramid while the rest do not. This is not to say that 
the individual studies of leaders do not provide an insight into their personalities and 
reasons why they undertook particular courses of action. Dyson’s (2009) account of 
Thatcher’s lack of complexity, for example, provides an excellent account of why she 
behaved in office as she did; Winter’s (1987) analysis of the motive profiles of 
American presidents gives us great insight into the forces driving presidential 
behaviour; Walter’s (1970) analysis of Gough Whitlam gives us a unique interpretation 
of possibly the most charismatic politician in Australia’s history. The problem with 
these accounts for the present purpose is that they tell us about leaders but they don’t 
tell us what differentiates leaders from non-leaders. If we are to use a theory-driven 
approach to selecting variables then we need to have some idea of the characteristics of 
leaders that differentiates them from non-leaders. 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
167 
 
One area where we might expect some insight as to the important variables to 
consider is behavioural science. However, there seems to be few insights that might 
guide our choice of variables from this source. As early as 1959 it was stated (Bennis 
1959: 259) that “[o]f all the hazy and confounding areas in social psychology, 
leadership theory undoubtedly contends for top nomination”. By 2009, Prafka (2009: 
41) showed that little had changed: 
The field of leadership is presently in a state of ferment and 
confusion (Yukl 1989). Most of the theories are beset with 
conceptual weaknesses and lack strong empirical support (Bass, 
2000; Northouse, 2004; Stogdill, 1974).  
    (references cited in Prafka 2009:41) 
. 
The lack of robust theoretical or empirical reasoning in the literature means that 
there is little to aid in the selection of independent variables out of the 109 that are in 
contention. 
It could be argued that in fact there are some good a priori reasons for selecting 
certain variables, notwithstanding the lack of consensus in the literature. The problem 
here is that if a variable is chosen on the grounds of some theoretical reason it will not 
necessarily be good at discriminating between two classes in a classification model. In 
other words, there may be a theoretical reason for selecting a variable and it may even 
be statistically significant but a classification procedure needs to use variables that are 
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not only significant but which had the ability to classify effectively. I demonstrated this 
problem in Chapter 3 in which I created several models to test the significance of 
several variables. A small number of these were statistically significant yet the model 
itself was unable to classify more than a handful of cabinet appointment events.  
I would like to provide the following example of how THT could lead to the 
selection of statistically significant but inefficient variables from the dataset under 
consideration. One branch of the leadership theory states that individuals who lack 
humility may be less likely to become leaders (Morris, Botheridge and Urbanski 2005, 
p1332). The idea is that a lack of humility reduces the chances that you will listen to the 
ideas of others. A traditional hypothesis testing approach would be to look at the 
variables on offer in order to see whether there is a variable that could operationalise 
humility or a lack thereof. The one that seems to do this well, from an a priori point of 
view is the LIWC variable “I” or first person pronouns (FPP) which include “I”, “me”, 
and “my”.  Several other researchers have used FPP as a proxy for self-obsession, self-
importance and self-focus (Raskin and Shaw 1988; Fast and Funder 2010; Holtzman, 
Vazire and Mehl 2010). The traditional hypothesis testing approach would therefore be 
to include this variable in the candidate variables in a multivariate model. However, 
although the FPP does have a significant (p<.05) negative association with CM, there 
are other candidate variables that have a much higher discriminative power than it. 
Including the FPP in the model when there are other variables that are likely to have 
higher discriminative power could result in overfitting which will mean that the model 
is less able to discriminate between CMs and non-CMs than a more “data-driven” 
model.  
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Given the above discussion it is contended that a more empirical approach 
should be used to choose the variables out of the 109 that are in contention. One such 
strategy is data mining. Let us now consider the case for data mining.  
 
Data Mining 
Data mining is the process of looking for patterns associated with a phenomenon 
of interest. An essential element of data mining is that “nuggets” of knowledge are 
derived from large amounts of raw data, much of which is not relevant to the problem at 
hand (Han and Kamber 2006: 5). Importantly, the selection of explanatory variables is 
driven by how well the variables predict the dependent variable. This is in contrast to 
traditional statistical approaches which attempt to posit a hypothesis as to why particular 
independent variables might be associated with the dependent variable and then go on to 
test the hypothesis. In data mining there is more emphasis placed on classification 
accuracy while theory development follows the discovery of relationships in the data. 
The important point is that the discovery of the relationship in the data comes first. This 
essentially eliminates the problems associated with selecting variables by a priori 
means because it is the data that “select” the variables. 
To illustrate how classification problems are approached using data mining it is 
worthwhile considering a particular military application – how to identify the most 
effective military recruiters. Halstead, Goerger and McGinnis (2006) describe a system 
that is designed to select, from the pool of available NCOs, those who will be best at 
recruiting civilians into the army. The idea here is that some NCOs have better “sales” 
skills than others and these are the individuals who should be deployed in the 
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recruitment tasks as they will tend to sign up more recruits. The system compares the 
recruitment rates of NCOs who have been engaged in the recruitment process and 
attempts to discover the identifying variables of those who are able to sign up high 
numbers of recruits compared with those who are less able to do so. The independent 
variables used were responses to psychological test banks and biographical data such as 
age and gender. Using this method the system was able to relatively accurately rank 
individuals in terms of their ability to sign up recruits using only the test bank and 
biographical data. The idea is that if you are looking for a recruiter there is a set of test 
bank and biographical characteristics that you should look for. 
The description of this system sounds similar to a system that might have been 
constructed using traditional statistics. However, the important point is that the 
independent variables or “features” were not selected using some a priori assumption 
about what makes a good recruiter: they were selected by mining the available data. The 
test bank and biographical data yielded 260 features and in order to create a model that 
was able to classify efficiently, the number of features had to be significantly reduced, 
otherwise the “noise” in the data might overwhelm any signal. Thus, it was important 
that only those features that were able to add to the classification efficiency of the 
model were included. For this reason data mining was employed. Algorithms were used 
to trawl through the data to find what the relationship was, if any, between each of the 
260 features and the ability of an NCO to sign up recruits. The result was that 36 
features out of the possible 260 were found to be predictive of the ability to recruit 
(Halstead, Goerger and McGinnis 2006: 26).  
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To put this in the context of the current thesis, in the same way that test bank and 
biographical data were used to classify recruiters in Halstead, Goerger and McGinnis 
(2006), I use biographical, educational and linguistic variables to trawl for differences 
between those who become CMs and those that do not. In this way I avoid having to 
make a subjective or theory-based selection of the variables from the 109 candidates.  
The major benefit of this approach is that it is more likely than hypothesis 
testing to find variables that are significantly related to the dependent variable, even 
those we might not have thought to consider. This is the basis of the term “mining” in 
that the underlying assumption is that there are “nuggets” of information in the mass of 
data and the process of mining will enable such nuggets to be discovered. 
  
Summary of Section 5.2 
In this section I have discussed why a hypothesis testing approach to the 
problem of selecting variables is unlikely to result in the selection of appropriate 
independent variables. The first reason I mention in relation to this issue is not a failure 
of the statistical methods but a lack of theoretical basis in the leadership research on 
which to select variables. My second objection is that even if we did have a good basis 
for selecting variables, theory driven selection of variables emphasises statistical 
significance rather than discriminant power. Related to this problem is that using theory 
can lead to the rejection of variables that are not obviously associated with the 
dependent variable but which might be useful. A data mining approach avoids the 
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problems associated with a theory-driven hypothesis testing approach because it is the 
data that are used to select the variables.  
While data mining solves the major problems associated with theory driven 
hypothesis testing it raises other issues. In the next section I will outline the major 
issues and explain how they can be addressed. 
 
Section 5.3: Data Mining Issues 
We saw in the last section that data mining solves the problem of how to select 
predictive variables. In essence, the process is data driven. That is, those independent 
variables that are best at performing the classification task are identified directly rather 
than by hypothesising about putative relationships with the dependent variable. In this 
section I propose to address four issues that arise with data mining. The first is the 
actual approach to selecting the most appropriate independent variables. We need to 
address the actual procedure by which independent variables will be selected. The 
second issue to be addressed is how to validate the model created. In hypothesis-testing 
a model is assessed by various means including whether the variables explain more of 
the variance than a model without the variables; how much of the variance is explained 
by the model; and whether the independent variables lead to significant differences. In 
data mining a model is chosen purely and simply on the basis of its classification 
accuracy. In this section we will review validation methods as well as the metrics used 
to measure validation accuracy. The third issue I wish to address is how to interpret the 
model. In hypothesis-testing we begin with a theoretical stance and the analysis either 
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supports the stance or does not. In data mining there is no such theoretical stance prior 
to the construction of the model. This means that the interpretation needs to be 
undertaken posterior to the creation of the model. This is not always possible because of 
the “black box nature of many data mining techniques. However, I will argue that data 
mining can proceed with more transparent models which enable interpretation. Finally I 
would like to introduce the idea of “committee” models. In data mining and machine 
learning it has been found that using one model for classification is not as effective as 
using several models and averaging the results. I will explain how this approach can be 
used in the current thesis. 
 
Feature Selection 
Data mining methods are designed to find patterns in data. Although this seems 
similar to what we would do in traditional hypothesis testing it is very different for the 
fundamental reason that we do not begin with any hypothesis. We simply allow the 
algorithms to find the relevant patterns. This means that we can find patterns we would 
not otherwise have considered. The fact that we use algorithms to search for patterns 
means that we are able to explore vast amounts of data. Prior to the period in which 
computer power was easily accessible this was not a practical possibility. It is now 
possible to analyse extremely large databases with little more than a standard desktop 
computer. This means that such fields as text analysis and genetic research can be 
conducted using tens of thousands of independent variables in the search for predictors 
of the phenomena under investigation. However, given the large number of possible 
predictive variables it is important to narrow down the field early in the modelling 
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process so that only the most powerful are included in the modelling process. 
Otherwise, a large number of ineffective models could be created. As Foreman (2003: 
1289) states “…no degree of clever induction can make up for a lack of predictive 
signal in the input features”. The predictors selected will become the independent 
variables used to predict and explain the phenomenon under examination. The question 
is how do we find the best predictors? The answer is that we adopt a method that has 
been used in a field where the search for predictors out of a vast field of potential 
candidate predictors has been an on-going issue – genetic research. This field in 
particular has provided the impetus for many of the advances in data mining, including 
providing methods of selecting a small subset of independent variables from huge set of 
potential independent variables.  
Typically, genetic research involves a sample size significantly smaller than the 
number of independent variables. For example, Ultsch and Kämpf (2004) give an 
example of a data set consisting of 72 leukaemia patients and 7192 variables. There are 
two types of leukaemia represented in the data set, acute lymphoblastic leukaemia and 
acute myeloid leukaemia. As the treatment for each type is different it is important to be 
able to distinguish between them. The authors therefore used data mining techniques to 
distinguish each type on the basis of their genetic characteristics. The problem is that 
there were 7192 gene expressions associated with these 72 cases. Each of these 7192 
gene expressions is a potential marker of the disease. Furthermore, particular clusters 
are likely to be involved. Similarly Nguyen (2005) reports on a method for calculating 
the survival times for patients with B-cell lymphoma in which the survival times for 40 
patients was available and the independent variables consisted of expression values for 
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5622 genes. These examples highlight the necessity of eliminating the “uninteresting” 
variables to find the potentially “interesting” variables. This has been described as the 
“curse of dimensionality” (Friedman 1994). Much of the literature in the field of data 
mining is devoted to narrowing down a large number of potential independent variables 
to a manageable set of independent variables.  
Possibly the most common method used to identify good potential predictors is 
simple correlation (May, Dandy and Maier 2005: 34). The idea here is that independent 
variables that are correlated with the dependent variable are likely to be useful in 
predicting the dependent variable (Guyon and Elisseeff 2003: 1161). Ideally, a selection 
of variables that are correlated with the dependent variable but not correlated with 
themselves will be chosen. Independent variables that are correlated with each other are 
likely to be measuring closely related phenomena and, as such, some are likely to be 
redundant when all are included together. 
Related to correlation is the use of t-tests for the differences of means. The 
standard t-test for the significance of the differences between the means of two different 
classes simply compares the means of the two classes under consideration on the basis 
of the variable being assessed. Thus, for a given variable ‘v’ we would compare the 
mean value of ‘v’ for the non-CM class with that of the CM class. We then check for 
unequal variances as between the two classes using an F-test. If the variances are equal 
we use Student’s t-test to determine the p-value of the difference. If the variances are 
not equal we use Welch’s t-test. We then rank each variable on p-values. Those with the 
lowest p-value are likely to be the most useful.  
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Another method of variable ranking is to test each variable’s univariate ability to 
classify the dependent variable. This method assesses variables on the very 
characteristic they will be called upon to perform – classification (Guyon and Elisseeff 
2003: 1161). This method has been found to be useful in selecting independent variables 
in text analysis. The idea is that variables that are able to contribute to the classification 
of the dependent variable need to be identified. We therefore create a univariate model 
using logistic regression or any other induction method and assess its classification 
accuracy. If we iteratively go through the independent variables to see which individual 
independent variables perform best as univariate predictors at classifying the two 
classes then we will get a good idea of which variables are likely to perform well in a 
multivariate classification model. The selection of variables is based on the 
classification accuracy of each univariate classification model. That is, variables are 
ranked on the basis of their classification accuracy in univariate models. Clearly, the 
problem of redundancy is likely to be an issue here. It is always possible that combining 
the best such predictors will result in a model that is not as good as the univariate 
predictor performance indicated it would be. The essence of model building is that 
variables often behave differently when combined with other variables. Nevertheless, 
the idea of ranking each variable on its performance as a single variable classifier has 
been found to provide a good way of identifying potentially good predictors (Bowden et 
al., 2006; Raghuraj 2008).  
The basic algorithm that will be used in this thesis the t-test for differences in 
means. The reason for this is that this is possibly the simplest available. As we will see, 
using this method to filter out the variables that are unlikely to be useful will leave a 
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smaller set of independent variables that have a high degree of discriminant power. If 
this method was found to be unable to yield a set of predictors that were likely to be 
useful then I would be warranted in using some other more complex method. However, 
as we will see, this is not the case.  
Thus, t-tests will be used to filter the vast majority of the variables out of 
contention leaving a small group of variables. Using the t-test criterion I will reduce the 
number of variables from 109 to 3 – 8 over the course of creating several models. For 
each model I will use a test for redundancy to further reduce the number of variables. I 
will then use these as the basis for the final modelling. 
Before leaving the issue of reducing the number of variables to be considered, it 
is worthwhile considering whether the approach advocated is wasteful. Thus, it might be 
possible to use a method such as principal components analysis or factor analysis to 
create a synthetic scale based on all the text variables. The idea here is that by 
“filtering” out the variables that seem to have little connection with the dependent 
variable we may be losing information that could contribute to classification accuracy. 
Thus, there is a potential gain by using all the variables in some way. 
Principal components analysis works by assessing the correlations between 
independent variables and distilling the common correlations into a number of 
uncorrelated components. Thus, a large number of variables can be reduced to a smaller 
number of variables which theoretically contain the “important” information. Similarly, 
factor analysis reduces a large number of variables to a smaller number of putative 
underlying common “factors” by assessing the commonalities between variables.  
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These methods and their variants have been used in data mining. However, they 
are not as common as filter methods (Luyckx and Daelemans 2011: 38). Furthermore, 
where they have been used, the results indicate that they do not increase classification 
accuracy. In Skott (2005) dimension reduction using a PCA based on a “bottleneck 
network” was not as effective as using individual variables identified as being 
associated with the dependent variable.  Lam and Lee (1999) found that PCA resulted in 
a slight albeit insignificant reduction in classification accuracy of text documents in 
comparison with using individual word based strategies.  Similarly, in a study that 
specifically uses LIWC, Liu et al (2012) found that PCA did not increase classification 
accuracy over the use of the top ten individually selected variables.  Kramer and 
Rodden (2008) used a factor analysis of LIWC data derived from blogs. The factor 
structure revealed 5 factors but this provided “mixed results” when this was used in an 
attempt to create five clusters of writing types (2008: 1128).  Beyond text analysis, Hall 
and Holmes (2003) experimented with six variable selection methods as well as PCA on 
fifteen different datasets from science, medicine and engineering. PCA was found to be 
the least efficient data reduction method in terms of classification accuracy. 
A possible reason why PCA and FA do not increase classification accuracy is 
that they select independent variables that covary amongst themselves without reference 
to the dependent variable (Tian 2009: 10). They work by focusing on the independent 
variables and the search for associations is not “supervised” by reference to the 
dependent variable. This “ unsupervised” approach means the procedure may result in 
the exclusion of variables that may have low variance relative to the other variables but 
which are highly correlated with the dependent variable . Cunningham (2008) makes 
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essentially the same point in stating that in unsupervised methods (such as PCA and 
FA) the object of the exercise is not as well defined as when the features are selected 
directly in relation to the dependent variable] and “…consequently it is a much less 
explored area” (Cunningham 2008: 100). Cunningham points out that where the data is 
unlabelled (that is, there is no dependent variable) then PCA can be used. Where the 
data are labelled, then the appropriate method is some form of feature selection 
(Cunningham 2008: 111).  
Beyond unsupervised methods, it may be possible to develop some kind of 
synthetic measure based on an a priori  idea of what may be a reasonable combination 
of linguistic variables. The major problem with this is that it makes the assumption that 
we can make some kind of hypothesis about what the important variables might be. This 
is precisely the kind of hypothesising that we wish to avoid: the data mining approach is 
designed to let the data speak for itself. Certainly there is the possibility that, by not 
making any attempt to include variables that we think are sensibly associated with the 
dependent variable we may exclude some important variable(s). However, there is also 
the possibility that we could simply add noise. The procedure advocated in this thesis of 
applying  a “filter” to remove the variables unlikely to provide information is prominent 
in text analysis (Luyckx and Daelemans 2011: 38). This is largely because it has been 
found to be effective.  
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Validating the Model 
The purpose of a classification model is classification. Ideally, a model should 
be assessed entirely on whether it is able to classify a holdout sample at an acceptable 
level of accuracy. The reason for the dependence on a holdout sample is that a holdout 
sample indicates how the model is likely to perform on data the model has not been 
“trained” on. Such a test is determines whether the rules generated by the model are 
generalisable to a sample wider than that which was used to generate the model. In this 
section I will outline various methods of validating the ability of a model to do this.  
According to many data mining researchers, the best method of validation in 
data mining is holdout-sample validation (Ransohoff 2004). Holdout sample validation 
(HOV) is where a portion of the data is separated from the data used for training the 
model and used only for testing the model. The idea here, as stated above, is that the true 
test of the model is its ability to classify a sample that the model has not “seen”. If the 
holdout sample is referred to for any purpose other than testing the classification 
accuracy of models then there is a danger that information may flow from the holdout 
sample to the training sample thus invalidating the independence of the holdout sample 
(Ransohoff 2004: 310).  
The main problem here is that I will need to split the data in such a way that 
there is enough data in the training sample for any regularities to be detected and, at the 
same time, ensure that the holdout sample is large enough to provide a statistically 
significant classification result (Fielding and Bell 1997: 39). A correct classification of 
70% of a holdout sample of n = 10 is not statistically significant. However the same rate 
of accuracy for a holdout sample of size n = 100 is statistically significant. The problem 
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is that a holdout sample of sufficient size to get statistical significance may not be viable 
with a small number of cases given that we need the majority of cases to build the 
model. As we will see in the following chapter, in the parliamentary sample to be used 
for model building we have 134 cases. This gives us very little data for both model 
building and testing. With large sample sizes it is possible to create a holdout sample 
using 50% of the cases. However, with a sample size of 134 this would leave only 67 
cases to create a model with.  
Another problem that is often mentioned in relation to using HOV is that there is 
always the possibility that the holdout sample, notwithstanding that it should be a 
random selection from the data, may not representative of the sample as a whole. This is 
particularly a problem with small holdout samples. By chance alone a holdout sample 
may contain a large number of outliers that are very difficult or very easy to classify. 
Furthermore, the estimation sample may contain outliers such that the parameters do not 
reflect the sample as a whole. These problems can affect our decision to accept or reject 
the model. Azuaje (2010) goes so far as to say that the holdout method results in 
“…highly biased and inexact estimates…independently of the prediction model or 
algorithm applied (Azuaje 2010: 39).  
Given the problems associated with holdout samples several alternatives have 
been suggested. One standard solution to the problem of holdout sample creation is to 
use k-fold cross validation. In the 10-fold variant, the data is divided into 10 equal sized 
“folds”. The fold 1 is held out and the model is estimated using the remaining nine of 
the folds. The classification accuracy of this classifier is tested on fold 1. This procedure 
is repeated ten times so that each fold is held out once and tested on a classifier 
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estimated using the remaining 9 folds. The average classification accuracy over all 10 
folds is the 10 fold cross validation accuracy. It will be noted that each time the model is 
trained, it is then tested on a sample that has been held out from the data used to train 
the model. As such the procedure gives a good indication of how well the model will 
classify an actual holdout sample.  
Any number of folds up to the number of cases in the sample can be used in this 
process. However, 10-fold-cross validation is considered by some to be the most 
reliable method (Witten and Frank 2005: 150). 
Other researchers have found that Leave One Out Validation (LOOV) is a better 
estimate of classification accuracy (Kohavi 1995; Ambroise and McLachlan 2002). This 
variant works by creating a number of folds equivalent to the number of cases. In the 
first iteration, one case is held out and the model is constructed using the remaining 
cases. This model is then used to classify the one case held out. The held out case is 
then returned to the rest of the data and another case is selected to be held out while the 
model is trained on the other cases. This process continues until each case has been used 
as the holdout once. Thus, if there are 90 cases there will be 90 models each predicting 
one held out case each time. The average accuracy of the individually held out cases is 
taken to be the classification accuracy of the model constructed using the selected 
variables on unseen data.  
LOOCV is considered to provide an unbiased estimate of error rate (Kohavi 
1995; Ambroise and McLachlan 2002; Cawley and Talbot 2006). Furthermore, LOOCV 
is better for use in small sample sizes than 10-fold CV. The reason for this is that in 
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LOOCV a smaller number of cases is held out of each fold than is the case for 10-Fold 
CV. Consider for example, a situation in which there are 90 cases and the model is 
tested using LOOCV. For each iteration, the model is trained on 89 cases and tested on 
1 and this is repeated 90 times. With 10 fold CV the model would be trained on 81 cases 
and tested on 9 and this is repeated 10 times. In the first case the classifier has a greater 
number of cases (89) to generalise from so is more likely to form a stable decision rule 
(Cawley and Talbot 2006: 2351).  
A method that represents a kind of hybrid of CV and HOV is Monte Carlo cross-
validation which uses a random splitting of the data into training and test sets (Picard 
and Cook 1984). This method has been shown to give a better estimate of the actual 
classification accuracy than LOOCV (Xu, Liang and Du 2004; Shao 1993; Efron 1986).  
Furthermore, this method addresses the possibility that a given holdout sample is not 
representative of the data as a whole. Monte Carlo cross-validation (MCCV) is 
identical, in its first stage, to using the pure holdout sample method in that a random 
sample is taken to create a holdout sample while the variable selection and model 
building is conducted on the estimation (training) sample which consists of the 
remaining cases. The holdout sample is used for testing the classification accuracy of 
the models created using the estimation sample. So far this is identical to the standard 
holdout method. However, the procedure is repeated several times with different 
randomly generated holdout samples and the accuracy is taken as the average 
classification accuracy of these models. 
The main problem with MCCV, is that it does not test models with different 
variables. MCCV and other methods that use ‘bootstrap’ re-sampling consist of 
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retesting with different samples but the same selection of independent variables is used. 
Re-sampling methods assume that some initial selection of variables is the optimum 
selection and then random re-sampling is undertaken to test the ability of this selection 
of variables to classify accurately. This is a limitation because there may be a slightly 
different selection of variables that would classify better. Furthermore, averaging across 
a high number re-sampled errors may not necessarily improve accuracy greatly because 
the errors of each individual iteration are likely to be highly correlated. 
Ideally, we need a method that minimises the disadvantages with all of the 
methods discussed while retaining their advantages. My solution is to create five 
completely independent models with five independently generated holdout samples for 
testing. The validated models will be form the basis of a “committee”. Importantly, the 
selection of variables will take place independently each time the process is repeated 
and each model is tested on a different independent holdout sample.  
Thus, the procedure will be as follows: I will create an initial model by 
randomly splitting the 134 cases into a 1/5 (n = 27) holdout sample and a 4/5 (n = 107) 
estimation sample. As we shall see this 1/5 – 4/5 split will provide a sufficient sample 
for model building and a large enough holdout sample to provide statistically significant 
results. The variables will be selected and the model built using the estimation sample. 
The model will then be tested on the holdout sample. This procedure will then be 
repeated four times. The process will begin each time with the full set of 134 cases. 
These will be split using random process into a training group (n=107) and a testing 
group (n=27). That is, rather than basing the modelling on the classification accuracy of 
one sample of 1/5 of the data I will conduct the exercise five times so that five 
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independent holdout samples are used to estimate the accuracy of the models. Thus, 
across the five models the test sample (5 * 27) will be effectively the same size as the 
training sample. This is similar to the standard methods of testing in data mining such as 
LOOCV and k-Fold CV in which the test sample is the same size as the training sample. 
As we will see the five independent model building exercises will provide models that 
lead to similar conclusions with classification accuracies of more than 
70%.Furthermore, as I will demonstrate in the discussion on committee models below, 
the use of the committee system has been identified as a highly effective means of 
maximising classification accuracy particularly where the errors of each model are 
diverse. The diversity of models means that errors are unlikely to be correlated and this 
means that only a small number of committee members is required to improve 
classification accuracy. 
One issue that should be addressed is why many hundreds of iterations of the 
model building process is not advocated in data mining. With modern computing power 
it is possible to run create many models based on different subdivisions of the data and 
yet the standard methods discussed above rely on a test set that is some kind of variation 
on the training set and of the same size. Thus, in LOOCV, the number of test samples is 
equivalent to the number of training samples. Similarly, in k – fold CV, the k folds are 
created by dividing the test set into k samples of size n/k. Thus, with 10 – fold CV and a 
data set of n = 134, 10 samples of approximate size 134/10 would be used for testing.  
As with these methods I create a five holdout samples across the five committee models 
such that the total size of the holdout sample used for testing is 5 * 27 = 135 which is 
effectively the same size as the training sample. The question is, given that computing 
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power is not an issue, is there a significant benefit in creating many more models (ie, 
using a greater number of test samples) than is advocated in the standard data mining 
approach? 
The answer is that there is no significant advantage in generating more models 
once a test sample is used that effectively replicates the training sample. Generating 
additional models results in models that are less dissimilar and that therefore add less 
information. Let us consider the theory behind this by considering the two related 
methods of validation used in data mining – ‘632 Bootstrap’ and its extension the ‘632 
Bootstrap +’. The sampling method used in these procedures is similar to the method I 
have used to generate holdout samples in that it uses sampling with replacement. 
However, unlike the method I advocate, these procedures use multiple repetitions of the 
bootstrap sampling procedure to validate the model. It is my contention that using five 
holdout samples is a more effective validation method.  
The ‘632 Bootstrap’ and ‘632 Bootstrap +’ methods use a “bootstrap” sample 
which is sampling with replacement of the data set. Essentially, for a data set of n, n 
random samples are chosen with replacement  to derive a test set of n (Witten and Frank 
2005: 152). Because the sampling takes place with replacement, there is a probability 
that some of the cases that occur in the test set will occur more than once. In such a 
bootstrap sample where the test set and the training set are equivalent in size, (eg: 
bootstrap sample  = 134 and training sample = 134), there is a .632 probability that an 
individual case will occur twice in the bootstrap sample (Witten and Frank 2005: 152. If 
a larger bootstrap sample were taken such that the bootstrap sample > n, the probability 
that individual cases will recur rises such that as the bootstrap sample rises beyond n, 
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the probability of a repetition of a single cases converges on 1. Where many times n is 
used as a bootstrap sample there will be many repetitions of cases so the information 
gained from the additional sample size falls away. The testing done on the one bootstrap 
sample (bootstrap sample = n) provides more diversity than any extension to x * n 
because going beyond n involves a repetition of cases that have already been tested. 
Thus resampling the data set so that the test set is many multiples of the training set 
does not increase the information gained significantly. 
Let us put this theory into the context of the current situation. If a bootstrap 
sample twice the size of the training sample were taken (that is, if I had made ten 
models rather than 5 such that there were in total ten random holdout samples of 27) the 
probability of a repetition of a given case in the bootstrap sample of 270 (2 * 135) 
converges on 1 for all cases. Thus, the incremental value of increasing the bootstrap 
sample (creating more models) begins to decline because the same cases begin to appear 
in each of the individual holdout samples. The question is, would producing more 
models, and thus increasing the bootstrap sample, increase accuracy? The answer would 
have to be that most likely it would but not significantly. The maximum diversity has 
already been achieved in the creation of the first five models and any subsequent 
model(s) will be more similar to the existing models than the existing models have to 
each other.  
The above discussion explains why data mining in general and the approach I 
have used in particular uses a test set that is effectively the same size as the training set 
even though computing power allows for the creating of many more models tested over 
many divisions of the data. However, where a committee approach is used, there is 
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another benefit of using only those models created from a replication of the training 
data. The reason is that, as explained above, the models created with a test set that is 1 * 
n are more diverse than the models created with 1X * n. In a committee setting, such 
diversity is an advantage. 
The theoretical argument from diversity states that, where models are diverse, 
only a small number need be included in the ensemble. I will discuss the theoretical 
reasons for this below. At this point it suffices to say that there is empirical evidence 
supporting this view. The empirical evidence bears this out. In Elder and Abbott (1997) 
only six committee members were used. A similar approach was used by Zhou et al 
(2001) which used five committee (‘ensemble’)members, The reason why only a small 
number of committee numbers was required in these cases was that the models were 
diverse. Diversity leads to low correlation between the errors of each model which 
means that combining only a few such committee members significantly improves 
classification accuracy. In general, increasing the number of diverse committee 
members beyond 10 is unlikely to be of benefit (Hansen and Salamon 1990; Agrafiotis 
et al 2002). Russell and Adam (1984) found that including all available models was not 
as effective as including only the best 3-5.  
In the current thesis, the diversity of the models used in the committee is 
achieved by the fact that 1) different random partitions of the data are used and 2) there 
are several different combinations of variables across the models used in the committee. 
The evidence that diversity actually exists across the committee models is that the 
classification accuracies of the models used in the committee are variable, ranging from 
74% – 85.19%. This diversity of model accuracy is a very good indication that the 
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errors are not highly correlated. Thus, although it is possible that using a vastly 
increased number of models would increase the overall performance of the committee, 
such improvement is unlikely to be significant because any subsequent models are 
likely to have errors that are correlated with the initial models.  
So far I have discussed accuracy in abstract terms. Thus, we need to be more 
specific about how accuracy will be assessed: we need to consider the validation 
metrics. I have already alluded to this issue by pointing out that a 70% classification 
accuracy across two different sample sizes of n = 10 and n = 100 can result in very 
different assessments of statistical significance. As such, it is important to use a measure 
of classification accuracy that includes an assessment of the statistical significance of 
the classification accuracy. For this purpose I will adopt Cohen’s Kappa discussed in 
Chapter 3. The advantage of this measure is that it provides an assessment of overall 
accuracy and test of the significance of the measure. A result that is significant at the 
p<.05 level can be taken as a result that is beyond what would occur by chance alone.  
The Calculation of Cohen’s Kappa is as follows: 
K = (P(A) - P(E)) / (1 - P(E)) 
where P(A) is the proportion of times that the predicted agrees with the actual and P(E) 
is the proportion of times that we would expect agreement by chance alone. This metric 
compensates for the fact that some hits will occur by chance alone. It evaluates the 
proportion of correctly classified instances relative to the number of instances that 
would have occurred by chance alone. In contrast to the raw accuracy rate, which 
calculates accuracy over both classes, the kappa calculates the accuracy rate over each 
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class separately and then aggregates the results (Galar et al 2011: 1766). Kappa varies 
from -1, where there is complete disagreement between the actual and predicted classes 
to 1 where there is complete agreement between actual and predicted classes. A score of 
0 would indicate that the classifier randomly assigns cases to classes.  
Another metric that needs to be considered is the sensitivity. As we saw in 
chapter 3 this measures the extent to which the model can correctly identify true 
positives: 
Sensitivity = True Positives / (True Positives + False Positives) 
The complement of the Sensitivity is the Specificity which measures the extent 
to which the model identifies that the negative cases are indeed negative: 
Specificity = True Negatives / (True Negatives + False Negatives) 
With accuracy, sensitivity, specificity and Cohen’s Kappa we can come to a 
good overall assessment of how well the model is able to classify the holdout sample as 
a whole and provide a statistical test for the significance of this as well providing a 
measure of how well the model classifies the true positives and true negatives. 
 
Interpreting the Output  - Prediction versus Explanation 
One of the strengths of data mining is that it finds patterns in the data that enable 
us to make predictions. Models are assessed on the basis of their ability to correctly 
classify. The problem is that in data mining there is a limited tradition of explanation. 
Data mining and machine learning emphasise classification accuracy over and beyond 
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any attempt to explain the reasons for the classifications. This is why “black box” 
methods such as artificial neural networks (ANNs) and support vector machines 
(SVMs) are well established in the data mining community even though they cannot be 
interrogated in any way analogous to the procedure of looking at the parameter 
estimates of a logistic equation. The lack of transparency of such methods is no bar to 
their being used to make accurate predictions. However, the lack of transparency is a 
bar to explaining their predictions. 
This is not to say that it is impossible to examine the likely effects of the 
important independent variables in a black box classification model. If a certain set of 
independent variables has been found to be useful in a classification task then this is 
good evidence that those variables are the ones that are likely to be importantly 
associated with the phenomenon under investigation. As such the identification of a 
group of potential signal-bearing variables is a good first step in explaining what is 
going on. Isolating interesting variables means that these variables can be further 
investigated. However, it is true to say that black box methods do not give any real 
explanation of the causal direction or importance of variables. Certainly “sensitivity” 
analyses can be conducted by perturbing inputs randomly and observing the effect on 
the dependent variable but this is an artificial method of determining the importance of a 
variable. 
One solution is to use a method that is transparent. Fortunately there is a method 
which is highly transparent and has been shown to be close to ANNs in terms of 
classification accuracy on many classification tasks – logistic regression (Sargent 2001; 
Dreiseitl and Ohno-Machado 2002). This method gives a readily interpretable means of 
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determining the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. There 
can be problems in interpreting the coefficient when the coefficient is not significant. 
Furthermore, the size of the coefficients can be subject to bias if the sample size is too 
small. However, these problems are less severe than the problems of interpreting more 
opaque methods. Thus, because the problem of transparency is tractable, logistic 
regression will be used rather than the more opaque methods such as ANNs and SVMs 
in this study. 
 
“Committee” Models 
In traditional statistics we tend to try to find one particular model to apply to a 
given situation. In data mining the attitude is more akin to Box’s idea that “…[a]ll 
models are wrong, but some are useful” (Box 1979: 212). In data mining, a model is 
only considered useful if it is good at classifying. Thus, it is not surprising that there has 
arisen a method in data mining which assumes that there is no sense in relying on one 
model when several may prove to be better at the classification task. Data miners have 
found that one way to increase the classification accuracy of a data set is to use the 
available data to create a number of models and use this “committee” of models to make 
predictions by averaging the results for each individual model (Dietterich 2000).  
The committee method results in increased classification accuracy if the 
constituent models are diverse and each is able to classify at a rate better than chance 
alone (Dietterich 2000: 2). The diversity requirement is due to the fact that averaging a 
number of models that produce exactly the same classifications will not result in a better 
outcome. It has been found that “[c]ombining outputs of multiple classifiers into an 
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ensemble (committee) output is one of the most important techniques for improving 
classification accuracy” (Verikas et al 2010: 6957). The important issue here is that 
each classification model needs to be different. That is, each of the models needs to 
classify a given set of input data slightly differently, otherwise there is no point in using 
the committee system. There are several ways of creating different models with the 
same basic dataset: we can use the same data but different induction methods, different 
subsections of the data and the same induction methods, different combinations of 
variables, or any combination of these. Intuitively this is equivalent to the idea that the 
errors of one committee member can be “corrected” by the other committee members if 
the committee members assess individual cases differently and each committee member 
has a greater than 50% chance of being right. This is closely related to Condorcet’s jury 
theorem which states that: 
If each voter has a probability p of being correct and the 
probability of a majority of voters being correct is M, then p > 
0.5 implies M > p. In the limit, M approaches 1, for all p > 0.5, 
as the number of voters approaches infinity (Zenobi and 
Cunningham 2001:2). 
In the current thesis I will be creating five separate classification models. The 
same basic data consisting of 134 cases and 109 variables will be used but the holdout 
samples (and, by construction, the estimation samples) for each will be randomly 
generated. Thus, each of the classifiers will be generated using a different training 
sample and tested on a different holdout sample. There will be some variation in the 
variables and classification accuracies as between the models. The use of different 
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subsamples for training and testing is one of the most common ways of introducing 
diversity into the system (Zenobi and Cunningham 2001:3, Cunningham 2007: 4). Thus, 
the models should fulfil the diversity requirement. Importantly, they will all produce 
classification accuracies beyond mere chance.  This means that combining the results of 
all five models will result in a more accurate estimate of classification accuracy than 
using any one model. 
One of the advantages of combining the results by using a committee system can 
be readily seen if we consider Azuaje’s objection that the holdout sample method can 
lead to biased results as there is no way of telling if the holdout sample is an accurate 
reflection of the data as a whole (Azuaje 2010: 39). If I were creating one model and 
testing it on one holdout sample this would be a concern. There is always the possibility 
that the holdout sample is particularly easy or particularly hard to classify and we might 
mistakenly accept or reject the model accordingly. With one holdout sample we cannot 
determine whether this is the case. However, I will create five models and test them on 
five different and independent holdout samples. There is a certain probability that one of 
these is not representative of the data as a whole and is either an unusually easy sample 
to classify or an unusually difficult sample to classify. However, the probability that all 
are unrepresentative is very low. By combining all five results we get a very good idea 
of the “unbiased” out-of-sample classification rate for the committee of models.  
Let us consider, then, how the creation and interpretation of the committee takes 
place. Let us assume that each of the five models M1, M2, M3, M4 and M5 has been 
trained and tested on 5 different divisions of the data into training and testing samples 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
195 
 
are described above. Let us also assume that the models have the independent variables 
and classification accuracies as depicted in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Hypothetical Committee Models 
 
For models M1, M2, M3 and M5 the classification accuracies are all significant at the 
p<.01 level. Model M4 has a non-significant classification accuracy. M5 seems to be 
redundant in that it has the same classification accuracy and the same variables as 
another model in the committee (M1). However, if each of these models was created 
with a different subset of the data this may be sufficient provide diversity as between 
the two models. Thus, we would be inclined to use models M1, M2, M3 and M5 in our 
committee.  
Using the committee of M1, M2, M3 and M5 is equivalent to saying that each 
model has a hypothesis. The hypothesis of M1 and M5 is that the independent variables 
a, b and c are related to the dependent variable. Assuming that they do not have 
identical coefficients for these variables (which is a reasonable assumption given that 
they have been created with different subdivisions of the data) they will give slightly 
different weightings to the variables and as such provide slightly different “opinions” as 
to whether the “case” should be classified as a 0 or as a 1. M2 has a different 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Ind' Variables a,b,c b,c a,b a,c a,b,c
Accuracy 70% 75% 80% 55% 70%
Kappa 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.12 0.51
p <.01 <.01 <.01 ns <.01
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hypothesis: that b and c are related to the dependent variable and its “opinion” on any 
given case will be based on this hypothesis. Finally, the hypotheses and opinions of M3 
are based on variables a and b. The “true” hypothesis might be none of these. However, 
the holdout sample classification accuracies indicate that the given hypotheses are good 
practical approximations. Furthermore, trying to find which of these is closer to the 
“true” hypothesis involves a risk that the one model chosen is actually the least correct. 
Thus, the solution is to average the results. We have evidence that using all four should 
yield an average classification accuracy on unseen data of 73.5% 
((70%+70%+75%+80%)/4). Thus, for any new case we could run the data through all 
three models and average the results and we could be 73.5% confident that the 
classification accuracy of the committee is correct. 
A final issue in relation to committee classification is the interpretation of the 
ensemble. There is no single model to rely on for interpretation. However, there are 
regularities that can be used to interpret how the variables are related to the dependent 
variable. For example, in the committee members chosen from Table 5.1 the variables a 
and c are in three of the committee models and variable b is in all four models. Thus, we 
would conclude that variable b is the most important variable because it is in all four 
models while variables a and c are less important. Thus we have a starting point for 
explaining the phenomenon under investigation in that we can determine which are the 
most important variables.  
I will show in the next Chapter that this method of interpretation can yield a 
good method of interpreting the variables. In four of the models, having a legal 
qualification occurs and is positively associated with CM. The age of entering 
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parliament (Parlage) is in four models and is negatively associated with CM. In three of 
the models three different measures of language concreteness occur and are negatively 
associated with CM. Thus, the interpretation of the committee is that having a legal 
qualification is positively associated with CM while higher age at the time of entering 
parliament and higher levels of concrete speech are negatively associated with CM. 
 
Summary of Section 5.3 
In this section I have discussed three issues that need to be addressed in data 
mining. The first is feature selection. I have pointed out that in data mining the 
researcher needs to select a small subset of variables from the large pool of candidate 
variables. I explained that I will use t-tests to narrow down the selection from 109 
variables to 3 – 8 in the course of creating 5 models. I will then narrow this down 
further by addressing such issues as redundancy. The second issue I addressed was 
validation. I pointed out that in data mining the validity of the model is determined by 
the ability of the model to classify “unseen” data. Two common ways of doing this are 
to use a holdout sample and to use k-fold cross validation. Both of these methods are 
valid but have their own limitations. A method that addresses the limitations of both is 
to use a committee of five models. Each model will be created using a random split of 
the data into training and test sets. This approach has the advantage that it uses the data 
splitting methods used in Monte Carlo cross validation but has the advantage that 
several completely separate models are used to estimate classification accuracy. I then 
went on to review a number of metrics that will be used to assess the classification 
accuracy of the holdout/cross validated samples. These were accuracy, sensitivity, 
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specificity and Cohen’s Kappa. The next issue I addressed was the issue of 
interpretation of the model created using data mining techniques. Some induction 
methods used in data mining make it difficult to interpret the relationships between the 
independent variables and the dependent variables. I argued that this would not be a 
major issue because it is possible to use logistic regression. This method has been 
shown to be comparable to more sophisticated methods in some data mining 
applications while not suffering from the “black box” phenomenon. The final issue I 
addressed was the idea of using a “committee” of models rather than one model. I 
explained how this approach can result in greater efficiency than using one model and I 
also explained how using the committee method was no bar to deriving an interpretation 
of the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable.  
 
Summary of Chapter 5 
In this Chapter I have explained why I am using a data mining approach rather 
than a hypothesis testing approach in analysing the data. The reason is partly because 
there is no reliable theoretical basis in leadership research upon which to base the 
selection of variables. A selection of variables based on theory runs the risk of choosing 
variables that are not the best predictors of the dependent variable. As such, the 
hypothesis testing approach seems inappropriate. An alternative approach has been 
advocated: data mining. This involves a more rigorous method of model building 
because the search for predictor variables involves a comprehensive search through a 
large amount of data. I explained that there are issues that need to be addressed in the 
design of the data mining procedure. Feature selection is one such issue and I explained 
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that I would be using t-test and tests for redundancy to narrow down the field of 
variables. I then discussed validation procedures and pointed out that I would use a 
committee method based on several models, each of which is created using a random 
splitting of the data into training and test sets. Monte Carlo cross validation. I also 
explained how the raw validation figures would be reported using accuracy, sensitivity, 
specificity and Cohen’s Kappa so that we could determine the statistical validity of any 
given model’s classification accuracy.  I discussed how it is possible to interpret the 
results because the induction method used will be the relatively transparent logistic 
regression. Finally I explained how the use of the committee method of model design 
could be of benefit. 
Having explained how the data will be analysed the next chapter deals with the 









Chapter 6: Modelling Factors Associated with Cabinet Appointment 
 
Section 6.1: Introduction 
In Chapter 4 I explained that I would use educational, biographical and text 
based variables in an analysis of the difference between CMs and non-CMs. I explained 
that these kinds of variables are likely to tap into the characteristics that distinguish 
between these two classes. In Chapter 5 I explained that the modelling method I would 
use to find the important variables would be data mining. I explained that traditional 
hypothesis testing would be inappropriate given the large number of potential 
independent variables that need to be investigated.  
In this chapter I will put these ideas into practice. The purpose of this chapter is 
to create a committee classifier that can be used to determine the characteristics that are 
associated with being appointed to cabinet. Essentially this involves determining the 
difference between CMs and non-CMs. The model will be assessed, not on traditional 
measures such as the overall goodness of fit but on the accuracy of the prediction of 
holdout samples. A model that is able to predict out-of-sample is highly likely to 
include the variables that are important in the phenomenon under investigation. In short, 
if the model can predict out-of-sample then we can be reasonably sure that we have 
detected the variables that are involved in distinguishing between CMs and non-CMs.  
We can then go on in Chapters 7-9 to use the insights developed from the model to 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
201 
 
come up with plausible explanations as to why these variables are associated with the 
dependent variable. 
In the next section I will present an overview of the study design. I will also 
describe the cohort from which the sample is drawn. Finally, I will provide a preview of 
the major findings of the chapter.  
 
Section 6.2: Study Design, Sample and Preview of the Findings 
The basic aim is to use data available at the beginning of a parliamentarian’s 
career to predict the likelihood that she will become a cabinet minister.  
The cohort under examination here is the parliamentarians who were in 
parliament at any time over the period from the first session of parliament in April 1996 
to the first session of parliament in February 2008. Using these parliamentarians as a 
basis I wish to determine whether there are differences between those who become CMs 
and those who do not. In order to do this I will compare CMs and non-CMs on the basis 
of a number of biographical, educational and linguistic characteristics. These 
characteristics will be taken from the information available on the parliamentarian at the 
time they give their first speech in parliament. Thus, the design of the study is 
prospective. Unlike the cross-sectional approach used in Chapter 3 I wish to compare 
individuals rather than events. In the regression analysis in Chapter 3 the unit of 
analysis was the cabinet appointment “event”. Thus, an individual being appointed to a 
cabinet position was considered an event. But in the current situation I wish to use 
individuals as the unit of analysis. That is, I wish to determine whether there is 
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something about individuals that leads to them becoming CMs. To do this I will create a 
study design that compares individuals who became CMs with individuals who did not. 
As such, the study is effectively a case-control design. In order to do this I need to 
define the dependent variable. That is, I need to define what I mean by a CM and, more 
problematically, what I mean by a non-CM.  
A CM is simply an individual who has been appointed to cabinet at any stage in 
their parliamentary career. This is essentially a matter of public record. In the cohort of 
parliamentarians over the period April 1996 – February 2008, there is a number of 
parliamentarians who were CMs in previous governments but were not CMs in the 
period 1996- 2008. However, for the purposes of the study they are defined as CMs. 
Peter Morris, for example, was an ALP parliamentarian from December 1972 –  August 
1998 but was first appointed CM in the Hawke ministry in September 1988. Similarly, 
Ian Sinclair was an LNPC parliamentarian from November 1963 – November 1998 but 
was first appointed CM in the Holt/McEwen ministry in October 1967. Neither of these 
parliamentarians were CMs during the period under investigation (1996-2007) 
However, for the purposes of this study they are defined as CMs because they were 
CMs at some point in their careers. At the other end of the spectrum are the newly 
appointed ALP CMs who assumed office after the election of November 2007. As at the 
first session of parliament in 2008 these individuals were defined as CMs because they 
had been appointed after the 2007 election.  
It is worth noting that even the CM classification I have adopted may not be as 
transparent as it seems even though it seems to be merely a matter of inspecting the 
public record. This is because there is always the possibility that one or more CM jobs 
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were allocated on the basis of nepotism, favouritism or political expediency. Such 
individuals will not have objective characteristics that set them apart from non-CMs. 
Blewett gives the example of Stewart West who was “[e]levated to the cabinet in the 
first Hawke ministry as a token representative of the left…[He] was neither quick on the 
uptake nor a notably dynamic minister” (Blewett 1999: 20). This individual is not in the 
cohort under consideration but the example indicates that this kind of thing does occur. 
If we are looking for characteristics that differentiate CMs from non-CMs then having a 
large number of individuals who may not have actually possessed the differentiating 
characteristics has the potential to make the task difficult. As with the sampling in 
general there is no way of eliminating the possibility of these types of errors. Another 
anomaly occurred in the case of Duncan Kerr who was a the Minister for Justice (a JM 
position) in the Keating administration from 1993 – 1996. This includes a three week 
period as “caretaker” Attorney General when the position was vacant and Keating was 
waiting for the outcome of a by-election which the intended future Attorney General 
Michael Lavarch was contesting. Lavarch won the by-election and became Attorney 
General and Kerr reverted to his role as Minister for Justice. The question is, should we 
classify Kerr as a CM given that “at some time in his career” he had been a CM. As it is 
I have classified him as a non-CM (JM). This makes some sense because he was not an 
official member of cabinet and was not sworn in. However, the examples reveal that 
even a seemingly transparent definition such as CM can present difficulties. 
The basic definition of a non-CM is a parliamentarian who was a backbencher 
(BB), Junior Minister (JM) or Parliamentary Secretary (PS). However, there is a 
complication with this definition. We need to be able to observe an individual’s whole 
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parliamentary career in order to define them as a non-CM. The reason for this is that if 
an individual is still in parliament, it is still possible that he could become a CM at some 
time in the future. Clearly this is not a problem for the CMs who are still in parliament 
as they are definable as CMs. With the non-CMs it is a problem because they may not 
have reached the highest office of their career. As we will see, the sample will need to 
be adjusted so that we only include as non-CMs those individuals whose entire career 
we can observe. I will explain this in more detail in the section on the sample design. 
Another issue I will need to consider in the design of the sample is how to deal 
with backbenchers (BBs) who were in parliament for only a short period. The issue here 
is that some BBs are in parliament for less time than it takes to become a CM and, 
having remained on the backbench, have not been selected for any ministerial role 
whether CM, Junior Minister (JM) or Parliamentary Secretary (PS). These individuals 
may have had the potential to rise beyond the backbench but they are removed by the 
electorate before they have come to the attention of the selectors or before they have 
served enough time to be granted a senior position. For example, the shortest length of 
time in parliament served by a BB in the cohort was eight months served by Leonie 
Short. If she had had the ability to become a CM it is unlikely that this would have been 
revealed in this time. On the other hand, she may have only had the ability to remain on 
the backbench or to attain a role in the outer ministry as a JM or PS. Furthermore, she 
was a member of the ALP which was in opposition at the time she was in parliament so 
even if she had been seen to have talent she would not have had the opportunity to be 
appointed to cabinet. At the other extreme we have the case of John Watson who 
accumulated 29 years in parliament which includes 16 years, accumulated over several 
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changes of government, in which his party was in government. Thus, during the 16 
years in which he was in parliament and his party was in government he had ample 
opportunity to become a CM but was not selected. The two extremes of Leonie Short 
and John Watson illustrate the fact that it is only those BBs who had enough 
opportunity to become a CM but were not appointed should be classified as non-CMs. 
Classifying the short stay BBs, such as Leonie Short, as non-CMs would seem to run 
the risk of classifying as a non-CMs persons who may have had the potential to become 
a CM but were removed by the electorate before being able to do so. My solution is to 
include in the sample only those BBs who had sufficient time in parliament while their 
party was in power. I will explain this in greater detail in the section on sample design. 
The next stage in the process of developing the model will be to explain the 
derivation of the data used as independent variables. There are 9 biographical and 
educational variables and 100 linguistic variables. In the case of the biographical and 
educational variables I will define these in the section on the sample data below. In the 
case of the linguistic variables it is not feasible to explain the derivation of all these due 
to their number. Furthermore, many are irrelevant for the purposes of constructing the 
model. The data mining process will identify the several important linguistic variables 
and I will then address the issue as to what each represents. 
The final stage in the process is the creation of the actual models. I will show 
that of the 109 variables, fewer than ten in total are of potential interest. I will go on to 
use data mining techniques to determine which of these are the most useful in 
differentiating between CMs and non-CMs. It will become clear that there are several 
variables that are particularly useful.  
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One of the variables that I find to be important is having a legal education. This 
replicates similar findings in the literature. Kerby (2009), for example, found that 
possessing a legal qualification is associated with cabinet appointment in the Canadian 
parliament. Another variable that I find to be important is the age of first entry to 
parliament (Parlage). This replicates the finding in a number of different settings. Kerby 
(2009) found that after age 42 an individual’s chances of being appointed to cabinet fall. 
Buck (1963) and King (1981) found a similar age related phenomenon. Kam et al 
(2010) found that age is negatively associated with cabinet appointment. My finding 
that the age of entry to parliament is negatively associated with a parliamentarian’s 
likelihood of becoming a CM is consistent with these findings.  In Chapters 7 and 8 I 
will derive plausible explanations as to why legal qualification and age have this 
relationship with CM.   
As well as the legal and age variables there are several linguistic variables that 
are important in the selection of CMs. These variables seem to be related to the 
concreteness of language. I will show that those parliamentarians who use language that 
is relatively non-concrete (i.e., abstract) are have a greater likelihood of becoming CMs. 
This is the first time this observation has been made. In Chapter 8 I will derive a 
plausible explanation as to why this relationship exists. 
Thus, by the end of this chapter I will have solved the problem I wished to 
address – the characteristics of those who become CMs. I will have identified a small 
number of variables that explain who became a CM in approximately 70% of the cases 
in the sample derived from the cohort of ALP and LNPC parliamentarians from the 
period 1996-2008.  
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Summary of Section 6.2 
In this section I have discussed the procedure by which I intend to address the 
identification of the characteristics associated with becoming a CM. The basic approach 
will be to use data available at the start of parliamentarians’ parliamentary careers to 
build a committee classifier that can predict who will become a CM. I have defined the 
dependent variable: CMs are those who have been a CM at some time in their 
parliamentary careers. Non-CMs are those who were not appointed to cabinet over their 
entire parliamentary careers. I have pointed out that this means we must be able to 
observe the entire parliamentary career of those we define as non-CMs. That is, we need 
to consider how to deal with those who were still in parliament after the first session of 
parliament in 2008. I have also alluded to the problem of defining BBs in term of their 
opportunity to become CMs. I have pointed out that the sampling procedure will involve 
removing those BBs who did not have the opportunity to become CMs. I then addressed 
the issue of data. The biographical and educational variables will be defined in the 
section below. Given that there are 100 linguistic variables I will discuss only those that 
are found by data mining techniques to be important in the final modelling process. We 
will see that of the 109 variables, only a small number is potentially of interest – four 
linguistic and three educational/biographical. A further screening process will reveal 
that of these, five variables can be used in a committee modelling procedure to correctly 
classify 78% of the cases in holdout samples. 
In the next section I will turn to the development of the sample from the total 
cohort of ALP and LNPC parliamentarians in parliament over the period 1996-2008. I 
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will use the sampling methods discussed above to reduce the initial cohort of 384 to a 
sample of 134.  
 
Section 6.3: The Sample 
The cohort was drawn from those ALP and LNPC parliamentarians who were in 
parliament at any time from the first session of Parliament in 1996 to the first session of 
parliament in 2008. Only ALP and LNPC members were included because in the 
Australian Federal context these are the only parties from which ministers are drawn. 
The definitions of cabinet minister (CM), junior minister (JM), parliamentary secretary 
(PS) and backbencher (BB) are based on the highest office achieved by the 
parliamentarian over their parliamentary career using information available at the first 
session of parliament in 2008. The resulting cohort consists of 205 LNPC 
parliamentarians and 179 ALP parliamentarians making a total of 384.  
The breakdown of the 384 parliamentarians by party/LNPC and ministerial rank 
is given in Table 6.1. Data on each of the individuals in the cohort are given in 
Appendix 2. Of the 205 LNPC parliamentarians, 112 were BBs, 26 PSs, 33 JMs and 34 
CMs. Of the ALP parliamentarians, 111 were BBs, 16 were PSs, 18 were JMs and 34 
were CMs.  
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
209 
 
Table 6.1: Cohort by Party and Ministerial Rank 
 
The idea is to use the 68 CMs as the study group and create a control group of 
non-CMs from the remaining parliamentarians. However, as I mentioned above, we 
cannot use all of these parliamentarians in the control group.  
The first problem to consider is that there is a difficulty classifying those BBs, 
PSs and JMs who were still in parliament at the February 2008 session. These may go 
on to become CMs and they are therefore difficult to classify. In contrast, the CMs who 
were in parliament in the first session of 2008 are not difficult to classify because they 
have already reached, at some stage in their career, the highest point. Thus, the problem 
is, how do we classify parliamentarians who have never been CMs but who still have 
the opportunity to become CMs because they were still in parliament in February 2008? 
The answer is that we need to remove them. We cannot observe whether or not they will 
go on to become CMs so we cannot classify them as CMs or non-CMs. Removing the 
BBs, PSs and JMs who were in parliament in the first session of parliament in 2008 
(including those who were newly elected and re-elected at the November 2007 election) 
results in the sample shown in Table 6.2. 
LNPC ALP Total
BB 112 111 223
PS 26 16 42
JM 33 18 51
CM 34 34 68
Total 205 179 384
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Table 6.2: Sample without  BBs, PSs and JMs in Parliament at February ‘08 
 
The result is that we have a cohort of 68 CMs who were in parliament at 
February 2008 or who had served in parliament at some time over the period 1996 – 
2007, and a control group of non-CMs whose career had come to an end by February 
2008. In short, we have a study group who are clearly definable as CMs and a control 
group of individuals who did not become CMs over their entire parliamentary careers 
and are thus classifiable as non-CMs. 
With this reduced sample there is still a problem. Within the sample of BBs 
there are individuals who did not have enough time in parliament to become CMs. 
These are the individuals who may have had the ability to become CMs but were 
removed by the electorate before they had sufficient time in parliament to demonstrate 
CM ability. A related problem is that some backbenchers may have spent some or all of 
their parliamentary experience in opposition. Such individuals may not have had the 
opportunity to be appointed to cabinet merely because their party was not in power. An 
individual whose party was in opposition for the duration of their time in parliament had 
no chance of being elevated to cabinet. They might have had the ability to be a CM had 
their party been in power but, due to electoral preferences, they were unable to become 
LNPC ALP Total
BB 57 46 103
PS 12 3 15
JM 14 7 21
CM 34 34 68
Total 117 90 207





 Including in the control group the short stay BBs and the BBs who spent most of 
their careers in opposition would run the risk of including individuals who had a high 
probability of becoming CMs given other circumstances. This is something we wish to 
avoid and although we cannot eliminate the possibility of including such individuals in 
the sample, there are steps we can take to minimise the probability of this occurring.  
The solution I have decided on to deal with these problems is to exclude those 
backbenchers who did not have sufficient “in-government” experience to become CMs. 
Here, in-government experience includes the total amount of time in parliament during 
which their party was in government. Thus, a BB who has two years of experience as a 
BB while his party is in government followed by ten years when his party was in 
opposition and another three years of experience as a BB while his party is in 
government will have 15 years of total parliamentary experience of which 2 + 3 = 5 was 
in-government experience.  
With the concept of in-government experience we can now go on to consider 
how much in-government experience a BB needs to reveal executive potential. The idea 
here is that when a position in cabinet arises there will be a search for potential 
candidates. Possibly the first to be considered will be those who are already in the 
ministry. However, there are situations when BBs are directly appointed to cabinet but a 
BB’s party has to be in power in order for such an opportunity to arise. Thus, in-
government experience rather than total parliamentary experience is the important 
factor.  Therefore, of the 103 backbenchers in the sample in Table 6.2 I wish to remove 
                                                 
1
 One possible solution would be to factor in membership of the shadow cabinet here. However, 
as we have seen, the ALP tended not to divide the ministry into inner and outer shadow ministries which 
makes this infeasible in the current situation. Furthermore, the dynamics of promotions and appointments 
in opposition may not be comparable to what occurs when in power.  
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those who possibly had potential but did not have sufficient in-government experience 
to demonstrate it. The question is, how do we determine how long is sufficient time to 
reveal ministerial potential? In order to determine this, we must consider how much in-
government experience CMs had on average before they were appointed to cabinet. 
This will give us a good indication of the amount of time required for a parliamentarian 
who has potential to actually reveal that potential.  
For the sample of 68 CMs, the average amount of in-government experience 
these individuals had before being appointed to cabinet was 3 years with a standard 
deviation of 3.5 years. The problem here, however, is that this includes a number of 
CMs who were appointed without any in-government experience. Typically, these 
individuals were senior members of the party when in opposition and, upon the party 
winning government, these individuals became CMs due to having demonstrated 
cabinet potential while in opposition. These individuals were not “waiting in the wings” 
to be called upon to enter cabinet while their party was in power. Including these 
individuals in the calculation underestimates the amount of in-government experience 
an individual must accumulate in order to be appointed to cabinet. If we exclude the 
CMs who were appointed with no in-government experience we find that the amount of 
in-government experience accumulated by CMs on average before they were appointed 
was 5.5 years with a standard deviation of 3.0 years (n = 37). 
We can now say that an individual who has not become a CM within 5.5 + 3.0 
years = 8.5 years in-government experience is very unlikely to do so. The most likely 
explanation for their lack of success is that there was always someone else who was 
seen as better able to do the job. This is not to say that using this criterion will ensure 
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that all BBs in the control group lacked the qualities to become CMs. No sampling 
method can claim to be so efficient. What I am suggesting is that this is a method of 
reducing the probability that, on average, the BBs in the sample had the qualities 
required to become CMs. It should also be stated that there is nothing absolute about 
this decision rule. The point is that some trade-off is required between a decision rule 
that is too strict and one that is too lenient. Too strict a rule will mean that the sample of 
BBs will be reduced to the point that there will not be a sufficient representation of BBs. 
Too lenient a decision rule and the risk is that there will be included in the control group 
individuals who actually had the talent to become CMs. The decision rule of 8.5 years is 
merely an empirically derived attempt to balance these two considerations.  
Removing from the sample those BBs who had less than 8.5 years in-
government experience results in the number of BBs falling to 30. The breakdown of 
the distribution of parliamentarians with this reduced number of BBs is given in table 
6.3. 
Table 6.3: Final Modelling Sample 
 
LNPC ALP Total
BB 16 14 30
PS 12 3 15
JM 14 7 21
CM 34 34 68
Total 76 58 134
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The remaining sample consists of 68 CMs (including CMs who were still in 
parliament in the first session of 2008) and 66 BBs, JMs and PSs whose careers had 
ended by the first session of parliament in 2008.   
This sample of 134 should provide a good basis for the analysis. The control 
group consists of 66 individuals who were not selected for cabinet positions during their 
entire careers. The BBs, because we have selected them on the basis of their in-
government experience, had sufficient time to prove themselves during their careers and 
yet had not been selected. In the case of the JMs and PSs, these individuals are also 
likely to be good non-CM exemplars because during their parliamentary careers they 
did not rise further than the junior ministry. In other words, they had come to the 
attention of the selectors at some time but during the appointments and re-shuffles it 
was always judged that there was someone who was more appropriately suited to 
cabinet than the career JMs and PSs. Conceptually, it is always possible that, as with the 
BBs, given more time some might have been appointed to cabinet. Furthermore, in 
extraordinary circumstances such as war or other national emergency, it is possible that 
these individuals might have been elevated to cabinet. However, the point is that, 
because they rose no higher during their careers, on average this group represents 
individuals who were judged as being less capable of CM appointment. Thus, as a 
group, the BBs, PSs and JMs in the sample should provide a good set of non-CM 
exemplars.  
It should be added that the two adjustments to the sample are unlikely to 
introduce any systematic bias. The idea with the deletions is to maximise the extent to 
which the control group of non-CMs actually does represent non-CMs. Given the 
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reasoning upon which the deletions were made there does not seem to be any basis on 
which it could be said that systematic bias was introduced.  
 
Summary of Section 6.3 
In this section I have explained the sampling technique for the modelling 
sample. The basic cohort consists of those members of the ALP and LNPC  in 
parliament over the period March 1996 to February 2008. Of these 384, I removed any 
BBs, PSs and JMs who were still in parliament in the first session of parliament in 
February 2008. The reason for this is that we could not tell, from the information 
available at February 2008 whether or not they would eventually become CMs. Another 
alteration to the basic cohort was that I also removed those who were backbenchers and 
who had less than 8.5 years in-government experience. These were removed because it 
is important to include only those backbenchers who had sufficient time to prove 
themselves and yet who failed to do so. With these adjustments to the sample the 
control group consists of 66 non-CMs and the study group consists of 68 CMs. 
Having explained the sampling method I will turn, in the next section, to the 
data. I will explain the coding for the binary dependent variable and 109 independent 
variables. 
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Section 6.4: The Data. 
In this section I will explain the coding for the dependent and independent 
variables. In the case of the independent variables I will restrict a full explanation to the 
biographical and educational variables as well as the small handful of linguistic 
variables that become important in the modelling. It is not useful to describe in detail 
the 100 linguistic variables as many of them turn out to be relevant in the modelling 
process.  
 
The Dependent Variable - CM 
The dependent variable for the modelling is quite straightforward: using 
information available at the first session of parliament in February 2008, a 
parliamentarian who had been selected to be a cabinet minister at any time in their 
career is scored as 1. Non-CM controls were scored as 0. The definition of non-CM is as 
discussed in section 6.3 Briefly, it consists of BBs, PSs, and JMs whose whole career 
we are able to observe (that is, whose career had ended) by the first session of 
parliament in February 2008. Furthermore, the definition of a BB is a BB who had 
ended their career by February 2008 and who had more than 8.5 years of in-government 
experience. It should be noted that the restriction of 8.5 in-government experience was 
not placed on PSs and JMs. The reason for this was that, being active members of the 
ministry, their abilities were on display to the selectorate and therefore it is likely that, 
had they displayed executive potential, they would have been promoted. The BBs were 
not involved in ministerial activities and therefore did not have the opportunity to 
display their talent or lack thereof. 
 




The Educational and Biographical Independent Variables 
Parlage – This is the age in years of the parliamentarian at the time they entered 
federal parliament for the first time. For the vast majority of parliamentarians there was 
one time of entry and the age at this date was used. Where an individual entered federal 
parliament, lost her seat and then regained it in a subsequent period, the age at the time 
of the initial entry to parliament is used. Where an individual moved from state 
parliament to federal parliament the age at entry to federal parliament is used. Where an 
individual moved from one house to another, the age at the time of entering the first 
house was used. 
InPower – This is a dummy representing whether the parliamentarian’s party 
was in power when the parliamentarian delivered her first speech. The idea here is that 
individuals in opposition have been found to use slightly different language in 
comparison with those in government (Hirst et al 2010). This variable is designed to 
capture this effect. A parliamentarian whose party was in power when they delivered 
their speech is coded as 1 while if they were in opposition when the speech was 
delivered the coding is 0.  
Female – This is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the parliamentarian is a 
female and 0 if not. 
The remaining variables are educational. This data is drawn from the various 
editions of the Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia (1968 – 
2008) as well as the online editions (www.aph.gov.au). The education coded for is the 
education acquired by an individual before entering parliament. The idea is to attempt to 
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capture the cognitive style of parliamentarians as represented by educational 
background.  
There are six binary variables for tertiary education:  
Law – Individuals who were academically qualified to practice law are coded as 
1 with the others coded 0. This variable represents the qualification so an individual 
who has acquired the qualification but has not practised as a lawyer is still coded as 1. 
The qualifications included in this category are B.Juris, LLB, LLM and the diploma 
qualifications leading to admission to practise through the Legal Practitioners 
Admissions board and its predecessors. Where a qualification is not stated but it was 
stated that an individual was a legal practitioner prior to entry to parliament they receive 
a coding of 1. 
Arts – Individuals with the following qualifications were coded as 1: BA, MA, 
BASocWk.  
ECon – Individuals with the following economics qualifications were coded as 
1: B.Ec, B.Com, B.Bus, MBA, M.Ec, BSc (Econ). 
Edu – Individuals with any education qualification that qualified them to teach 
in a state or territory school system were coded as 1. Qualifications included were 
DipEd, B.Ed, M.Ed, Dip. T, Cert. T.  
SciEngSurv – Individuals with the following Science, Engineering or Surveying 
qualifications were coded as 1: BSc, MSc, BE, BSurv. 
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Med  – Individuals with the following medical qualifications were coded as 1: 
MBBS, BMBS. Where a qualification is not stated but it was stated that an individual 
was a medical practitioner prior to entry to parliament they received a coding of 1. 
 
The Linguistic Independent Variables 
The linguistic independent variables consist of two sets of variables. One set 
comes from Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). Variables from LIWC 
constitute 68 of the 100 linguistic variables. The remaining 32 are derived from the 
Paivio Yuille and Madigan (1968) and Clarke and Paivio (2004) psycholinguistic word 
norms.  
Linguistic Enquiry and Word Count variables consist of 68 continuous variables 
as described in previous chapters. They are derived by running maiden speeches 
through the LIWC software using the LIWC dictionary version 
LIWC2007_English100131.  
Paivio Yuille and Madigan (1968) and Clarke and Paivio (2004) (PYMCP) 
Word Norms are used to create 32 continuous psycholinguistic variables. In section 
4.3.2 of Chapter 4 I gave an example of how the ease of definition (Def) variable is 
calculated. All the psycholinguistic variables are calculated in a similar way using a 
sample of 925 words originally developed by Paivio Yuille and Madigan (1968) with 
additional variables for the 925 words measured by Clarke and Paivio (2004). 
Essentially, each of the 925 words is given a value on 32 psycholinguistic variables. My 
scoring of the speeches used this data to give a score for each speech on all 32 variables.  
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Of the 100 linguistic variables only 5 survive the filtering process. They are Img, 
(imagability) Con (concreteness), Conav (context availability), AOA (age of 
acquisition) and Def (ease of definition). Def has been discussed above. I will now 
discuss the remaining four variables.  
Img is derived from the Paivio Yuille and Madigan (1968) norms for a sample of 
925 nouns. Imagability scores for each word were derived by asking subjects the 
following question in relation to each of the words: 
Nouns differ in their capacity to arouse mental images of 
things or events. Some words arouse a sensory experience such 
as a mental picture or sound, very quickly and easily, whereas 
others may do so only with difficulty (i.e., after a long delay) or 
not at all. The purpose of this experiment is to rate a list of 
words as to the ease or difficulty with which they arouse mental 
images. Any word which…[]…arouses a mental image (i.e., a 
mental picture or sound, or other sensory experience) very 
quickly and easily should be given a high imagery rating; any 
word that arouses a mental image with difficulty or not at all 
should be given a low imagery rating (Paivio Yuille and 
Madigan 1968: 4, italics in original). 
Subjects were asked to rate each word on a score of 1(low) – 7 (high).  
Scores for Con (concreteness) were derived in the same way as those for Img 
except that the question was as follows: 
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Any word that refers to objects, materials or persons 
should receive a high concreteness rating; any word that refers 
to an abstract concept that cannot be experienced by the senses 
should receive a high abstractness rating,… (Paivio Yuille and 
Madigan 1968:5; italics in original). 
Subjects were asked to rate each word on a score of 1(low) – 7 (high).  
In the case of Conav (context availability), the following instructions were 
given: 
Think of a context for each word and then rate how easy 
it was to think of a context on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means 
“very hard to think of a context” and 7 means “very easy to 
think of a context.” For example, it may be easy to think of a 
context for the words “baseball” and “repentance” (e.g., the 
World Series or a Church) and they should receive high ratings 
of 6 or 7. It may be harder to think of a context for the words 
“inversion” and “sloop,” although eventually contexts might 
come to mind (e.g., a smog inversion in a large city or sailing on 
a lake). Such words should receive low ratings of 1 or 2. Rate 
words of intermediate ease of context availability between these 
extremes (Clarke and Paivio 2004: 381). 
Subjects were asked to rate each word on a score of 1 – 7.  
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 In the case of AOA (Age of acquisition), subjects were given the following 
instructions: 
Use the following scale [1 – 7 ] to rate the words in the booklet 
on their AGE OF ACQUISITION—that is, on how old you were 
when you learned to understand and use the words. Words that 
you learned early in childhood get high ratings. Words that you 
learned later in childhood get low ratings (Clarke and Paivio 
2004: 381). 
The concept that links these five variables is concreteness or some closely 
associated phenomenon. The variable Con measures concreteness directly while the 
variables Img and Conav  measure concepts related to concreteness. Clearly, the ability 
to derive an image associated with an object is likely to be associated with the extent to 
which a sensory “image” can be imagined, thus explaining the connection between 
concreteness and Img. It has been suggested that Conav  is a more reliable measure of 
the actual concept of concreteness than Con (Schwanenfugel and Schoben 1983, cited in 
Wiemer-Hastings, Krug and Xu 2001: 1135). The idea here is that it is easier to think of 
a context for concrete objects than for abstract objects.  The variable Def is not a direct 
measure of concreteness but measures something closely related to concreteness. 
Abstract words are more difficult to define than concrete words (Clarke and Paivio 
1991: 160). The word “car”, for example, is easier to define than the word “justice”. 
This explains why, as we will see below, the scores for Def are highly correlated with 
the other measures for concreteness. I will return to this issue in Chapter 8 where I will 
explain how the Dual Coding Theory (Clarke and Paivio 1991) links the ease of 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
223 
 
definition of a word (Def) to the extent to which the definition is stored using non-
semantic images associated with the word.  Finally, the variable AOA is linked to 
concreteness in that “…words acquired early in life tend to be short, concrete and 
common” (Morrison, Ellis and Quinlan 1992:706).  
Of the five linguistic variables, only three – Img, Con and Def – survive the 
filtering processes involved in model building. Two of these (Img and Def) are direct 
measures of concreteness while the remaining variable, Def, can be taken as a close 
proxy for concreteness. This is not to say that there is not some ambiguity with the 
concept of concreteness itself. In a factor analysis of the 925 words (Clarke and Paivio 
2004), there is evidence that concreteness is not a unitary concept in that there is some 
difference in the way that the various measures of concreteness load on to different 
factors.  Img,   Img2
2
 and Con load on the same factor (‘Imagery/Concreteness’) 
however Conav and Img2, as well as Def, load on a different factor 
(‘Familiarity/Context availability’). This suggests that concreteness may not be 
reducible to a single phenomenon. However, the important point for the current analysis 
is that there are good reasons for saying that Con and Img are closely related to 
concreteness while Def is a proxy for concreteness.  
  
Summary of Section 6.4 
                                                 
2
Img and Img2 are identical in terms of the sample of 925 words and the stimulus question used 
to generate the scores. The difference is that the data for Img was gathered from the studies undertaken in 
1968 (Paivio, Yuille and Madigan 1968) with the 1968 cohort of subjects while the data for Img2 was 
gathered in 2001-2002 from different subjects (Clarke and Paivio 2004). The two measures have a 
correlation of .803 (Clarke and Paivio 2004: 375). 
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In this section I have described how the variables to be used in the analysis have 
been derived. The dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the 
parliamentarian was a CM and 0 if not. The biographical data consist of 2 binary 
variables and one continuous variable. The educational variables consist of 6 binary 
variables. The linguistic data are from two sources. The first consist of 68 continuous 
LIWC variables; the second consists of 32 continuous psycholinguistic variables. Both 
sets of linguistic data were derived by running the first speeches of the 134 
parliamentarians in the sample through the relevant software. Of the 100 linguistic 
variables, we will see that only five survive the initial filtering process and only three 
appear in the final models. These variables are linked in that they are measures of 
concreteness. 
The data for the five “important” variables described in this section for the 
modelling sample of 134 parliamentarians is provided in Appendix 3. 
 
Section 6.5: The Modelling Process 
In this section I will go through the procedure for creating Model 1 of the 5 
Model committee. The creation of the other 4 models in the committee follows the same 
procedure. Full details of the model creation process for the other 4 models are in 
Appendix 3.   
I will select, from the 109 candidates, a group of variables that are most likely to 
be useful in distinguishing between CMs and non-CMs. In order to identify the 
variables most likely to provide such a signal I will use a variable selection method 
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based on the standard t-test for the difference of means. I will demonstrate that there are 
seven variables out of the 109 that are likely to be useful predictors of CM. This set of 
variables will be used to create a “naïve” model consisting of all seven variables. I will 
then use a test of redundancy to create a “reduced” model which has the redundant 
variables removed. This reduced model consists of four variables. I will then use these 
four variables to create 10 models by using all possible combinations of the 4 variables. 
The “optimum” model will be the model that has the highest out-of-sample 
classification accuracy.  
Division of the data into training and test Sets 
The first stage in this process involves dividing the 134 cases into training and 
test sets. One of the most salient differences between traditional statistics and data 
mining is that data mining uses out-of-sample classification accuracy to validate 
models. I have chosen to use an external holdout sample to test the accuracy of the 
models. Thus, the first stage of the modelling process is to split the 134 cases into an 
estimation (training) sample and a holdout sample. The training set will be used for all 
analysis while the test set will be used for testing models.  
The difficulty here is to split the data in such a way as to provide enough of a 
training sample to enable regularities to be extracted from while providing a holdout 
sample of sufficient size to provide statistical significance. There is no ideal split 
between training and testing sample size. Where the sample size is large it is possible to 
use a 50-50 split. Such a split with a small sample size would result in a training sample 
that was not large enough to build a viable model with. At the other extreme, having a 
very small test sample can mean that the classification accuracy of the test sample is 
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meaningless. Ransohoff gives an example of a published study which uses a training 
sample of 24 and a holdout sample of 6 (Chang et al 2003, cited in Ransohoff 2004: 
310). Ransohoff points out that even if the classification accuracy of a holdout sample 
of n = 6 was beyond chance the error variance is likely to be such that the same result 
may not occur with a different sample.  
Given these considerations the strategy I have decided on is to use a 80-20 split. 
This provides 107 cases for training which should be adequate for a small number of 
independent variables without running into the problem of overfitting. The holdout 
sample of 27 is close to the standard sample size of 30 and therefore can be seen as 
reasonable for the purposes of statistical significance.  
The holdout sample was created using stratified random sampling (Witten and 
Frank 2005: 149).  That is, the cases to include in the holdout sample were randomly 
selected but the proportion of CMs and non-CMs was set up to reflect the distribution of 
CMs and non-CMs in the data set as a whole. As there were slightly more that 50% in 
the CM class (CMs = 68/134 = 51%), the holdout sample was designed to have slightly 
more than 50% CMs. Thus, in each holdout sample of 27, 13 were non-CMs and 14 
were CMs.  
Having thus split the 134 cases into holdout and training samples, the analysis of 
variables was conducted on the training sample only. The holdout sample was used only 
to test the models after they had been constructed. If the model can classify the holdout 
sample at a probability level beyond mere chance there is a lower probability that the 
model has merely “learnt” ungeneralisable patterns in the training sample. 




Initial Screening of Variables 
Using the 107 cases of the training sample, the first stage of data screening 
involved scanning all 109 variables for possible associations with the dependent 
variable CM. The aim here is to find the variables most likely to provide a signal which 
can be used to predict the dependent variable. There is a large number of variables and 
we should therefore be aware that some of them will be associated with CM by chance 
alone. As such we should be stricter than we would normally be with our decision 
criterion. Thus, in tests of statistical significance in relation to the selection of variables 
we should apply the p<.01 level of significance rather than the p<.05 level. The reason 
for this is that in a group of 109 variables approximately .05 * 109 = 5 will be 
associated with CM appointment by chance alone. However, only 1 will be associated 
by chance alone at the 1% level. Thus, if we find more than one variable that is 
significantly associated with CM appointment we can be reasonably sure that there is 
some signal beyond the noise in the data. 
For each of the 109 variables a t-test was conducted to see if there was a 
significant difference between the mean values for CMs and non-CMs.
3
 Variables were 
then ranked according to their p-values on the t-tests. Figure 6.1 depicts this ranking. 
The lowest p–values are at the bottom left and it is clear from the p-values that the vast 
majority of variables is unlikely to be useful. Only 7 are associated with CM 
appointment at the p<.01 level with an additional 8 associated at the p<.05 level. 
                                                 
3
 F-tests were used to determine whether the populations had equal variances. Where this was 
not the case Welsh’s t-test was applied.  
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
228 
 
Figure 6.1: Ranking of 109 Variables on the Basis of T-tests 
 
Ninety four of the variables are unrelated to CM on the basis of t-tests. This is 
not to suggest that it is impossible that they could provide information from which to 
detect a signal in the data. Searches based on non-linear and discontinuous relationships 
could yield useful variables. Furthermore, interactions between variables could provide 
data that would be useful information. However, the number of such possibilities is 
extremely large. For example, the number of possible two variable interactions is n(n-
1)/2. With 109 variables the number of possible interaction terms is 5886. Thus, it is 
computationally and possibly methodologically more prudent to look at simple 
relationships as a first step. If I had been unable to find any significant relationships 
using t-tests it would have been useful to move on to more complicated searches. 
However, given that I have found 7 potentially useful variables I proceeded with these. 
The seven variables that were associated with CM appointment at the p<.01 
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Table 6.4: Variables with p<.01 on Tests of Differences in Means 
 
*The values given for these variables are converted to z-scores  to aid interpretation. The 
original values are on a scale of 1 -7 
 
Having selected the variables the next stage is to create a “naive model” using 
all 7 variables.  
The Naïve Model 
This model consists of the variables Law, Con, Parlage, Img, Def, Arts and 
Conav. I have called it naïve because there has been no attempt to eliminate variables 
based on further tests. Using these 7 variables the classification performance using 
holdout sample 1 (n = 27) was as follows: Accuracy = 66.67%; Sensitivity = 50.00%; 
Specificity = 84.62%; Kappa = .3415 (p=.057).
4
   
The strength of this model is that it identifies the non-CMs at a rate of 84.62% 
which is well beyond what we would expect by chance. However, it is not able to detect 
CMs, given that it has a sensitivity of only 50%. The overall measure of the ability to 
classify correctly (on a scale of 0 = random classification to 1 = perfect agreement) is 
.3415 and this is at borderline significance (p =.057).  
                                                 
4
 The data used for training and testing this model as well as the 4 other models created using 
different holdout samples are presented in Appendix 3. 
Mean Mean
Non-CMs CMs p-value Description
Law 0.11 0.52 0.000 Binary Variable: 1 = legal qualification, 0 = no legal qualification
CON* 0.41 -0.36 0.000 Concreteness
ParlAge 42.74 37.87 0.000 Age of first entry to Federal Parliament
IMG* 0.37 -0.33 0.000 Imagability. A measure of concreteness
DEF* 0.28 -0.37 0.001 Ease of definitions. A measure of concreteness
Arts 0.25 0.56 0.001 Binary Variable: 1 = Arts qualification, 0 = no Arts qualification
CONAV* 0.24 -0.26 0.009 Context availability. A measure of concreteness
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What this indicates is that either there is not a sufficient signal in the data to 
enable a more accurate classification rate to take place or there is redundancy in the 
model. In the latter case, the inclusion of variables that carry similar information may 
have resulted in the degradation the ability of the model to generalise. I will now 
address this issue. We will find that the removal of redundant variables can increase the 
classification accuracy of the model. 
 
Redundancy 
A problem contributing to the lack of a model’s ability to generalise is the 
inclusion of redundant variables in a model. This can be a problem with both traditional 
methods such as logistic regression as well as with more sophisticated methods. 
Gabrilovich and Markovitch (2004), for example, provide an example of how 
redundancy can degrade the performance of support vector machines, possibly the most 
sophisticated induction method currently in use.  
It is possible that there is considerable redundancy in the selection of variables 
because I have used a univariate test for each variable. That is, I have selected variables 
using an individual test for each variable. The problem here is that although each 
variable is individually significantly associated with the dependent variable, we need to 
consider their intercorrelations. As mentioned earlier, there are several variables that are 
linked in that they are measuring concreteness or a closely related concept. If they are 
measuring similar phenomena then including more than one in any one model is likely 
to result in redundancy and this can add noise to the model (Gibbs, Morgan, Maier, 
Dandy, Holmes and Nixon 2003: 791). The extent to which potential redundancy is 
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present becomes evident if we consider the correlations between variables. Table 6.6 
shows the intercorrelations of the variables in the model.  
Table 6.6: Inter-correlations between CM and 7 Independent Variables 
 
The correlation between Img and the other three linguistic variables varies from 
a high of .92 (Con) to a low of .74 (Def). In comparison, Img is correlated with the 
dependent variable, CM, at -.34. In other words, Img is more correlated with the other 
linguistic variables than it is with the dependent variable. The same situation obtains for 
the other three linguistic variables. Thus, there is a classic case of redundancy in that the 
four linguistic variables are effectively measuring similar things and with such high 
levels of redundancy it is unlikely that they are collectively adding more signal than 
noise. This indicates that the model can be improved by removing one or more of them.  
The procedure here is to create four models, each of which has all three 
independent variables Law, Parlage and Arts but only one of Img, Con, Conav  or Def. 
Table 6.7 shows the holdout sample classification accuracy for each of these four 
models.  
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Table 6.7: Holdout Sample Classification Accuracy  – Four Models 
 
*p<.05 
The models that include Img and Conav have equal highest accuracy at 74.07%. 
This means that we still have to make a decision about which of the two out of Img and 
Conav  to continue with in the further analysis of the variables. Where the accuracy is 
identical the next criterion is to look at the actual Kappa values. The Kappa for the 
model including Img is .4793 while that for the model including Conav  is .4822. Thus, 
it is the latter we should continue with. 
 
The Optimum Model 
The redundancy test has resulted in a reduced model consisting of Law, Parlage, 
Arts and Conav. I would now like to explore all possibilities of the four variables we 
have isolated. The procedure here is quite straightforward: the 10 possible combinations 
of the four variables is used to create 10 models. It is then a simple procedure to use the 
holdout sample to assess which is the best model.  Table 6.9 lists the model variables, 
their classification accuracy and their Kappas. 
Variables Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Kappa
Law, Parlage, Arts, IMG 74.07 78.57 69.23 0.48*
Law, Parlage, Arts, CON 66.67 64.29 69.23 0.33  
Law, Parlage, Arts, CONAV 74.07 71.43 76.92 0.48*
Law, Parlage, Arts, DEF 62.96 42.86 84.62 0.27  
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Table 6.8: Accuracy of  Models Created with Law, Arts, Parlage and Conav 
 
 
On the criterion of holdout sample performance it is clear that a model 
consisting of Law and Parlage is the best performer. The holdout sample accuracy is 
74% with a sensitivity of 64% and a specificity of 85%. The Kappa of .49 indicates that, 
on a scale of random agreement = 0 and complete agreement = 1, there is agreement of 
.49 between actual and predicted classifications. This classification accuracy is likely to 
occur by chance in only one out of 100 random classifications (p=.0098).  
Parameter estimates for the model are presented in Table 6.9. There is a 
significant (p<.01) positive association between Law and CM and a significant (p<.01) 
negative association between Parlage and CM. 
Table 6.9: Parameter Estimates of Model 1  
 
Variables Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity    Kappa p
Law, Parlage 74.07 64.29 84.62 0.49 0.0098
Law, Parlage, Conav 74.07 71.43 76.92 0.48 0.0120
Arts, Conav, Law 70.37 64.29 76.92 0.41 0.0313
Law, Conav 66.67 50.00 84.62 0.34 0.0566
Law, Parlage, Arts 66.67 64.29 69.23 0.33 0.0816
Parlage, Arts, Conav 62.96 57.14 69.23 0.26 0.1682
Law,Arts 59.26 35.71 84.62 0.20 0.2284
Parlage, Conav 59.26 57.14 61.54 0.19 0.3317
Parlage, Arts 55.56 57.14 53.85 0.11 0.5680
Arts, Conav 51.85 50.00 53.85 0.04 0.8416
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Summary of Section 6.5 
In this section I have described the modelling process. The first stage involved 
the division of the 134 cases into an estimation group (n = 107) and a holdout sample (n 
= 27). Using the estimation group of 107 cases I undertook an initial screening of 
variables using t-tests. From this I created a naïve model consisting of 7 variables.. This 
model had an accuracy of 66%. The next stage was to reduce the 7 variable model by 
eliminating any redundant variables. A correlation matrix was used to identify variables 
that were more correlated with each other than with the dependent variable. On this 
basis it was found that the four linguistic variables were good candidates for removal 
given that they were correlated with each other more than with the dependent variable. 
Thus, I decided to remove three of these. To determine which to remove I ranked the 
linguistic variables according to how they performed individually in models along with 
the other variables Law, Parlage and Arts. That is, I constructed four new models, each 
of which included Law, Parlage and Arts and one only of the linguistic variables. On 
this basis the model containing Conav was found to have the highest accuracy so it was 
retained while the other 3 were discarded. This reduced model (Law, Parlage, Arts and 
Conav) had a holdout sample classification accuracy of 74%. The final stage of the 
model creation process was to attempt to find an optimum model by searching through 
the fifteen possible combinations of these four variables. The resulting model consisted 
of two variables, Law and Parlage. I then went on to look at the parameter estimates of 
these variables. Law is positively associated with CM while Parlage is negatively 
associated with CM.  
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Section 6.6: The Committee 
In the previous section I detailed the construction of Model 1 of the committee 
of models. The model building process was repeated with four other randomly 
generated holdout (n = 27) and estimation (n = 107) groups. Data used to construct 
these models are presented in Appendix 3. The summary results for all five models are 
displayed in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9: Summary Classification Results for 5 Models 
 
The highest classification accuracy is achieved by Model 2 with an accuracy of 
85% and a Kappa of .70. The lowest accuracy in the committee is 74% with a Kappa of 
.49 which is achieved by both Models 1 and 5. The average accuracy of all 5 models is 
78% with a Kappa of 57. The temptation is to select the model with the highest 
accuracy rate, Model 2. However, as discussed above, this model may achieve this high 
level of accuracy due to a serendipitously easily classified holdout sample. Similarly, if 
we were to reject the two lowest scoring models, Model 1 and Model 5, on the grounds 
that they do not perform as well as the others in the committee, we may be making a 
mistake because they may, by chance, have difficult holdout samples to classify. It will 
be recalled that Azuaje (2010: 39) objected to the holdout sample method because the a 
given holdout sample could be biased. However, we do not have one holdout sample but 
Model Model Variables Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity    Kappa
1 Law, Parlage 74.07 64.29 84.62 0.49
2 Law, Parlage, IMG 85.19 78.57 92.31 0.70
3 Parlage, CON 77.78 71.43 84.62 0.56
4 Law, Parlage 81.48 78.57 84.62 0.63
5 Law, DEF 74.07 64.29 84.62 0.49
Average 78.52 71.43 86.16 0.57
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five. Thus, the solution here is that we do not choose any individual model. Instead, we 
choose all of them. That is, we should use the decisions of the entire committee. The 
average accuracy rate of the committee of 78% is likely to represent the realistic error 
rate of the “hypothesis” that the variables in the models are related to the dependent 
variable in the way depicted by the committee. 
The question we must now consider is what the important variables are. Various 
metrics for determining variable importance have been considered in the data mining 
literature. The issue is important in data mining because many induction methods are 
“black-boxes” which do not allow direct inspection of the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable as is possible with logistic regression. 
Thus, a popular method of assessing the importance of variables in black-box methods 
is determining the influence of the variable on the model’s classification accuracy 
(Baxter, Gawler and Ang 2007: 22).  The method here is to assess how well the model 
classifies when each of the variables is removed individually. Variables are then ranked 
according to the effect they have on the classification accuracy. The data mining 
community is in the process of determining new ways of measuring variable importance 
(van der Laan 2006). However, in the current situation, because logistic regression is 
transparent it is possible to rely on a fairly standard set of measures. 
The first method I would like to use is the intuitively appealing idea that the 
number of times a variable is used by the committee is a good indication of the 
importance of a variable. On a raw count of the variables in the committee, Law and 
Parlage are the most prominent, appearing in four of the five models. Thus, there is little 
doubt that these variables are important in the committee’s decisions. The two measures 
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of concreteness, Con and Img appear in one model each, while the proxy for 
concreteness, Def, also appears in one model, indicating that concreteness is the third 
most important concept given that some measure of concreteness appears in three of the 
models.  
A second measure of the importance of variables is available by inspection of 
the odds ratios and statistical significance for each of the variables in each of the 
models. Table 6.11 shows the odds ratios for the variables in each of the five models. 
As a further indication of the importance of each variable, those variables that are 
significant at the p<.01 level in the respective models are in bold while those that are 
not in bold are significant at the p<.05 level.  
Table 6.11: Odds Ratios for Variables in 5 Models 
 
 
 Clearly, Law is the most important variable given that the average odds ratio for 
the five models is 5.81. Furthermore, this variable is significant at the p<.01 level in 
each of the four models in which it appears. The average odds ratio for Parlage is .92 
and in two of the models in which it appears it is significant at the p<.01 level while in 
the remaining two models it is significant at the p<.05 level. The two measures of 
concreteness, Con and Img have odds ratios of .56 and .59 respectively while the proxy 
Model Law Parlage Con IMG Def
1 7.94 0.90




Average 5.81 0.92 0.56 0.59 0.60
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for concreteness, Def, has an odds ratio of .60. All three of Con, Img and Def are 
significant at the .05 level in the models in which they appear.  
 Given that Parlage appears in four of the models and is significant at the p<.01 
level in two it is reasonable to say that it is the second most important variable. 
However, it should be noted that, on the basis of odds ratios, the linguistic variables are 
more influential than Parlage in that the average odds ratio for Parlage is .92 while the 
odds ratios for the linguistic variables are .56 for Con, .59 for Img and .6 for Def. If we 
going on the basis of odds ratios alone there we might conclude that Con is more 
influential than Parlage followed by Img and and Def. In short, while it is clear that Law 
is the most important variable in the committee there is some room for interpretation as 
to whether Parlage or the variables associated with concreteness should be considered 
the second most important. 
 
Summary of Section 6.6 
In this section I have considered the interpretation of the committee. The 
committee consists of five models, each constructed according to the same procedure 
but using different holdout and estimation samples. There are five variables in the 
committee: Law, Parlage, Con, Img and Def.  Law and Parlage are the most important, 
occurring in four models. The three linguistic variables occur in one model each.  Two 
of the variables, Con and Img, are closely related measures of concreteness. The 
remaining variable, Def, is a close proxy for concreteness. Thus, the three “concepts” 
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that are used in the “decisions” of the committee could be said to be Law, Parlage and 
concreteness of language. 
 
Summary of Chapter 6 
The purpose of this chapter was to create a committee of models that could be 
used to isolate the characteristics associated with CM. The first stage of this process was 
the creation of a sample to be used in the analysis. This is an important stage as the 
selection of the control group was not a straightforward task. The sample had to be 
adjusted to remove BBs, PSs and JMs whose careers could not be fully observed. 
Furthermore, BBs who had only spent a short term in parliament or who had spent large 
portions of their careers in opposition had to be removed. The remaining sample 
provided 66 non-CMs and 68 CMs for analysis. Having defined the sample I turned to a 
description of the data. I described the 6 educational variables and three biographical 
variables. I did not explain in detail all the linguistic variables but pointed out that 68 
were derived from the LIWC analysis of maiden speeches and 32 were derived from 
psycholinguistic analyses of maiden speeches. I explained the derivation of the five 
linguistic variables that would survive the initial variable screening process. The next 
stage of the analysis was to create 5 different models using 5 different holdout and 
estimation groups. For each model the same procedure was followed but in the 
exposition above only the creation of the first model was described. I explained the split 
of the sample of 134 cases into an estimation sample of 107 and a holdout sample of 27. 
The subsequent analysis took place using the training sample with the testing sample 
used only for testing models. The training sample was used to rank the 109 variables in 
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terms of their performance on t-tests. By doing this 7 variables were isolated as being 
potentially useful. A naïve model was then constructed using these variables. This 
model was able to classify out-of-sample with an accuracy of 66%. Reducing the 
number of variables by eliminating the redundant variables yielded a model with four 
variables which had a classification accuracy of 74%. Further optimising the mix of 
variables resulted in the creation of the “optimum” model which was selected to be  
Model 1 of the committee. This had a slightly better accuracy than the 4 variable model 
and was more parsimonious, consisting of only Law and Parlage. I then explained how 
this model building procedure was repeated four times and that the committee of models 
results in a classification accuracy of 78%. The most important variable in the 
committee is Law. There is some room for interpretation as to which is the more 
important of Parlage or the three linguistic measures of concreteness. 
Having isolated the variables associated with CM I can say that the purpose of 
the chapter has been fulfilled. The first research question has been addressed in that the 
characteristics associated with CM have been identified. It is now necessary to turn to 
the second research question: why are these characteristics associated with CM? In 
order to answer this I will need to turn to the wider research on these characteristics. I 
will demonstrate that there are good theoretical reasons why Law, Parlage, Con, Img 
and Def are associated with CM. 
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Chapter 7: Legal Qualification 
 
Section 7.1: Introduction 
Having a legal qualification is the most important predictor in the committee of 
models. There is a strong influence of legal education on the likelihood of a 
parliamentarian becoming a CM. I will show in the following sections that there are 
good reasons why this should be. I will cover several ideas about the relationship 
between legal training, the cognitive habits of lawyers and specific skills associated 
with legal training.  
I will begin the analysis with a review of the perception of the high proportion of 
lawyers in politics as it appears in the popular media. This is a useful exercise because it 
shows that the public is aware that the selection of CMs is possibly linked to legal 
training. Although there is no statement by the leaders that this might be the case it is 
interesting to note that the issue emerges in the media.  
I will then discuss the reasons why there might be a relationship between CM 
and legal training. The first consideration is whether there may be similarity bias. That 
is, whether there is a large number of legally trained individuals (LTIs) who do the 
selecting and they tend to pick people like themselves. I use a simple statistical analysis 
to show that this is not the case. I then consider the findings from US congress which 
show that there is a long-standing association between having a legal qualification and 
attaining positions on the more prestigious and influential committees. I discuss several 
reasons why this might be. I then turn to possible cognitive explanations for the 
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advantage lawyers have when it comes to promotions in the legislature. I use 
Christiansen’s (2006) idea that legal training gives individuals an ability to summarise 
information efficiently. I argue that this could not account for the advantage because 
other professions instil similar skills in their students. I then turn to the empirical studies 
on the relationship between legal training and the development of specific cognitive 
skills. There are two particular skills associated with legal training that have been 
identified in the literature. I end the chapter with an analysis of how these skills could 
be of benefit to an aspiring CM. 
 
Section 7.2: The Media Perception 
In November 1998 Tim O’Dwyer wrote an article for the Australian observing 
that front benches tend to be heavily weighted in favour of lawyers and the legally 
trained. His feeling was that he would rather the “country [were] governed by the law, 
not by lawyers” (O’Dwyer 1998). He points out that the cabinet and outer ministry are 
“swamped” by lawyers with 19 out of 30 ministers being legally trained and 11 out of 
17 in the cabinet being legally trained. O’Dwyer points out that the ALP shadow 
ministry, by contrast had only 9 LTIs in its shadow ministry of 30.  
O’Dwyer states that he agrees with Edward DeBono’s contention that the over-
representation of LTIs in parliament was likely to lead to a lack of new ideas because 
the logical legal thinking was too rigid to allow the exploration of “new possibilities or 
outcomes”. In a later article on the same issue O’Dwyer (2003) makes the point as 
follows: 
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Concern about too many lawyers in government is based partly 
on De Bono's invitation for all problem solvers to move beyond 
old style thinking and partly on a personal suspicion that once 
you have been to law school, studied the classic cases about 
carbolic smoke balls, snails in bottles and wagon mounds, 
learned a little black-letter-parliament-made-law, written legal 
assignments, mooted and passed law exams, you will have 
acquired the lawyer's mindset De Bono sees as "analysis and 
judgment, fine tuning and juggling of existing concepts". 
The idea here is that the subtle analysis of “existing concepts” leads to a mindset 
that is not attuned to new ideas.  
However, O’Dwyer departs from the argument about what might be good for the 
country and goes on to point out that there is an advantage to a prospective 
parliamentarian in having legal training. He quotes MP Joe Hockey who states that the 
analysis of legislation and policy that lawyers must do is similar to what 
parliamentarians must do. He also quotes Senator Amanda Vanstone who says that they 
law gives people a sense of “fairness and equity” as well as the ability to “marshal[…] 
the arguments one way or the other." 
There are several ideas here in relation to the perception that lawyers bring a 
particular way of thinking to politics. The first is the rigidity of thinking. There is a 
concern that lawyers are not trained to think beyond a certain repertoire of cognitive 
skills and this, according to DeBono and O’Dwyer, is likely to be detrimental to 
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government. Interestingly there is some substance to O’Dwyer and DeBono’s concern 
about the lawyer’s mindset. In the section below on the cognitive habits of those with 
legal training we will see that there are differences in the way LTIs process information: 
lawyers tend to view the notion of causality quite differently to non-LTIs and this 
tendency is not just in relation to legal issues but flows into their interpretation of the 
external world.  
Another strand in the argument is that there are strengths developed by those 
who study law in relation to arguing and presenting arguments. It makes intuitive sense 
that the adversarial legal training may be be useful in the adversarial parliament. 
Furthermore, the ability to marshal arguments quickly and persuasively in a courtroom 
setting is likely to be of use to a parliamentarian who must do essentially the same thing 
in parliament, with the media and amongst her constituents.  
There is a perception, at least on the part of Vanstone, that the law gives 
individuals a sense of fairness and equity. There is no empirical evidence to support 
this. However, Perez (2010) conducted a laboratory study of “inequity aversion” 
amongst first year student lawyers and teachers. The aim of the study was to determine 
whether there was a difference in the extent to which lawyers as opposed to teachers 
were willing to adopt a remuneration strategy for a group which could have resulted in 
some members of the group being remunerated better than others. One of the findings 
was that first year lawyers who planned a career in public law were more likely to be 
averse to inequity than those lawyers who were planning a career in private practice. 
This suggests, contra Vanstone, that it is the ideology of the individual rather than the 
training that influences attitudes to fairness and equity. 
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O’Dwyer’s observations and those of his interlocutors are interesting because 
they provide an intuitive overview of some of the themes that, as we will see, recur in 
the literature in relation to LTIs in politics. The perception that there are more lawyers 
at the executive level than at the backbench level is certainly apposite. The modelling 
results given in the last chapter indicate that there is an advantage to having a legal 
qualification for an individual who wishes to rise through the legislature. Furthermore, 
as we will see below, the advantage that a legal training bestows on a legislator who is 
aiming for high office is confirmed in studies of US legislatures. Finally, the intuition 
that there is a lawyer’s mindset has some merit and I will review the empirical literature 
on this in the section on legal thinking.  
 
Summary of Section 7.2  
In this section I have provided an overview of the perception of the role of 
lawyers in parliament. I reviewed two articles by Tim O’Dwyer (1998; 2003) and found 
that there was a perception that: i) there were too many lawyers in parliament: ii) the 
over-representation of lawyers may give rise to overly rigid thinking: iii) there is a 
mindset associated with legal training: and iv) there are some advantages in a legal 
training for an aspiring parliamentarian. The importance of these observations is that 
they show that there is a public perception that there is a link between legal training and 
attaining high political office. Thus, the modelling seems to confirm what people 
suspect. Furthermore, the public perception that there are ways of thinking and skills 
that are bestowed by legal training is interesting in that it demonstrates that there is an 
intuitive idea that lawyers think differently. Thus, the media discussion is an apt prelude 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
246 
 
to the analysis in this chapter which is intended to determine the differences between the 
cognitive habits  of lawyers and non-lawyers.  
Before proceeding to this analysis, however, I must consider an opposing idea. 
In the next section I will address the idea of similarity bias in the selection of lawyers. 
That is, I will consider whether there is a bias in the Australian federal system of LTIs 
appointing LTIs to cabinet. We will see that the similarity bias explanation for the 
prevalence of lawyers in parliament is not strongly supported. 
 
Section 7.3: Similarity Bias and the Selection of Legally Trained Individuals  
In order to explain the prevalence of LTIs in cabinet I need to consider the 
possibility of similarity bias (Byrne 1971). Similarity bias theory essentially states that 
people are likely to find people who are like them to be more agreeable than those who 
are not like them. Many of those who are instrumental in making cabinet selection 
decisions are themselves legally trained so this is a plausible explanation for the 
importance of legal training in cabinet selection. We saw very good evidence for this 
perception in the articles of O’Dwyer (1998; 2003) who asserts that the legally trained 
Howard had a preference for selecting legally trained CMs. If this is a pervasive 
influence in the selection of CMs across leaders then it could account for the association 
between having a legal training and becoming a CM. 
The similarity effect occurs where an individual observes similarities in others 
and, on this basis, develops positive affect towards them. The similarity can be based on 
self-categorisation, in which an individual identifies with a particular category, such as 
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race or gender and views others in that category favourably (Jackson et al 1991; Turner 
1987). An alternative explanation for similarity bias is social identity theory which 
explains the attraction to a group in terms of the positive feeling associated with 
belonging to the group (Tajfel 1982). On this account, the group membership provides a 
basis for belonging in that it provides a medium for creating the “ingroup” and 
“outgroups” (Dustin and Davis 1970; Brewer 1979). A positive feeling is generated by 
being part of the ingroup and identifying members of the outgroup as the “other”. 
In the case of CM selection, the basis on which any putative similarity effect 
would be based is legal training. If we can find evidence of a systematic bias of LTI 
leaders appointing LTIs to cabinet then we have some support for the explanation based 
on similarity bias. Alternatively, if we find that non-LTI leaders appoint LTIs at a 
similar rate as non-LTI leaders then the argument would lose support. 
The vast majority of CMs in the LNPC sample were appointed by LTIs. In fact, 
of the 34 CMs in the LNPC sample, excluding himself, Howard appointed 32. The 
legally trained Ian Sinclair was initially appointed by the legally trained Holt while 
Howard himself was appointed by the non-legally trained Fraser. The remaining LNPC 
CMs were first appointed by Howard and it is therefore possible that the LNPC sample 
reflects Howard’s similarity bias. Howard studied law at Sydney University in the late 
1950 and graduated in 1961. He then practised law until becoming a member of the 
House of Representatives in 1973. As we have seen from O’Dwyer (1998; 2003) there 
is a perception that Howard had a penchant for appointing LTIs to cabinet. 
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In contrast, a great proportion of the ALP CMs were appointed by non-LTIs.
5
 In 
the ALP sample of 34 CMs, two of the three leaders responsible for making cabinet 
appointments were not legally trained. The non-legally trained Rudd made 17 of the 34 
ALP CM appointments with the non-legally trained Keating appointing 7 while the 
legally trained Hawke appointed 9. Thus, only 9 out of 34 were appointed by a legally 
trained leader.
6
 Table 7.2 summarises the situation for both the LNPC and the ALP.  
  
                                                 
5
 In the ALP, the caucus traditionally selects the individuals who will be in the ministry but the 
leader allocates the portfolios. As such the leader selects who will be in cabinet. 
6
 Rudd himself is excluded from the numbers here as he first became a CM when he became 
prime minister. Thus, he was not appointed to cabinet by another leader. 
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Table 7.2: CM Appointer and Appointee Legal Training Status 
 
Source: Data drawn from Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, www.aph.gov.au. 
 





















AbbottA Yes Howard Yes AlbaneseA No Rudd No
AlstonR Yes Howard Yes BaldwinP No Keating No
AndersonJ No Howard Yes Beasleyk No Hawke Yes
AndrewsK Yes Howard Yes BolkusN Yes Hawke Yes
BishopJI Yes Howard Yes BreretonL No Keating No
BroughM No Howard Yes BurkeAT Yes Rudd No
CampbellIG No Howard Yes CarrK No Rudd No
CoonanH Yes Howard Yes CollinsRL No Keating No
CostelloP Yes Howard Yes ConroyS No Rudd No
DownerA No Howard Yes CookP No Hawke Yes
FaheyJ Yes Howard Yes CreanS Yes Hawke Yes
FischerT No Howard Yes EvansC No Rudd No
HillRM Yes Howard Yes EvansG Yes Hawke Yes
HockeyJ Yes Howard Yes FaulknerJP No Keating No
HowardJ Yes Fraser No FergusonM No Rudd No
KempD Yes Howard Yes FitzgibbonJ No Rudd No
MacfarlaneIE No Howard Yes GarrettP Yes Rudd No
McGauranP Yes Howard Yes GillardJ Yes Rudd No
McLachlanIM No Howard Yes HoldingC Yes Hawke Yes
MinchinN Yes Howard Yes LawrenceC No Keating No
Moorej No Howard Yes LeeM No Keating No
NelsonB No Howard Yes LudwigJ Yes Rudd No
NewmanJM Yes Howard Yes MacklinJ No Rudd No
PattersonK No Howard Yes McClellandR Yes Rudd No
ReithP Yes Howard Yes McMullanRF No Keating No
RuddockP Yes Howard Yes MorrisP No Hawke Yes
SharpJR No Howard Yes RayR No Hawke Yes
SinclairI Yes Holt Yes RoxonN Yes Rudd No
TrussW No Howard Yes RuddK No n/a n/a
TurnbullM Yes Howard Yes SmithSF Yes Rudd No
VaileM No Howard Yes SwanW No Rudd No
VanstoneA Yes Howard Yes TannerL Yes Rudd No
WillamsDR Yes Howard Yes WillisR No Hawke Yes
WooldridgeMRL No Howard Yes WongP Yes Rudd No
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It is difficult to determine whether there was bias in Howard’s selection of LTIs. 
Certainly he selected LTIs at a high rate: 56.25% of his appointments were of LTIs. 
However, this is only marginally more than Rudd’s LTI appointment rate of 53%. These 
rates are higher than those for Hawke (40%) and Keating (0%). Thus, it is possible that 
both Howard and Rudd had a bias towards LTIs. However this would reduce the 
strength of the similarity bias argument because Rudd was not legally trained while 
Hawke was.  
To assess whether there is similarity bias across the sample we need to take into 
account the legal education status of the leader who appointed the CM and see if there is 
a difference in the rate of appointment of LTIs for legally trained leaders as opposed to 
that of non-legally trained leaders. The way to do this is to conduct a t-test. Those with 
legal training are coded as 1 while those without legal training are coded as 0. If the 
average “legal training score” of the group of individuals appointed by an appointee 
with legal training is significantly greater than the average “legal training score” of the 
group of individuals appointed by those without legal training then we will suspect 
similarity bias.  
For the non-legally trained leaders (Fraser, Rudd, and Keating) 40% of the 
appointees were legally trained (n = 25) while for the legally trained appointers 
(Howard, Holt and Hawke), 55% of appointees had legal training (n = 42). This 
difference is not statistically significant (p>.1). We can conclude that there is no 
statistical support for the idea that LTIs are selected due to similarity bias.  
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Summary of Section 7.3 
In this section I have addressed the idea that the high proportion of LTIs in 
Cabinets is due to similarity bias. Legally trained Howard did seem to appoint a large 
number of legally trained cabinet ministers, more so than any other leader. 56% of the 
CMs he appointed were legally trained. However, non-legally trained Rudd was not far 
behind at 53%. Furthermore, t-tests show that those appointers who are legally trained 
do not show a statistically significant bias towards appointing CMs with legal training. 
Thus, we cannot rely on similarity bias to account for the fact that a large number of 
LTIs become CMs.  
In the next section I will begin turn to alternative explanations for the 
association between legal training and CM appointment. I will examine the issue of the 
relationship between legal education and high political office in the context of the 
evidence from the US. We will see that in both US Federal and State arenas there is 
evidence that a legal education confers on an individual an advantage in rising through 
the legislature. 
 
Section 7.4: Findings from USA Congress 
A significant literature on the differences between lawyers and non-lawyers 
exists in relation to the US congress. Lawyers have an advantage in being appointed to 
influential congressional committees and tend to rise to more senior positions than non-
lawyers. Miller (1995) notes that LTIs tend to arrive at the legislature at earlier ages 
than non-legally trained legislators and, once there, are more likely to hold key positions 
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(Miller 1995: 86). Lawyers in USA legislatures have always been over-represented in 
the most important committees and have held a disproportionately high number of 
chairmanships of such committees (Eulau and Sprague 1964: 118; Blaustein and Porter 
1954: 97, both cited in Miller 1995: 86). There are three general strands of thought as to 
the reasons for this prevalence: i) lawyers have specific technical skills that are useful 
for a legislator: ii) lawyers perceive their role as representatives differently to non-
lawyers: and iii) individuals who are politically ambitious may, as an element of their 
ambition, pursue a legal education as part of the process of attaining high political 
office, thus creating an association between high political office and legal education.  
 
Technical Skills 
As might be expected, one area in which lawyers have an advantage is with the 
drafting of legislation (Miller 1995: 77). Legally trained members of the legislature are 
particularly useful in detecting technical defects in bills. Non-lawyers are more likely to 
defer to the judgment of their lawyer colleagues on such legal matters (Blaustein and 
Porter 1954: 99-100, cited in Miller 1995: 77). Non-lawyers are also more likely than 
lawyers to want to leave the consideration of constitutional issues to courts. 
Furthermore, the technical aspects of lawmaking are more likely to be attended to by 
lawyers than non-lawyers (Morgan 1966, 156-57, 366, 343-44, cited in Miller 1995: 
77). According to Miller, “[t]hese differences are subtle, but extremely important” 
(Miller 1995: 77).  
Polsby (1990, cited in Miller 1995: 78) points out that one of the subtle ways in 
which the legislative process is differentially influenced by the technical aspect of the 
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law is via the highly legally oriented committee system. Committees “hold hearings”, 
“witnesses” “testify” at these and their comments are “on the record” while one senior 
member is “counsel” to the committee. Because the language and general context of 
these activities are based on legal protocols, lawyers are in their element in such an 
environment. Thus, lawyers are at home in the engine-room of legislation - the 
congressional committee (Miller 1995: 78).  
In short, the skills and general approach that are important in the legislative 
process are more likely to be exhibited by LTIs. It is plausible that individuals who 
demonstrate the ability to actively participate in the legislative process are those who 
will attract the attention of the people responsible for making senior appointments. It 
should be noted that Australian federal parliamentary committees are similar to 
congressional committees in respect of their legal environment and as such the 
observation that US lawyers are “at home” in the legislative committee is extendable to 
the Australian context. Thus, it is possible that individuals with a legal background are 
able to participate in drafting, developing and scrutinising legislation to a greater extent 
than non-LTIs. This could give them an advantage in that they are seen as making a 
positive contribution from the time they enter parliament.  
Because lawyers have a knowledge of the law, non-lawyers are more likely to 
defer to them on technical aspects of law making (Blaustein and Porter, 1954: 99, cited 
in Miller 1995: 87). This deference leads to them being seen as leaders. According to 
Miller “[n]onlawyers in the legislature often defer to lawyers because lawyers are 
thought to hold more expertise on many legislative questions and because lawyers are 
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stereotyped as better leaders” (Miller 1995: 87). Thus, there is likely to be a connection 
between technical skill in the law and being perceived to be more “leader-like”. 
 
Role Perceptions 
A difference between lawyers and non-lawyers in their attitude to constituents 
has been noted in the research. Miller (1995) adopts the idea of the legislator as one of 
three kinds of representative: ‘the delegate’, who consults with his constituents and 
follows their instructions, irrespective of his own views; ‘the trustee’, who acts 
according to his conscience, principles and convictions without concern for their 
constituent’s opinions but always with their best interests in mind, and; ‘the politico’, 
who combines elements of both the delegate and the trustee (Miller, 1995: 91). 
According to Miller’s conclusions from interviews with members of the Ohio, Maryland 
and North Carolina legislatures, lawyers were much more likely than non-lawyers to see 
themselves as trustees and politicos than delegates. That is, they were much more likely 
to use their own judgment on political issues than merely follow the dictates of their 
constituents. Miller holds that this may be because the traditional role of the lawyer is to 
take instructions from a client but proceed using knowledge that far surpasses the 
client’s and therefore supersedes the ability of the client to give relevant instructions: 
“Just as a lawyer is hired because he or she has more knowledge or expertise than the 
client, the lawyer legislator does not feel constrained to accept instructions from his or 
her less informed constituents” (Miller 1995: 94). This way of thinking can be linked to 
the way a leader thinks in that the typical leader takes advice from those around her but 
makes a final decision based on her own perception of what should be done. As such it 
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is possible to see how an individual who behaves this way in relation to their 
constituency has an outlook more aligned to leading than following. It is conceivable 
that this kind of outlook will be seen by others as instantiating “leader-like” qualities. 
The problem with this explanation is that the definition of a profession usually 
includes the idea that the professional has greater knowledge than his or her employer 
and therefore, on technical issues may not take the position of the employer. This is the 
classic agency situation in which the agent has greater information than the principal 
and will therefore make a decision that is not always that which the principal would 
make. Thus, we would expect to find a similar advantage for professionals who are in 
the habit of engaging in an agency relationship with their clients such as medical 
professionals and economic and financial consultants. However we do not find this 
relationship: in the modelling in Chapter 6 only a legal education was found to be 
predictive of CM appointment. 
A second problem with this argument is that this difference in role perceptions 
may not be pervasive. A more recent study is Eakins’ (2006) study of the Ohio 
legislature which finds that both lawyer-legislators and non-lawyer-legislators are likely 
to identify with the politico role. Although this study is based on only one legislature 
and Miller’s (1995) study is of three, it seems that there may have been a change in the 
perception of the role of the legislator in the decade that separates these studies.  
 




Eulau and Sprague (1964) pointed out that lawyers in state legislatures were 
more likely than non-lawyers to desire running for higher political office. They state 
that “[i]nsofar as the state legislature serves as a proving ground for politicians, it 
appears that lawyers move on to other political offices not by predestination, but by 
force of forethought” (Eulau and Sprague 1964: 80, cited in Miller 1995: 90). 
Supporting this idea is the observation made above that lawyers tend to join the 
legislature at earlier ages than non-lawyers (Miller 1995: 86). This may indicate that 
they have an intention to be politicians at an early stage in their lives and choose to 
study law because it is seen as a good background for public life. Similarly, in a study 
of the Ohio state legislature by Eakins (2006), found that ambition and an early desire to 
be in politics are more prevalent in lawyers than non-lawyers. On this account, the 
ambition causes both the study of law and the ability to rise through the system, leading 
to the positive association between the latter two variables. 
It should be noted that the idea that Law is a measure of ambition is not 
supported by the modelling. I have effectively controlled for ambition by including 
Parlage in four of the five committee models.  The findings of Buck (1963) and King 
(1981) support the idea that the age of entry to the legislature is a good proxy for 
ambition, the idea being that the more ambitious the individual the earlier they will want 
to begin their career. I will return to this issue in Chapter 8. The important point at this 
stage is that if Parlage is a proxy for ambition then, given that it is present in four of the 
models and is significant at the p<.01 level in two and p<.05 level of the remaining two, 
ambition is already controlled for. Furthermore, in the models in which both Law and 
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Parlage are present, the legal education binary variable is still very powerful and 
significant. Thus, ambition is unlikely to be the reason for the strength of the legal 
variable.  
 
Summary of Section 7.4 
The above research shows three general strands of thought as to why LTIs 
should have an advantage in achieving high political office. The idea that there are 
specific technical skills that skills that LTIs bring to parliament is very plausible given 
that the function of the legislature is to produce legislation - the very subject matter that 
lawyers are experts in.  Due to their greater technical skill they tend to be deferred to by 
other non-lawyer legislators and this makes them seem more like natural leaders. The 
role perception argument is less convincing. The assertion is that, because they do not 
merely blindly follow instructions of their clients without their own judgement, this 
makes them more like leaders. However, most professions entail taking a similar agency 
role, yet only law has the advantage in the legislature. Furthermore, there is recent 
evidence that there has been a change in recent years towards the more consultative 
politico away from the more autonomous trustee by both lawyers and non-lawyers. 
Finally, the issue of ambition seems apposite. Those who see a clear path to political 
office via the legislature from an early age would plausibly see a legal training as part of 
the process. Thus, an association would occur between legal training and ambition. 
However, given that this may be controlled for in the model, the ambition explanation is 
not supported.   
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Thus, of the three explanations, skill sets, role perception and ambition, the 
explanation based on skill sets is the most persuasive. 
In the next section I will review the literature on a specific set of cognitive skills 
that lawyers learn. We will see that there is a plausible reason for accepting that lawyers 
do use a particular way of organising information. However, it will be argued that many 
other professionals use similar skills and therefore it is difficult to assume that the skills 
discussed should give LTIs the advantage they have in the legislature. 
 
Section 7.5: Cognitive Skill – “Chunking” and the Case Brief 
It is possible that the mode of thinking that LTIs learn during their training is 
akin to the work undertaken by a CM and LTIs are therefore better able to demonstrate 
the required skills. The ideas from O’Dwyer’s (1998; 2003) articles show that there is a 
perception that the skills LTIs have in organising information and presenting arguments 
are what sets them apart in the legislature. The question is: what is the nature of the 
skills that sets lawyers apart?  
If the ability to quickly and efficiently organise information is what marks LTIs 
apart then it is worthwhile looking at how lawyers are trained to organise information. 
Such an analysis has been made by Christensen (2006) who describes how high 
achieving individuals who first enrol in law find it very difficult to adapt to the kind of 
thinking required to understand legal argument. These students perform well on verbal 
ability tests and yet have considerable difficulty in their first encounter with legal 
reasoning. By the end of their first year most students have acquired the skill. According 
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to Christensen, the successful students learn how to condense a large amount of 
information using the “case brief”. The case brief is a schema used for the purpose of 
categorizing information contained in legal opinions. It is a method of organizing 
information in such a way that the general pattern of the case is retained but the short 
term memory is not swamped with the details. 
An essential aspect of the case brief is that it facilitates “chunking” Expert 
knowledge involves chunking information into rational “chunks” of information such 
that, once allocated to a rational category, the information takes up less space in 
working memory. This frees up more space for the “challenging task of actually 
thinking about the material” (Christiansen 2006: 18). Experts tend to be able to solve 
problems in their domain significantly more easily than non experts largely because 
they have chunked a lot of the ways of thinking about problems in such a way that the 
information held in the chunks can be easily retrieved and applied to the problem at 
hand. Blasi (1995, cited in Christiansen 2006: 18) uses the example of the phrase 
WYSIWYG/P6/QWERTY/AS400.
7
 This 27 symbol phrase is difficult for a non-
computer literate person to remember, let alone think about. But a computer literate 
person sees this as only 4 concepts or chunks and can immediately begin the process of 
analyzing what it is saying.  
This is a plausible explanation as to why LTIs are more likely to become CMs. 
In political life there are many situations that require an ability to quickly master the 
basics of a subject area and then move on to actually debating about the concepts. The 
                                                 
7
 WYSIWYG = “What you see [on the computer screen] is what you get [on the printout]; 
QWERTY = Standard Keyboard layout; P6 = A post Pentium processor; AS400 = A mid-range model 
IBM computer (Blasi 1995, ff: 343).   
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problem with this explanation, however, is that, as Christensen points out, experts in 
general tend to engage in chunking in their own domains (Christensen 2006: 18). 
Professionals in all fields tend to be able to quickly assess problems in their own 
domains because they have a good understanding of the overall picture due to their 
ability to apply schemas from their own fields of expertise to problems that arise. In 
medical diagnosis, for example, a clinician takes into account a broad spread of 
information including the qualitative information from the patient and data from tests 
but the procedure undertaken is not iterative. That is, the clinician does not evaluate 
each possible diagnosis against the data available. Instead they use heuristics derived 
from training and experience (Ericsson and Lehman 1996).  In particular, they tend to 
begin anticipating likely scenarios before they get all the data. This means that they 
already limit the amount of information processing they need to do. Chess players have 
been found to do exactly the same kind of thing such that the best moves are already 
determined early within each assessment of a move (de Groot 1946/1978, cited in 
Ericsson and Lehman 1996: 275). In other words, they perceive the situation without 
needing to iteratively work through a large number of possibilities. The latter course of 
action would be prohibitively cognitively expensive and thus, for a human, as opposed 
to a computer, it makes more sense to rely on global heuristics. The important point 
here is that all professionals tend to do this in their own domain. The case brief is the 
LTI’s version of the same phenomenon.  
Thus, we cannot explain the advantage that LTIs have in the legislature by 
saying that they have a more efficient method of processing information than others 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
261 
 
because the evidence is that most professionals would possess an analogous skill yet 
they do not have the same advantage as the LTIs in the legislature. 
 
Summary of Section 7.5 
In this section I looked at whether there was a distinctive way that lawyers are 
taught to organise information and whether this could account for their advantage in 
parliament. I considered the case brief as the paradigm way that lawyers are taught to 
organise information. The case brief is a way of isolating the essential information so 
that the legal principals can be applied. The idea is that the cognitive load of holding the 
information can be minimised so that the analytical apparatus can be put to work. The 
problem with ascribing to this the advantage that lawyers have in the legislature is that 
all professionals have this ability in their own domain but they do not have the same 
advantage that lawyers have in the legislature. Thus, it does not seem reasonable to 
assume that the way lawyers are taught to organise legal information is what gives them 
the advantage in the legislature. 
In the next section I will continue with the analysis of the cognitive skills that 
lawyers have by looking at observations from empirical studies of the way lawyers 
reason. 
 
Section 7.6: Observations from Empirical Studies 
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The empirical evidence is that there are cognitive characteristics that lawyers 
have to a greater extent than non-lawyers. These are a tendency to rely on 
counterfactual reasoning and a lack of probabilistic skills. Each of these could 
conceivably be of benefit to an aspiring CM. 
Lehman, Lempert and Nisbett (1988) looked at whether postgraduate training in 
law, psychology, medicine and chemistry has an influence on the ability to use different 
types of reasoning. The types of reasoning were statistical (e.g., the idea of regression to 
the mean in large groups), methodological (e.g., the ability to use the concepts such as 
control groups and self-selection to determine whether causal processes were at work), 
conditional (e.g., the ability to use the material conditional “p if and only if q” in a 
complex setting) and verbal (e.g. the ability to detect analogies and evaluate arguments) 
(Lehman Lempert and Nisbett 1988: 435). The procedure was to use cross sectional and 
longitudinal designs to determine whether there was a change in any of the reasoning 
skills as subjects were inculcated with the ways of thinking in their chosen discipline. 
Students’ scores from each of the subject areas when they first began their studies were 
not significantly different except that law students had a slight advantage in verbal 
reasoning. 
The results showed that, on tests of verbal reasoning, only medical students 
showed an increase in both the cross section and longitudinal studies. On tests of 
statistical and methodological reasoning, there were “dramatic” improvements over the 
three year period of psychology and medical students in both the cross sectional and 
longitudinal studies. There was no increase in statistical or methodological reasoning 
scores for chemistry students in either the cross sectional or the longitudinal studies. On 
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tests of conditional reasoning, students in law, medicine and psychology increased their 
scores in the longitudinal but not the cross sectional study. Chemistry students did not 
improve in either the longitudinal or the cross sectional study. The conclusion to be 
drawn is that the probabilistic disciplines of medicine and psychology develop statistical 
reasoning while chemistry, being non-probabilistic and law being non-scientific, did not 
develop these skills. Furthermore, psychology, law and medicine all teach rule based 
systems in which conditionals are employed and thus these groups’ conditional 
reasoning improved.  
Thus, the major observation is that legal training is not associated with any 
benefits over and above those conferred to medical and psychology students in relation 
to verbal or conditional reasoning. However, there is a big difference in statistical 
reasoning. Legal training does not confer any training in the analysis of “variability or 
uncertainty in causal relations” and therefore does not confer the ability to apply the 
statistical or methodological rules of the probabilistic sciences.  
In short, LTIs tend to have naïve notions of cause. They do, however, develop 
high level conditional reasoning skills over the course of their training but this does not 
set them apart from others because Psychology and medical students also develop 
conditional reasoning skills over the course of their training. As such the increase in 
conditional reasoning skills cannot be seen as a skill that sets lawyers apart. If we are 
looking for a difference between CMs and non-CMs, the clue to be derived from the 
above discussion is that lawyers are likely to lack probabilistic thinking skills. It seems 
to be incongruous that a lack of skill could be an advantage. However, I will explain this 
finding in subsequent sections. 
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Amsel, Langer and Loutzenhiser (1991) were critical of the Lehman et al’s 
(1988) conclusion that causal reasoning is not developed in legal training. They cite the 
fact that there is a large body of research in law on the nature of causality and in 
particular in the law of torts (Amsel et al 1991: 226). They argue that Lehman et al 
(1988) used a conception of cause that was more associated with social science training 
than general causal explanation and therefore did not tap into a general conception of 
cause. To address the issue using a more general conception of cause, Amsel et al 
(1991) looked at whether the training and experience of lawyers leads to them solving 
problems by using a different set of causal schemas in comparison to psychologists and 
“novices”. The procedure was to see how lawyers, as compared with other groups, 
evaluated a statement by a protagonist that a series of events is causally related rather 
than coincidental (Amsel et al 1991: 237). In particular, they were asked to evaluate an 
explanation as to why a TV image became clear after the TV was kicked. There were 
three basic schemas examined: the mechanical, in which causal explanations are given 
in standard mechanical terms by pointing out physical chains of cause (such as the 
possibility that kicking the TV re-connected some wires); the covariance explanation in 
which causal explanations are couched in terms of the observation that particular types 
of causes are usually associated with events and can therefore be taken as causing an 
event in a given case (thus, kicking the TV usually clears the picture therefore the two 
are casually connected), and; counterfactual in which the explanation for a cause relies 
on the idea that had an event not preceded a subsequent event, the subsequent event 
would not have occurred (had the TV not been kicked the picture would have remained 
fuzzy). The idea under investigation was that there would be differences in the way 
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psychologists, lawyers and “novices” (adult policemen and undergraduates - those 
untrained in law or social sciences) prefer to explain cause.  
For all groups except the psychologists, mechanism was the most convincing 
evidence for cause. For psychologists, covariation was the most convincing explanation. 
For all groups, except lawyers, the counterfactual explanation was the least preferred 
explanation. Lawyers chose counterfactual explanations as often as they chose 
covariance explanations. In short, lawyers considered counterfactual explanations to be 
as acceptable as covariance explanations while the other groups gave very little support 
to counterfactual explanations. The authors explain that this is possibly related to 
exposure of lawyers to the “but-for” reasoning test used in legal causal reasoning 
(Amsel et al 1991: 236). This type of reasoning proceeds by positing causal efficacy to 
event e in the circumstance that “but for” the occurrence of event e, the outcome would 
not have occurred. 
 
Summary of Section 7.6 
Drawing together the findings of the two studies we can see that there are good 
reasons for thinking that lawyers may be “different”. Firstly, we can say that they do not 
tend to use statistical or methodological reasoning skills well. Lehman et al (1988) 
found that law students did not improve in the kinds of causal reasoning used in the 
sciences whereas psychology and medicine students did.  Secondly, Amsel et al (1991) 
showed that although lawyers, as with other groups, used mechanistic reasoning more 
than any other method, their preference for counterfactual causal explanations was 
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greater than that for other groups. In sum, training in law is associated with a preference 
for counterfactual causal explanations and seems not to be associated with any benefit 
in probabilistic thinking.  
The question remains, how do these two cognitive habits assist individuals in 
becoming CMs? In the next section I will consider how each of these characteristics 
could conceivably be of benefit to an aspiring CM. 
 
Section 7.7: The Value of Skills Derived from Legal Training 
In the last section I reported on two ways of thinking that have been found to be 
peculiar to those with legal training. LTIs tend to be more prone than other groups to 
use counterfactual reasoning, and relatively unskilled in the use of probabilistic 
reasoning. 
 In this section I will explain how each of these is likely to be of use to a 
parliamentarian who wishes to become a CM. 
 
Counterfactual Reasoning 
The evidence is that lawyers tend to use counterfactual reasoning more than 
others. This can be useful because counterfactual reasoning has been found to stimulate 
the ability of the individual to come up with solutions that she might otherwise not have 
devised.  
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Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) found that generating counterfactual thinking 
can improve the performance of individuals in problem solving. The basic finding was 
that counterfactual thinking primes individuals to consider alternatives (Galinsky and 
Moskowitz 2000: 385). In this study, the conception of a counterfactual situation used 
was that of an event which “almost” didn’t happen. The idea here is that counterfactual 
thinking is stimulated where some counterfactual event is proximate in that it “almost” 
happened. Missing an aeroplane by five minutes is more likely to stimulate ideas about 
“what might have been” than missing it by 6 hours. Thus, the counterfactual scenarios 
used in the study involved priming with a story of an event that “almost” happened. In 
particular, it consisted of an individual who changes seats at a concert and as a result 
wins a lottery, the prize for which is a trip to Hawaii. In the negative version the person 
with whom the individual swaps wins the trip. Thus, in the first case she “almost” loses 
the trip while in the second she “almost” wins. The control scenarios were both positive 
and negative but did not involve outcomes that almost did not occur. Instead, the events 
were very distal. For example, the change in seats involved a swap to the other side of 
the auditorium. Thus, the non-counterfactual scenarios involved situations that did not 
involve “almost” winning or losing. 
After being primed with the counterfactual/ non-counterfactual negative/non-
negative primes, subjects were asked to complete the Duncker candle problem in which 
subjects are presented with a candle, matches and a box of thumbtacks and asked to 
attach the candle to a cardboard wall in such a way that the candle does not drip on the 
floor. The solution requires the subject to realise that the box can be emptied and stuck 
to the wall with thumbtacks and used as a shelf to hold the candle in place.  Those 
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participants who were primed with the both the negative and positive counterfactual 
solved the problem at a significantly (p<.001) higher rate than those who were primed 
with a non-counterfactual. Similar results were found for the time taken to complete the 
task. For those who completed the task, those who were primed with the counterfactual 
took significantly (p<.01) less time (Mean = 6.89 minutes) than those who were primed 
with a non-counterfactual (Mean = 9.65 minutes). The authors point out that there is no 
logical connection between almost winning or losing trips to Hawaii due to relocating in 
an arena and finding an alternative function for a box (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000: 
393). They contend that reading the counterfactual scenario makes one aware of the 
outcome and an alternative and thus primes an individual to think of alternative uses for 
the thumbtack box.  
In a second experiment the idea was to test whether the counterfactual thinking 
can hinder solving a particular type of problem. The problem here was a variation of the 
Wason card sorting test. Subjects were presented with the rule that travellers who wish 
to enter the country, as opposed to merely pass through in transit, need to have been 
inoculated against cholera. Each traveller has a health card. On one side of their health 
card their travelling status is revealed (Entering or Transit) and on the other is a 
statement of the inoculations the individual has had. The participant is presented with 
the health cards of four individuals. On the desk the participant can see the following 
information from the health cards of four individuals:  
 
A: Transit   
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B: Entering  
C: Innoculations: Cholera and Hepatitis   
D: Innoculations: Typhoid 
 
On the other side of the A and B cards is the inoculation status and on the other 
side of the C and D cards is the travel status. The question is what are the cards that 
need to be turned over to check that each of these individuals, A, B, C and D, has the 
required permission? The first card is irrelevant because the individual is not trying to 
enter. The second card must be turned over to check if the individual has been 
inoculated against cholera. The third card is irrelevant because whether they are 
entering or not they have permission to enter because they have been inoculated against 
cholera. The fourth needs to be turned over to check whether they wish to enter the 
country. Thus, only the second and fourth cards need to be turned over.  
The point about this test is that, unlike the Duncker test a counterfactual scenario 
is detrimental. There are two cards that need to be examined and that is the only 
solution. Thus, considering alternatives may actually confuse individuals. This is, in 
fact, what was found: priming with a counterfactual scenario (identical to that in 
experiment 1 described above) significantly reduced the ability of participants to solve 
the card test (p<.01) (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000: 397).  
A third experiment tested the idea that exposure to counterfactuals would reduce 
confirmation bias in a trait hypothesis-testing situation. The starting point here is the 
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observation that when subjects are told an individual has a particular personality trait, 
upon being asked to determine if this is in fact the case, subjects tend to look for 
evidence to confirm the hypothesis rather than disconfirm it and to neglect evidence that 
disconfirms it (Snyder and Swann 1978; Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987, cited in 
Galinsky and Moskowitz 200: 398). This is because subjects tend to use a few simple 
heuristics to arrive at conclusions (Trope and Liberman 1996: 242, Sherman and Corty 
1984, cited in Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000: 398). Exposing subjects to 
counterfactuals should, according to the theory, open individuals up to alternative 
possibilities and therefore encourage them to entertain a disconfirming hypothesis. The 
priming materials for this experiment were as for the first two experiments. Subjects 
were then told an individual had been tested and was an extrovert. They were shown a 
description of an extrovert and then asked to select a 12 interview questions from a 
selection of 25 to determine whether the individual was an extrovert. Ten of the 
questions were hypothesis confirming, ten were hypothesis disconfirming and five were 
indeterminate. As expected, those primed with the counterfactual scenario asked 
significantly (p<.05) more introvert (hypothesis disconfirming) questions and 
significantly ( p<.04) fewer extrovert (hypothesis confirming) questions than those 
primed with the non-counterfactual scenario. No significant differences were found with 
the indeterminate questions. Thus, those who were primed with the counterfactual 
scenario were more likely to consider alternatives instead of falling foul of confirmation 
bias. 
The experiments of Galinski and Moskowitz (2000) show that there is good 
evidence that counterfactual thinking can affect the way individuals process 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
271 
 
information. My contention here is that LTIs, because they have a higher level of 
baseline propensity to use counterfactual reasoning, will be like the individuals who are 
primed to think counterfactually. That is, they may have a more permanently primed 
propensity to use counterfactual thinking due to their training. This tendency may, 
according to the Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000), result in the generation of alternatives 
which those who do not engage in counterfactual thinking, may not be willing or able to 
countenance. In the political environment the range of problems an individual is called 
upon to consider is great. From the practical issue of electoral success to issues of 
international importance, a CM is called upon to confront a wide variety of problems. It 
is conceivable that an individual who is able to consider a larger range of options will be 
at an advantage and will be seen by those who are involved in the selection process to 
have the ability to generate potential solutions to problems.  
However, the Gallinsky and Moskowitz (2000) study also found that on 
problems associated with the strict application of rules, such as the Wason test, as 
opposed to open ended problems such as the Duncker test, those primed with 
counterfactual thinking are likely to do worse than those who are not so primed. Thus, 
there is a potential disbenefit associated with counterfactual thinking.  This implies that 
those who engage in counterfactual thinking will have a disadvantage on tasks involving 
closed problems. The Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) study showed that there was a 
disbenefit of counterfactual thinking in the conditional permission task. The reason for 
this is that alternatives are not possible and are likely to divert subjects from the correct 
response. We might expect, therefore, that lawyers would be diverted from the correct 
procedure when dealing with these types of closed logical problems and would be 
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therefore less effective at them. Thus, lawyers, with their higher than average baseline 
propensity to use counterfactual thinking should also have a disadvantage in relation to 
those who have a lower propensity to use counterfactual reasoning, such as non-
Lawyers. 
One way of answering this objection is to point out that legal training, as well as 
medical and psychology training, involves training students to look at closed logical 
problems in a particular way. The Amsel et al (1991) study showed that all groups 
except chemistry students improved their conditional reasoning skills, and the 
conditional permission/obligation type of scenario is exactly the type of activity that 
lawyers excel in. What this suggests is that where the situation calls for closed logical 
thinking, notwithstanding that they may be professionally primed to think 
counterfactually, lawyers will not be diverted from strictly logical way of thinking 
because their ability to solve closed rule based problems is a separate skill which they 
learn and master. In other words, lawyers have the best of both worlds in that, due to 
their increased proclivity to entertain counterfactual reasoning,  they are able to generate 
alternatives in the types of scenario in which this is beneficial, as shown in experiments 
1 and 3 of the Galinsky and Moscowitz (2000) study, but are not disadvantaged by this 
proclivity when solving logical problems such as that in experiment 2 because, like 
medical and psychology students, they are trained to recognise these situations and 
apply the appropriate reasoning.  
In sum, there is a plausible explanation for the benefit associated with 
counterfactual reasoning, particularly in the case of lawyers. Counterfactual reasoning 
leads to the generation of more ideas in an open ended problem situation and therefore 
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is associated with success in such problems. However, in closed rule-based problems 
counterfactual reasoning is generally associated with poorer performance. Lawyers, by 
their training, have a higher propensity to engage in counterfactual reasoning and 
therefore may be more likely to generate novel solutions than non-legally trained 
parliamentarians. However, they may be less prone to distraction in closed rule-based 
problems due to their specific training in these types of problems.  
 
Lack of Probabilistic Reasoning Skill 
We usually consider the possession of any skill to be a positive attribute. 
However, in certain contexts it is actually a disadvantage to have certain skills, or at 
least, to reveal them if you do have them. I would like to make the case in this section 
for the idea that a potential CM who does not demonstrate probabilistic reasoning skills 
is in a better position to rise through the ranks than an individual who does. The reason 
for this is that probabilistic thinking tends not to provide the kind of thinking that 
political leaders, the media, parliamentary colleagues or the electorate prefer. It is my 
contention that leaders tend to prefer ideas that are clear cut and easily sold. The 
probabilistic reasoning used by scientists used to explain causal processes is quite 
different from the legal notions of cause. However, I will attempt to demonstrate that 
this works to the advantage of parliamentarians aspiring to become CMs because it 
creates a vision of certainty. Scientific thinking is better described as reducing 
uncertainty than creating certainty and political leaders and the electorate require the 
impression of certainty. Therefore, individuals who can provide this will be favoured. 
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The starting point for this analysis is the division between the scientific concept 
of cause and the lawyer’s. The modern scientific notion of causation is based on 
inference. Where two phenomena are seen to be connected a causal hypothesis for this 
connection is posited. This hypothesis is subject to falsification and as more 
sophisticated experimental methods become available the posited hypothesis is put 
under further scrutiny (Culhane 1997: 188). This process is therefore based on 
uncertainty in that hypotheses are never considered certain but simply less uncertain 
than their predecessors. 
Let us now consider the judicial notion of cause. Basically, the legal demand is 
for the explanation for an event. The legal system requires a statement of what caused 
certain events with near certainty (Berger and Solan, 2008: 851). In many cases a purely 
mechanistic explanation is quite appropriate because the events are closely related. 
Thus, the but-for test would seem to be an ideal way of explaining causation in a simple 
case of assault where an injury would not have occurred “but for” the contact by the 
assailant. However, the judicial procedure is to attempt to apply these types of reasoning 
to complex situations such as toxic torts (Culhane 1997: 190). Here, the causal chains 
are notoriously difficult to determine. Nevertheless, the legal system requires a method 
of determining whether given events produced given outcomes. The use of simplified 
definitions of cause are therefore an essential part of the legal process. 
Exemplifying this phenomenon is the situation in Australia in which the phrase 
“common sense causation” has been used as a basis for legal decision making 
(Stapleton 2010: 468). This has been described in the following terms: “…in some cases 
what the court means by this slippery term is simply the permission to infer facts from 
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common experience” (Stapleton 2010: 469). In short, phenomena that are actually the 
result of complex causal chains are simplified in legal reasoning so that the legal 
question as to whether one event caused another can be given a straightforward answer. 
The emphasis is on whether or not the facts can be proved. This is very much at odds 
with the scientific notion of cause. 
Let us now consider a leader who wishes to select a parliamentarian to take up 
the role of CM in a given portfolio. The new CM will need to be able to quickly and 
efficiently explain reasons for policy decisions to cabinet colleagues, the media, the 
public, the electorate and to the leader herself. What kinds of explanations do these 
stakeholders require? The answer seems to be that they require answers that convey a 
notion of certainty that inferential explanation cannot provide. Moreover, the 
appearance of uncertainty in the portrayal of the facts by the CM will undermine the 
credibility of the CM (and their government) in the eyes of the public. Oreskes and 
Conway (2010) point out how tobacco industry executives used this strategy to 
undermine the claims of scientists that there was a link between smoking and lung 
cancer: 
Doubt is crucial to science – in the version we call curiosity or 
healthy scepticism, it drives science forward – but it also makes 
science vulnerable to misrepresentation, because it is easy to 
take uncertainties out of context and create the impression that 
everything is unresolved. This was the tobacco industry’s key 
insight: that you could use normal scientific uncertainty to 
undermine the status of actual scientific knowledge….”Doubt is 
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our product,” ran the infamous memo written by one tobacco 
industry executive  in 1969, “since it is the best means of 
competing with the “body of fact” that exists in the minds of the 
general public” (Oreskes and Conway 2010: 34). 
A CM who presents information based on inferential reasoning opens himself up 
to exactly the same kind of undermining that the tobacco industry undertook. Interest 
groups, political opponents and journalists can use the uncertainty inherent in an 
inferential exposition to attack both the speaker and the speaker’s message if the 
speaker couches the debate in inferential terms. Thus, the kind of individual who 
communicates using such ideas will not be as effective in cabinet as an individual who 
is trained to give the appearance of certainty.  
This conclusion is supported by the observations on the effects of different types 
of education. There is no association between having a scientific background and being 
a CM. The results for t-tests for differences in group means for those with science 
engineering or surveying degrees (n=8), economics degrees (n=24), or medical degrees 
(n=5) show that there is no association between having an education that fosters 
inferential thinking and being a CM. The same result occurs if we add these categories 
together to get a bigger sample size (n=37). What this indicates is that those who think 
inferentially are no more likely to become CMs than any other parliamentarian. 
However, those who have law degrees (mean = .48) are significantly (p<.001) more 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
277 
 
likely to be CMs than non CMs (mean = .12).
8
 The same results hold for another group 
that tends to be non-probabilistically oriented – the arts qualified individuals. For such 
individuals the mean for the possession of an arts qualification amongst CMs (.53) is 
significantly (p<.01) higher than that for non-CMs (mean = .29).  
We can see that a legal training actively encourages individuals to generate 
simplified ideas of causation and, by extension, scientific explanation. This observation 
coheres well with the observation made above in relation to the Lehman et al (1988) 
study which found that law students did not improve in their methodological and 
statistical reasoning skills. Thus, it is a substantial benefit for an aspiring CM to be 
legally trained because he is already primed for the kind of thinking he is likely to be 
called upon to produce. There is little need to subvert a desire to consider nuances of 
probabilistic explanation if your training has already reduced this proclivity.  
Thus, the LTI’s lack of probabilistic reasoning skills can be seen as a positive 
benefit in the accession to cabinet. The kind of reasoning required in explaining policy 
to the media, public, journalists, the leader of your party and cabinet colleagues is 
already inculcated into the mindset of the LTI. 
 
Summary of Section 7.7 
In this section I have considered how specific skills that are imparted to the 
legally trained may be of use to the aspiring CM. These are a proclivity to engage in 
                                                 
8
 These results differ slightly from the results reported in the discussion of the modelling in 
Chapter 6. The reason for this is that the results in Chapter 6 were based on the training sample (n = 107) 
while the results here are based on the full sample of 134).  
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counterfactual reasoning and a lack of probabilistic reasoning skills. I considered how 
these might be of use for a parliamentarian who wishes to become a CM. The proclivity 
for using counterfactual reasoning is beneficial because it encourages individuals to 
consider more options in open-ended problems than they would otherwise consider and, 
in the case of lawyers and others who experience improvements in their conditional 
reasoning skills, does not distract them from the correct solution in closed, rule-based 
problems. Finally, the lack of probabilistic reasoning skills is of benefit because it 
reduces the element of uncertainty in expositions. A parliamentarian who phrases things 
in terms of certainty is less likely to be undermined by opponents who can exploit the 
uncertainty inherent in the exposition of those using more probabilistic explanations. 
 
Summary of Chapter 7 
In this chapter I have addressed the issue of how legal training could be of 
benefit to parliamentarians who aspire to cabinet appointment. I started the chapter by 
pointing out that statistically there is a significant advantage for an individual who 
wants to become a CM if she has a legal education. I followed this observation by 
noting that there is a perception in the media that there is a bias towards LTIs in cabinet. 
The media debate gave a suggestion that similarity bias may be responsible for this to 
some extent but then went on to point out that there are more practical benefits for a 
parliamentarian who has a legal education. I then addressed the issue of similarity bias. I 
found that there was some evidence of similarity bias in the case of Howard in that he 
had a higher tendency to appoint LTIs than any other appointer. However, there was no 
statistical evidence that legally trained appointers tend to appoint legally trained CMs. 
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Given the benefit to the parliamentarian aspiring to a CM appointment of legal 
education I looked at some of the research that has come from the US on this issue. The 
research shows that there is a significant advantage in having a legal education for a 
legislator who aspires to high office. My reading of the research led me to conclude that 
this is due to the technical expertise of lawyers which is of benefit in drafting legislation 
and because others defer to them in this process. I followed this with an attempt to 
isolate a particular way of thinking associated with legal reasoning. I looked at the 
possibility that the skill learnt via the case report – “chunking” – might give lawyers an 
advantage in parliament. I concluded that many professionals have a way of thinking 
that is akin to this and therefore this is unlikely to be the explanation for the lawyer’s 
advantage. The next step was to look at the empirical research and it is here that a good 
explanation for the benefit of legal training becomes clear. I found that counterfactual 
reasoning and a lack of probabilistic reasoning skills are cognitive habits imparted to the 
legally trained. I then explained how these can all be useful for a parliamentarian to high 
office.  
As we have seen, there is recognition in both the media and academic debate of 
the greater likelihood of the legally trained reaching high political office in comparison 
with their non-legally trained colleagues. Much of the debate has focused on the 
practical benefits of having a knowledge of the law for an individual who wants to have 
significant input into creating law. There has been empirical research on the differences 
in the way lawyers think, however these ideas have not been applied to the issue of why 
legally trained legislators have an advantage. In this chapter I have addressed this issue 
in detail and have developed a plausible explanation as to why the legally trained should 
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have an advantage in the legislature. The cognitive skills and habits imparted by legal 
training can be seen to be beneficial for an individual working in the parliamentary 
environment. This is because parliament requires a particular way of thinking which 
allows for some creative input via the generation of novel ideas, but requires the 
impression of certainty and therefore downplays probabilistic reasoning. I have shown 
that these ways of thinking are imparted by legal education. Certainly there are other 
factors at play such as that others defer to the legally trained on legislative matters and 
this gives the legally trained a “leader-like” aura. However, it seems that the habits of 
mind associated with legal training are likely to be the reason why they have an 
advantage in the legislature. 
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Chapter 8: Parlage and the Dynamics of Ambition 
 
Section 8.1: Introduction 
The variable Parlage represents the age of parliamentarians at entry to 
parliament. It appears in four of the committee models and is negatively associated with 
CM. It is significant at the p<.01 level in two of the models of at the p<.05 level in the 
remaining two. This is good evidence that the younger an individual is when they enter 
parliament the more likely they are to be appointed to cabinet in their subsequent career. 
This is consistent with the findings of several others in other legislatures. Buck (1963) 
pointed out in an aptly titled article, The Early Start Toward Cabinet 1918-55, that in 
the UK House of commons, “[m]inisterial aspirants seize an early opportunity to begin 
their advance in the official hierarchy, and in most cases they have also begun their 
career in the Commons at a relatively early age” (Buck 1963: 629). Schlesinger (1966: 
176) noted that "[t]he younger a man is when he enters politics, the greater the range of 
his ambitions and the likelihood of his developing a career commitment to politics". In 
this chapter I will show that there is good evidence that it is not age per se that is the 
important factor but ambition. I will examine the idea that ambition is the important 
factor and Parlage taps into ambition. Ambitious individuals both enter parliament at an 
earlier age and are more assiduous in pursuing opportunities as they arise. This, I 
contend, is part of the reason for the negative association between Parlage and CM. I 
also consider another phenomenon that links age and ambition. I look at the idea that the 
desire to progress to higher levels of office, “progressive ambition”, declines at a certain 
age. Essentially, individuals who have not achieved their goals by the average age at 
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which such goals are achieved tend to become less assiduous in pursuing promotion. I 
support this contention by surveying the literature to look for evidence that ambition 
declines with age whereas few of the other qualities associated with age decline 
sufficiently to explain the fall in promotional prospects. I conclude that the best 
explanation for this is that there is a fall in the ambition of individuals over time and it is 
this subjective state of mind that results in the reduction of chances of future promotion. 
I will provide a good example of this from the Australian political literature later in the 
chapter. 
 
Section 8.2: Overview of Age at Entry to Parliament 
Parlage is the age at entry to parliament. The descriptive data for Parlage is 
presented in Table 8.1. The average age at entry of CMs for the model sample (n = 68) 
is 38 and the standard deviation is 6. For non-CMs (n = 66), the average is 43 with a 
standard deviation of 7. Thus, CMs were on average five years younger than non-CMs 
on entry to parliament. 
Table 8.1: Descriptive Data for Parlage - Age at Entry To Parliament 
 
 
Summary of Section 8.2 
Average Stdev Min Max N
CMs 38 6 27 54 68
Non-CMs 43 7 28 58 66
Total Sample 40 7 27 58 134
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In this section I have provided a brief overview of Parlage. I have presented 
descriptive data and pointed out that Parlage is negatively associated with CM 
In the next section I will survey some of the literature on the relationship 
between age and senior appointment in other legislatures. It will become apparent that a 
negative relationship between age and accession to high political office is well 
established in the literature. 
 
 
Section 8.3:  Age and Leadership in General 
As mentioned earlier, Buck (1963) points out that those who enter parliament at 
an earlier age are more likely to become CMs than those who entered at a later age. He 
puts this down to ambition. King (1981) also notes that those who enter the UK 
parliament at an earlier age are more likely to become cabinet ministers. His explanation 
is that there is a passion and drive in the “career politician” which results in both a 
desire to enter politics at an earlier age and greater ambition for high political office. 
Such individuals are “…eager for office and promotion and, if they are offered them, 
will accept with alacrity" (King 1981: 282). In this section I would like to establish two 
propositions. The first is that the literature in general supports a negative association 
between age and the probability of promotion. The second is that a number of standard 
reasons given for this association are not plausible. That is, there are no declines in 
ability as a person ages that map the decline in the likelihood of appointment. I will 
therefore conclude that several explanations for the decline in the probability of 
promotion are not plausible. 




Age and the Probability of Promotion 
There are two types of studies that look at the relationship between age and the 
likelihood of promotion. The first is prospective. These look at the relationship between 
the age at entry to parliament and the likelihood of achieving high office in the future. 
The findings of these studies are very similar to the finding that Parlage is negatively 
associated with CM. Two studies that use this prospective approach are Buck (1963) 
and King (1981). These studies find a negative association between the age at entry and 
the probability of future accession to high office.   
The second set of models is based on cross sectional analysis such as Kam et al 
(2010) and O’Malley (2006). Kam et al (2010) in their model of cabinet appointment 
show that there is a significant (p <.01) negative association between age and the 
probability of being appointed to cabinet. Each additional year of age decreases the 
probability of appointment by 6%. O’Malley (2006) used a cross sectional approach and 
found a negative association between age and cabinet appointment but this association 
is not significant. This is explained by O’Malley by pointing out that in the small pool 
of the Irish parliament, experience is more important than age because in the small pool 
and with a low level of parliamentary turnover, appointments tend to be made on the 
basis of how well known an individual is (O’Malley 2006: 331). Thus, in the “small 
pool” situation of the Irish parliament experience in parliament is more important than 
age. In the judicial sphere, Blaines i Vidal and Leaver (2010) found that the relationship 
between age and promotion to higher office in the English judiciary was a negative 
quadratic with a peak at the age of 50 (Blaines i Vidal and Leaver 2010: 586).  Finally, 
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it should be recalled that the relationship between age and the probability of being a CM 
in the LNPC RIF model in Chapter 3 was a negative quadratic with a peak at the age of 
47. 
The general conclusion from both the prospective and cross sectional literature 
is that there is a negative association between age and promotion. Where quadratic 
terms are included the form of the relationship is a negative quadratic. In the one case 
where no association was found between age and CM (O’Malley 2006) there were 
institutional factors that explained this. There are no studies that show a positive 
association between age and promotion to senior political office.  
It is the contention of this chapter that ambition is the reason for the negative 
association between age and accession to high office. However, before embarking on an 
analysis of ambition it is necessary to consider other alternatives. There is a stream of 
the literature that examines the relationship between age and leadership and I would like 
to consider a number of these explanations. I will show that the explanations are 
implausible in the current context.  
Age and Leadership Ability 
There is some empirical evidence that the effectiveness of a leader peaks in the 
mid-40s. Simonton (1984) conducted an historiometric analysis of 25 absolute 
monarchs between the middle ages and the Napoleonic era. The idea here was that, 
because the monarchs were absolute, any beneficial or detrimental effects of their 
leadership style would be directly reflected in the condition of their kingdoms. If there 
are effects of age on the ability to govern then this should be measurable by tracking the 
state of the kingdom as the monarch ages. Simonton (1984) found that the older a 
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leader, the less likely a country is to invade another and the less likely they are to gain 
territory if they do invade. Furthermore, the older the monarch, the less likely the army 
is to be victorious in any engagement. There are also changes in diplomatic 
relationships as a monarch ages: the number of international treaties declines as the age 
of the monarch increases. There are more domestic disturbances in the monarch’s 
country amongst his people as she ages.  Militarily, the optimum age for success in 
battle is a negative quadratic with a peak at 42. Here, success includes maximising 
territorial gains as well as a minimising loss of territory via negotiated settlements. In 
sum, on many measures of leadership ability there is a negative association with age. 
In a similar analysis of British monarchs from 1066 to 1811, Simonton (1998) 
calculated the effects of age and “experience” – the number of years on the throne  –  on 
17 criteria relating to the condition of the nation. Age was found to have a negative 
quadratic association with: i) civil disturbances initiated by the aristocracy: and ii) 
volume of legislation and number of reforms. Thus, there was an inverted u function 
and an optimum age for each of these two activities. For aristocratic disturbances, the 
peak age was 43, indicating that legislation and reforms likely to upset entrenched 
interests begin to fall after this age (Simonton 1998: 315). The peak ages for legislation 
and reforms were 44.8 years and 42.3 years respectively (Simonton 1998: 316).  
Thus, the empirical literature on political leadership and age suggests that the 
important turning point occurs in the fifth decade. The basic findings are that actual 
leader effectiveness tends to decline at some point during the 40s. This is not to suggest 
that a leader cannot contribute for some time after this age. However, there is a steady 
decline on a number of measures of leadership.  
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How plausible is this as an explanation for the negative association found 
between age and future promotion in the prospective studies? To examine this we have 
to consider a cohort of individuals who, after acquiring the required experience in 
parliament, are assessed on their leadership ability. Those who are older than the 
average age at which selection decisions are made are likely to be assessed as having 
passed their peak. Using the data from the modelling sample it can be shown that this is 
an implausible scenario. Let us consider that the average age at which CMs arrive in 
parliament is 38 while the average age at which non-CMs arrive in parliament is 43. 
Thus, there is an average difference of 5 years. Let us now consider the average age at 
which CMs are appointed. Table 8.2 shows that the average age at which LNPC CMs 
arrived in parliament was 38.5 years and these parliamentarians were appointed to 
cabinet, nine years later at the age of 48. The figures for the ALP CMs are not 
statistically significantly different. They tend to arrive in parliament at the age of 37.6 
and are, on average, appointed to cabinet nine years later at the age of 46.3 
Table 8.2: Age at Entry (Parlage) and Age at Appointment for CMs 
 
 
Mean Stdev Min Max n
LNPC:
Age at Entry (Parlage) 38.5 7.3 27.3 53.5          34
Age at Appointment 48.0 6.6 38.3 59.5          34
ALP:
Age at Entry (Parlage) 37.6 5.1 27.7 53.5          34
Age at Appointment 46.3 5.9 36.0 56.8          34
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Let us see how the “leadership decline” theory fits with these observations. At the time 
that the CMs are being appointed to cabinet, their non-CM colleagues are approximately 
5 years older than they are. Thus, on average they would be approximately 51-2. The 
leadership decline theory holds that there is a peak in the leadership ability sometime in 
the 40s. Theoretically, therefore, the leadership decline theory fits with this scenario. Of 
those who have done on average a 9 year “apprenticeship”, those who are 51-2 will 
have begun to decline in leadership ability while their colleagues who are 5 years 
youngers will not. 
The first problem with this scenario is that the decline in leadership in the 
Simonton (1984; 1998) studies cited was noted in active leaders. Potential CMs have 
not been engaged in actual leadership roles so they cannot be assessed on their actual 
ability to govern. Thus, the idea that potential CMs are being assessed in terms of 
whether they have peaked in terms of leadership ability seems unlikely. A second 
problem is that the leadership decline theory simply states that there is a peak in 
leadership ability but there is no suggestion that the decline is precipitous. In order for 
the leadership decline theory to apply the selectorate needs to be able to discern subtle 
differences in the leadership potential of the pool of potential CMs from the pool of 
parliamentarians and to be able to discern that those at around the age of 47 have not 
suffered a decline in their leadership potential while those at the age of 51-2 have. This 
is implausible as the differences would have to be discernible between individuals who 
do not differ greatly in age. The negative quadratics in the Simonton (1984: 98) studies 
cited above were derived by looking at the careers of monarch over their entire lives. 
The idea that it is possible to discern significant differences between individuals who 
are not greatly dispersed around the peak is unlikely.  
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 We can conclude that the leadership decline theory does not explain the negative 
association between age and future accession to cabinet. 
 
Survival Value of Information 
Evolutionary explanations relate leadership to survival value. The idea here is 
that information vital for survival will confer leadership status on individuals. As it is 
older individuals with more experience who will hold this information leadership status 
comes to be associated with age (van Vugt, Johnson, Kaiser and O’Gorman 2008, 
p276). This explanation supports a generally positive association between leadership 
and age. Reynolds et al (2006) found using agent based modelling of hunter gatherer 
societies that the “fixed order” feeding rule in which the older more experienced 
members of the group were fed first was the most stable survival strategy for the group. 
The idea here is that the information held by the older individuals is of value and 
preserving it helps preserve the group.  
As an explanation this certainly makes sense.  However it does not explain why 
there should be a negative association between age and CM. The evidence is that 
knowledge and experience continue to grow well into middle age and do not decline 
until much later. Crystalised intelligence tends to be stable until old age (Horne and 
Cattel 1967; Schaie 1983; Roring and Charness 2007). If holding information has 
survival value and this is the explanation for the relationship between age and 
leadership we would expect the prospects of promotion to track the ongoing 
accumulation of knowledge. However, this does not occur. If it did then we would 
expect that age would be positively associated with CM. This would occur throughout 
the parliamentary career so that younger parliamentarians would be ranked lower in 
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terms of wisdom and knowledge on the basis of their age. After a certain amount of 
experience had been acquired (from Table 8.2 it would seem that the “required” 
experience is 9 years) those who were older would be seen as the most appropriate 
CMs. In fact, we see the reverse. Furthermore, in none of the studies on cabinet 
appointment cited above is age positively associated with cabinet appointment. Kam et 
al (2010) show a significant (p<.01) negative association between cabinet appointment 
and age, an association we would not see if there were an information-based advantage 
of age. Furthermore, the LNPC RIF models developed in Chapter 3 showed a negative 
quadratic association between age and being a CM with a peak at 47, well before the 
declines associated with age-related cognitive decline would be manifested. Thus, we 
would be unwise to consider the age-related accumulation of knowledge to be 
associated with the political appointment dynamics. 
 
Testosterone 
Another strand of the literature links age and leadership via variations in 
testosterone levels. Both men and women have higher levels of testosterone at younger 
ages and this may have an influence on behaviour which is noted by selectors who may 
reward aggressive moves to rise up the political ladder. As an individual’s behaviour 
changes over time due to lowered levels of testosterone selectors may be less willing to 
award promotions due to the individuals lowered ambition. Horowitz et al (2005) used 
leader’s age as a proxy for testosterone levels in a study of age and the initiation of 
military conflict. One of the hypotheses was that younger men would be more likely to 
initiate hostilities than older men. Their findings were that the reverse was the case with 
older male leaders more likely to initiate hostilities than younger men.  
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A related testosterone-based argument is that younger individuals may be more 
willing to attack an older individual’s position due to their perception that the older 
individual’s aggression and risk-taking propensity is lower than their own. Bak and 
Palmer (2010) found support for this in that they found older rather than younger US 
presidents were more likely to be in office at the time of a targeted military attack on the 
US.  
Applying this explanation to the current problem we can imagine that a group of 
younger individuals may be more likely to offer themselves as candidates for cabinet 
positions if they perceive that the incumbents are significantly older than they are. 
Younger individuals may be less likely to defer to older individuals on the basis of 
seniority or age. The effect of this would be that on average the pool of potential 
replacements is always younger than the pool of incumbents.  
The main problem with explanations based on testosterone is that testosterone 
levels fall over the course of life with a peak at 15-22 (Ellison et al 2002). Thus, it is 
difficult to see how a difference in the age of non-CMs as opposed to CMs of five years 
could account for the differences in promotional prospects at midlife when both groups’ 
testosterone levels have fallen significantly. Like the leadership decline theory the 
testosterone explanation seems to fit with the data but the actual size of the effect is 
likely to be very small.  
 
General Declines Associated with Age  
There is a strand of literature that deals with the general decline in the physical 
and cognitive performance of individuals in middle age. However, the fall in 
performance tends to be gradual over many years with many declines beginning in the 
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early thirties. As mentioned above levels of testosterone peak in the mid to late teens. 
One other factor that declines is “fluid” intelligence – general reasoning ability 
including the ability to take in and make sense of novel information (Horne 1978; 
Schaie 1983; Roring and Charness 2007). Fluid intelligence peaks in the late teens – 
early 20s. It is possible that the decline in these abilities may be what is responsible for 
the fall in leadership ability and performance. The problem here is that the decline in 
cognitive abilities is far slower than the decline in the prospects of promotion. The 
decline in cognitive abilities takes place over decades and it is unlikely that a decline in 
cognitive abilities of a 47 year old as opposed to a 52 year old would be discernible. 
Thus, it seems unlikely that the change in cognitive abilities could be responsible for the 
advantage that an individual has who arrives in parliament earlier than their older 
colleagues. 
 
Summary of Section 8.3 
In this section I have given an overview of the literature on the relationship 
between age and promotion to high office. It has become clear that most studies find a 
negative association between age and senior appointment while one study, O’Malley 
(2006) finds a non-statistically significant negative association. Where there is an 
explanation for the negative association it is couched in terms of ambition as in Buck 
(1963), King (1981) and Schlesinger (1966). I then examined some possible alternative 
reasons for this negative association between age and the prospects for promotion. I 
looked at arguments based on changes in general leadership ability as age increases, 
information changes associated with increased age, changes in testosterone in later life 
and general cognitive declines associated with age. None of these provided plausible 
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explanations for the general negative association between age and promotion noted in 
the literature and in the Australian federal data. 
In the sections that follow I will consider the case that ambition is the driving 
force that affects the probability of promotion and the reason that age is associated with 
promotional prospects is that age is associated with ambition.  
 
Section 8.4: Ambition 
In this section I will identify two respects in which age and ambition are likely 
to be related. The first is associated with Parlage in that it relates the baseline level of 
ambition to the age at which a parliamentarian enters parliament. The second is related 
to changes in ambition over time. This is a more contentious discussion because my 
evidence for its presence in the Australian context is based on tangential data. However, 
these two effects demonstrate that there is a clear case for saying that age and ambition 
are related.  
I will begin the section with a discussion of ambition in general. I will then point 
out that there is good evidence from the literature that age and ambition are negatively 
associated, and I will show that this can explain why age and political promotion are 
negatively associated.  
 
Definitions of Ambition 
The idea that ambition itself could play an important part in the career of a 
legislator was extensively discussed by Schlesinger (1966) who identified three types of 
ambition: discrete, static and progressive. Discrete ambition is where the legislator has a 
specific goal or office to achieve and when this is achieved the legislator is content to 
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voluntarily leave office. Static ambition is where the legislator is content to remain in 
the current office. Progressive ambition is where the legislator has a desire to seek 
higher office. Two other types of ambition are generally referred to in the literature. Fox 
and Lawless (2004; 2005) refer to “nascent ambition” as the ambition of an individual 
to one day enter a political contest. They use the term “expressed ambition” to describe 
the state of the individual who has actually entered into a political race. One form of 
ambition that has not been extensively examined in the literature is intrainstitutional 
ambition (Herrick and Moore 1993). This is the desire to reach higher office in the one 
institution. The other five types of ambition usually refer to ambition to reach office in a 
forum of which the individual is not yet a member. Progressive ambition, for example, 
usually refers to the ambition of a state member to enter the federal arena. Intra 
institutional ambition refers to the desire to reach higher office in the one institution. 
Thus, a backbencher who desires to become a CM exhibits intrainstitutional ambition. It 
is a matter of definition as to whether this could also be described as progressive 
ambition. 
As well as trying to identify different types of ambition, those who have looked 
at the concept of ambition acknowledge that ambition can change over the course of a 
career and can differ between individuals. Schlesinger, for example, pointed out that 
“[a]n ambition theory need not assume that office goals are constant in their intensity 
and direction for the same individual or for different individuals. As a man does or does 
not progress in his career the possibilities change, and if he is reasonable, so will his 
ambitions” (Schlesinger 1966, 9). 
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Empirical Measures of Ambition 
Buck (1963), King (1991) and Schelisinger (1966) emphasise the importance of 
age in relation to ambition. In these accounts, age at entry to parliament is a proxy for 
ambition. The idea here is that the ambitious are 1) more likely to enter parliament at an 
early age and 2) are more likely to “seize” opportunities as they arise. Thus, age at the 
time of entry to parliament is a good way of capturing ambitiousness without needing a 
direct measure of ambition. 
The factor that is said to drive both the desire to enter politics early and the 
eventual accession to high office is ambition. This is a plausible account. However, it 
would be useful if we had some empirical evidence that ambition was in fact related to 
the early entry to parliament and the desire to seek higher office. Fortunately there is 
such evidence. Fox and Lawless (2005) undertook a study of “nascent” political 
ambition using data from the Citizen Political Ambition study (Fox and Lawless 2005: 
647). The idea here is that nascent political ambition gives rise to “expressive” political 
ambition, which is the actual running as a candidate (Fox and Lawless 2005: 647). The 
methodology involved drawing a national sample of 6800 individuals from the areas 
that supply the vast majority of political candidates: law, business, education and 
political/community activism. Sample design intended to redress the gender imbalance 
in these professions resulted in a final sample of 3765 (Fox and Lawless 2004: 267). 
Respondents were given a questionnaire designed to capture details of socio-
demographic backgrounds, family arrangements, political outlook and experience and 
their perceptions of, and intentions to, run for office. One of the findings from the study 
was that age was significantly (p<.01) negatively associated with the ambition to run for 
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any office at all such as local, school board, council, state or federal. Age was also 
significantly negatively associated with the ambition to run for higher office such as 
federal. 
Other studies in different settings find essentially the same phenomenon. Gaddie 
(2004), found that among office-holding national political convention delegates, those 
who were younger were more likely to express a desire to achieve higher office than 
those who were over 55 (Gaddie 2004, cited in Fox and Lawless 2005: 647). Gallagher 
(2009) found of a negative association between political ambition in line with her initial 
hypothesis. In her words, she  “…[e]xpect[ed] that younger individuals who are perhaps 
more willing to endure the rigors of politics and who have less time invested in a 
particular career path will prove to be more ambitious than older individuals who are 
further advanced in their careers” (Gallagher 2009: 8). 
The importance of the studies that find a negative association between age and 
ambition is that it strengthens the idea that age can be used to tap into ambition. In the 
absence of a direct measure of ambition it can be said that age is a good approximation. 
Thus, it is clear that the interpretation of Parlage as being related to ambition 
seems justified in the light of the literature. The literature that examines the negative 
relationship between the age of entry to parliament and prospective success (Buck 1963; 
Schelisinger 1966; King 1981) imputes a higher degree of ambitiousness to younger 
entrants. In this respect age is being used as a proxy for ambition. I am essentially 
making a similar contention in that I am contending that Parlage is a proxy for ambition. 
The studies that examine ambition directly and find a negative association between 
ambition and age (Fox and Lawless 2005; Gaddie 2004; Gallagher 2009) show that 
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using age as a proxy for ambition is empirically supportable. In short, interpreting 
Parlage as a way of tapping into ambition is a justifiable strategy.  
 
 
Changes in Ambition 
There is evidence that as age increases ambition declines.   Schlesinger (1966) 
argues that ambition and opportunity are inter-related and both decline as a politician 
ages (Schlesinger 1966, cited in Hain 1974: 642). Hain (1974) undertook a study of 
legislators for the states of California, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee  and found 
evidence that both ambition and opportunity decline as a legislator approaches the age 
of 50. Using data from interviews of 94% of the incumbents, Hain found that the mean 
age of those who had a desire to reach a higher position was 44.3 years while those who 
did not aspire to a higher position were aged on average 54.1 years (Hain 1974: 266). 
Thus, there was a decrease in ambition as age increased. Furthermore, there was no 
influence of experience. That is, prior legislative experience was not related to the 
change in ambition indicating that the important factor was the relationship between age 
and ambition. Following up in the years after the initial interviews, it was found, as 
expected, that the actual rates of advancement followed this pattern. The mean age of 
legislators initially interviewed who subsequently advanced was 43.3 at the time of the 
interview while the mean age of those who did not advance was 50.6 years (Hain 1974, 
p271). The conclusion Hain comes to is that the opportunities for advancement fall as a 
legislator approaches 50 and his expectations also fall.  This clearly supports 
Schlesinger’s view. However, neither Hain nor Schlesinger attempts to disentangle the 
relationship between the decline in ambition and the decline in opportunity. The 
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problem with using ambition in combination with opportunity as an explanation for a 
fall in promotional prospects as age increases is that the relationship between ambition 
and opportunity is difficult to unravel. The drop in ambition may be due to the 
realisation that opportunities (offers of higher positions) have begun to diminish. 
Alternatively, the fall in ambition may be a cause of the fall in the promotional 
prospects with the individual not following up opportunities that present themselves.  
Brace (1984) included age and age squared in a logistic regression analysis of 
risk and ambition. The binary variable here was seeking higher office as opposed to 
merely seeking re-election to the house in which they were serving. The idea was that 
the relatively old and the relatively young were less likely to pursue higher office as 
opposed to merely seek re-election. Brace found a negative quadratic effect with the age 
of 43 being the age at which an individual was most likely to seek higher office. Brace’s 
study supports the ideas of Schlesinger and Hain (1974) that age and ambition are 
negatively associated (Brace 1974: 568) and supports the general idea that age can be 
used as a proxy for ambition. 
Kiewiet and Zeng (1993) found a negative association between the desire to seek 
higher office and age. The average age of those retiring from the US House of 
Representatives was 59.6 years while the average age of those seeking re-election was 
51.4 years, and those seeking higher office was 46.6 years (Kiewiet and Zeng 1993: 
934). Their explanation for the decline in ambitiousness was that younger members 
have typically served fewer terms than older members and thus had less to lose by going 
for a more risky alternative.  
The studies cited show that there is a decline in the ambition of members of 
various forums. The decline effect seems to be related to the age at which subjects 
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perceive they should have achieved certain goals. In other words, the decline effect is 
likely to be related to the age of achieving high status in specific domains. It has been 
well documented that in different domains, high status is achieved at different ages. 
Simonton (2007) used a linear regression approach in determining the peak age of 
output of authors of a variety of literary styles. Conceptualist poets do their best work at 
the age of 28. Conceptualist novelists do their best work at 33.5. The ages at which 
experimental poets and novelists produce their best work are 38.9 and 44.2 respectively 
(Simonton 2007: 136).  Similarly, Simonton (1985) found that eminent psychologists 
produce their best work at the age of approximately 40. Levin and Stephan (1991) used 
a pooled regression model and found that there were differences in the peak age for 
output of different types of scientists. For example, solid-state/condensed matter 
physicists tended to have their peak publication output at 45 years while geophysicists 
peak at age 59 years. (Levin and Stephan 1991:  122-125).  Blanes i Vidal and Leaver 
(2010: 46) found a negative quadratic association between age and promotion in the 
English judiciary with a peak at age 50.  Similar patterns occur in the field of leadership. 
Lehman (1947) surveyed political, military, economic and political leaders and found 
that for each field of leadership there were different average ages of serving leaders. 
Popes tended to be older while the youngest were hereditary rulers of England, France, 
Germany and Italy (Lehman 1947: 354).   
The importance of there being specific milestones in different spheres of 
leadership is that this may be the reason for the decline effect. It is conceivable that the 
decline effect is due to the realisation by the individual that they have not achieved 
certain mileposts in their career at the time when their peers have done so and this 
causes a fall in their aspirations due to a realisation that they may not achieve their 
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desired goals. This would explain why, as Brace (1984), Hain (1974), and Kiewiet and 
Zeng (1993) stress, ambition tends to decline at a specific age in various domains. The 
idea here is that, in each of the forums in which these three studies were conducted, 
there was an age at which the successful high office seekers should have attained their 
goals. Those who had not achieved these offices would perceive that they had “missed 
the boat” and would suffer a decrease in ambition.  
It is worthwhile examining whether there is a similar decline effect at play in the 
Australian federal context. The presence of such an effect would strengthen the idea 
underlying the interpretation of Parlage in that it shows that there is a close relationship 
between age and ambition.  
Let us consider how the decline effect might work in the Australian federal 
system. We have seen from Table 8.2 that, on average, it takes 9 years after entry to 
parliament to be appointed to cabinet. We have also seen that the average age of 
appointment to cabinet is 47 years. Thus, the average CM enters parliament at the age of 
38 years and, after 9 years is appointed to cabinet. In order to establish a decline effect 
we would need to find evidence that non-CMs suffer a decline in ambition after the age 
of 47 years, the average age at which high office is achieved in the forum under 
discussion. If they are older than the age of 47 years they are likely to feel that they 
have “missed the boat “ and lower their aspirations accordingly. The question is, do we 
have evidence of this? 
We have two sources indicating that the late 40s are an important turning point. 
The first is biographical. The second is quantitative and is based on the quadratic 
relationship between age and the probability of being a CM at a given cross section in 
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time that we found in Chapter 3 using data from the LNPC in government for the period 
1996-2007. 
 The biographical accounts of the careers of Petro Georgiou and Malcolm 
Turnbull are good examples of the phenomenon in question. Georgiou’s case gives a 
good indication that, at 50, an Australian federal parliamentarian may consider that, if 
he has not been appointed to a senior position, he is not likely to be. Petro Georgiou is 
interesting because he is one of the few Australian federal parliamentarians to refuse an 
offer of a promotion. He entered parliament at the age of 47 in 1994 when the LNPC 
was in opposition. In 1996 the LNPC was returned to power and in 1997 at the age of 
50 he was offered the position of parliamentary secretary. He is reputed to have said to 
Howard “I’m too old and ugly for that” (Gordon 2005). The implication was that he 
aspired to a more senior position. However, he was never subsequently offered another 
senior position and remained a backbencher until he left parliament in 2010. The point 
of this is that it indicates that there may be a perception on the part of parliamentarians 
that 50 is the age at which a parliamentarian should be a CM and if you have not 
achieved this there is no point continuing in the effort to achieve a senior position.  
 Turnbull is an excellent counterexample because he is the exception that proves 
the rule. He was older than Georgiou when he entered parliament and yet his ambition 
had not declined. Turnbull entered parliament at the age of 50, was offered a role of 
parliamentary secretary at the age of 51 which he accepted and was a cabinet minister 
by the age of 52. Clearly, the junior position of parliamentary secretary was not a role 
he felt he was “too old and ugly” for. Instead, he seized the opportunity. The point of 
this comparison is that Turnbull, although he entered parliament relatively late, was 
known for his drive and ambition. Crabb (2009) in an aptly titled essay on Turnbull, 
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Stop at Nothing: The Life and Times of Malcolm Turnbull, points out that he was 
described by one associate as a “force of nature” (Crabb 2009: 7). He seems to have 
been driven by the urge to engage in politics from an early age given that his first 
attempt to enter parliament was in 1981 at the age of 26. Failing this he went on to a 
number of high profile corporate and legal positions until his entry to parliament in 
2004.   
 Georgiou represents the archetypal individual who instantiates the decline effect. 
He perceived himself to be too old to accept a junior position, expecting at age 50 to be 
offered a senior position. Having not secured such a role he effectively gave up. The 
important point is that his ambition declined. Turnbull provides a good counterexample 
because he represents the individual whose ambition did not decline and, not 
surprisingly, attained the goal of high office. Turnbull demonstrates that the decline 
effect is not due to age but to ambition. On this account age is merely a proxy for 
ambition and as age increases, ambition has a tendency to fall. Age is a proximate 
measure of ambition rather than an absolute measure of ambition and this is 
demonstrated by the counterexample of Turnbull whose ambition was not substantially 
diminished by age. The point is, however, that Georgiou’s response represents the usual 
response to the situation of not achieving high office. Hence, his example seems to be 
the kind of thinking that underlies the decline effect. 
 As well as this biographical account of the decline effect there is some evidence 
that the probability of being a CM declines after the age of 47. In the LNPC RIF model 
developed in Chapter 3 using cross sectional data, one of the factors considered was 
age. Both age and age squared were included in the model and the coefficients were 
.799 and -.008 respectively, with both significant at the p<.01 level. These coefficients 
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essentially distil the effect of age on the probability of being a CM at a given cross 
section of time. They form a negative quadratic with a peak at the age of 47.
9
 In other 
words, the cross sectional analysis in Chapter 3 shows that the age at which a 
parliamentarian is most likely to be a CM is 47. Older individuals are less likely to be 
CMs at a given point in time. It should be stressed that being a CM at a given point in 
time is conceptually different from the age at first appointment, which, from Table 8.2, 
is also 47. Nevertheless, the quadratic relationship between age and the probability of 
being a CM shows that there is a plausible connection between age and ambition in that 
after the age of 47 parliamentarians may feel that they are unlikely to accede to cabinet 
if they have not done so by this age. Conceivably, they therefore lower their aspirations. 
That is, their ambition declines. Like Georgiou, they are therefore less likely to be 
appointed to such roles. The reason they would feel that way after the age of 47 is that 
they would compare themselves with those who have made it to cabinet and either 
unconsciously or after doing the calculations themselves, would come to the conclusion 
that those who have made it to cabinet did so by the age of 47.  
 This discussion of the decline affect has provided further support for the idea 
that it is not unreasonable to see Parlage as tapping into ambition. There is some 
evidence that the decline effect is at work in the Australian federal parliament. After an 
average of 9 years of “apprenticeship”, those who are beyond the age of 47 may lower 
their aspirations and therefore, by their own loss of ambition reduce their chances of 
attaining high office. 
                                                 
9
 It should be noted that the inflection point of 47 is not merely an artefact of the average age of 
appointment being 47. These coefficients were generated using a cross sectional analysis of the cohort of 
LNPC members over the period 1996-2007. Table 3.19 in Chapter 3 shows that the average age of CMs 
in this analysis was 51.7 while that of parliamentarians as a whole was 50.8 




Summary of Section 8.4 
In this section I have explored the idea of ambition and its relationship to age. In 
particular my concern was to see how Parlage might tap into ambition.  My first step 
was to consider how others had conceived of ambition and to see how ambition had 
been measured in the literature. In general, age at the time of entry to parliament is 
negatively associated with ambition. Furthermore, direct measures of ambition seem to 
show a negative associated with age. I took this to be a good justification for 
interpreting Parlage as tapping into ambition. I then went on to consider the literature on 
changes in ambition. The empirical literature shows that there is a generally negative 
association between age and ambition. I discussed this in terms of there being an age 
comparison on the part of those who are unsuccessful in their bid for higher office with 
those who were successful. I determined that there is evidence for this in the Australian 
federal parliament. I concluded that this gives further justification for seeing Parlage as 




Summary of Chapter 8 
In this chapter I have examined whether it is justifiable to interpret Parlage as a 
means of tapping into ambition. I began with an overview of Parlage and determined 
that it is negatively linearly associated with CM and that there is an average 5 year age 
difference in the Parlage of CMs as opposed to non-CMs. I then went on to examine the 
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relationship between age and the probability of achieving high office in a number of 
settings and found that the relationship was in general negative. I examined a number of 
reasons unrelated to ambition that could explain this and found that these explanations 
were implausible. I determined that ambition was the most plausible reason for the age 
related negative association with CM. Examining the literature I found that there is 
general agreement that age and ambition are negatively associated. In particular I found 
that there was support for the idea that the more ambitious parliamentarians enter 
parliament earlier and their ambitiousness is manifested in a more assiduous pursuit of 
promotion opportunities as they arise. I went on to look at how ambition might change 
over time. I found that in the Australian federal parliament there is evidence that after 
the late 40s a parliamentarian who has not become a CM will suffer a decline in 
ambition. I was able to link this with Parlage in that those who enter parliament at a 
later date will, by the time they have acquired sufficient experience to be appointed to 
cabinet, tend to be older than the age by which most CMs are appointed. They therefore 
lower their aspirations. I also gave two biographical examples indicating that it is 
ambition not age per se that is the important factor. Finally, I offered an explanation for 
the decline effect using the insights gained from the models developed in Chapter 3. 
In the next chapter I turn to the explanation of the final variables to be 
considered Con, Img and Def and the concept that they instantiate – concreteness.  
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Chapter 9: Abstract versus Concrete Thinking and Cabinet Selection 
 
Section 9.1: Introduction 
In the chapter on modelling I noted that there is a set of linguistic variables 
which were significantly correlated with CM. Three models had such variables. One 
model contained the variable Con (concreteness), another contained Img (Imagability) 
and another contained Def (Ease of Definition). I have pointed out that these variables 
tap into linguistic concreteness. That is, these variables measure a form of linguistic 
behaviour characterised by the use of terms that are easily representable using sensory 
images. Thus, the contention is that the less concrete the language of a parliamentarian 
the more likely she is to become a CM. I will discuss possible reasons why this 
association should exist. That is, I will examine whether concreteness is a proxy for 
some other quality that is of benefit to those aspiring to higher political office. I will 
then test for the association between concreteness and the existence of this higher order 
quality by selecting two individuals, one of whom displays high levels of concreteness 
in their first speech, the other of whom displays low levels of concreteness.  I will show 
that the two members of this dyad demonstrate cognitive differences that are plausibly 
linked to the differences in the concreteness of the language used.  
Before continuing I should point out that throughout this chapter I will use the 
terms concrete and abstract as antonyms representing the two extremes of the same 
phenomenon.  The concreteness measures I refer to represent continua so any discussion 
of concreteness is also a discussion of abstractness. It is important to make this point 
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because much of the literature phrases the debate from the point of view of abstractness 
and by making this point explicit here I should be able to avoid any ambiguity as to 
what is meant by abstractness as opposed to concreteness in the exposition. 
In the next section I will discuss what is meant by concreteness in the specific 
case of the variables in question and link this with the discussion of concreteness in the 
literature in general. 
 
Section 9.2: What is Concreteness? 
Concreteness, in linguistic terms, is the extent to which the object represented by 
a word can be represented to the senses. Thus, the word “horse” is concrete in that it is 
not difficult to conjure up a visual image of a horse. However, the word “unreality” is 
more difficult to imagine. One requires information beyond that available to the senses 
in order to conceptualise such an abstract concept.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the psycholinguistic measure of concreteness used in 
this thesis is derived from a group of 925 common nouns (Paivio, Yuille and Madigan 
1968). The measure of Concreteness (Con), which is arguably the variable that most 
directly measures the concept in question, was derived for the 925 nouns by asking 
subjects to rate each word on the basis of the question: “Any word that refers to objects, 
materials or persons should receive a high concreteness rating; any word that refers to 
an abstract concept that cannot be experienced by the senses should receive a high 
abstractness rating,…” (Paivio Yuille and Madigan 1968: 5; italics in original).  
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We can get a sense of what this represents by pointing out that the two words 
with the lowest concreteness score in the 925 word sample are “hope” and “unreality”, 
both scoring 1.18. Words with the highest score (7) are concrete objects and consist of 
such words as “accordion”, “car” and “window”. The average concreteness score in the 
925 word sample is 4.97 (sd = 1.87). Words in this range include peacemaker (4.97) and 
combustion (4.98). The average score for the parliamentary speech sample is 4.19 (sd = 
.38) indicating that the average speech uses words slightly less concrete than the 
average concreteness of the 925 noun sample.  
Other measures of concreteness have been used and are referred to in the 
literature. All tend to be related by the concept of sensory perception in that the easier 
the word is to represent to the senses, the more concrete it is. Much of the conceptual 
work on the importance of concreteness in language has been based on the Linguistic 
Category Model (Semin and Fiedler 1988). In this model, measures of concreteness – 
abstraction are based on four categories of words of ascending levels or abstraction. The 
four categories, in descending levels of concreteness, are descriptive action verbs, 
interpretative action verbs, state verbs and adjectives. Descriptive action verbs are 
words that describe a direct perceptible event such as “kicked” in ‘Mary kicked the 
ball’. Interpretative action verbs are words that go beyond description and interpret an 
event such as “helped” in ‘Mary helped the child’. State verbs describe states rather than 
events such as “loves” in ‘Mary loves john’. Adjectives describe dispositions rather than 
states such as “honest” in ‘Mary is honest’ (Maas, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin 1989: 982). 
The link between the concept of concreteness here and the general linguistic concept of 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
309 
 
concreteness is that tangible words and concepts are more concrete while the more 
interpretative words and concepts are more abstract.  
One issue we need to address is the extent to which the three variables Con, Img 
and Def are tapping into the same basic concept of concreteness. There is good evidence 
that Con and Img are closely related. Def, on the other hand, is not a direct measure of 
concreteness. Nevertheless, the connection between Def and concreteness is established. 
Reynolds and Paivio (1968, cited in Clarke and Paivio 1991: 159) found that, when 
orally defining words subjects tended to utter dysfluencies and hesitate more with 
abstract words than with concrete words.  O’Neill (1972, cited in Clarke and Paivio 
1991: 159) used a sample of 277 nouns and found that when subjects rated them on ease 
of definition the scores were correlated with scores of .70 with rated imagery and .64 
with rated concreteness. The results for the 925 sample (Clarke and Paivio 2004) are 
essentially the same. The theoretical reason for the connection between 
imagery/concreteness and the ease of definition is that there is more to determining the 
meaning of a word than verbal processes. The Dual Coding Theory (DCT) holds that 
the meaning of a word is represented in an image-based non-verbal network of 
associations as well as a verbal network (Clarke and Paivio 1991: 153).  Thus any 
attempt to define a word will involve drawing on both the verbal and non-verbal 
networks. A highly concrete word has a strong representation in the non-verbal network 
as well as the verbal network. A highly abstract word has a less rich set of semantic 
associations in the non-verbal coding system and is therefore more difficult to define.  
The predictions of DCT were substantiated in an fMRI study which found that 
the visuospatial processing regions of the brain tend to be more active when a subject is 
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reading or hearing high imagery-based sentences as opposed to low imagery based 
sentences while the semantic processing regions showed greater activation during the 
comprehension of low-imagery sentences (Just, Newman McEleny and Carpenter 2004: 
112). In short, the link between Def and concreteness is via the DCT. It is therefore 
justifiable to interpret Def as being a measure of concreteness similar to Con and Img. 
 
Summary of Section 9.2 
I have presented a discussion of concreteness both in terms of the variable Con 
and in more broad terms. Concreteness in general is related to the extent to which an 
object or concept can be represented to the senses. I then went on to a more contentious 
issue: whether Def can be considered as tapping into concreteness. On the face of it Def 
does not directly measure the extent to which an object or concept can be represented to 
the senses. However, it is clearly tapping into something closely related to concreteness. 
This is evident from the correlations between Def and the various measures of 
concreteness. Furthermore, the findings of DCT support the idea that there is likely to 
be a link between the lexical task of defining a word and the non-verbal process of 
drawing on imagery to do so.  
In the next section I will begin the analysis of the role of concreteness in the 
selection of CMs. I will begin by providing an overview of plausible explanations as to 
why concreteness might be related to the selection of CMs.  
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Section 9.3: Some Effects of Differing Levels of Abstraction 
I have found that those who use relatively abstract language are more likely to 
become CMs. My contention is that the level of abstraction of language is a marker of 
the level of abstraction of the mindset of the speaker. In this section I will provide an 
overview of the literature on abstraction and thinking style. In general, the more abstract 
and individual’s thinking , the better at generalising, planning, and making assessments 
based on the gist of a situation without her needing or wanting to know the details. In 
short, abstract thinking is associated with the kinds of skills one would expect in big 
picture thinking (Liberman and Trope 2008: 1202). Concrete thinking is associated with 
attention to fine detail, a procedural mindset and a propensity to hold off making any 
kind of judgment without a full knowledge of the facts and circumstances. Thus, 
concrete mindsets are associated with a technical way of thinking. Importantly, there are 
circumstances in which one type of thinking is better than another. Reacting to 
immediate surroundings in a crisis situation requires highly concrete thinking whereas 
planning for possible future contingencies requires abstract thinking skills. Most 
individuals tend to be able to inhabit each mindset to some extent as the circumstances 
require. The important point for the analysis of CMs is that there is a difference in the 
baseline concreteness of individuals and this has an effect on their way of looking at the 
world and interacting with it. 
In this section I will review several phenomena associated with the level of 
abstraction in an individual’s way of looking at the world. There is a vast amount of 
research on this relationship and any of the issues I have selected are indicative only of 
the scope of the field.  




Hendrick (1979) used a standard measure of abstractness orientation to divide a 
group of subjects into a high abstractness group and a high concreteness group. Given 
the same group problem-solving task, the high concrete group took almost twice as long 
as the high abstract group to complete the task. Pacini and Epstein (1999) found that 
concrete thinking underlies the ratio-bias phenomenon. This phenomenon is 
characterised by a tendency to interpret the probability of an unlikely event as being 
higher than it really is due to it being expressed in larger rather than smaller numbers. 
Thus, 10 out of 100 would be considered by a concrete thinker to be more likely than 1 
out of 10. The concrete thinker’s holistic processing strategy is to associate greater 
quantity with greater probability. The abstract thinker, on the other hand, is more likely 
to process the actual meaning of the ratios.  
The above examples show that there are advantages in abstract thinking. 
However there are also disadvantages. One such disadvantage is that abstract thinkers 
tend to be less capable of persuasion. The reason for this is that concrete words portray 
vividness and are therefore more memorable (Martindale 1986). The more concrete a 
word, the easier it is to conjure up a sense associated with a word and the greater its 
impact. Thus, the more concrete the message the more persuasive (Forgas 2007). 
However, the extent to which the persuasion is successful depends on the match 
between the imminence of the issue and the concreteness (Kim, Rao and Lee 2009). 
That is, a concrete argument is more persuasive in a decision that is closer in time while 
an abstract argument is more persuasive where there is a longer time to consider the 
issues. Thus, explaining to people why they should vote will be more persuasive when 
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the election is temporally distant but explaining how to vote is more persuasive when 
the election is temporally proximate (Kim, Rao and Lee 2009, p877). Given that there is 
a positive relationship between concreteness and persuasiveness and that there is a 
negative relationship between concreteness and CM we could infer that CMs are not 
chosen on the basis of their skills in persuasion. It is possible that it is set of some other 
skills that are associated with concreteness which CMs are chosen for. That is, there 
may be a set of cognitive characteristics that are characterised by abstract thinking and it 
is these that determine whether a parliamentarian is more likely to be a CM. I will 
examine this possibility further in the section on the psychological level of construal 
below. 
 
Summary of Section 9.3 
In this section I have presented a brief selective overview of the kinds of 
psychological phenomena associated with the level of abstraction of thinking. I 
discussed some evidence that abstract thinkers may be better at team based problem 
solving. I mentioned evidence that a common error - the ratio bias phenomenon -  may 
be due to a concrete thinking style. Finally, I looked at the relationship between 
persuasion and concreteness, concluding that concreteness is associated with 
persuasiveness. I pointed out that the negative association between CM and abstractness 
indicates that CMs may not be selected for their powers of persuasion. I concluded that 
concreteness may be a marker for some other set of characteristics that are related to the 
cognitive requirements of CMs.  
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In the next section I wish to consider is a strand of the research on abstraction 
that seems to encapsulate a broad variety of cognitive phenomena, possibly including 
the phenomena referred to in this section. I am referring here to the research on the 
psychological level of construal (Liberman and Trope 2008). This way of looking at the 
issue provides a comprehensive account of how variations in thinking abstraction can 
have a powerful influence on the way an individual perceives the world and interacts 
with it.  
 
Section 9.4: Concreteness as a Marker of the Level of Construal 
In the previous section I discussed concreteness as a phenomenon in itself. That 
is, I examined a number of phenomena that have been associated with concreteness.  
However, there is a way of conceptualising concrete thinking such that many of these 
phenomena are subsumed as well as a range of other cognitive phenomena. I am 
referring here to the idea that the level of abstraction in language may be a marker for 
the extent to which the speaker is focused on the proximal rather than the distal.  The 
“psychological level of construal” (PLC) indicates the extent to which an individual 
uses concepts and ideas that are proximal rather than distal in physical, psychological, 
temporal and social senses. Individuals who conceptualise the world in terms of the 
here-and-now have a low PLC while those whose focus is on distant times, places and 
people have a high PLC (Liberman and Trope 2008). The importance of this in the 
current discussion is that, given there is a strong relationship between concreteness and 
the PLC, the indication is that CMs, with low levels of concreteness, have a high level 
of PLC in comparison with the more concrete non-CMs. 
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The importance of the level of construal on influencing an individual’s world 
outlook is illustrated by Liberman and Trope in the following words: 
“Human history is associated with expanding horizons—
traversing greater spatial distances (e.g., discovering new 
continents, space travel); forming larger social groups (families 
versus cities versus states versus global institutions); planning 
and investing in the more distant future; and reaching farther 
back into the past. Human development in the first years of life 
involves acquiring the ability to plan for the more distant future, 
to consider possibilities that are not present, and to consider the 
perspective of more distant people…” (Liberman and Trope 
2008, p1202). 
 
There has been some research on PLC and political leaders. A relationship 
between level of construal and charisma was identified  by Shamir, Arthur, and House 
(1994) who found that those leaders who were considered more charismatic tended to 
have more distal than proximate goals in their speeches.  
A higher level of temporal construal – that is, a greater temporal distance - tends 
to influence an individual’s emphasis of ends versus means. In a study by Day and 
Bartels (2008, cited in Trope, Liberman and Wakslak, 2007, p85), participants were 
asked to judge the similarity of such activities as “going to the dentist”, “getting a 
tattoo”, and “joining a health club”. When described in the distant future, the first and 
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the third were found to be more similar in that they were both good for the health. That 
is, the ends were emphasised. When described in the very near future the first and the 
second were found to be more similar as they both involved sitting in a chair. That is, 
the means were emphasised.   
Similarly, greater temporal distance will tend to lead to people using traits to 
characterise behavior rather than situational constraints (Nussbaum, Tope and Liberman 
2003 cited in Trope Liberman and Wakslak, 2007). Thus, where the priming story 
involves a man who is described as temporarily upset (a situational constraint) and who 
deals with it by getting drunk, subjects will be more likely to judge the fact that he 
resorted to alcohol as evidence that he was temporarily upset. However, where the same 
event is set in the temporally distal future (one year hence) subjects are more likely to 
attribute the resorting to alcohol as indicative of an underlying propensity to drink. In 
short, the greater the temporal distance, the more likely subjects will attribute behaviour 
to general dispositions rather than context-based reactions to immediate stimuli. 
The importance of the PLC to the current issue is that it seems likely that the 
base level of construal differs among individuals and those who become CMs may have 
a more distal level of construal. Concreteness is associated with a proximate level of 
construal: as the level of construal becomes more distal the details become more 
abstract and general (Liberman and Trope 2008, p1203). The implication is therefore 
that CMs have a higher psychological level of construal. 
Before I continue with this discussion it is important to point out that much of 
the research in this area has been based on studies of state rather than trait. That is, 
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experiments have in general involved manipulating the level of construal by changing 
such things as the future versus present orientation of priming questions. In the 
parliamentary speech sample it is more likely we are tapping trait characteristics than 
state characteristics as the state of the individuals is largely controlled in that the maiden 
speeches are given in very similar circumstances. Thus, I am claiming that those 
individuals who are initially elected to federal Parliament are likely to reveal their trait 
level of construal in the controlled conditions of delivering a first speech. I am 
implicitly assuming that individuals differ in their baseline PLC and that the model has 
picked up a relationship between the level of construal and the probability of becoming 
a CM. This is in contrast to much of the literature on the PLC in which it is the state that 
is manipulated. However, there is no reason to think that the observations made in 
relation to the state might not be extrapolated to trait level.  
Why should a high PLC be beneficial to a potential CM? Trope and Liberman 
point out that “[t]he use of high-level, abstract construals to represent psychologically 
distal objects is…[]…indispensable for effective functioning in many domains: for 
developing object constancy, orienting in space, planning the future, learning from the 
past, relating to and understanding other people, and for considering alternative 
outcomes and courses of action” (Trope and Liberman 2010, p441). 
One advantage of a higher PLC significantly pertinent to political office is that it 
can give rise to a broader search for alternative solutions. The reason for this is that it 
enables a comparison of alternatives that are not strictly “alignable’ (Malkoc, 
Zauberman, and Ulu, 2005, cited in Trope and Liberman 2010, p453). Objects are 
alignable if they share concrete attributes. Thus, the selection of one residential 
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apartment compared to another could be based on similar concrete attributes such as 
price, location and size. Even at a low level of construal this can be done with ease as 
the trade-off requires a simple comparison of the concrete variables. However, moving 
to a house is not strictly alignable with selecting an apartment because there are 
different concrete attributes associated with each alternative. This means that that it 
requires a higher level of construal to compare living in a house with living in an 
apartment. In order to compare these two alternatives an individual must be able to 
make an abstract comparison of qualities that are not commensurable. For example, 
being close to the city in an apartment is not directly comparable to living in a house 
which has the benefit of having a garden. The overall satisfaction of both these options 
cannot be measured on the same terms as is possible when measuring a single concrete 
variable such as price. The point of this is that individuals with a trait of low level of 
construal will tend to stick to options that are comparable on concrete variables and will 
not bother to countenance options beyond easily comparable options. However, 
individuals with a higher level of construal are more likely to be able to countenance a 
greater number of possible alternatives because they are willing to make the abstract 
jump and compare alternatives on criteria that are not commensurable. Malkoc, 
Zauberman, and Ulu (2005, cited in Trope and Liberman 2010: 453) tested this idea 
using perceptions of the quality of potato chips which were to be given out at either the 
end of the session (temporally proximal – low level construal) or at the end of a six 
month period (temporally distal – high level construal). The two brands had 12 
attributes, 4 of which were common between the two brands, 4 of which were alignable 
attributes, and 4 of which were non-alignable attributes.  As predicted by the theory, in 
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the more temporally distal condition, more weight was given to non-alignable qualities 
than in the temporally proximal condition.  
The importance of this is that an individual with a higher base PLC is likely to 
come up with a greater number of possibilities. In a political party it can be seen that 
those in senior positions would need to have this ability. The ministers need to be able 
to weigh up a number of different solutions presented to him. Those who can weigh up 
many different alternative solutions to problems will be more likely to decide on a 
solution that is optimal and would have a greater ability of coming up with solutions 
that more people agree with than an individual without this ability. The latter will be 
able to consider fewer possibilities because he is restricted to solutions that have 
alignable qualities.  
Another characteristic that varies according to the PLC is the extent to which 
individuals are willing to mitigate their own ideological positions, with higher levels of 
construal being associated with lower mitigation. Those who mitigate their ideological 
outlook can be seen to have deserted their ideals and this reflects negatively on them as 
potential leaders. This idea was tested by priming individuals with a proximal cue to see 
if they are more likely to consider short term deviations from their long term ideological 
position (Ledgerwood et al 2008, cited in Trope and Liberman 2010: 544). In this study 
subjects were initially assessed on an ideological scale in order to determine their likely 
support for a policy on immigration, the assumption being that conservatives were less 
likely than liberals to support immigration. Subjects then read about the policy and were 
told it was due to be implemented next week/next year. They also had a discussion 
partner who expressed agreement/disagreement with the policy. Subjects then reported 
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their voting intention privately. The finding was that the subject’s voting intention 
deviated from their ideological position and toward their discussion partner’s to a 
greater extent when the policy was due to be implemented in the near future as opposed 
to the distant future. When the policy was due to be implemented in the distant future 
subjects’ voting intentions were less swayed by interaction with the discussion partner 
and the subject’s voting intention was influenced more by their ideological position.  A 
plausible implication of this is that those with a higher base PLC will be less likely to 
compromise their long term ideological position.  
This is likely to be seen to be a strongly positive characteristic. Those who do 
compromise their position are likely to weaken their standing in the eyes of their 
colleagues. A good example of this is Costello’s reaction to Hewson’s decision to tone 
down the LNPC’s economic policy after the party lost the election in 1993, the 
ostensible reason for the toning down being that the public did not like the policy: 
The worst thing a conviction politician can do is give up his 
convictions. After the 1993 election defeat Hewson announced 
he was no longer in favour of a GST. This damaged his one 
great strength: his economic credibility. He gave away his chief 
equity. He had always said that the Fightback! Program was 
necessary for the economy and he would not compromise on it. 
His appeal had been: ‘I’m the tough economic leader for these 
tough economic times. I have the tough – but right –economic 
program.’ He now saw that Fightback! was not necessary after 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
321 
 
all and he dumped it. He abandoned his whole raison d’etre. He 
could not remake himself as a populist (Costello 2008, p58-9).   
Thus, a parliamentarian who has a high PLC will tend to be seen as less likely to 
sacrifice their “ raison d’etre”. It should be noted that this can lead, in extreme cases, to 
intransigence which can be a negative aspect of the high level of construal. However, 
the point is that in the eyes of the selectors, being willing to “flip-flop” may be seen as a 
greater sin than intransigence. 
 
Summary of Section 9.4 
It is the contention of this section that the measure of concreteness that 
distinguishes CMs and non-CMs may be tapping into differences in PLC. A higher PLC 
has been shown to be associated with a range of habits of mind that are likely to be 
associated with the kinds of phenomena that distinguish CMs from non-CMs. The 
general picture is that those with a high PLC are more likely to engage in long term 
planning and will tend to have a better idea of the “big picture” than those with a lower 
PLC. Having pointed out these general benefits associated with a higher PLC I 
discussed two specific benefits that are likely to be associated with accession to cabinet: 
those with a higher PLC are better able to develop alternative strategies in problem 
solving scenarios; furthermore, those who have a higher PLC are more likely to have 
more stable overarching perceptions of the “big picture” and are therefore less likely to 
deviate from their long term ideological position. This means that they maintain their 
credibility. 
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In order to examine the idea that CMs have higher PLCs than non-CMs I will 
examine the speeches of two individuals with vastly different measures of concreteness. 
I will show in the next section that the PLC explanation is plausible given the 
differences in the ways of thinking exhibited by the two individuals concerned. 
  
Section 9.5: Case Studies from the Speech Sample 
In this section I intend to look for evidence of variations in the PLC of two 
parliamentarians who differ in their scores on concreteness. The argument here is that, 
given the relationship between concreteness and the PLC I discussed in the previous 
section, if the variables Con, Img and Def are measuring concreteness, then those who 
score high on these variables should demonstrate a low level of PLC while those that 
score low on these variables should score high on PLC.   
To create a dyad I added together the scores for Con, Img and Def (CID) to get a 
single index. I then ordered the whole sample (n = 134) on the basis of this index. The 
dyad consists of the highest scorer De-Anne Kelly (z score =  2.68) and the lowest 
scorer Simon Crean (z score = 2). As these parliamentarians are 4.68 standard 
deviations apart on the variables I have associated with concreteness then, according to 
the PLC theory, we should see differences in their PLC with Crean demonstrating a 
higher PLC and Kelly demonstrating a lower PLC. I will attempt to determine their 
differing perceptions by examining their first speeches.  
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De-Ann Kelly’s Speech 
Kelly’s speech displays a number of characteristics of low PLC. In particular 
this is demonstrated by a high level of self-references and the lack of an over-arching 
set of ideas tying together her observations. 
A good indicator of the level of psychological construal of individuals is the 
extent to which they are self-focused: 
Psychological distance is egocentric: Its reference point 
is the self in the here and now, and the different ways in which 
an object might be removed from that point—in time, in space, 
in social distance, and in hypotheticality—constitute different 
distance dimensions. Transcending the self in the here and now 
entails mental construal, and the farther removed an object is 
from direct experience, the higher (more abstract) the level of 
construal of that object (Trope and Liberman 2010, p440). 
 
A good proxy for the level of self-focus is the extent to which an individual self-
refers. This can be examined using the LIWC “I” variable which measures the rate of 
use of the words “I”, “me”, “mine”, “my” and “myself”. The “I” use in the speech 
sample (n = 134) is positively correlated with the concreteness (Con) of speeches (r = 
.29, p <.01). This is an important observation because it underscores the extent to which 
a concrete mindset tends to focus the individual on the immediate present. There is 
nothing more present to the individual than the self and as such those who tend to be 
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concrete thinkers tend to focus on themselves and those in their immediate 
surroundings. The upshot of this is that concrete thinkers tend to miss the big picture. 
A salient aspect of Kelly’s speech is the relatively high number of uses of “I” 
terms: the z score for Kelly’s “I” use is 1.77 (q = .038) indicating that she is in the top 
4% for “I” use.1 This is the first indication that she is likely to have a low level of 
construal. She is likely to be focused on herself and her immediate environment. By 
definition this means that she is less focused on the big picture.  
The relative lack of awareness of the big picture in the case of Kelly is evident in 
that she tends to base most of her thinking around her electorate. While this is an 
admirable quality for a parliamentarian it is not for a CM. A CM needs to see that the 
factors affecting their own electorate are likely to be part of a complex interaction of 
factors and that general nationally based policy prescriptions may be preferable to 
thinking at the local level. Let us consider the following extract: 
I would like to pause for a moment and tell you some of 
the difficulties that face the industries in [the electorate of] 
Dawson. Our beef industry has now seen a dramatic fall in 
prices of 20 per cent. Soon that will be 30 per cent. I am also 
concerned about access for tourists to the mighty Whitsundays. 
If you have not had a holiday in North Queensland, do yourself 
a favour and come to the Whitsunday [islands]. It is absolutely 
                                                 
1
 The measure used here is q rather than p because we wish to derive the probability that the 
observed z-score deviates from average by chance alone. This is equivalent to a one tailed t-test. The use 
of a one tailed test is appropriate given that we are looking for a difference in one direction. The 
hypothesis is that those with a low levels of PLC use are likely to have a score on ‘I’ use significantly 
above the mean. 
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magnificent there. But we have a difficulty because [tourists on 
the islands] do not have access to the tourist areas in Dawson. 
That is something that I have pledged to rectify while I am the 
federal member (Australia, House of Representatives, Debates 
1996: 193).   
This extract indicates that Kelly is certainly aware of the issues in her own 
electorate. However, it is interesting to note that, given that Australian beef is sold on 
the international market, she sees the fall in beef prices as being a problem in her 
electorate rather than as a national problem. Furthermore, her concern for the local 
tourism industry, again admirable, is centred on a highly local and specific problem. A 
more global approach might be to derive policies that increase tourism in general and 
this could conceivably lead to benefits at both the national and local level.  
Another interesting observation about the above extract is that Kelly mentions 
several problems fleetingly without an overarching vision or comprehensive approach to 
addressing problems. There are several ways of connecting beef prices and tourism. 
Both, for example, are related to the strength of the Australian dollar. But Kelly does 
not try to make connections. Instead, she lists issues that are connected with her local 
concerns. In the paragraph following the one quoted she engages in the same listing 
process with the lack of water storage and the “over-analysis” of the sugar industry by 
bureaucrats, devoting one sentence to the former and three to the latter. Both of these 
are certainly significant local concerns but their cursory treatment suggests a lack of 
global thinking. Kelly’s approach to her vision for the nation takes a similar form:  
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I would now like to mention a little about my view of 
how you do not build a nation and then what I believe does need 
to be done. You cannot build a nation by dividing its people 
with special privileges. You cannot build a nation by pitting the 
weak against the strong. Competition is sometimes exploitation. 
You cannot pit the metropolitan city against the regional centre 
or the country town. You cannot pit the chain store against the 
corner store. You cannot pit the international commodity traders 
against the small family farmer. You cannot build a nation by 
substituting the disorderly love and discipline of family life for 
the cold, structured care of the state. You cannot build a nation 
by substituting kindness and respect for life with the sterile 
computer-generated use-by date for human life (Australia, 
House of Representatives, Debates 1996: 194-5). 
This sequential, fluid enumeration of contextualised, detailed, local, unstructured 
observations is archetypically low level construal (Trope, Liberman and Wakslak 2007, 
p83).  
So far I have pointed out that Kelly exemplifies a low level construal in that she 
lacks an overarching vision. However, it should be noted that there are places in her 
speech where Kelly does make more abstract, general and national statements. For 
example: 
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The national interest is what we should be concerning 
ourselves with, because the nation is not just a public, which is 
those who are living now. A nation is those who have defended 
and worked for our great country. It is those who are yet unborn. 
A nation is a contract between past, present and future 
Australians (Australia, House of Representatives, Debates 1996: 
194). 
Here the concerns are national rather than local and relatively abstract in that, 
echoing Burke’s idea of society being a contract between the living, dead and unborn 
(Burke 2001: 143), she sees the nation as a set of relationships. In another paragraph 
Kelly refers to the temporally distal future and asks what the nation will be like in years 
to come. However, the important point is that the vast majority of her speech is local, 
contextualised and contains details but little global thought connecting the details.  
 
Simon Crean’s Speech 
Kelly’s speech is in stark contrast to that of Simon Crean, the parliamentarian 
with the lowest score on the Con, Img Def (CID) index in the sample. Crean shows an 
outward orientation away from narrow concerns and towards the bigger picture of the 
national stage. He also has a coherent overarching vision. Both of these characteristics 
are typical of a higher level of construal.  
As we would expect from a low scorer on concreteness, Crean uses “I” terms 
less than Kelly: his z score on this variable is .14 which is not significantly different 
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from average. His orientation is outward rather than inward: he mentions his electorate 
by name only 8 times in comparison to Kelly’s 19 times.  
One of the most significant differences between the speeches of Kelly and Crean 
is that, as mentioned above, Kelly tends to provide lists of desirable features of a 
political and social system while Crean, on the other hand, explains what he thinks 
needs to be done. While Kelly’s unstructured listing lacks an overarching concept 
linking them together, Crean provides a linked set of ideas based on the role of the trade 
union movement: 
A strong proactive and independent trade union movement is a 
bellwether of a strong democracy. In these dramatic and historic 
times, as we observe with humility and intense admiration the 
efforts of the men and women of the countries of eastern Europe 
to seize their destinies and overturn totalitarianism in favour of 
democracy, it is no mere detail or unintended consequence that 
those people are establishing free trade unions as an initial 
step…[T]he trade union movement is nothing at all if not 
concerned with the promotion and protection of individual rights 
and freedoms. This is the very bedrock principle of trade 
unionism. It is the essence of naivety to ignore the fact that in a 
democracy it is through collective means that such rights and 
freedoms are protected. Without the capacity for collective 
action in its democratic forms, whether through trade union 
organisation or indeed the Parliament, then individual rights are 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
329 
 
at risk and the aspirations of individuals will remain unfulfilled 
(Australia, House of Representatives, Debates 1990: 747). 
This is a cohesive statement rather than an unstructured list. Here and throughout his 
speech, Crean uses the idea that the trade union movement can perform a number of 
roles associated with democratic and social goals to tie together his ideas.  Kelly 
changes the subject under discussion almost every paragraph but there is no unifying 
idea to tie the disparate ideas together while Crean has an overarching notion that the 
trade union movement can be used as a unifying principle in tying together the disparate 
issues that he mentions. This is typical of a high level of construal:  
“[h]igh level construals entail constructing abstract 
conceptualizations of information about objects and events. 
They apply to a broad array of examples and selectively include 
relevant and exclude irrelevant features of those objects and 
events. High-level construals, therefore, capture the 
superordinate, central features of an object or event, and 
abstracting these high-level, immutable features conveys the 
general meaning of the event. Low-level construals, 
alternatively, consist of subordinate, incidental features. In low-
level construals, events and objects are unique and specific” 
(Fujita et al 2006, p5).  
 




The two case studies presented above indicate that there is a specific set of 
intellectual habits associated with concrete versus abstract thinking. The low level of 
construal of Kelly is exemplified by the extent to which her ambit of reference is based 
around herself while Crean’s high level of construal is demonstrated by the extent to 
which he is outwardly focused. Furthermore, the low level construal of Kelly is 
demonstrated by the lack of an overarching set of ideas that tie together her perceptions 
while Crean’s high level of construal is demonstrated by the extent to which he connects 
individual observations to the “bigger picture”. 
Let us now consider a hypothetical discussion between two senior party 
members as to whom a CM position should be allocated. There are two candidates. One 
is like Kelley with local, unstructured views on policy while the other is like Crean with 
an outward orientation and a coherent set of ideas underlying his policy prescriptions. It 
seems clear that individuals wishing to maximise the political talent in cabinet would do 
better to appoint an individual such as Crean rather than Kelly. This is, in effect what 
did occur, with Crean being appointed to the junior ministry on his arrival in the HOR 
in 1990 and appointed to cabinet 14 months later. He remained in cabinet until the 
Labor party lost power in 1996. He was then re-appointed to cabinet when the Labor 
party regained power in 2007 and remains there at the time of writing (December 2011). 
Kelly, on the other hand held the role of parliamentary secretary in the Howard 
government (1996-2007) from October 2003 until October 2004 when she was 
appointed to a junior ministerial role. In September 2006 she was demoted to 
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parliamentary secretary, a position she held until the end of the Howard government in 
November 2007.  
There are a number of characteristics we usually associate with leadership, such 
as having a “vision” of the future rather than being concerned with merely day-to-day 
issues. It seems that the selectors in the case of Kelly and Crean were likely to have 
perceived that Kelly did not have the required abilities while Crean did. Their respective 
abilities are revealed in their speeches and it is highly plausible that their way of seeing 
the world became apparent to the selectors in their respective parties. Crean with his 
high PLC was deemed to be leadership material while Kelly, with her low level of 
psychological construal was not. 
 
Summary of Section 9.5 
The starting point of this section is the idea that we can use concreteness, as 
measured by the PYMCP word norms, to tap into the PLC of parliamentarians. This is 
very plausible given that the PLC is strongly linked to the level of concreteness of 
thinking: those with a low PLC tend to have a concrete way of thinking such that the 
immediate environment is emphasised while the reverse is the case for those with a high 
PLC. Thus, two individuals with opposing levels of concreteness should demonstrate 
opposing levels of psychological level of construal. Using the two most extreme cases 
in the sample I have compared the most concrete Kelly with the least concrete Crean. 
Two salient aspects emerge from this comparison. Kelly has a highly proximal focus 
and lacks an overarching set of ideas while Crean has a distal focus and has a well 
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developed sense of the “big picture”. Thus, there is support for the ideas that the three 
variables Con, Img and Def tap into concreteness and for the idea that concreteness is 
negatively associated with CM because concreteness is associated with PLC. Having 
made these observations I went on to suggest that the selectors would be likely to 
perceive this difference in world view in their day to day dealings with the two 
individuals involved. I pointed out that the high level of construal of Crean gave him a 
way of looking at the world that marked him as being able to see the world as a CM 
should while Kelly’s low level of construal marked her as a non-CM.  
 
Chapter 9 Summary and Conclusion 
In this Chapter I have discussed the notion of concreteness and the way it relates 
to the selection of CMs. I began by pointing out that there is a negative association 
between CM and concreteness. I then surveyed some of the general research on the 
relationship between concreteness and thinking styles. I pointed out that there is 
research linking abstract thinking with the ability to solve management problems in a 
team. I also looked at research linking abstract thinking with the ability to process 
abstract concepts as opposed to concrete thinking which relies on holistic processes. I 
further linked this with the idea that abstract thinkers are less likely to fall foul of the 
ratio bias phenomenon. I also looked briefly at the relationship between concreteness 
and persuasion commenting on the fact that persuasion and concreteness are positively 
linked. I made the point that, as concreteness and becoming a cabinet minister are 
negatively linked it was very likely that CMs are not chosen on the basis of their 
persuasion skills. This led to the idea that concreteness may be a marker for a set of 
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cognitive skills. In other words, it may be that the low level of concreteness of CMs is 
associated with a set of cognitive skills and it is these that CMs are selected for. This led 
to a discussion of the psychological level of construal. Those with a high PLC are more 
likely to think in global, distal and general terms. Their way of perceiving the world is 
abstract rather than concrete. As such their language is relatively abstract. I contended 
that this is what is tapped into with the scores on concreteness as measured by Con, Img 
and Def. I examined this idea by looking at two individuals who score at opposite ends 
of the spectrum on and index made of these measures. As expected, Kelly, with her high 
score on concreteness demonstrated a lower level of construal while Crean, with his low 
score demonstrated a high level of psychological construal. As those habits of mind 
associated with a high level of CM are those that we would normally associate with the 
ability to function as a leader it seems apt that Crean was selected for a CM role while 
Kelly was not.  
Thus, in this chapter I have developed a plausible explanation as to why Con 
Img and Def are related to being appointed as a CM. These variables tap into the 
psychological level of construal via concreteness. These variables are therefore markers 
for those characteristics we would normally associated with the ability to plan, assess 
individuals and subordinates, make global judgments and assess information in a global 
way. 
I have now explained how the three characteristics identified as associated with 
CM appointment, Law, Parlage, and the three measures of concreteness, are likely to be 
linked to CM appoitment. I have therefore fulfilled the second research question of the 
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thesis. In the next Chapter I will summarise the findings, suggest some applications and 
point out some possibilities for future research. 
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Chapter 10: Thesis Summary and Conclusion 
 
Section 10.1: Introduction 
In this thesis I have examined two related questions. This first is the question of 
who is likely to become a CM in the Australian federal Parliament. The second is the 
question of why those who become CMs are successful. In other words, I have isolated 
a set of characteristics of those who become CMs and I have explained why these 
characteristics are efficacious in assisting a parliamentarian to become a CM. In this 
chapter I intend to recapitulate the main findings of the thesis and to make some general 
observations on the findings as well as to suggest how these findings might inform 
future related research. 
 
Section 10.2: Thesis Summary 
I began my analysis in Chapter 2 where I surveyed the general threads in the 
literature on ministerial selection in parliamentary systems, with particular emphasis on 
the Australian and UK parliaments. The general trend, in both the qualitative and the 
quantitative literature is that there are two general sets of factors that are used to analyse 
why certain individuals become ministers. The first set of factors can be described as 
representational and institutional factors (RIFs). These are factors that the selectors take 
into account when deciding how representational the cabinet should be in relation to the 
various interests that need to be represented as well as taking into account any 
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institutional constraints. In general these are not peculiar to the individual in that 
numerous individuals might instantiate any particular representational factor. The RIFs 
usually cited as being important in the Australian literature are gender, geographical 
area represented, house (upper or lower), party (if in LNPC), and faction (in the ALP). 
Two other factors that can be considered representational are age and experience. 
However, these are often “represented” in cabinet differently than the representation in 
parliament.  The second set of factors can be considered to be personal factors. These 
factors enter into the ministerial selection calculus in a different way to the RIFs in that 
the selectorate looks for these characteristics to judge whether the individual in question 
has the appropriate characteristics to be a CM. Such factors cited in the literature 
include education, loyalty to the party or leader and parliamentary performance. It has 
been suggested that electoral performance is also an individual factor in that individuals 
with the ability to engender electoral success demonstrate a valuable political skill.  
In chapter 3 I attempted to examine the validity of the claims that RIFs are 
important in the Australian Federal context. I began the chapter by considering the 
public debate and found that there is significant support in the mainstream press for the 
idea that a particular set of RIFs is important in the selection of CMs. These are gender, 
state/territory represented, party (only an issue in the LNPC in which members are 
drawn from the two constituent parties), faction (only an issue in the ALP where CMs 
are drawn from three basic factional groupings), house (HOR or Senate), age and 
parliamentary experience. In order determine whether these factors influence an 
individual parliamentarian’s probability of being selected to be a CM I modelled the 
CM selection process for the LNPC in government (1996-2007) and the ALP in 
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opposition (2005-6) using these RIFs as independent variables. In the case of the LNPC 
I found that age and experience and some states are statistically significant but overall 
the variables did not greatly contribute to classification accuracy. In the case of the ALP 
I found that experience is statistically significant as well as some states but the ALP 
models in general, as with the LNPC models, performed poorly on actual classification 
accuracy. The important finding was that the models with RIFs could explain only a 
very small proportion of cabinet appointments. This is despite the fact that an enormous 
amount of effort is expended by party leaders to ensure representational balance in 
regard to most of these factors. I was able to explain this apparent paradox by pointing 
out that RIFs, other than age and experience and a small number of states, have no 
statistical influence on the probability of an individual being selected because the leader 
is under pressure to make the cabinet representative and thus has little leeway to bias the 
cabinet towards or away from the parliamentary representation of interests. Where the 
leader does not make the cabinet representative there is a statistical 
advantage/disadvantage for an individual who instantiates a representational factor 
which the leader over-represents/underrepresents. 
Having found that the RIFs explain only a small proportion of appointments I 
turned in Chapter 4 to an analysis of the more personal factors. I decided to use 
education and speech as a way to do this because these are very personal markers of 
personality and cognitive characteristics. I also included 3 biographical variables in the 
analysis. For the education variables I coded for 6 categories that represented the vast 
majority of qualifications in parliament. For the speech analysis I chose to use the first 
or maiden speech in federal parliament because this is delivered in a controlled situation 
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for all members and therefore provides a relatively comparable speech sample. I 
surveyed a number of text analysis methods and chose to use LIWC because it has been 
shown to be effective in psychological applications. I also used the PYMCP word 
norms to score the speeches as these psycholinguistic variables tap into the way 
individuals process information. 
Having explained the reasons for the selection of various independent variables 
in Chapter 4 I turned to the issue of the modelling method in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 5 was devoted to the exposition of how I would use data mining rather 
than traditional hypothesis testing to analyse the data. I explained why hypothesis 
testing was not appropriate in the specific circumstances of the problem. In particular I 
pointed out that there is a lack of consistent theory in the leadership literature from 
which to derive hypotheses. I then explained that if we were to try to derive theoretical 
reasons for why particular variables were related to the dependent variable we might, 
paradoxically, find that there was a statistically significant relationship but that the 
relationship was not strong enough to add discriminatory power to the model. I 
therefore advocated the use of data mining. The impetus for this decision was that the 
selection of variables would be based on their potential discriminatory power rather than 
on some a priori assumption. Furthermore, if conducted rigorously, the data mining 
method is more likely to be able to identify the important variables because so many 
variables are considered. I then went on to discuss several issues associated with data 
mining. I pointed out that the “committee” classifier was appropriate given the problems 
associated with using a single model with a single holdout sample. The committee 
method involved creating five models using five different training and testing groups. 
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Each model was slightly different but was independently efficient at classifying a 
random holdout group. The results for each model are averaged and the results of the 
committee of models is more likely to be accurate than any individual model. The 
interpretation of the models involves looking at all the variables in the five constituent 
models. For each individual model the same creation process was used. I discussed how 
feature selection would need to be done in such a way as to identify the best possible 
predictors. I decided on the use of t-tests for the initial screening and used tests for 
redundancy to reduce the number of variables in the models created. I then discussed 
validation of the model, pointing out that the ultimate measure of accuracy is the 
classification accuracy and this necessitates testing on holdout samples. I explained how 
the data was to be divided into training and testing sets for this purpose. Central to using 
classification accuracy as a criterion for assessing models is the discussion of how 
classification accuracy is to be measured and for this purpose I discussed the use of 
accuracy, sensitivity, specificity and kappa. Finally, I discussed the issue of how to 
interpret the models created using the selected variables. I explained that logistic 
regression would provide a relatively transparent view of the important variables in the 
models.  
In Chapter 6 I described the actual model creation process. I defined the cohort 
as those parliamentarians in parliament at any time between April 1996 and February 
2008.  I defined the dependent variable as a binary consisting of a coding of 1 if the 
individual was appointed to cabinet at some time in their career and 0 if not. 
Importantly, the definition of a non-CM is dependent on us being able to observe the 
entire career of the non-CM so those whose careers had not ended at February 2008 
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were removed from the sample. Furthermore, those BBs who did not have sufficient in-
government experience (8.5years) to reveal their executive potential were removed from 
the sample. The independent variables consisted of 6 binary educational variables, two 
binary biographical variables, one continuous biographical variable and 100 continuous 
linguistic variables derived from the parliamentarians’ first speeches. I then created five 
different models. For each model, the creation process involved the reduction of this 
large set of variables into a small subset of “interesting” variables. Using t-tests I 
identified variables significant at the p<.01 level. These were used to create a naïve 
model. By looking at inter-correlations it was found that the linguistic variables were 
more correlated with each other than with CM so I removed the redundant variables. 
The variables in the reduced model were then used to create a number of simpler 
models based on all possible combinations of the variables in the reduced model. I used 
the holdout sample to test each of these models. The best ‘optimum’ model that was 
created using this method was used as a member of a committee of models. Using five 
models created using the same process I created a five member committee of models 
and determined that the characteristics associated with CM are Law (positively), Parlage 
(negatively) and the use of concrete language (negatively). I had therefore isolated the 
characteristics associated with CM. The next stage in the process was to explain why 
these might be associated with CM. 
In Chapter 7 I began explaining why having a legal qualification should be 
associated with CM. There is a perception in the popular press that the two are related 
and I gave an example of how O’Dwyer (1998; 2003) made the observation that lawyers 
tend to have skills that could be useful in parliament. I also noted his impression that 
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Howard may have chosen legally trained individuals preferentially. In order to examine 
whether similarity bias was behind the selection of LTIs I conducted t-tests for the 
difference of means as between the legally trained and the non-legally trained leaders to 
see whether the former preferentially chose LTIs to be CMs. I found no evidence for 
this across the sample.  The next stage in the analysis was to look at the US research on 
the relationship between legal training and high political office. The main findings are 
that there are technical benefits associated with legal training and that these benefits 
assist in the legislator’s rise though the legislature. There was also some indication that 
legally trained individuals are more likely to perceive their roles less in terms of 
representing their constituents and that this gives them a different outlook compared to 
the non-legally trained. However, this evidence was equivocal and furthermore, this 
principal-agent explanation could equally apply to other professions. I then looked at 
the concept of “chunking” in relation to legal training on the ground that there may be a 
method of summarising information that is taught to law students that gives them an 
advantage. The “case brief” was found to facilitate this procedure. However, there is 
evidence that all experts use a similar method of solving complex problems so I argued 
that this was not a good explanation. My final step was to look at the empirical studies 
on the differences between those with legal training and those without. I found that 
there is good evidence that the legally trained differ from the non-legally trained in that 
they are more likely to use counterfactual reasoning and are less likely to be adept in 
probabilistic thinking than the non-legally trained. I argued that these two cognitive 
habits would be potentially of benefit to a parliamentarian. Counter factual thinking was 
found to be beneficial in stimulating the creative production of ideas while a non-
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probabilistic cognitive orientation is of benefit to a parliamentarian because it allows 
them to communicate in a non-ambiguous way.   
In Chapter 8 I addressed the negative relationship between Parlage and CM. I 
explained this in terms of ambition. An individual who enters parliament at a young age 
can be seen to be more politically ambitious than an individual who enters at a later age. 
This ambitiousness is manifested in a greater assiduousness in taking opportunities as 
they arise. I also examined ambition in terms of the phenomenon of the decline in 
ambition that seems to take place in a number of forums. The idea here is that 
individuals who do not achieve their goals by the average age at which such goals are 
usually achieved tend to lower their aspirations. I explained how this force may be at 
work in the Australian system such that an individual who enters parliament after the 
age of 38 is more likely to lower their aspirations by the age of 47 if they have not been 
appointed to cabinet given that this is the average age at which CMs are appointed and 
that there is an average 9 year “waiting period” for a cabinet appointment. 
Parliamentarians who enter before the age of 38 are less likely to lower their aspirations 
after the expiration of the “waiting period” because, on average , they will not have 
reached the age of 47. I also addressed the reason why there should be a negative 
relationship between age and appointment to higher political office. This is a motif in 
the political literature. I looked at a number of possible explanations for this including 
the idea that cognitive abilities decline and that testosterone declines. I did not consider 
these types of argument convincing because the pattern of change in the chances of 
promotion is quite different from the changes that take place in cognitive ability and 
testosterone as an individual ages. The most convincing argument is that it is ambition 
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that declines and this has an effect on the probability of appointment after the middle of 
the fifth decade.  
In Chapter 9 I addressed the negative association between concrete language use 
and CM. I determined that the three variables isolated in the model building procedure 
were likely to be measuring concreteness of language or something very similar. I then 
went on to consider some of the literature on the influence of differing levels of 
concreteness on cognitive phenomena. I found that the literature supports the idea of a 
link. In particular, abstract thinking is related to a greater ability to solve team-based 
problems. Concrete thinking is also possibly behind the ratio-bias phenomenon. Finally, 
concrete language is more persuasive than abstract language. Thus, there is likely to be 
a set of cognitive habits which are positively associated with abstractness and which 
account for the appointment to cabinet of CMs. In order to explore this possibility I 
turned to the research on the psychological level of construal. This theoretical 
framework links abstract thought with the extent to which an individual has a focus on 
the distal rather than the proximate. I gave examples of how those with a distal level of 
construal would be at an advantage in being able to assess differing alternatives that had 
non-alignable factors while those with a more concrete level of construal would have 
difficulty doing so. Finally, I looked at how those with an abstract mindset may be more 
likely to stick to their long term ideological outlook than those with a short-term 
mindset. I argued that those with a concrete mindset are more likely to depart from their 
stated ideological stance and this is detrimental in political circles as it demonstrates 
that such individuals may be unreliable in their commitment to their ideology. In the 
final section of Chapter 9 I compared the highest scorer on concreteness in the sample 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
344 
 
with the lowest scorer on the assumption that these two individuals would differ also in 
terms of their PLC. This assumption was borne out in that De-Anne Kelly, the highest 
scorer on a composite measure of concreteness (Con, Img and Def), had the 
characteristics of low level construal such as a focus on herself and her electorate and 
she lacked an overarching set of ideas tying her observations together. The lowest scorer 
on concreteness (Simon Crean) exhibited the opposite. His high PLC was evidence by a 
high degree of outward orientation and a coherent set of ideas linked by an overarching 
way of providing coherence to his observations. 
In essence, Chapter 6 answers the first research question in that it is this chapter 
which identifies the factors associated with CM while chapters 7, 8 and 9 answer the 
second research question in that they provide explanations as to why these factors 
should be associated with CM. 
In the next section I will address some general ideas that emerge from the 
research I have undertaken 
 
Section 10.3: CM Selection may be a Species of Personnel Selection. 
By demonstrating that there are three variables that can classify parliamentarians 
into CMs and no-CMs with approximately 78% accuracy I have essentially shown that 
CM selection can be considered as transparent as analytical selection methods such as 
those used to determine the suitability of individuals for higher level training in the 
airforce (Garrad 2003). In this section I would like to explore the possibility that much 
of the discussion of ephemeral qualities such as “leadership” may be reducible to 
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measurable characteristics and that the notion of “leadership” is at best a useful 
shorthand for these characteristics and at worst a reification of ephemeral notions of 
what makes a “leader”. 
What is being proposed here is that the way CMs are selected is much like the 
way any individual is selected for promotion. Those who are doing the selecting need to 
ensure that they select individuals with the right qualities. One way of doing this is by 
observation over a long period to see how individuals perform at lower levels. We can 
see how parliamentarians enter parliament and are assessed by their colleagues, in the 
case of the ALP and by their leader, in the case of the LNPC. Those that show that they 
are able to handle the demands of parliamentary life are given a promotion, possibly to 
the role of parliamentary secretary or junior minister. This puts them under more 
pressure to perform and also more scrutiny. Those that are able to perform at this level 
are then likely to be promoted further. At all stages they are under scrutiny and those 
that do very well at each subsequent level are likely to be promoted. This is the standard 
way of being promoted in any bureaucracy. The words written over one hundred years 
ago in a quite different context describe the same phenomenon: 
When I was a lad I served a term  
As office boy to an Attorney's firm  
I cleaned the windows and I swept the floor  
And I polished up the handle of the big front door  
…[]… 
As office boy I made such a mark  
That they gave me the post of a junior clerk  
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I served the writs with a smile so bland  
And I copied all the letters in a big round hand  
…[]… 
In serving writs I made such a name  
That an articled clerk I soon became  
I wore clean collars and a brand-new suit  
For the pass examination at the Institute 
…[]… 
Of legal knowledge I acquired such a grip  
That they took me into the partnership  
……..(Gilbert and Sullivan 1878, from  H.M.S. 
Pinafore)  
 
What I am suggesting is that, as with Sir Joseph in HMS Pinafore, CMs are 
selected by observation of how well they do at each level. There are no characteristics 
that are mandatory. Instead, members of the selectorate observe individuals over time to 
determine how well the individual is able to do the lower level jobs leading up to CM. 
An individual may have failings in one sphere but is able to make up for them in 
another. The selectors will note the strengths and weaknesses and make an overall 
assessment of an individual’s ability to perform at higher levels. In short, my contention 
is that there is no need for reference to a quality called leadership because the process of 
CM selection is reducible to a personnel selection process. 
 The important point is that if CM appointment is reducible to a species of 
personnel selection then, like other personnel selection methods, it should be amenable 
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to analysis in terms of measurable characteristics. This is essentially what I have 
demonstrated in this thesis.  I have demonstrated that it is possible to reduce the process 
of CM selection to a number of variables which, conceivably, could take the place of 
the long period of observation usually required to identify CMs. 
Although the idea that this kind of “talent identification” may seem heretical to 
traditionalists it has been applied in many contexts. To illustrate how this might operate 
in another context I would like to use the example of talent identification in sport. In 
recent years talent identification methods have been used to determine which school 
aged children are likely to go on to become professional athletes. One example is 
Pienaar et al (1998) who took anthropometric and motor measurements of the top three 
teams in the South African under 11 rugby cohort. They used non-rugby playing boys of 
the same age as controls and developed a regression model in which four motor skills 
and four anthopometric measures were the dependent variables. Applying this model to 
a broader out-of-sample cohort of players in the under 11 league they were able to 
classify players as back or forward players with an accuracy of 88%. The variables that 
were important in the discriminant equations were 7 metre passing accuracy, sprint 
time, flexed arm hang, vertical jump, femur width, arm correction, calf correction and 
stature/body mass. The important point to be made here is that the method does not rely 
on observation of actual rugby playing. It uses base level characteristics that are 
proximate to the higher level characteristics that an actual rugby player requires. This is 
essentially what I have done with the CM models. There is no evidence that CMs are 
chosen because they have a legal education, use less concrete language or entered 
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parliament early. However, these base level characteristics are proximate to higher level 
characteristics which are selected for. 
There is a good argument for saying that the analytical methods are more 
objective than the traditional methods of selection. The evidence for this is that it is very 
difficult to determine what the high level characteristics are that an individual is 
selected for. In chapter 2 I surveyed the literature on the subjective methods used for 
selecting CMs and found that even interviews with leaders did not provide an analytical 
framework for determining the criteria for selecting CMs. Fraser, for example, seems to 
have used completely different methods for choosing Howard on one hand and Chaney 
on the other. Other literature referred to “parliamentary performance” and such 
characteristics as the ability to contribute to party policy. However, the indications were 
that the observational criteria were ephemeral. Similarly, the selection of athletes, until 
recently, took place using largely subjective methods. Team members for US baseball 
were traditionally selected by a talent scout who would attend minor league games and 
look for what he thought was the high level characteristics demonstrative of playing 
talent. However, Lewis (2004) shows that the careful analysis of statistical data relating 
to individual players (“sabermetrics”) yields better results for the selection of baseball 
players than the traditional subjective approach. In baseball and rugby player selection 
and, it is contended, CM selection, it is very difficult to subjectively determine the 
characteristics that lead to success. The evidence for this is that it takes a long period of 
observation in each of these fields to work out who will actually succeed. However, as I 
have demonstrated, it is possible to determine the objective measurable qualities that are 
important. 




Summary of Section 10.3   
To summarise this part of the discussion, we can see that the standard method of 
selecting CMs is basically an observational method which is essentially a species of 
personnel selection. There are a number of high level characteristics such as 
“parliamentary performance” which are selected for but these are difficult to pin down. 
Therefore, the selector needs to observe the potential CM over a long period to make a 
decision. The analytical methods using CM models do not directly determine the high 
level characteristics that are determinative of CM selection. Instead, they use measures 
of characteristics which are proximate to the higher level characteristics that are 
associated with CM.  
 
Section 10.4: Methods and approach: Problems and Possible Extensions 
As with any research project, there are a number of caveats in respect of the 
methods used and approach taken. In this section I would like to highlight a number of 
issues that should be taken into account in any further research undertaken on the topic. 
The first of these deals with the possibility that parliamentarians may change their 
language use in response to the findings of the model and therefore any subsequent 
attempt to use these methods may be thwarted. As we shall see there are alternative 
speech and text samples that can be used so that this does not present a major threat to 
the efficacy of the approach. Another issue is the choice of the linguistic variables used. 
The basic raw materials for the generation of the linguistic variables were the maiden 
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speeches of parliamentarians and I made a choice to use a particular set of linguistic 
variables generated from these speeches in this thesis. However, it is possible that the 
classification accuracy of the models could be improved by using quite different 
variables such as n-grams. Finally, the choice of classification algorithm was logistic 
regression. However, it is possible that classification accuracy could be improved by 
using different methods.  
 
Changes in parliamentarian’s speech behaviour due to awareness of the modelling 
methods 
In this thesis I have used a public source of information to derive linguistic 
variables which were then used to derive predictive models. I then examined the 
variables in the models to derive some characteristics of CMs that, if possessed by a 
parliamentarian might lead to her becoming a CM. Thus, this thesis has both a practical 
and a theoretical aspect. The practical aspect is that it provides a method by which 
future neophyte parliamentarians can be reasonably accurately classified as future CMs 
or non-CMs. However, it is possible that individuals who come to know of the methods 
used in this thesis might change their speech behaviour in the future in order to mask 
their true baseline characteristics. This could potentially alter the behaviour of the 
variables Con, Img and Def in the sample of incoming parliamentarians. The question 
we must consider is whether this has implications for the current models. 
If neophyte BBs in federal parliament did start using less concrete language, 
then the predictive ability of the models containing these variables would most likely 
not be applicable to newcomers to parliament. This is because the models were built 
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using speeches which were delivered unselfconsciously. A parliamentarian who is 
aware that he needs to use more abstract words from the PYMCP sample in order to be 
classified as a potential CM may deliberately adopt this strategy. This would decrease 
the predictive validity of the committee of models. In this situation a predictive model 
would need to be created using an unselfconscious speech or text sample. Contributions 
to committee proceedings, spontaneous media interviews and even electorate level 
speeches by candidates could provide a rich source of text for analysis. The problem 
with using such data is collecting it. While committee proceedings are recorded in 
Hansard the other sources would be difficult for a researcher to collect. However there 
is one source that is easily collectable: personal websites. Almost all MPs now have 
their own personal websites. A member who did not would be at a considerable 
electoral disadvantage as it is now the accepted method by which a parliamentarian 
makes contact with the general public. Any criticism that much of this text may not be 
written by the parliamentarian himself could be met with the answer to the ghost writer 
problem mentioned in Chapter 4. That is, the ghost writer puts enough information 
representative of the principal into the speech/text that it is possible to distil the 
principal’s voice. Thus, the primary texts used for analysis would not be maiden 
speeches but the initial text from the websites of neophyte parliamentarians. This would, 
of course, have to be collected soon after the parliamentarian entered parliament 
because we need a sample of text that is written before each parliamentarian begins to 
follow a particular career trajectory.   
Thus, the procedure would be to repeat the procedure undertaken in this thesis 
but using website texts as the basic documents.  
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In sum, a self-conscious desire on the part of neophyte BBs to change their 
language could conceivably make the committee as it is presented in this thesis 
inapplicable to newcomers to parliament. However, by using other text sources such as 
web pages this problem could be overcome. 
 
Using different linguistic variables 
In this thesis I have used two sets of linguistic variables. I have used the 
variables generated by LIWC and have derived a set of psycholinguistic variables based 
on the PYMCP data. Only three variables remained in any of the models after the sifting 
process: Con, Img and Def. However, in the text analysis research there is a plethora of 
other methods available. The most basic method is the “bag of words” approach which 
uses the individual words in a document as the basic information unit. The idea here is 
that a document with a large proportion of its text containing one particular word is 
unlikely to be in the same class as a document with a low occurrence of that word.  
Building on the bag of words approach is the technique of using adjacent word 
clusters or “n-grams”. The idea here is that a word such as “nuclear” can occur in a 
variety of contexts and it is the context of the word that gives it explanatory power. 
Thus, the bigram “nuclear power” is conceivably more likely to be used by a 
conservative than the bigram “nuclear waste”. Bigrams have been found deliver 
statistically significant results in discriminating between types of text. Working with 
bigrams in the analysis of detective fiction, Lamkin and McCarthy (2011) find that the 
bigram “my office” is indicative of the hardboiled genre of detective fiction whereas the 
bigram “upon the” is indicative of the whodunit genre.  
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
353 
 
Another possible method is Latent Semantic Analysis which uses certain words 
to imply the subject of a text. The idea here is that the word “captain” is more likely to 
appear in a document about airlines and ships than it is to appear in a document about 
dentistry. Using the latent semantics of the word “captain” can therefore help to classify 
the document. 
This is just a small sample of the methods that are used in text analysis. There is 
a general finding that certain methods work better in particular areas but there is no 
general approach that can be expected to work better than any other. It is therefore 
possible that some different method or even a combination of methods could be used to 
increase the classification accuracy of the speech samples in this thesis over and above 
that which has been achieved.   
 
Using other classification algorithms 
In this thesis I have used a logistic regression to classify speeches. This is a very 
widely accepted method of classification. However, there is increasing evidence that 
other methods may be better at classifying texts.  
Neural networks (NN) have been employed in classification tasks for over 20 
years and have been found to be superior to statistical methods such as logistic 
regression for some applications. They work by “learning” the association between the 
independent and dependent variables. The internal architecture consists of a set of 
interconnected “neurons” which react to the inputs (independent variables) and generate 
an “output” (the dependent variable). During the training stage the internal connections 
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between neurons are adjusted in order to get the predicted value of the dependent 
variable to approximate the actual value of the dependent variable in the training case 
under consideration. This process continues with all cases in the dataset over many 
iterations until the association between independent and dependent variables has been 
inculcated into the interconnections between neurons. The superior classification 
accuracy of NNs for many applications in comparison to statistical methods occurs 
because they are able to model highly non-linear data, do not require the explicit 
specification of the functional relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables, and are able to achieve accurate classification with a lower sample size than 
more traditional classification methods. It is possible that neural networks could be used 
in the classification task undertaken in this thesis, thus increasing the classification 
accuracy. 
The most prominent classification technique in text analysis in recent years has 
been support vector machines. Like neural networks, the support vector machines 
(SVMs) do not use statistical concepts to distinguish between classes. The method 
works by creating a hyperplane (a support vector) between two classes that maximises 
the distance between the two classes. Because this distance is maximised the 
classification accuracy is higher than if the dividing line were calculated as an average 
of the distances between classes. In many studies support vector machines have been 
found to be superior at classifying text than neural networks. Therefore it may be that 
SVMs would enable a higher level of classification accuracy in the classification of 
CMs. As an indication of the efficacy of this approach, Diermeier, Godbout, Yu and 
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Kaufman (2012) achieved an accuracy of 92% in classifying US senators on the basis of 
ideology using SVMs to analyse their speeches.  
One caveat needs to be kept in mind when considering non-probabilistic 
methods such as NNs and SVMs. Although these methods achieve higher levels of 
classification accuracy than probabilistic methods they do not provide explanations as 
comprehensive as more traditional methods. For example, in logistic regression we can 
immediately see whether there is a significant relationship between an independent 
variable and the dependent variable and, if there is such a relationship, how strong the 
relationship is. With non-statistical methods the relationships between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable is not as transparent. It is certainly possible to 
determine the general influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable 
and the approximate strength in relation to other variables but it is not possible to come 
up with an explanation of how much the independent variable contributes on its own to 
the value of the dependent variable holding other variables constant. For this reason 
non-statistical methods are not good for the development of theory. In Chapters 7, 8 and 
9 I was able to develop an explanation for the efficacy of each of the variables in the 
two CM models because the models explicitly state the direction of their influence on 
the dependent variable holding the other variables constant. In the non-statistical context 
this is more problematic because each individual independent variable contributes to the 
generation of the dependent variable value in concert with the other independent 
variables. As such, isolating individual influences of dependent variables, as is the 
standard procedure in theory building, is difficult. 
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In sum it can be said that there are possible gains to be made in the classification 
accuracy of CMs using essentially the same data but different classification methods. 
Neural networks and SVMs are two that could plausibly be used for this but they suffer 
from the disadvantage that they make it difficult to develop theoretical insights. 
 
Summary of Section 10.4:  
In this section I have considered a number of issues that may need attention in 
subsequent related research. I considered the possibility that parliamentarians may 
change their speech behaviour in response to their knowledge of the model. The 
solution here was to use other text sources such as websites. I also considered the issue 
of using different linguistic variables. While there is no a priori reason why different 
variables might result in better classification it has been shown that various types of 
linguistic variables have had success in text classification and it is therefore worthwhile 
trying a number of different methods in order to increase the classification accuracy. 
Similarly, it is worthwhile considering using classification algorithms that have been 
shown to yield higher classification accuracies than logistic regression. However, the 
major caveat here is that those which are most effective, NNs and SVMs, may not be 
able to yield good theory building results. 
Having considered a number of possible improvements to the approach taken in 
this thesis I would like to turn to two possible applications of the method. 
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Section 10.5: Possible applications.  
In this section I wish to discuss two possible applications. The first may be of 
benefit to party leaders and selectors who wish to identify talent in parliamentary 
neophytes. The second may be of benefit to lobbyists who wish to identify future CMs 
in order to cultivate working relationships with them. 
 
 Aiding the Selectors 
The most direct application of the models is in the process of potential CM 
identification. We saw in Chapter 2 that the ministerial selection process was looked at 
by some researchers as a talent evaluation problem where, despite all the screening 
based on a candidate having the right ideological leaning and fulfilling the requirements 
of the various coalition members, the leader still had to take a chance that the selected 
minister would be able to successfully do the job. The CM models effectively reduce 
the risk that a leader takes in such situations.  
As well as reducing the risk that the leader takes, identifying potential CMs early 
in their first term has a significant organisational benefit. The idea here is that 
individuals so identified could be fast-tracked. Such individuals could be given 
preference in promotions to junior ministerial roles, possibly leapfrogging the less 
important role of parliamentary secretary. In this way a leader could ensure that there 
was supply of capable and experienced individuals ready to take over from a CM who 
was dismissed from or voluntarily left cabinet. 
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Knowing whom to Lobby 
Another application is the identification of up and coming CMs for the purposes 
of cultivation by lobbyists. The idea here is that a lobbyist has an advantage if she is 
able to identify, from a cohort of entrants to parliament, who is likely to be influential in 
subsequent years. A lobbyist who cultivates a relationship with such a person is in a 
better position that a lobbyist who approaches that same person later when they have 
become a CM. The reason for this is that an existing CM has multiple demands imposed 
on her and is less likely to be willing or able to spend time developing a working 
relationship with an individual lobbyist. On the contrary, there are likely to be many 
lobbyists vying for the CMs attention. If the lobbyist is able to approach that CM before 
they become a CM, preferably when they are a neophyte backbencher, they will have 
significantly less competition from other lobbyists and they are therefore more likely to 
be open to developing a working relationship with an individual lobbyist.  
One drawback of the CM models for both these applications is that there is a 
strong inclination to avoid analytical methods in areas which have traditionally used 
subjective methods. This is despite the fact that the actuarial approach to decision 
making in repetitive situations has been found to be significantly more efficient than 
using “clinical” judgment (Dawes et al 1989; Grove et al 2000).  This has been shown 
to be the case in such diverse fields such as predicting legal outcomes (Ruger et al 
2004), predicting wine prices (Lecocq and Visser 2006) and breast cancer diagnosis 
(Eadie et al, 2011). Adoption of such techniques is hindered by the fact that 
organisations are notoriously slow at responding to the insights gained by using 
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analytical methods.  A good example comes from Lewis who was one of the originators 
of sabermetrics, a method of using statistical analysis in selecting baseball players: 
The people who were paid to manage professional teams 
failed to see the point. They hadn’t even bothered to compile the 
information they need to analyze their systems intelligently. 
Presented with new information (by sabermetricians), they 
showed little interest in it, even when it was offered to them 
gratis. (Lewis 2004, p. 84) 
Given the initial reluctance to adopt analytical methods, it is worthwhile noting 
that, over time, such systems are eventually adopted. Even in the fields of wine tasting 
and baseball where, traditionally, important decisions were made by authority figures 
who used subjective methods to make evaluations, others in the industry realised that 
there was merit in using more analytical methods. Thus, despite the likelihood of initial 
rejection, it is likely that the methods will gain general acceptance over time and those 
who adopt the methods earlier will have a significant advantage.  
 
Summary of Section 10.5 
In this section I have discussed two possible applications of the model. The first 
is a straightforward application to the problem of identifying talent early for the 
purposes of fast-tracking. It is envisaged that this would be of use to party selectors. The 
second application is intended to solve the problem lobbyists face of which neophyte 
BBs to invest time and effort in so as to maximise the probability of having long term 
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political influence. It is anticipated that neither of these applications are likely to gain 
acceptance in the short term. However, as with any analytical method that performs 
better than clinical judgment, it is likely that there will be acceptance in the long term.  
 
Section 10.6: Conclusion 
The object of this thesis has been to answer two related questions:  
1) What are the characteristics that lead to individuals becoming CMs in the 
Australian federal parliament? 
2) Why are those characteristics determinant of becoming a CM? 
In order to answer the first question I created a logistic regression models to 
classify members of the ALP and the LNPC into CMs and non-CMs.  
In order to address the second question I undertook an analysis of the literature 
to determine why the characteristics identified in the modelling process should be 
determinative of CM success. I was able to demonstrate that there are good reasons why 
the variables in the models should be related to CM success.  
In this chapter I have attempted to put these findings into a broader context and 
demonstrate that CM selection is really a species of personnel selection. There is no 
need for a theory of leadership any more than there is a need for a theory of rugby-
player-ship. This is not to say that there is not a specific set of skills which significantly 
increases the probability that an individual will perform well in that role and, quite 
The Selection of Cabinet Ministers in the Australian Federal Parliament   
361 
 
possibly be attracted to that role. However, to posit a characteristic over and above this 
set of baseline characteristics would be to reify a non-existent quality.  
In this chapter I also discussed a number of issues that it would be worthwhile to 
address in any subsequent related work in this area. The first of these is the text source. 
In this regard it was noted that in order to avoid the problem of using maiden speech 
text that has been self-consciously altered it would be useful to use other publicly 
available text sources such as websites. I also discussed the possible advantages of using 
different linguistic variables to improve the classification accuracy of the models.  
Another way of increasing classification accuracy is to use different classification 
methods. Two non-probabilistic methods were discussed NNs and SVMs. Both these 
methods have the potential to improve classification accuracy. However, being non-
statistical these methods tend to be difficult to use for theory development. 
Finally I have attempted to outline two practical applications of the models. 
Both applications are based on the ability of the models to identify potential CMs from 
the pool of new entrants to parliament. The first application is potentially of use to 
selectors who want to have an insight into whom to focus on in cultivating ministerial 
talent in the party. The idea here is that such individuals can be “fast-tracked” into 
leadership positions. The second application is of use to lobbyists. The idea is that 
lobbyists can use the models to determine whom to cultivate as targets for their 
lobbying activities. The idea here is that it is likely to be easier to cultivate a 
relationship with a neophyte than an existing CM but if a lobbyist is going to cultivate a 
relationship with a neophyte parliamentarian it would be best to cultivate a relationship 
with a neophyte who is likely to become a CM at some time in the future than to 
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cultivate a relationship with a neophyte parliamentarian who is unlikely to become a 
CM.  
Thus, it can be stated that the original research questions have been answered. 
An original contribution has been made to the field of parliamentary leadership in that I 
have provided support for the proposition that CM selection is a species of personnel 
selection and that the concept of “leadership” may be redundant in the context of the 
Australian federal parliament. I have also considered some areas in which the methods 
might be improved. Finally, I have been able to suggest to possible practical 
applications of the method. 
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Appendix 1: Data for RIF Models 
LNPC Data 
Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1996 Abbott, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.51 2.1 0 
1999 Abbott, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.27 4.86 0 
2002 Abbott, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44.27 7.86 1 
2005 Abbott, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.28 10.86 1 
2007 Abbott, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.28 12.86 1 
1996 Abetz, E 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 38.29 2.19 0 
1999 Abetz, E 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 41.05 4.95 0 
2002 Abetz, E 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 44.05 7.95 0 
2005 Abetz, E 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 47.05 10.95 0 
2007 Abetz, E 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 49.05 12.95 0 
2007 Adams, JA 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 63.85 1.59 0 
1996 Alston, RK 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.4 9.99 1 
1999 Alston, RK 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.16 12.75 1 
2002 Alston, RK 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.16 15.75 1 
1996 Anderson, JD 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 39.48 7.05 1 
1999 Anderson, JD 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 42.24 9.81 1 
2002 Anderson, JD 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 45.25 12.81 1 
2005 Anderson, JD 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 48.25 15.81 1 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2007 Anderson, JD 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50.25 17.81 0 
1996 Andrew, JN 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 51.93 13.16 0 
1999 Andrew, JN 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 54.69 15.92 0 
2002 Andrew, JN 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 57.69 18.93 0 
1996 Andrews, KJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.5 4.98 0 
1999 Andrews, KJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43.26 7.73 0 
2002 Andrews, KJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46.26 10.74 0 
2005 Andrews, KJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.27 13.74 1 
2007 Andrews, KJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.27 15.74 1 
1996 Anthony, LJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 34.39 0.16 0 
1999 Anthony, LJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 37.15 2.92 0 
2002 Anthony, LJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 40.15 5.92 0 
1996 Bailey, FE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.98 3.13 0 
1999 Bailey, FE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52.74 5.89 0 
2002 Bailey, FE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55.74 8.9 0 
2005 Bailey, FE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.74 11.9 0 
2007 Bailey, FE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.74 13.9 0 
1999 Baird, BG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.96 0.33 0 
2002 Baird, BG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.97 3.33 0 
2005 Baird, BG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.97 6.34 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2007 Baird, BG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64.97 8.34 0 
2005 Baker, MH 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 46.12 0.32 0 
2007 Baker, MH 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 48.12 2.32 0 
1996 Baldwin, RC 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.17 0.16 0 
2002 Baldwin, RC 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46.93 2.82 0 
2005 Baldwin, RC 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.94 5.82 0 
2007 Baldwin, RC 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.94 7.82 0 
2005 Barnett, G 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 42.86 2.93 0 
2007 Barnett, G 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 44.86 4.93 0 
1996 Barresi, PA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.76 0.16 0 
1999 Barresi, PA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43.52 2.92 0 
2002 Barresi, PA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46.52 5.92 0 
2005 Barresi, PA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.52 8.93 0 
2007 Barresi, PA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.52 10.93 0 
1996 Bartlett, KJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.07 0.16 0 
1999 Bartlett, KJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.83 2.92 0 
2002 Bartlett, KJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52.84 5.92 0 
2005 Bartlett, KJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55.84 8.93 0 
2007 Bartlett, KJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.84 10.93 0 
1996 Baume, ME 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65.86 18.07 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2007 Bernardi, C 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 37.26 0.75 0 
1996 Billson, BF 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30.28 0.16 0 
1999 Billson, BF 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33.04 2.92 0 
2002 Billson, BF 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.04 5.92 0 
2005 Billson, BF 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39.04 8.93 0 
2007 Billson, BF 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.04 10.93 0 
1996 Bishop, BK 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53.57 8.73 0 
1999 Bishop, BK 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.33 11.49 0 
2002 Bishop, BK 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.33 14.49 0 
2005 Bishop, BK 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.33 17.49 0 
2007 Bishop, BK 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64.33 19.49 0 
1999 Bishop, JI 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 42.57 0.33 0 
2002 Bishop, JI 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 45.58 3.33 0 
2005 Bishop, JI 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 48.58 6.34 0 
2007 Bishop, JI 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 50.58 8.34 1 
1996 Boswell, RL 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 55.43 13.16 0 
1999 Boswell, RL 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 58.19 15.92 0 
2002 Boswell, RL 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 61.19 18.93 0 
2005 Boswell, RL 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 64.19 21.93 0 
2007 Boswell, RL 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 66.19 23.93 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1996 Bradford, JW 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.36 6.11 0 
2002 Brandis, GH 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 44.64 1.72 0 
2005 Brandis, GH 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.65 4.72 0 
2007 Brandis, GH 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.65 6.72 0 
1996 Broadbent, RE 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45.38 3.13 0 
2005 Broadbent, RE 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.14 5.88 0 
2007 Broadbent, RE 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.14 7.88 0 
1996 Brough, MT 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 34.36 0.16 0 
1999 Brough, MT 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.12 2.92 0 
2002 Brough, MT 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.12 5.92 0 
2005 Brough, MT 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 43.12 8.93 0 
2007 Brough, MT 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 45.12 10.93 1 
1996 Brownhill, DG 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 60.5 11.42 0 
1999 Brownhill, DG 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 63.25 14.18 0 
1996 Cadman, AG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.8 21.97 0 
1999 Cadman, AG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61.56 24.73 0 
2002 Cadman, AG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64.56 27.73 0 
2005 Cadman, AG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67.57 30.73 0 
2007 Cadman, AG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69.57 32.73 0 
1996 Calvert, PH 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 56.32 8.81 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1999 Calvert, PH 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 59.08 11.57 0 
2002 Calvert, PH 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 62.08 14.57 0 
2005 Calvert, PH 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 65.08 17.58 0 
2007 Calvert, PH 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 67.08 19.58 0 
1996 Cameron, EH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 45.35 3.13 0 
1996 Cameron, RA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30.98 0.16 0 
1999 Cameron, RA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33.74 2.92 0 
2002 Cameron, RA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.75 5.92 0 
1996 Campbell, IG 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 36.97 5.96 0 
1999 Campbell, IG 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 39.73 8.72 0 
2002 Campbell, IG 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 42.73 11.72 0 
2005 Campbell, IG 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 45.73 14.73 1 
2007 Campbell, IG 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 47.73 16.73 1 
1996 Causley, IR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 55.57 0.16 0 
1999 Causley, IR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 58.33 2.92 0 
2002 Causley, IR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 61.33 5.92 0 
2005 Causley, IR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 64.33 8.93 0 
2007 Causley, IR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 66.33 10.93 0 
1996 Chapman, HG 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 47.04 16.04 0 
1999 Chapman, HG 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 49.8 18.8 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2002 Chapman, HG 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 52.8 21.8 0 
2005 Chapman, HG 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55.81 24.81 0 
2007 Chapman, HG 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 57.81 26.81 0 
1996 Charles, RE 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.81 6.11 0 
1999 Charles, RE 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.57 8.87 0 
2002 Charles, RE 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65.57 11.87 0 
2002 Ciobo, SM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 27.7 0.23 0 
2005 Ciobo, SM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 30.7 3.23 0 
2007 Ciobo, SM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 32.7 5.23 0 
2002 Cobb, JK 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 52.01 0.23 0 
2005 Cobb, JK 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 55.01 3.23 0 
2007 Cobb, JK 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 57.01 5.23 0 
1996 Cobb, MR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 51.16 11.42 0 
2002 Colbeck, RM 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 43.86 0 0 
2005 Colbeck, RM 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 46.86 2.99 0 
2007 Colbeck, RM 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 48.86 4.99 0 
1999 Coonan, HL 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.3 2.59 0 
2002 Coonan, HL 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.3 5.59 0 
2005 Coonan, HL 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.3 8.59 1 
2007 Coonan, HL 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.3 10.59 1 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1996 Costello, PH 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.74 6.11 1 
1999 Costello, PH 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.5 8.87 1 
2002 Costello, PH 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44.5 11.87 1 
2005 Costello, PH 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.5 14.87 1 
2007 Costello, PH 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.5 16.87 1 
1996 Crane, AW 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 54.73 5.84 0 
1999 Crane, AW 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 57.49 8.59 0 
2002 Crane, AW 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 60.49 11.6 0 
1996 Dondas, NM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 56.55 0.16 0 
1996 Downer, AJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 44.67 11.42 1 
1999 Downer, AJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 47.43 14.18 1 
2002 Downer, AJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 50.43 17.18 1 
2005 Downer, AJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 53.44 20.18 1 
2007 Downer, AJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55.44 22.18 1 
1996 Draper, P 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 37.1 0.16 0 
1999 Draper, P 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 39.86 2.92 0 
2002 Draper, P 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 42.87 5.92 0 
2005 Draper, P 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 45.87 8.93 0 
2007 Draper, P 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 47.87 10.93 0 
2002 Dutton, PC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 31.23 0.23 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2005 Dutton, PC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 34.23 3.23 0 
2007 Dutton, PC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.23 5.23 0 
1999 Eggleston, A 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 57.13 2.59 0 
2002 Eggleston, A 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 60.13 5.59 0 
2005 Eggleston, A 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 63.13 8.59 0 
2007 Eggleston, A 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 65.13 10.59 0 
1996 Ellison, CM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 41.9 2.83 0 
1999 Ellison, CM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 44.66 5.59 0 
2002 Ellison, CM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 47.67 8.59 0 
2005 Ellison, CM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 50.67 11.6 0 
2007 Ellison, CM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 52.67 13.6 0 
1996 Elson, KS 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.3 0.16 0 
1999 Elson, KS 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 52.05 2.92 0 
2002 Elson, KS 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 55.06 5.92 0 
2005 Elson, KS 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.06 8.93 0 
2007 Elson, KS 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.06 10.93 0 
1996 Entsch, WG 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 45.95 0.16 0 
1999 Entsch, WG 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 48.71 2.92 0 
2002 Entsch, WG 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.71 5.92 0 
2005 Entsch, WG 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.71 8.93 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2007 Entsch, WG 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.71 10.93 0 
1996 Evans, RD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 42.67 3.13 0 
1996 Fahey, JJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.34 0.16 1 
1999 Fahey, JJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.1 2.92 1 
2002 Farmer, PF 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39.92 0.23 0 
2005 Farmer, PF 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42.92 3.23 0 
2007 Farmer, PF 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44.92 5.23 0 
2005 Fawcett, DJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 41.31 0.32 0 
2007 Fawcett, DJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 43.31 2.32 0 
1996 Ferguson, AB 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 52.66 3.93 0 
1999 Ferguson, AB 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55.42 6.69 0 
2002 Ferguson, AB 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 58.42 9.69 0 
2005 Ferguson, AB 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 61.42 12.7 0 
2007 Ferguson, AB 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 63.42 14.7 0 
2005 Ferguson, MD 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 30.88 0.32 0 
2007 Ferguson, MD 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 32.88 2.32 0 
1999 Ferris, JM 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 57.93 2.59 0 
2002 Ferris, JM 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 60.93 5.59 0 
2005 Ferris, JM 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 63.93 8.59 0 
2007 Ferris, JM 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 65.93 10.59 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2007 Fierravanti-Wells, CA 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46.73 1.75 0 
2005 Fifield, MP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.07 0.84 0 
2007 Fifield, MP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.07 2.84 0 
1996 Fischer, TA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50.03 11.42 1 
1999 Fischer, TA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 52.79 14.18 1 
1996 Forrest, JA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 46.72 3.13 0 
1999 Forrest, JA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 49.47 5.89 0 
2002 Forrest, JA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 52.48 8.9 0 
2005 Forrest, JA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 55.48 11.9 0 
2007 Forrest, JA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 57.48 13.9 0 
1996 Gallus, CA 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 53.1 6.11 0 
1999 Gallus, CA 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55.86 8.87 0 
2002 Gallus, CA 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 58.87 11.87 0 
1996 Gambaro, T 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.44 0.16 0 
1999 Gambaro, T 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.2 2.92 0 
2002 Gambaro, T 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 43.21 5.92 0 
2005 Gambaro, T 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 46.21 8.93 0 
2007 Gambaro, T 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 48.21 10.93 0 
1996 Gash, J 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.81 0.16 0 
1999 Gash, J 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.57 2.92 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2002 Gash, J 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.57 5.92 0 
2005 Gash, J 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.58 8.93 0 
2007 Gash, J 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.58 10.93 0 
1996 Georgiou, P 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48.45 1.45 0 
1999 Georgiou, P 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.21 4.21 0 
2002 Georgiou, P 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.21 7.21 0 
2005 Georgiou, P 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.21 10.21 0 
2007 Georgiou, P 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.21 12.21 0 
1996 Gibson, BF 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 59.53 2.83 0 
1999 Gibson, BF 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 62.28 5.59 0 
2002 Gibson, BF 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 65.29 8.59 0 
1996 Grace, EJ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 55.96 0.16 0 
1999 Haase, BW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 53.24 0.33 0 
2002 Haase, BW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 56.24 3.33 0 
2005 Haase, BW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 59.24 6.34 0 
2007 Haase, BW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 61.24 8.34 0 
1996 Halverson, RG 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.56 11.42 0 
1996 Hardgrave, GD 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.34 0.16 0 
1999 Hardgrave, GD 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 39.1 2.92 0 
2002 Hardgrave, GD 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 42.1 5.92 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2005 Hardgrave, GD 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 45.11 8.93 0 
2007 Hardgrave, GD 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.11 10.93 0 
2002 Hartsuyker, L 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 42.79 0.23 0 
2005 Hartsuyker, L 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 45.8 3.23 0 
2007 Hartsuyker, L 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 47.8 5.23 0 
1996 Hawker, DP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.03 12.99 0 
1999 Hawker, DP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.79 15.75 0 
2002 Hawker, DP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52.79 18.75 0 
2005 Hawker, DP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55.79 21.76 0 
2007 Hawker, DP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.79 23.76 0 
1999 Heffernan, WD 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55.96 2.37 0 
2002 Heffernan, WD 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.96 5.38 0 
2005 Heffernan, WD 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61.96 8.38 0 
2007 Heffernan, WD 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63.96 10.38 0 
2005 Henry, SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 58.66 0.32 0 
2007 Henry, SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 60.66 2.32 0 
1996 Herron, JJ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 63.7 5.84 0 
1999 Herron, JJ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 66.45 8.59 0 
2002 Herron, JJ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 69.46 11.6 0 
1996 Hicks, NJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 55.52 15.54 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1996 Hill, RM 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 49.63 14.84 1 
1999 Hill, RM 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 52.39 17.6 1 
2002 Hill, RM 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55.39 20.6 1 
2005 Hill, RM 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 58.39 23.61 1 
1996 Hockey, JB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30.76 0.16 0 
1999 Hockey, JB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33.52 2.92 0 
2002 Hockey, JB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.53 5.92 0 
2005 Hockey, JB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39.53 8.93 0 
2007 Hockey, JB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.53 10.93 1 
1996 Howard, JW 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.8 21.97 1 
1999 Howard, JW 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.56 24.73 1 
2002 Howard, JW 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.56 27.73 1 
2005 Howard, JW 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65.57 30.73 1 
2007 Howard, JW 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67.57 32.73 1 
1999 Hull, KE 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 45.02 0.33 0 
2002 Hull, KE 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 48.03 3.33 0 
2005 Hull, KE 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 51.03 6.34 0 
2007 Hull, KE 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 53.03 8.34 0 
2005 Humphries, GJ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46.61 1.96 0 
2007 Humphries, GJ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 48.61 3.96 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2002 Hunt, GA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.23 0.23 0 
2005 Hunt, GA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39.23 3.23 0 
2007 Hunt, GA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.23 5.23 0 
1996 Jeanes, SB 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 38.21 0.16 0 
2005 Jensen, DG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 42.96 0.32 0 
2007 Jensen, DG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 44.96 2.32 0 
2002 Johnson, MA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 32.02 0.23 0 
2005 Johnson, MA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 35.03 3.23 0 
2007 Johnson, MA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.03 5.23 0 
2005 Johnston, DA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 49 2.59 0 
2007 Johnston, DA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 51 4.59 0 
1996 Johnston, R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 52.62 0.16 0 
2007 Joyce, BT 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 39.82 1.59 0 
1996 Jull, DF 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.61 18.65 0 
1999 Jull, DF 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.36 21.41 0 
2002 Jull, DF 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.37 24.41 0 
2005 Jull, DF 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.37 27.41 0 
2007 Jull, DF 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.37 29.41 0 
1996 Katter, RC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 50.98 3.13 0 
1999 Katter, RC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 53.73 5.89 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2005 Keenan, MF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 32.9 0.32 0 
2007 Keenan, MF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 34.9 2.32 0 
1996 Kelly, DM 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 42.14 0.16 0 
1999 Kelly, DM 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 44.9 2.92 0 
2002 Kelly, DM 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 47.9 5.92 0 
2005 Kelly, DM 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 50.9 8.93 0 
2007 Kelly, DM 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 52.9 10.93 0 
1996 Kelly, JM 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32.22 0.16 0 
1999 Kelly, JM 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34.98 2.92 0 
2002 Kelly, JM 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.98 5.92 0 
2005 Kelly, JM 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.98 8.93 0 
2007 Kelly, JM 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42.98 10.93 0 
1996 Kemp, CR 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.39 5.84 0 
1999 Kemp, CR 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.15 8.59 0 
2002 Kemp, CR 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.15 11.6 0 
2005 Kemp, CR 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.16 14.6 0 
2007 Kemp, CR 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.16 16.6 0 
1996 Kemp, DA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.58 6.11 0 
1999 Kemp, DA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.34 8.87 1 
2002 Kemp, DA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.34 11.87 1 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2002 King, PE 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.63 0.23 0 
1996 Knowles, SC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 45.09 11.42 0 
1999 Knowles, SC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 47.85 14.18 0 
2002 Knowles, SC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 50.85 17.18 0 
2005 Knowles, SC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 53.85 20.18 0 
2005 Laming, AC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.37 0.32 0 
2007 Laming, AC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.37 2.32 0 
1999 Lawler, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 37.32 0.33 0 
2002 Ley, SP 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.16 0.23 0 
2005 Ley, SP 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43.16 3.23 0 
2007 Ley, SP 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45.16 5.23 0 
1996 Liberman, LS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.98 3.13 0 
1999 Liberman, LS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.74 5.89 0 
1999 Lightfoot, PR 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 62.52 1.71 0 
2002 Lightfoot, PR 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 65.52 4.71 0 
2005 Lightfoot, PR 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 68.52 7.71 0 
2007 Lightfoot, PR 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 70.52 9.71 0 
1996 Lindsay, PJ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 52.02 0.16 0 
1999 Lindsay, PJ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.78 2.92 0 
2002 Lindsay, PJ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.79 5.92 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2005 Lindsay, PJ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.79 8.93 0 
2007 Lindsay, PJ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.79 10.93 0 
1996 Lloyd, JE 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.82 0.16 0 
1999 Lloyd, JE 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44.58 2.92 0 
2002 Lloyd, JE 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.58 5.92 0 
2005 Lloyd, JE 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.58 8.93 0 
2007 Lloyd, JE 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52.58 10.93 0 
1996 Macdonald, ID 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.45 5.84 0 
1999 Macdonald, ID 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 53.21 8.59 0 
2002 Macdonald, ID 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.21 11.6 0 
2005 Macdonald, ID 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.22 14.6 0 
2007 Macdonald, ID 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 61.22 16.6 0 
1996 Macdonald, JA 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 42 2.83 0 
1999 Macdonald, JA 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 44.76 5.59 0 
2002 Macdonald, JA 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 47.76 7.75 0 
2005 Macdonald, JA 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50.77 10.75 0 
2007 Macdonald, JA 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 52.77 12.75 0 
1999 Macfarlane, IE 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 43.86 0.33 0 
2002 Macfarlane, IE 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 46.86 3.33 1 
2005 Macfarlane, IE 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.86 6.34 1 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2007 Macfarlane, IE 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.86 8.34 1 
1996 MacGibbon, DJ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.01 17.84 0 
1999 MacGibbon, DJ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 64.77 20.6 0 
1996 Marek, P 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 31.79 0.16 0 
2005 Markus, LE 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46.44 0.32 0 
2007 Markus, LE 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48.44 2.32 0 
2002 Mason, BJ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 39.94 2.59 0 
2005 Mason, BJ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 42.94 5.59 0 
2007 Mason, BJ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 44.94 7.59 0 
1999 May, MA 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 48.62 0.33 0 
2002 May, MA 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.63 3.33 0 
2005 May, MA 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.63 6.34 0 
2007 May, MA 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.63 8.34 0 
1996 McArthur, FS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.55 12.21 0 
1999 McArthur, FS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61.31 14.96 0 
2002 McArthur, FS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64.31 17.97 0 
2005 McArthur, FS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67.31 20.97 0 
2007 McArthur, FS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69.31 22.97 0 
1996 McDougall, GR 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.47 0.16 0 
1996 McGauran, JJ 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 39.18 5.81 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1999 McGauran, JJ 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 41.94 8.56 0 
2002 McGauran, JJ 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 44.94 11.57 0 
2005 McGauran, JJ 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 47.95 14.57 0 
2007 McGauran, JJ 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.95 16.57 0 
1996 McGauran, PJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 40.48 13.16 0 
1999 McGauran, PJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 43.24 15.92 0 
2002 McGauran, PJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 46.24 18.93 0 
2005 McGauran, PJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 49.25 21.93 0 
2007 McGauran, PJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 51.25 23.93 1 
1996 McLachlan, IM 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 59.62 6.11 1 
1996 Miles, CG 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 48.73 11.42 0 
1996 Minchin, NH 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 43.07 2.83 0 
1999 Minchin, NH 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 45.83 5.59 1 
2002 Minchin, NH 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 48.83 8.59 1 
2005 Minchin, NH 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 51.84 11.6 1 
2007 Minchin, NH 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 53.84 13.6 1 
2002 Mirabella, S 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33.29 0.23 0 
2005 Mirabella, S 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.29 3.23 0 
2007 Mirabella, S 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.29 5.23 0 
1996 Moore, JC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.49 20.39 1 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1999 Moore, JC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.25 23.15 1 
1996 Moylan, JE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 52.22 3.13 0 
1999 Moylan, JE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 54.98 5.89 0 
2002 Moylan, JE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 57.98 8.9 0 
2005 Moylan, JE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 60.98 11.9 0 
2007 Moylan, JE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 62.98 13.9 0 
1996 Mutch, SB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.26 0.16 0 
1996 Nairn, GR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45.35 0.16 0 
1999 Nairn, GR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48.11 2.92 0 
2002 Nairn, GR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.12 5.92 0 
2005 Nairn, GR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.12 8.93 0 
2007 Nairn, GR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.12 10.93 0 
2007 Nash, FJ 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 41.77 1.59 0 
1996 Nehl, GB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 62.24 11.42 0 
1999 Nehl, GB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 64.99 14.18 0 
1996 Nelson, BJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.72 0.16 0 
1999 Nelson, BJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39.48 2.92 0 
2002 Nelson, BJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42.48 5.92 1 
2005 Nelson, BJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45.49 8.93 1 
2007 Nelson, BJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.49 10.93 1 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1996 Neville, PC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 56.13 3.13 0 
1999 Neville, PC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 58.89 5.89 0 
2002 Neville, PC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 61.89 8.9 0 
2005 Neville, PC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 64.89 11.9 0 
2007 Neville, PC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 66.89 13.9 0 
1996 Newman, JM 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 58.85 10.14 1 
1999 Newman, JM 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 61.61 12.9 1 
1996 Nugent, PE 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.12 6.11 0 
1999 Nugent, PE 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.88 8.87 0 
1996 O'Chee, WG 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 30.88 5.98 0 
1999 O'Chee, WG 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 33.64 8.74 0 
1996 Panizza, JH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 65.15 8.81 0 
1996 Parer, WR 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.11 11.44 0 
1999 Parer, WR 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.87 14.2 0 
2007 Parry, SS 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 46.28 1.59 0 
1996 Patterson, KC 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.47 8.81 0 
1999 Patterson, KC 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.23 11.57 0 
2002 Patterson, KC 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.24 14.57 1 
2005 Patterson, KC 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.24 17.58 1 
2007 Patterson, KC 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.24 19.58 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1999 Payne, MA 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34.53 1.82 0 
2002 Payne, MA 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.54 4.82 0 
2005 Payne, MA 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.54 7.82 0 
2007 Payne, MA 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42.54 9.82 0 
2002 Pearce, CJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.95 0.55 0 
2005 Pearce, CJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.95 3.56 0 
2007 Pearce, CJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43.95 5.56 0 
1996 Prosser, GD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 47.51 8.81 0 
1999 Prosser, GD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 50.27 11.57 0 
2002 Prosser, GD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 53.27 14.57 0 
2005 Prosser, GD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 56.28 17.58 0 
2007 Prosser, GD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 58.28 19.58 0 
1996 Pyne, CM 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 28.73 3.13 0 
1999 Pyne, CM 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 31.49 5.89 0 
2002 Pyne, CM 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 34.5 8.9 0 
2005 Pyne, CM 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 37.5 11.9 0 
2007 Pyne, CM 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 39.5 13.9 0 
1996 Randall, DJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 43.02 0.16 0 
2002 Randall, DJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 48.79 2.82 0 
2005 Randall, DJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 51.79 5.82 0 
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2007 Randall, DJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 53.79 7.82 0 
1996 Reid, ME 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 60.97 15 0 
1999 Reid, ME 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 63.73 17.76 0 
2002 Reid, ME 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 66.73 20.76 0 
1996 Reid, NB 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.79 6.11 0 
1996 Reith, PK 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45.82 11.67 1 
1999 Reith, PK 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48.58 14.43 1 
2005 Richardson, KC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 46.92 0.32 0 
2007 Richardson, KC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 48.92 2.32 0 
2005 Robb, AJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53.49 0.32 0 
2007 Robb, AJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55.49 2.32 0 
1996 Ronaldson, M 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42.24 6.11 0 
1999 Ronaldson, M 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 8.87 0 
2007 Ronaldson, M 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 13.14 0 
1996 Ruddock, PM 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53.17 22.62 0 
1999 Ruddock, PM 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55.93 25.38 1 
2002 Ruddock, PM 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.93 28.38 1 
2005 Ruddock, PM 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61.94 31.38 1 
2007 Ruddock, PM 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63.94 33.38 1 
2005 Santoro, S 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 48.8 2.26 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2007 Santoro, S 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.8 4.26 0 
1999 Schultz, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.72 0.33 0 
2002 Schultz, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.72 3.33 0 
2005 Schultz, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65.73 6.34 0 
2007 Schultz, AJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67.73 8.34 0 
1996 Scott, BC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 52.56 6.11 0 
1999 Scott, BC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 55.32 8.87 0 
2002 Scott, BC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 58.33 11.87 0 
2005 Scott, BC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 61.33 14.87 0 
2007 Scott, BC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 63.33 16.87 0 
2002 Scullion, NG 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 45.78 0.23 0 
2005 Scullion, NG 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 48.78 3.23 0 
2007 Scullion, NG 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 50.78 5.23 0 
1999 Secker, PD 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 42.68 0.33 0 
2002 Secker, PD 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 45.69 3.33 0 
2005 Secker, PD 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 48.69 6.34 0 
2007 Secker, PD 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 50.69 8.34 0 
1996 Sharp, JR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 41.4 11.42 1 
1996 Short, JR 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.44 16.27 0 
1996 Sinclair, IM 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 66.93 32.44 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1996 Slipper, PN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 46.24 5.74 0 
1999 Slipper, PN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 8.5 0 
2002 Slipper, PN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 11.5 0 
2005 Slipper, PN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 14.51 0 
2007 Slipper, PN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 16.51 0 
1996 Smith, AC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 45.82 0.16 0 
2002 Smith, AD 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34.92 0.23 0 
2005 Smith, AD 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.92 3.23 0 
2007 Smith, AD 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39.92 5.23 0 
1996 Smith, WL 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 41.99 8.45 0 
1996 Somlyay, AM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.32 6.11 0 
1999 Somlyay, AM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 53.07 8.87 0 
2002 Somlyay, AM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.08 11.87 0 
2005 Somlyay, AM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.08 14.87 0 
2007 Somlyay, AM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 61.08 16.87 0 
1996 Southcott, AJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 28.56 0.16 0 
1999 Southcott, AJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 31.32 2.92 0 
2002 Southcott, AJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 34.32 5.92 0 
2005 Southcott, AJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 37.33 8.93 0 
2007 Southcott, AJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 39.33 10.93 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1999 St Clair, SS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 49.23 0.33 0 
1996 Stone, SN 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45.05 0.16 0 
1999 Stone, SN 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.81 2.92 0 
2002 Stone, SN 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.81 5.92 0 
2005 Stone, SN 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53.82 8.93 0 
2007 Stone, SN 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55.82 10.93 0 
1996 Sullivan, KJ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.18 21.9 0 
1999 Sullivan, KJ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.94 24.65 0 
1999 Synon, KM 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39.41 1.72 0 
1996 Tambling, GE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 52.9 11.19 0 
1999 Tambling, GE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 55.66 13.95 0 
1996 Taylor, WL 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.67 8.06 0 
2002 Tchen, T 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.94 2.59 0 
2005 Tchen, T 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63.94 5.59 0 
1996 Teague, BC 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 51.65 17.84 0 
1999 Thompson, CP 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.36 0.33 0 
2002 Thompson, CP 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.36 3.33 0 
2005 Thompson, CP 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 44.37 6.34 0 
2007 Thompson, CP 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 46.37 8.34 0 
1996 Thomson, AP 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35.33 1.06 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1999 Thomson, AP 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.09 3.82 0 
2002 Ticehurst, KV 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.07 0.23 0 
2005 Ticehurst, KV 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.07 3.23 0 
2007 Ticehurst, KV 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.07 5.23 0 
1996 Tierney, JW 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.31 5.22 0 
1999 Tierney, JW 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53.07 7.98 0 
2002 Tierney, JW 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56.07 10.98 0 
2005 Tierney, JW 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59.07 13.98 0 
2002 Tollner, DW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 36.03 0.23 0 
2005 Tollner, DW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 39.03 3.23 0 
2007 Tollner, DW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 41.03 5.23 0 
1996 Troeth, JM 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55.78 2.83 0 
1999 Troeth, JM 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.54 5.59 0 
2002 Troeth, JM 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61.54 8.59 0 
2005 Troeth, JM 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64.54 11.6 0 
2007 Troeth, JM 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66.54 13.6 0 
2007 Trood, RB 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.2 1.59 0 
1996 Truss, WE 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 47.59 6.11 0 
1999 Truss, WE 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 50.35 8.87 0 
2002 Truss, WE 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 53.35 11.87 1 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
2005 Truss, WE 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 56.36 14.87 1 
2007 Truss, WE 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 58.36 16.87 1 
1996 Tuckey, CW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 60.85 15.54 0 
1999 Tuckey, CW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 63.61 18.3 0 
2002 Tuckey, CW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 66.61 21.3 0 
2005 Tuckey, CW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 69.61 24.31 0 
2007 Tuckey, CW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 71.61 26.31 0 
2005 Turnbull, MB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.31 0.32 0 
2007 Turnbull, MB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52.31 2.32 1 
1996 Vaile, MA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 40.06 3.13 0 
1999 Vaile, MA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 42.82 5.89 1 
2002 Vaile, MA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 45.82 8.9 1 
2005 Vaile, MA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 48.82 11.9 1 
2007 Vaile, MA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50.82 13.9 1 
1996 Vale, DS 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.49 0.16 0 
1999 Vale, DS 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.25 2.92 0 
2002 Vale, DS 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.25 5.92 0 
2005 Vale, DS 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.26 8.93 0 
2007 Vale, DS 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.26 10.93 0 
1996 Vanstone, AE 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 43.42 11.42 1 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1999 Vanstone, AE 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 46.18 14.18 0 
2002 Vanstone, AE 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 49.19 17.18 1 
2005 Vanstone, AE 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 52.19 20.18 1 
2007 Vanstone, AE 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 54.19 22.18 0 
2005 Vasta, RX 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.35 0.32 0 
2007 Vasta, RX 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.35 2.32 0 
1996 Wakelin, BH 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 50.02 3.13 0 
1999 Wakelin, BH 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 52.78 5.89 0 
2002 Wakelin, BH 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55.78 8.9 0 
2005 Wakelin, BH 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 58.78 11.9 0 
2007 Wakelin, BH 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 60.78 13.9 0 
1999 Washer, MJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 53.51 0.33 0 
2002 Washer, MJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 56.51 3.33 0 
2005 Washer, MJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 59.52 6.34 0 
2007 Washer, MJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 61.52 8.34 0 
1996 Watson, JO 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 59.3 17.84 0 
1999 Watson, JO 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 62.06 20.6 0 
2002 Watson, JO 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 65.06 23.61 0 
2005 Watson, JO 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 68.07 26.61 0 
2007 Watson, JO 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 70.07 28.61 0 






Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Age Exp' Cab' 
1996 West, AG 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 43.65 0.16 0 
1996 Williams, DR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 53.73 3.13 0 
1999 Williams, DR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 56.49 5.89 1 
2002 Williams, DR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 59.49 8.9 1 
2005 Wood, JP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.72 0.32 0 
2007 Wood, JP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.72 2.32 0 
1996 Woods, RL 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49.08 7.82 0 
1996 Wooldridge, MR 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39.5 8.81 1 
1999 Wooldridge, MR 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42.26 11.57 1 
1996 Worth, PM 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 50.06 3.13 0 
1999 Worth, PM 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 52.82 5.89 0 
2002 Worth, PM 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55.82 8.9 0 
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                          Appendix 1: Data for RIF Models     Data for ALP RIF Models 
 
 
Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT L R CI Age Exp ShadCab 
2005 Adams, DG 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 53.8 11.9 0 
2006 Adams, DG 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 54.8 12.9 0 
2005 Albanese, AN 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 41.95 8.93 1 
2006 Albanese, AN 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 42.95 9.93 1 
2005 Beazley, KC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 56.17 24.31 1 
2006 Beazley, KC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 57.17 25.31 1 
2005 Bevis, AR 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 49.85 14.87 0 
2006 Bevis, AR 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 50.85 15.87 0 
2005 Bird, S 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 42.24 0.32 0 
2006 Bird, S 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 43.24 1.32 0 
2005 Bishop, M 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 50.63 8.59 0 
2006 Bishop, M 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 51.63 9.59 0 
2005 Bolkus, N 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 54.58 23.61 0 
2005 Bowen, CE 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 32.06 0.32 0 
2006 Bowen, CE 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 33.06 1.32 0 
2006 Brown, CL 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 42.57 0.44 0 
2005 Buckland, GF 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 57.27 4.39 0 
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Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT L R CI Age Exp ShadCab 
2005 Burke, AE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 39.11 6.34 0 
2006 Burke, AE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 40.11 7.34 0 
2005 Burke, AS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 35.27 0.32 0 
2006 Burke, AS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 36.27 1.32 0 
2005 Byrne, AM 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 42.2 5.24 0 
2006 Byrne, AM 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 43.2 6.24 0 
2005 Campbell, G 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 62 7.38 0 
2006 Campbell, G 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 63 8.38 0 
2005 Carr, KJ 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 49.62 11.77 1 
2006 Carr, KJ 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 50.62 12.77 1 
2005 Collins, JM 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 42.44 9.76 0 
2005 Conroy, SM 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 42.07 8.76 1 
2006 Conroy, SM 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 43.07 9.76 1 
2005 Cook, PF 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 61.28 21.93 0 
2005 Corcoran, AK 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 53.4 4.48 0 
2006 Corcoran, AK 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 54.4 5.48 0 
2005 Crean, SF 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 55.97 14.87 1 
2006 Crean, SF 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 56.97 15.87 1 
2005 Crossin, PM 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 48.9 6.64 0 
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Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT L R CI Age Exp ShadCab 
2006 Crossin, PM 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 49.9 7.64 0 
2005 Danby, MD 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 49.99 6.34 0 
2006 Danby, MD 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 50.99 7.34 0 
2005 Denman, KJ 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 67.58 11.45 0 
2005 Edwards, GJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 58.58 6.34 0 
2006 Edwards, GJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 59.58 7.34 0 
2005 Elliot, MJ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 37.54 0.32 0 
2006 Elliot, MJ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 38.54 1.32 0 
2005 Ellis, AL 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 58.35 8.93 0 
2006 Ellis, AL 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 59.35 9.93 0 
2005 Ellis, KM 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 27.38 0.32 0 
2006 Ellis, KM 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 28.38 1.32 0 
2005 Emerson, CA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 50.25 6.34 0 
2006 Emerson, CA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 51.25 7.34 0 
2005 Evans, CV 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 46.75 11.6 1 
2006 Evans, CV 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 47.75 12.6 1 
2005 Faulkner, JP 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 50.84 15.84 0 
2006 Faulkner, JP 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 51.84 16.84 0 
2005 Ferguson, LD 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 52.61 14.87 1 
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Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT L R CI Age Exp ShadCab 
2006 Ferguson, LD 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 53.61 15.87 0 
2005 Ferguson, MJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 51.18 8.93 0 
2006 Ferguson, MJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 52.18 9.93 1 
2005 Fitzgibbon, JA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 43.07 8.93 0 
2006 Fitzgibbon, JA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 44.07 9.93 0 
2005 Forshaw, MG 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 53.1 10.74 0 
2006 Forshaw, MG 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 54.1 11.74 0 
2005 Garrett, PR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 51.83 0.32 0 
2006 Garrett, PR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 52.83 1.32 0 
2005 Georganas, S 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 45.67 0.32 0 
2006 Georganas, S 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 46.67 1.32 0 
2005 George, J 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 57.49 3.23 0 
2006 George, J 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 58.49 4.23 0 
2005 Gibbons, SW 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 55.43 6.34 0 
2006 Gibbons, SW 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 56.43 7.34 0 
2005 Gillard, JE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 43.37 6.34 1 
2006 Gillard, JE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 44.37 7.34 1 
2005 Grierson, SJ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 53.79 3.23 0 
2006 Grierson, SJ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 54.79 4.23 0 
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Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT L R CI Age Exp ShadCab 
2005 Griffin, AP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 44.97 11.9 0 
2006 Griffin, AP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 45.97 12.9 0 
2005 Hall, JG 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 55.25 6.34 0 
2006 Hall, JG 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 56.25 7.34 0 
2005 Hatton, MJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 53.48 8.64 0 
2006 Hatton, MJ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 54.48 9.64 0 
2006 Hayes, CP 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 50.58 0.87 0 
2005 Hoare, KJ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 41.62 6.34 0 
2006 Hoare, KJ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 42.62 7.34 0 
2005 Hogg, JJ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 55.91 8.59 0 
2006 Hogg, JJ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 56.91 9.59 0 
2006 Hurley, AK 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 50.63 0.59 0 
2005 Hutchins, SP 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 48.81 6.31 0 
2006 Hutchins, SP 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 49.81 7.31 0 
2005 Irwin, JC 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 53.27 6.34 0 
2006 Irwin, JC 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 54.27 7.34 0 
2005 Jenkins, HA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 52.49 18.99 0 
2006 Jenkins, HA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 53.49 19.99 0 
2005 Kerr, DJ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 52.97 17.58 0 
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Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT L R CI Age Exp ShadCab 
2006 Kerr, DJ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 53.97 18.58 0 
2005 King, CF 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 38.7 3.23 0 
2006 King, CF 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 39.7 4.23 0 
2005 Kirk, LJ 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 37.72 2.59 0 
2006 Kirk, LJ 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 38.72 3.59 0 
2005 Lawrence, CM 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 56.96 10.9 0 
2006 Lawrence, CM 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 57.96 11.9 0 
2005 Livermore, KF 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 35.25 6.34 0 
2006 Livermore, KF 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 36.25 7.34 0 
2005 Ludwig, JW 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 45.57 5.59 0 
2006 Ludwig, JW 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 46.57 6.59 0 
2005 Lundy, KA 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 37.16 8.93 0 
2006 Lundy, KA 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 38.16 9.93 0 
2005 Mackay, SM 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 44.83 8.91 0 
2005 Macklin, JL 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 51.13 8.93 1 
2006 Macklin, JL 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 52.13 9.93 1 
2005 Marshall, GM 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 44.89 2.59 0 
2006 Marshall, GM 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 45.89 3.59 0 
2005 McClelland, RB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 47.05 8.93 1 
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Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT L R CI Age Exp ShadCab 
2006 McClelland, RB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 48.05 9.93 1 
2006 McEwen, A 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 51.53 0.59 0 
2005 McLucas, JE 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46.88 5.59 0 
2006 McLucas, JE 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 47.88 6.59 0 
2005 McMullan, RF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 57.19 16.9 0 
2006 McMullan, RF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 58.19 17.9 0 
2005 Melham, D 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 50.22 14.87 0 
2006 Melham, D 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 51.22 15.87 0 
2005 Moore, CM 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 48.99 2.59 0 
2006 Moore, CM 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 49.99 3.59 0 
2005 Murphy, JP 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 54.71 6.34 0 
2006 Murphy, JP 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 55.71 7.34 0 
2005 O’Brien, KW 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 53.58 8.41 0 
2006 O’Brien, KW 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 54.58 9.41 0 
2005 O’Connor, BP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 42.95 3.23 0 
2006 O’Connor, BP 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 43.95 4.23 0 
2005 O’Connor, GM 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 57.21 11.9 0 
2006 O’Connor, GM 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 58.21 12.9 0 
2005 Owens, JA 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46.33 0.32 0 
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Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT L R CI Age Exp ShadCab 
2006 Owens, JA 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 47.33 1.32 0 
2005 Plibersek, TJ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 35.19 6.34 1 
2006 Plibersek, TJ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 36.19 7.34 1 
2006 Polley, HB 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 49.01 0.59 0 
2005 Price, LR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 59.22 20.18 0 
2006 Price, LR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 60.22 21.18 0 
2005 Quick, HV 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 63.64 11.9 0 
2006 Quick, HV 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 64.64 12.9 0 
2005 Ray, RF 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 57.86 23.61 0 
2006 Ray, RF 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 58.86 24.61 0 
2005 Ripoll, BF 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 39.1 6.34 0 
2006 Ripoll, BF 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 40.1 7.34 0 
2005 Roxon, NL 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 37.87 6.34 0 
2006 Roxon, NL 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 38.87 7.34 1 
2005 Rudd, KM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 47.4 6.34 1 
2006 Rudd, KM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 48.4 7.34 1 
2005 Sawford, RW 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 60.64 16.87 0 
2006 Sawford, RW 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 61.64 17.87 0 
2005 Sercombe, RC 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 55.87 8.93 0 
                            Appendix 1: Data for RIF Models             ALP Data (Continued)                       
 
 
Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT L R CI Age Exp ShadCab 
2006 Sercombe, RC 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 56.87 9.93 0 
2005 Sherry, NJ 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 49.24 14.6 1 
2006 Sherry, NJ 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50.24 15.6 1 
2005 Smith, SF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 49.18 11.9 1 
2006 Smith, SF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 50.18 12.9 1 
2005 Snowdon, WE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 54.91 14.99 0 
2006 Snowdon, WE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 55.91 15.99 0 
2005 Stephens, UM 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 50.61 2.59 0 
2006 Stephens, UM 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 51.61 3.59 0 
2006 Sterle, G 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 46.11 0.59 0 
2005 Swan, WM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 50.63 9.31 1 
2006 Swan, WM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 51.63 10.31 1 
2005 Tanner, LJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 48.81 11.9 0 
2006 Tanner, LJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 49.81 12.9 1 
2005 Thomson, KJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 49.79 8.93 1 
2006 Thomson, KJ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 50.79 9.93 1 
2005 Vamvakinou, M 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46.11 3.23 0 
2006 Vamvakinou, M 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 47.11 4.23 0 
2005 Webber, RS 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 39.89 2.59 0 
                            Appendix 1: Data for RIF Models             ALP Data (Continued)                       
 
 
Year Name Senate Female Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT L R CI Age Exp ShadCab 
2006 Webber, RS 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 40.89 3.59 0 
2005 Wilkie, K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 45.7 6.34 0 
2006 Wilkie, K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 46.7 7.34 0 
2005 Wong, PY 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 36.27 2.59 1 
2006 Wong, PY 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 37.27 3.59 1 
2006 Wortley, DJ 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 46.62 0.59 0 
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Appendix 2: Cohort Details (n = 384) 
Name                                                     ALP/LNPC             Modelling Sample              Removed from Sample 
                                                                                               CM           Non-CM             In Parl’               BB &  
        @Feb’ 08           IGE<8.5yrs 
      
Abbott, Anthony John LNPC 1    
Abetz, Eric LNPC   1  
Adams, Dick Godfrey Harry ALP   1  
Adams, Judith Anne LNPC   1  
Albanese, Anthony Norman ALP 1    
Alston, Richard Kenneth Robert LNPC 1    
Anderson, John Duncan LNPC 1    
Andrew, John Neil LNPC  1   
Andrews, Kevin James LNPC 1    
Anthony, Lawrence James LNPC  1   
Bailey, Frances Esther LNPC   1  
Baird, Bruce George LNPC  1   
Baker, Mark Horden LNPC    1 
Baldwin, Peter Jeremy ALP 1    
Baldwin, Robert Charles LNPC   1  
Barnett, Guy LNPC   1  
Barresi, Phillip Anthony LNPC  1   
Bartlett, Kerry Joseph LNPC  1   
Baume, Michael Ehrenfried LNPC  1   
Beahan, Michael Eamon ALP  1   
Beazley, Kim Christian ALP 1    
Beddall, David Peter ALP  1   
Bernardi, Cory LNPC   1  
Bevis, Archibald Ronald ALP   1  
Bidgood, James Mark ALP   1  
Billson, Bruce Fredrick LNPC   1  
Bird, Sharon ALP   1  
Birmingham, Simon John LNPC   1  
Bishop, (Thomas) Mark ALP   1  
Bishop, Bronwyn Kathleen LNPC   1  
Bishop, Julie Isabel LNPC 1    
Bolkus, Nick ALP 1    
Boswell, Ronald Leslie Doyle LNPC   1  
Bowen, Christopher Eyles ALP   1  
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Name                                                     ALP/LNPC             Modelling Sample              Removed from Sample 
                                                                                               CM           Non-CM             In Parl’               BB &  
        @Feb’ 08           IGE<8.5yrs 
Boyce, Suzanne Kay LNPC   1  
Bradbury, David John ALP   1  
Bradford, John Walter LNPC    1 
Brandis, George Henry LNPC   1  
Brereton, Laurence John ALP 1    
Broadbent, Russell Evan LNPC   1  
Brough, Malcolm Thomas LNPC 1    
Brown, Carol Louise ALP   1  
Brown, RJ ALP  1   
Brownhill, David Gordon Cadell LNPC  1   
Buckland, Geoffrey Frederick ALP    1 
Burke, Anna Elizabeth ALP   1  
Burke, Anthony Stephen ALP 1    
Burns, Bryant Robert ALP  1   
Bushby, David Christopher LNPC   1  
Butler, Mark Christopher ALP   1  
Byrne, Anthony Michael ALP   1  
Cadman, Alan Glyndwr LNPC  1   
Calvert, Paul Henry LNPC  1   
Cameron, Eoin Harrap LNPC    1 
Cameron, Ross Alexander LNPC  1   
Campbell, George ALP   1  
Campbell, Ian Gordon LNPC 1    
Campbell, Jodie Louise ALP   1  
Carr, Kim John ALP 1    
Causley, Ian Raymond LNPC  1   
Champion, Nicholas David ALP   1  
Chapman, Hedley Grant Pearson LNPC   1  
Charles, Robert Edwin LNPC  1   
Cheeseman, Darren Leicester ALP   1  
Childs, Bruce Kenneth ALP  1   
Ciobo, Steven Michele LNPC   1  
Clare, Jason Dean ALP   1  
Coates, John ALP  1   
Cobb, John Kenneth LNPC   1  
Cobb, Michael Roy LNPC    1 
Colbeck, Richard Mansell LNPC   1  
Collins, Jacinta Mary Ann ALP   1  
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Name                                                     ALP/LNPC             Modelling Sample              Removed from Sample 
                                                                                               CM           Non-CM             In Parl’               BB &  
        @Feb’ 08           IGE<8.5yrs 
Collins, Julie Maree ALP   1  
Collins, Robert Lindsay ALP 1    
Colston, Malcolm Arthur ALP  1   
Combet,  Gregory Ivan ALP   1  
Conroy, Stephen Michael ALP 1    
Cook, Peter Francis Salmon ALP 1    
Coonan, Helen Lloyd LNPC 1    
Cooney, Bernard Cornelius ALP  1   
Corcoran, Ann Kathleen ALP    1 
Cormann, Mathias Hubert Paul LNPC   1  
Costello, Peter Howard LNPC 1    
Coulton, Mark Maclean LNPC   1  
Cox, David Alexander ALP    1 
Crane, Arthur Winston LNPC    1 
Crean, Simon Findlay ALP 1    
Crosio, Janice Anne ALP    1 
Crossin, Patricia Margaret ALP   1  
Crowley, Rosemary Anne ALP  1   
D’Ath, Yvette Maree ALP   1  
Danby, Michael David ALP   1  
Dargavel, Steven John ALP    1 
Debus,  Robert John ALP   1  
Denman, Kay Janet ALP    1 
Dondas, Nicholas Manuel LNPC    1 
Downer, Alexander John Gosse LNPC 1    
Draper, Patricia LNPC  1   
Dreyfus, Mark Alfred ALP   1  
Dutton, Peter Craig LNPC   1  
Edwards, Graham John ALP    1 
Eggleston, Alan LNPC   1  
Elliot, Maria Justine ALP   1  
Ellis, Annette Louise ALP   1  
Ellis, Katherine Margaret ALP   1  
Ellison, Christopher Martin LNPC   1  
Elson, Kay Selma LNPC  1   
Emerson, Craig Anthony ALP   1  
Entsch, Warren George LNPC  1   
Evans, Christopher Vaughan ALP 1    
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Name                                                     ALP/LNPC             Modelling Sample              Removed from Sample 
                                                                                               CM           Non-CM             In Parl’               BB &  
        @Feb’ 08           IGE<8.5yrs 
Evans, Gareth John ALP 1    
Evans, Martyn John ALP    1 
Evans, Richard David Conroy LNPC    1 
Fahey, John Joseph LNPC 1    
Farmer, Patrick Francis LNPC   1  
Faulkner, John Philip ALP 1    
Fawcett, David Julian LNPC    1 
Ferguson, Alan Baird LNPC   1  
Ferguson, Laurie Donald Thomas ALP   1  
Ferguson, Martin John ALP 1    
Ferguson, Michael Darrel LNPC    1 
Ferris, Jeannie Margaret LNPC  1   
Fierravanti-Wells, Concetta Anna LNPC   1  
Fifield, Mitchell Peter LNPC   1  
Fischer, Timothy Andrew LNPC 1    
Fisher, Mary Jo LNPC   1  
Fitzgibbon, Joel Andrew ALP 1    
Foreman, Dominic John ALP  1   
Forrest, John Alexander LNPC   1  
Forshaw, Michael George ALP   1  
Gallus, Christine Ann LNPC  1   
Gambaro, Teresa LNPC  1   
Garrett, Peter Robert ALP 1    
Gash, Joanna LNPC   1  
Georganas, Steven ALP   1  
George, Jennie ALP   1  
Georgiou, Petro LNPC   1  
Gerick, Jane Frances ALP    1 
Gibbons, Stephen William ALP   1  
Gibbs, Brenda ALP    1 
Gibson, Brian Francis LNPC    1 
Gillard, Julia Eileen ALP 1    
Grace, Edward Laurence ALP  1   
Grace, Elizabeth Jane LNPC    1 
Gray,  Gary ALP   1  
Grierson, Sharon Joy ALP   1  
Griffin, Alan Peter ALP   1  
Haase, Barry Wayne LNPC   1  
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Name                                                     ALP/LNPC             Modelling Sample              Removed from Sample 
                                                                                               CM           Non-CM             In Parl’               BB &  
        @Feb’ 08           IGE<8.5yrs 
Hale, Damian Francis ALP   1  
Hall, Jill Griffiths ALP   1  
Halverson, Robert George LNPC    1 
Hardgrave, Gary Douglas LNPC  1   
Hartsuyker, Luke LNPC   1  
Hatton, Michael John ALP    1 
Hawke, Alexander George LNPC   1  
Hawker, David Peter Maxwell LNPC   1  
Hayes, Christopher Patrick ALP   1  
Heffernan, William Daniel LNPC   1  
Henry, Stuart Irwin LNPC    1 
Herron, John Joseph LNPC  1   
Hicks, Noel Jeffrey LNPC    1 
Hill, Robert Murray LNPC 1    
Hoare, Kelly Joy ALP    1 
Hockey, Joseph Benedict LNPC 1    
Hogg, John Joseph ALP   1  
Holding, Allan Clyde ALP 1    
Hollis, Colin ALP  1   
Horne, Robert Hodges ALP    1 
Howard, John Winston LNPC 1    
Hull, Kay Elizabeth LNPC   1  
Humphries, Gary John Joseph LNPC    1 
Hunt, Gregory Andrew LNPC   1  
Hurley, Annette Kay ALP   1  
Hutchins, Stephen Patrick ALP   1  
Irons, Stephen James LNPC   1  
Irwin, Julia Claire ALP   1  
Jackson, Sharryn Maree ALP    1 
Jeanes, Susan Barbara LNPC    1 
Jenkins, Henry Alfred ALP   1  
Jensen, Dennis Geoffrey LNPC   1  
Johnson, Michael Andrew LNPC   1  
Johnston, David Albert Lloyd LNPC   1  
Johnston, Ricky LNPC    1 
Jones, Barry Owen ALP  1   
Jones, Gerry Norman ALP  1   
Joyce, Barnaby Thomas Gerrard LNPC   1  
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Name                                                     ALP/LNPC             Modelling Sample              Removed from Sample 
                                                                                               CM           Non-CM             In Parl’               BB &  
        @Feb’ 08           IGE<8.5yrs 
Jull, David Francis LNPC  1   
Katter, Robert Carl LNPC   1  
Keenan, Michael Fayat LNPC   1  
Kelly,  Michael Joseph ALP   1  
Kelly, De-Anne Margaret LNPC  1   
Kelly, Jacqueline Marie LNPC  1   
Kemp, Charles Roderick LNPC   1  
Kemp, David Alistair LNPC 1    
Kernot, Cheryl ALP    1 
Kerr, Duncan James Colquhoun ALP   1  
King, Catherine Fiona ALP   1  
King, Peter Edward LNPC    1 
Kirk, Linda Jean ALP   1  
Knowles, Susan Christine LNPC  1   
Laming, Andrew Charles LNPC   1  
Langmore, John Vance ALP  1   
Latham, Mark William ALP    1 
Lawler, Anthony John LNPC    1 
Lawrence, Carmen Mary ALP 1    
Lee, Michael John ALP 1    
Ley, Sussan Penelope LNPC   1  
Liberman, Louis Stuart LNPC    1 
Lightfoot, Philip Ross LNPC   1  
Lindsay, Peter John LNPC   1  
Livermore, Kirsten Fiona ALP   1  
Lloyd, James Eric LNPC  1   
Ludwig, Joseph William ALP 1    
Lundy, Kate Alexandra ALP   1  
Macdonald, Ian Douglas LNPC   1  
Macdonald, John Alexander 
Lindsay  
LNPC   1  
Macfarlane, Ian Elgin LNPC 1    
MacGibbon, David John LNPC    1 
Mackay, Susan Mary ALP    1 
Macklin, Jennifer Louise ALP 1    
Marek, Paul LNPC    1 
Marino, Nola Bethwyn LNPC   1  
Markus, Louise Elizabeth LNPC   1  
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Name                                                     ALP/LNPC             Modelling Sample              Removed from Sample 
                                                                                               CM           Non-CM             In Parl’               BB &  
        @Feb’ 08           IGE<8.5yrs 
Marles, Richard Donald ALP   1  
Marshall, Gavin Mark ALP   1  
Martin, Stephen Paul ALP  1   
Mason, Brett John LNPC   1  
May, Margaret Ann LNPC   1  
McArthur, Fergus Stewart LNPC  1   
McClelland, Robert Bruce ALP 1    
McDougall, Graeme Robert LNPC    1 
McEwen, Anne ALP   1  
McFarlane, Jann Sonya ALP    1 
McGauran, Julian John James LNPC   1  
McGauran, Peter John LNPC 1    
McKew,  Maxine Margaret ALP   1  
McKiernan, James Philip ALP  1   
McLachlan, Ian Murray LNPC 1    
McLeay, Leo Boyce ALP  1   
McLucas, Jan Elizabeth ALP   1  
McMullan, Robert Francis ALP 1    
Melham, Daryl ALP   1  
Miles, Christopher Gordon LNPC  1   
Minchin, Nicholas Hugh LNPC 1    
Mirabella (Panopoulos), Sophie  LNPC   1  
Moore, Claire Mary ALP   1  
Moore, John Colinton LNPC 1    
Morris, Allan Agapitos ALP  1   
Morris, Peter Frederick ALP 1    
Morrison, Scott John LNPC   1  
Mossfield, Frank William ALP    1 
Moylan, Judith Eleanor LNPC   1  
Murphy, John Paul ALP   1  
Murphy, Shayne Michael ALP    1 
Mutch, Stephen Bruce LNPC    1 
Nairn, Gary Roy LNPC  1   
Nash, Fiona Joy LNPC   1  
Neal, Belinda Jane ALP   1  
Nehl, Garry Barr LNPC    1 
Nelson, Brendan John LNPC 1    
Neumann, Shayne Kenneth ALP   1  
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Name                                                     ALP/LNPC             Modelling Sample              Removed from Sample 
                                                                                               CM           Non-CM             In Parl’               BB &  
        @Feb’ 08           IGE<8.5yrs 
Neville, Paul Christopher LNPC   1  
Newman, Jocelyn Margaret LNPC 1    
Nugent, Peter Edward LNPC    1 
O’Brien, Kerry Williams Kelso ALP   1  
O’Byrne, Michelle Anne ALP    1 
O’Chee, William George LNPC    1 
O’Connor, Brendan Patrick ALP   1  
O’Connor, Gavan Michael ALP    1 
O’Keefe, Neil Patrick ALP  1   
Owens, Julie Ann ALP   1  
Panizza, John Horace LNPC    1 
Parer, Warwick Raymond LNPC  1   
Parke, Melissa ALP   1  
Parry, Stephen Shane LNPC   1  
Patterson, Kay Christine Lesley LNPC 1    
Payne, Marise Ann LNPC   1  
Pearce, Christopher John LNPC   1  
Perrett, Graham Douglas ALP   1  
Plibersek, Tanya Joan ALP   1  
Polley, Helen Beatrice ALP   1  
Price, Leo Roger Spurway ALP   1  
Prosser, Geoffrey Daniel LNPC  1   
Pyne, Christopher Maurice LNPC   1  
Quick, Harry Vernon ALP    1 
Quirke, John Andrew ALP    1 
Raguse, Brett Blair ALP   1  
Ramsey, Rowan Eric LNPC   1  
Randall, Donald James LNPC   1  
Ray, Robert Francis ALP 1    
Rea, Kerry Marie ALP   1  
Reid, Margaret Elizabeth LNPC  1   
Reid, Nicholas Bruce LNPC    1 
Reith, Peter Keaston LNPC 1    
Reynolds, Margaret ALP  1   
Richardson, Kym Charles LNPC    1 
Ripoll, Bernard Fernando ALP   1  
Rishworth, Amanda Louise ALP   1  
Robb, Andrew John LNPC   1  
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Name                                                     ALP/LNPC             Modelling Sample              Removed from Sample 
                                                                                               CM           Non-CM             In Parl’               BB &  
        @Feb’ 08           IGE<8.5yrs 
Robert, Stuart Rowland LNPC   1  
Ronaldson, M LNPC   1  
Roxon, Nicola Louise ALP 1    
Rudd, Kevin Michael ALP 1    
Ruddock, Philip Maxwell LNPC 1    
Saffin, Janelle Anne ALP   1  
Santoro, Santo LNPC  1   
Sawford, Rodney Weston ALP    1 
Schacht, Christopher Cleland ALP  1   
Schultz, Albert John LNPC   1  
Sciacca, Concetto Antonio ALP  1   
Scott, Bruce Craig LNPC   1  
Scullion, Nigel Gregory LNPC   1  
Secker, Patrick Damien LNPC   1  
Sercombe, Robert Charles Grant ALP    1 
Sharp, John Randall LNPC 1    
Sherry, Nicholas John ALP   1  
Short, James Robert LNPC  1   
Short, Leonie Marjorie ALP    1 
Shorten,  William Richard ALP   1  
Sidebottom, Peter Sid ALP   1  
Simpkins, Luke Xavier Linton LNPC   1  
Sinclair, Ian McCahon LNPC 1    
Slipper, Peter Neil LNPC   1  
Smith, Anthony Charles LNPC    1 
Smith, Anthony David Hawthorn LNPC   1  
Smith, Stephen Francis ALP 1    
Smith, Warwick Leslie LNPC  1   
Snowdon, Warren Edward ALP   1  
Somlyay, Alexander Michael LNPC   1  
Southcott, Andrew John LNPC   1  
St Clair, Stuart Roy LNPC    1 
Stephens, Ursula Mary ALP   1  
Sterle, Glenn ALP   1  
Stone, Sharman Nancy LNPC   1  
Sullivan, Jonathan Harold ALP   1  
Sullivan, Kathryn Jean Martin LNPC  1   
Swan, Wayne Maxwell ALP 1    
Appendix 2: Cohort Details (Continued) 
 449 
 
Name                                                     ALP/LNPC             Modelling Sample              Removed from Sample 
                                                                                               CM           Non-CM             In Parl’               BB &  
        @Feb’ 08           IGE<8.5yrs 
Symon, Michael Stuart ALP   1  
Synon, Karen Margaret LNPC    1 
Tambling, Grant Ernest John LNPC  1   
Tanner, Lindsay James ALP 1    
Taylor, William Leonard LNPC    1 
Tchen, Tsebin LNPC    1 
Teague, Baden Chapman LNPC    1 
Theophanous, Andrew Charles ALP  1   
Thompson, Cameron Paul LNPC  1   
Thomson, Andrew Peter LNPC  1   
Thomson, Craig Robert ALP   1  
Thomson, Kelvin John ALP   1  
Ticehurst, Kenneth Vincent LNPC    1 
Tierney, John William LNPC  1   
Tollner, David William LNPC    1 
Trevor, Chris Allan ALP   1  
Troeth, Judith Mary LNPC   1  
Trood, Russell Brunell LNPC   1  
Truss, Warren Errol LNPC 1    
Tuckey, Charles Wilson LNPC   1  
Turnbull, Malcolm Bligh LNPC 1    
Turnour, James Pearce ALP   1  
Vaile, Mark Anthony James LNPC 1    
Vale, Danna Sue LNPC   1  
Vamvakinou, Maria ALP   1  
Vanstone, Amanda Eloise LNPC 1    
Vasta, Ross Xavier LNPC    1 
Wakelin, Barry Hugh LNPC  1   
Washer, Malcolm James LNPC   1  
Watson, John Odin Wentworth LNPC   1  
Webber, Ruth Stephanie ALP   1  
West, Andrea Gail LNPC    1 
West, Suzanne Margaret ALP    1 
Wheelwright, Thomas Clive ALP    1 
Wilkie, Kim ALP    1 
Williams, Daryl Robert LNPC 1    
Willis, Ralph ALP 1    
Wilton, Gregory Stuart ALP    1 
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Name                                                     ALP/LNPC             Modelling Sample              Removed from Sample 
                                                                                               CM           Non-CM             In Parl’               BB &  
        @Feb’ 08           IGE<8.5yrs 
Wong, Penelope Ying Yen ALP 1    
Wood, Jason Peter LNPC   1  
Woods, Robert Leslie LNPC  1   
Wooldridge, Michael Richard L LNPC 1    
Worth, Patricia Mary LNPC  1   
Wortley, Dana Johanna ALP   1  
Zahra, Christian John ALP    1 
Zammit, Paul John LNPC    1 
Zappia, Tony ALP   1  
      
Total  68 66 177 73 






Appendix 3: Data Used for Committee Modelling 
Name CM Law Arts ParlAge IMG CON AOA CONAV DEF 
AbbottA 1 1 1 37 -0.16 -0.43 -0.77 0.53 -0.47 
AlbaneseA 1 0 0 33 0.12 -0.06 -0.46 -0.35 0.77 
AlstonR 1 1 1 45 -0.68 -0.8 1.21 -0.6 -2.01 
AndersonJ 1 0 1 33 -0.85 -0.99 0.35 -1.38 -1.17 
AndrewJN 0 0 0 39 2.02 2.23 -0.9 1.51 1.37 
AndrewsK 1 1 1 36 -0.54 -0.98 0.4 -0.02 -0.19 
AnthonyL 0 0 0 35 1.52 1.09 -0.8 1.36 0.42 
BairdB 0 0 1 56 1.31 1.41 -1.16 0.65 0.22 
BaldwinP 1 0 1 32 -1.1 -0.75 0.26 -0.14 -0.86 
BarresiP 0 0 1 41 1.53 1.32 -1.08 0.9 0.69 
BartlettK 0 0 0 47 -0.54 -0.7 0.21 0.02 -0.57 
BaumeME 0 0 1 45 0.22 0.23 -1.2 1.11 1.46 
BeahanME 0 0 1 50 -1.01 -0.85 0.42 -0.6 -1.74 
Beasleyk 1 0 1 32 -1.32 -0.54 0.3 -0.79 -0.78 
BeddallD 0 0 0 35 0.43 0.82 0.76 -0.52 0.35 
BishopJI 1 1 0 42 -1.43 -1.51 1.02 -1.16 -2.12 
BolkusN 1 1 0 30 0.21 -0.51 -0.27 -0.01 0.06 
BreretonL 1 0 0 44 -0.88 -1.09 0.83 -0.15 -1.5 
BroughM 1 0 0 35 0.53 0.51 -1.12 0.85 -0.32 
BrownBJ 0 0 0 47 -1.92 -0.49 1.75 -2.17 -0.36 
BrownhillDG 0 0 0 49 0.64 0.94 -1.09 1.31 1.13 
BurkeAT 1 1 1 35 -0.05 -0.25 -0.58 0.03 -0.05 
BurnsBR 0 0 0 58 0.08 0.5 -1.01 0.94 0.67 
CadmanA 0 0 0 37 1.15 1.65 -0.69 0.46 1.12 
CalvertP 0 0 0 47 0.31 0.19 0.82 -0.86 -0.8 
CameronRA 0 1 0 31 0.76 1.22 -0.79 0.22 0.78 
CampbellIG 1 0 0 31 -0.5 -0.69 0.95 -0.63 -0.74 
CarrK 1 0 1 38 -1 -0.97 0.92 -1.72 -0.43 
CausleyIR 0 0 0 56 2.3 2.59 -1.11 0.86 1.23 
CharlesRE 0 0 0 54 -0.6 -0.58 0.83 -0.25 -1.23 
ChildsBK 0 0 0 46 0.12 0.42 0.81 -0.45 0.72 
CoatesJ 0 0 0 28 -0.41 -1.26 0.85 0.17 -0.09 
CollinsRL 1 0 0 41 0.82 1.29 -0.5 1.24 1.08 
ColstonM 0 0 1 37 0.75 0.21 -0.98 0.84 1.45 
ConroyS 1 0 0 33 -0.69 -1.16 0.67 -0.6 -0.5 
CookP 1 0 0 40 -0.88 -0.5 1.05 -1.32 -0.15 
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Name CM Law Arts ParlAge IMG CON AOA CONAV DEF 
CoonanH 1 1 1 49 -0.48 -0.46 0.64 -0.11 0.08 
CooneyB 0 1 0 50 -0.42 -1.35 0.61 -1.06 -1.24 
CostelloP 1 1 1 33 -1.63 -0.75 0.34 -0.62 -1.28 
CreanS 1 1 0 41 -1.29 -1.06 2.27 -2.29 -3.14 
CrowleyR 0 0 0 45 0.08 -0.21 -0.44 1.3 1.37 
DownerA 1 0 1 33 -1.17 -1.37 1.43 -1.82 -2.55 
DraperP 0 0 1 37 0.78 0.78 -0.37 0.62 1.06 
ElsonK 0 0 0 49 1.91 1.08 -1.05 1.89 1.64 
EntchW 0 0 0 46 0.57 0.39 -1.07 0.34 1.08 
EvansC 1 0 1 35 -1.45 -1.24 1.62 -2.13 -1.56 
EvansG 1 1 1 33 -1.06 -0.67 0.26 -0.51 -1.01 
FaheyJ 1 1 0 51 0.68 0.51 -0.8 0.25 1.16 
FaulknerJP 1 0 1 35 1.04 0.58 -0.62 0.48 1.49 
FergusonM 1 0 0 43 0.65 -0.05 -1.34 1.03 0.71 
FerrisJ 0 0 0 55 0.66 0.51 -0.65 0.28 -0.1 
FischerT 1 0 0 38 0.84 1.63 0.15 0.65 0.27 
FitzgibbonJ 1 0 0 34 -0.13 -0.12 0.71 -1 -0.16 
ForemanD 0 0 0 47 0.69 0.66 -0.1 0.17 0.34 
GallusC 0 0 1 47 -0.36 -0.58 -1.02 0.74 0.09 
GambaroT 0 0 0 38 0.74 0.43 -1.33 0.81 0.68 
GarrettP 1 1 1 51 -0.6 -0.93 0.35 -0.4 -0.16 
GillardJ 1 1 1 37 0.76 0.14 -0.87 0.72 0.29 
GraceE 0 0 0 53 0.52 0.23 0.88 -0.2 -0.08 
HardgraveG 0 0 0 36 0.83 0.83 -0.99 0.79 0.12 
HerronJJ 0 0 0 58 -1.69 -1.61 0.13 -0.13 0.58 
HillRM 1 1 1 34 -1.2 -0.13 2.39 -2.37 -1.52 
HockeyJ 1 1 1 31 -0.82 -1.03 -0.84 0.44 -0.25 
HoldingC 1 1 0 46 0.28 0.9 -0.02 -0.45 0.91 
HollisC 0 0 1 45 0.39 0.76 1.27 -1.11 -0.24 
HowardJ 1 1 0 35 -0.57 -0.17 -0.77 0.33 0.36 
JonesB 0 1 1 45 0.22 0.21 -0.93 0.23 0.77 
JonesG 0 0 0 48 1.21 1.59 -1.33 0.65 2.27 
JullD 0 0 0 31 -0.44 0.1 -0.02 0.38 1.03 
KellyD 0 0 0 42 3.02 2.65 -2.68 2.35 1.69 
KellyJ 0 1 0 32 1.16 0.52 -1.77 1.03 -0.21 
KempD 1 1 1 49 -1.35 -1.86 2.1 -1.09 -1.93 
KnowlesS 0 0 0 33 -1.19 -1.82 1.07 -0.4 -0.74 
LangmoreJ 0 0 0 45 -0.57 -0.32 0.81 -1.21 -0.03 
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Name CM Law Arts ParlAge IMG CON AOA CONAV DEF 
LawrenceC 1 0 0 46 -0.79 -0.4 -0.44 -0.04 -0.3 
LeeM 1 0 0 27 1.66 1.39 -1.62 2.06 1.81 
LloydJ 0 0 0 42 1.73 1.3 -2.41 2.07 0.2 
LudwigJ 1 1 1 39 -0.42 -0.85 -0.16 0.34 -0.17 
MacfarlaneIE 1 0 0 43 1.11 1.16 -0.98 0.65 0.67 
MacklinJ 1 0 0 43 -1.87 -2.2 0.72 -0.84 -0.86 
MartinSP 0 0 1 36 1.73 1.83 0.12 0.29 0.2 
McArthurFS 0 0 1 47 1.29 1.73 -0.27 0.63 0.22 
McClellandR 1 1 1 38 -1.62 -1.15 1.19 -2.28 -0.76 
McGauranP 1 1 1 28 -1.45 -1.45 1.46 -0.96 -1.18 
McKiernanJ 0 0 0 40 0.79 1.1 -0.39 0.29 0.97 
McLachlanIM 1 0 1 54 0.87 0.42 -1.41 1.74 0.91 
McLeayL 0 0 0 34 0.35 0.28 -1.21 1.53 1.08 
McMullanRF 1 0 1 41 -1.71 -0.92 1.31 -2.26 -0.46 
MilesC 0 0 0 37 -0.57 -0.44 -0.23 0.45 0.02 
MinchinN 1 1 0 40 0.61 0.02 0.26 -0.66 0.21 
Moorej 1 0 0 45 -0.86 -0.59 1.08 -1.18 -2.07 
MorrisA 0 0 1 43 0.92 0.77 -0.16 0.4 0.74 
MorrisP 1 0 0 40 1.87 2.06 -1.7 1.05 2.99 
NairnG 0 0 0 45 1.6 1.64 0.23 1.16 0.67 
NelsonB 1 0 0 38 0.54 0.07 -2.07 1.9 1.13 
NewmanJM 1 1 0 49 -0.18 -0.13 0.09 0.43 0.14 
O'KeefeN 0 0 0 37 0.53 0.81 0.72 -0.06 -0.15 
ParerW 0 0 0 48 0.39 0.4 0.79 -0.26 -0.55 
PattersonK 1 0 1 43 -0.06 0.45 -0.37 -0.41 0.02 
ProsserG 0 0 0 39 0.11 0.71 0.05 0.13 0.69 
RayR 1 0 1 33 -0.24 -0.26 -0.04 0.46 0.49 
ReidME 0 1 0 46 0.84 0.59 -2.32 2.07 0.6 
ReithP 1 1 0 32 0.34 -0.01 0.04 0.28 0.39 
ReynoldsM 0 0 1 42 -0.34 -0.48 0.72 -0.57 0.03 
RoxonN 1 1 1 31 -0.64 -1.14 -0.58 0.35 0 
RuddK 1 0 1 41 -0.48 -0.79 0.66 -0.27 -0.09 
RuddockP 1 1 1 30 -0.25 0.01 1.19 -1.55 -0.81 
SantoroS 0 0 1 46 -0.87 -0.98 0.55 -0.78 -0.85 
SchachtC 0 0 0 41 0.18 0.69 -0.86 -0.24 -0.05 
SciaccaC 0 1 0 40 0.14 -0.08 -0.49 -0.32 0.6 
SharpJR 1 0 0 30 1.03 1.4 0.47 -0.45 -0.85 
ShortJR 0 0 1 39 -0.15 -0.11 0.01 0.59 0.2 
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Name CM Law Arts ParlAge IMG CON AOA CONAV DEF 
SinclairI 1 1 1 34 -1.33 -0.66 1.39 -1.37 -1.52 
SmithSF 1 1 1 38 0.13 -0.25 -0.23 -0.13 0.61 
SmithWL 0 1 0 30 -0.67 -0.54 0.9 -0.52 -0.87 
SullivanK 0 0 1 32 -1.44 -1.34 0.24 0.36 -0.92 
SwanW 1 0 1 39 1.44 1.3 -0.33 0.44 0.67 
Tambling 0 0 0 37 -1.13 -0.41 1.31 -1.67 -0.42 
TannerL 1 1 1 37 -0.54 -0.07 1.01 -0.52 -0.89 
TheophanousA 0 0 1 34 -1.72 -1.8 1.33 -1.06 -0.29 
ThompsonCP 0 0 0 38 0.81 0.54 -1.26 1.13 0.69 
ThomsonAP 0 1 1 34 -0.3 -1.04 -1.04 0.87 -1.11 
TierneyJW 0 0 0 45 0.53 0.96 0.13 -0.19 1.18 
TrussW 1 0 0 42 0.02 -0.02 0.55 -0.65 -1.18 
TurnbullM 1 1 1 50 0.94 -0.1 -1.01 1.27 -0.37 
VaileM 1 0 0 37 0.54 1 0.83 -0.56 -0.03 
VanstoneA 1 1 1 32 -1.37 -1.52 1.5 -0.81 -0.84 
WakelinB 0 0 0 47 -0.51 -0.2 0.33 0.07 -0.41 
WillamsDR 1 1 0 51 -0.84 0.05 0.93 -1.1 0.21 
WillisR 1 0 0 34 -0.42 -0.3 0.92 0.32 0.4 
WongP 1 1 1 33 -0.89 -1.53 0.18 -0.29 -1.08 
WoodsRL 0 0 0 40 -1 -1.11 0.82 -0.88 -0.97 
WooldridgeMRL 1 0 0 31 -0.08 -0.91 -0.3 0.95 1.55 





Appendix 4: Committee Modelling Procedure 
For each of the five iterations of the committee model building process the same 
basic procedure is undertaken.  
The first stage of the procedure is to divide the sample of 134 is divided into a 
training sample (n = 107) and a testing sample (n = 27).  
The training sample (n = 107) is used to isolate the variables that are 
significantly (p<.01) associated with CM on the basis of t-tests of the differences of 
means. These variables are then used to create a “naïve” model which consists of all 
variables that have p<.01. The classification accuracy on the holdout sample (n = 27) of 
this model is recorded and used as a baseline to compare with the subsequent attempts 
to improve the classification accuracy of the naïve model. 
The next stage attempts to improve the classification accuracy of the naïve 
model by eliminating redundant variables. Here, redundancy is defined as a situation in 
which, for two independent variables, there is a higher level of correlation than either 
variable has with the dependent variable. In order to assess the presence of redundancy 
a correlation matrix is generated. It is apparent form the correlation matrix that, as the 
linguistic variables are highly inter-correlated, it is possible there is redundancy in 
relation to the linguistic variables. This indicates that including more than one linguistic 
independent variable is unlikely to increase classification accuracy. However, the 
question is which of the linguistic variables to retain. Several models are created In 
order to determine which of the linguistic variables is the best predictor, each model 
consisting of one of the linguistic variables and the other non-linguistic variables from 
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the “naïve” model.  The model containing the linguistic variable with the highest 
classification accuracy is retained. This is referred to as the “reduced” model. 
Thus, the ”reduced” model consists of at most one linguistic variable and at least 
two other variables. The classification accuracy of the “reduced” model can be 
potentially increased by eliminating further variables. The procedure here is to use 
every possible combination of the variables in the “reduced” model to create a number 
of candidate “optimum” models. The optimum model is chosen by comparing these 
candidate “optimum” models on the basis of how well they classify the holdout sample.  
Finally, the parameter estimates of the optimum model are calculated. 
This entire procedure is undertaken for each of the 5 models in the committee. 
 
Committee Model 1 
Holdout Sample: 
AndersonJ ColstonM HerronJJ MilesC ThomsonAP 
AnthonyL CrowleyR HoldingC MinchinN WillamsDR 
BaumeME DownerA KellyJ  NewmanJM WooldridgeMRL 
BeahanME FaulknerJP LangmoreJ PattersonK  
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BolkusN FischerT LawrenceC RayR  
CadmanA ForemanD McMullanRF ShortJR  
Using the training sample, the first stage is to find the variables that have 
different means for CMs as opposed to non-CMs. These are ranked by p-values. Those 
for which  p<.01 are selected for use in the model (Table A4-1. 
Table A4-1: Variables for which p<.01 (Committee Model 1) 
 
The next stage is to calculate the holdout sample classification accuracy of a 
model consisting of all 7 of the variables identified with p<.01. The results are as 
follow: Accuracy = 66.67%; Sensitivity = 50.00%; Specificity = 84.62%; Kappa = 
.3415 (p=.0566). 
It is important to look for potential redundancy in the training sample (n = 107). 
To do this we calculate a table of intercorrelations of the variables in the naïve model 
and look for variables that are more correlated with each other than with the dependent 
variable (Table A4-2). 
Mean Mean
Non-CMs CMs p-value Description
Law 0.11 0.52 0.000 Binary Variable: 1 = legal qualification, 0 = no legal qualification
CON* 0.41 -0.36 0.000 Concreteness
ParlAge 42.74 37.87 0.000 Age of first entry to Federal Parliament
IMG* 0.37 -0.33 0.000 Imagability. A measure of concreteness
DEF* 0.28 -0.37 0.001 Ease of definitions. A measure of concreteness
Arts 0.25 0.56 0.001 Binary Variable: 1 = Arts qualification, 0 = no Arts qualification
CONAV* 0.24 -0.26 0.009 Context availability. A measure of concreteness
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Table A4-2: Intercorrelations between Variables (Committee Model 1) 
 
The linguistic variables have higher correlation with each other than they have with the 
dependent variable so such we can remove three of them. IN order to decide which one 
to retain is to create four models are created, each of which has one of the linguistic 
variables and all of the non-linguistic variables (Table 4A-3). The model with the best 
holdout sample classification accuracy is retained. Where there are two models with the 
identical classification accuracy the model with the higher Kappa is chosen. 
Table A4-3: Accuracies of Models with One Linguistic Variable (Committee Model 1) 
 
*p<.01 
The accuracies of the Law, Parlage, Arts and IMG model and the Law Parlage 
Arts and CONAV  models are the same at 74.07% but the Kappa of the latter is 
marginally higher at .4822 while that of the former is .4793. As such the CONAV  
model is selected.  
Model Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Kappa
Law, Parlage, Arts, IMG 74.07 78.57 69.23 0.48*
Law, Parlage, Arts, CON 66.67 64.29 69.23 0.33  
Law, Parlage, Arts, CONAV 74.07 71.43 76.92 0.48*
Law, Parlage, Arts, DEF 62.96 42.86 84.62 0.27  
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The next stage is to create models consisting of all possible combinations of 
CONAV, Law. Parlage and Arts. The Optimum model is the one with the highest 
classification accuracy or Kappa (Table 4A-4). 
Table A4-4: Accuracies - All Possible Variable Combinations (Committee Model 1) 
 
The highest score is 74.07% for the model consisting of Law and Parlage. The 
Kappa of the Law and Parlage model is .4850 which is marginally higher than the 
Kappa of the Law, Parlage and CONAV  model. As such the Law, Parlage model is the 
optimum model.  
The final stage is to calculate the parameter estimates for the Optimum Model. 
Table A4-5: Parameter Estimates for the Optimum Model (Committee Model 1) 
 
Model Variables Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity    Kappa p
Law, Parlage 74.07 64.29 84.62 0.49 0.0098
Law, Parlage, Conav 74.07 71.43 76.92 0.48 0.0120
Arts, Conav, Law 70.37 64.29 76.92 0.41 0.0313
Law, Conav 66.67 50.00 84.62 0.34 0.0566
Law, Parlage, Arts 66.67 64.29 69.23 0.33 0.0816
Parlage, Arts, Conav 62.96 57.14 69.23 0.26 0.1682
Law,Arts 59.26 35.71 84.62 0.20 0.2284
Parlage, Conav 59.26 57.14 61.54 0.19 0.3317
Parlage, Arts 55.56 57.14 53.85 0.11 0.5680
Arts, Conav 51.85 50.00 53.85 0.04 0.8416
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Table A4-6: Odds Ratios (Committee Model 1) 
 
 
Details of the four other models in the committee follow: 
 
Committee Model 2 
Holdout Sample: 
AndersonJ BishopJI CollinsRL McGauranP WillamsDR 
AndrewsK BurkeAT DraperP McLachlanIM WillisR 
AnthonyL Burns, Bryant GillardJ McLeayL WorthP 
BairdB  CampbellIG HowardJ MorrisA  
BarresiP CausleyIR LangmoreJ MorrisP  
BartlettK CoatesJ McClellandR ParerW  
 





Table A4-7: Variables for which p<.01 (Committee Model 2) 
 
“Naïve” Model Performance: 
Accuracy = 77.78; Sensitivity = 64.29; Specificity = 92.31, Kappa = .5598 
(p=.0023). 




Law 0.15 0.46 0.000
DEF 0.25 -0.35 0.001
CON 0.26 -0.33 0.002
ParlAge 42.09 38.13 0.002
Arts 0.26 0.54 0.004
IMG 0.23 -0.31 0.004
CONAV 0.24 -0.32 0.004
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Table A4-9: Accuracies of Models with One Linguistic Variable (Committee Model 2) 
 
Table A4-10: Accuracies - All Possible Variable Combinations (Committee Model 2) 
 
Table A4-11: Parameter Estimates for the Optimum Model (Committee Model 2) 
 
Table A4-12: Odds Ratios (Committee Model 2) 
 
Model Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Kappa
Law, Parlage, Arts, IMG 85.19 78.57 92.31 0.70**
Law, Parlage, Arts, CON 81.48 71.43 92.31 0.63**
Law, Parlage, Arts, DEF 77.78 64.29 92.31 0.56**
Law, Parlage, Arts, CONAV 81.48 71.43 92.31 0.63**
Model Variables Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity    Kappa p
Law, Parlage, IMG 85.19 78.57 92.31 0.70 0.0002
Parlage, IMG 74.07 64.29 84.62 0.49 0.0098
Law, Parlage 77.78 78.57 76.92 0.55 0.0039
Law, IMG 81.48 64.29 100.00 n/a* n/a*
Law, Parlage, Arts 70.37 64.29 76.92 0.41 0.0313
Arts, IMG, Law 81.48 64.29 100.00 n/a* n/a*
Law,Arts 70.37 71.43 69.23 0.41 0.0346
Arts, IMG 74.07 64.29 84.62 0.49 0.0098
Parlage, Arts 59.26 64.29 53.85 0.18 0.3434
Parlage, Arts, IMG 74.07 71.43 76.92 0.48 0.0120




Committee Model 3 
Holdout Sample: 
BartlettK DraperP HerronJJ MorrisP VanstoneA 
BrownBJ EvansG JonesB  ProsserG WakelinB 
CameronRA FaulknerJP JullD  SharpJR WongP 
CarrK  FerrisJ  KempD SinclairI  
CreanS GallusC LloydJ  TierneyJW  
DownerA GarrettP MacklinJ TrussW  
 
Table A4-13: Variables for which p<.01 (Committee Model 3) 
 
“Naïve” Model Performance: 
Mean Mean
Non-CMs CMs p-value
Law 0.11 0.48 0.000
IMG 0.41 -0.24 0.000
CON 0.36 -0.24 0.001
Parlage 42.17 38.15 0.003
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Accuracy = 70.37; Sensitivity = 71.43; Specificity = 69.23, Kappa = .4066 
(p=.0346). 
Table A4-14: Intercorrelations between Variables (Committee Model 3) 
 
Table A4-15: Accuracies of Models with One Linguistic Variable (Committee Model 3) 
 
Table A4-16: Accuracies - All Possible Variable Combinations (Committee Model 3) 
 
Table A4-17: Parameter Estimates for the Optimum Model (Committee Model 3) 
 
Model Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Kappa
Law, Parlage, IMG 70.37 71.43 69.23 0.41*
Law, Parlage, CON 74.07 71.43 76.92 0.48*
Model Variables Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity    Kappa p
Law, Parlage, Con 74.07 71.43 76.92 0.48 0.0120
Parlage, Con 77.78 71.43 84.62 0.56 0.0034
Law, Parlage 70.37 64.29 76.92 0.41 0.0313
Law, Con 74.07 71.43 76.92 0.48 0.0120
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Table A4-18: Odds Ratios (Committee Model 3) 
 
 
Committee Model 4 
Holdout Sample: 
AndersonJ ColstonM HowardJ ProsserG TierneyJW 
AndrewJN CoonanH JonesB  ReidME VaileM 
BarresiP CostelloP LeeM  ReithP  WooldridgeMRL 
Beasleyk EntchW McArthurFS RuddockP  
BeddallD EvansG McLeayL SwanW  
BurkeAT FergusonM ParerW TheophanousA 
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Table A4-19: Variables for which p<.01 (Committee Model 4) 
 
“Naïve” Model Performance: 
Accuracy = 74.04; Sensitivity = 64.29; Specificity = 84.62, Kappa = .4850 
(p=.0098). 




Law 0.11 0.48 0.000
CON 0.25 -0.38 0.001
IMG 0.26 -0.36 0.001
CONAV 0.25 -0.35 0.002
Arts 0.25 0.52 0.003
DEF 0.19 -0.36 0.004
ParlAge 42.83 38.98 0.006
AOA -0.19 0.31 0.010
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Table A4-21: Accuracies of Models with One Linguistic Variable (Committee Model 4) 
 
None of the linguistic variables adds to classification accuracy so they are all 
excluded. 
Table A4-22: Accuracies - All Possible Variable Combinations (Committee Model 4) 
 
Table A4-23: Parameter Estimates for the Optimum Model (Committee Model 4) 
 
Table A4-24: Odds Ratios (Committee Model 4) 
 
Model Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Kappa
Law, Parlage, Arts, IMG 70.37 64.29 76.92 0.41*  
Law, Parlage, Arts, CON 70.37 71.43 69.23 0.41*  
Law, Parlage, Arts, DEF 70.37 64.29 76.92 0.41*  
Law, Parlage, Arts, CONAV 74.07 64.29 84.62 0.49**
Law, Parlage, Arts, AOA 74.07 64.29 84.62 0.49**
Model Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity  Kappa
Law, Parlage, Arts 70.37 78.57 61.54 0.40*  
Law, Parlage 81.48 78.57 84.62 0.63**
Law, Arts 62.96 71.43 53.85 0.25     
Parlage, Arts 66.67 85.71 46.15 0.32     




Committee Model 5 
Holdout Sample: 
AnthonyL CostelloP HoldingC MorrisP TierneyJW 
BartlettK CreanS HollisC RuddockP TrussW 
BeddallD EntchW JonesB  SmithSF WakelinB 
CampbellIG EvansC McGauranP TannerL  
CoatesJ EvansG McKiernanJ TheophanousA  
CookP  FaheyJ  MilesC ThomsonAP  
Table A4-25: Variables for which p<.01 (Committee Model 5) 
 
Performance of “Naïve” Model 
Mean Mean
Non-CMs CMs p-value
CON 0.41 -0.34 0.000
Law 0.11 0.44 0.000
ParlAge 43.17 38.31 0.000
IMG 0.39 -0.27 0.001
DEF 0.32 -0.23 0.002
Arts 0.26 0.54 0.004
CONAV 0.34 -0.16 0.009
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Accuracy = 66.67; Sensitivity = 64.29; Specificity = 69.23, Kappa = .3342 
(p=.0816). 
Table A4-26: Intercorrelations between Variables (Committee Model 5) 
 
Table A4-27: Accuracies of Models with One Linguistic Variable (Committee Model 5) 
 
Table A4-28: Accuracies - All Possible Variable Combinations (Committee Model 5) 
 
Model Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Kappa
Law, Parlage, Arts, IMG 66.67 71.43 61.54 0.33  
Law, Parlage, Arts, CON 62.96 64.29 61.54 0.26  
Law, Parlage, Arts, DEF 66.67 64.29 69.23 0.33  
Law, Parlage, Arts, CONAV 62.96 71.43 53.85 0.25  
Model Variables Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity    Kappa p
Law, Parlage, DEF 62.96 78.57 46.15 0.25 0.1733
Parlage, DEF 62.96 71.43 53.85 0.25 0.1817
Law, Parlage 66.67 78.57 53.85 0.33 0.0814
Law, DEF 74.07 64.29 84.62 0.49 0.0098
Law, Parlage, Arts 70.37 71.43 69.23 0.41 0.0346
Arts, DEF, Law 70.37 71.43 69.23 0.41 0.0346
Law,Arts 70.37 71.43 69.23 0.41 0.0346
Arts, DEF 70.37 71.43 69.23 0.41 0.0346
Parlage, Arts 51.85 57.14 46.15 0.03 0.8632
Parlage, Arts, DEF 59.26 71.43 46.15 0.18 0.3445









Table A4-30: Odds Ratios (Committee Model 5) 
 
 
 
